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THE NEW COMMONWEALTH—WILL IT ENDURE?

By V. K. R. V. RAO

INTRODUCTORY

THE Commonwealth Conference which met in Bigwin Island from 7 to 17 September 1949 was, like its three predecessors, an unofficial meeting, delegates having been selected by Institutes of International Affairs in the various Dominions; India's delegates were selected by the Indian Council of World Affairs. But unlike the previous sessions, this Conference was notable for the fact that three new Dominions were now participating, and all of them were from Asia. Another notable feature was the participation of a non-member viz. the Irish Republic. Ireland had not only become a republic but had also ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth; the fact that she was nevertheless present at this unofficial Conference and indeed was very welcome is perhaps a significant pointer to the nature of the ties that link together Great Britain and her ex-colonies which had by now grown into sovereign nations. The Canadian Institute acted as hosts and set up standards of hospitality that it is not possible for any other Institute to emulate. The setting for the Conference was lovely beyond description, for we met in a little island in one of Canada's beautiful lakes, and all of us were housed in the same hotel. The contacts established outside the Conference hours proved one of the most attractive features of this session.

I

The main task before the Conference was an examination of the position of the member nations in the context of the post-war world and the extent to which mutual consultation, organization or aid was either possible or even desirable. There were certain fundamental changes which had overtaken the world and the Commonwealth in particular, and it was important that the effect of these should be assessed on both the individual position of the Commonwealth countries, and intra-Commonwealth relations. There also was the further question as to whether the Commonwealth as such had now any positive future in view of these post-war developments.

Among the most important of these developments was the emergence of the three Asian Dominions of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. This meant that more than 400 million people, whose foreign policy had hitherto rested in the hands of the United Kingdom and therefore, to some extent also with the self-governing Dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, were now free to determine their own foreign policy, enter into alliances with non-members of the Commonwealth, and remain neutral in any future war in which the rest of the Commonwealth may become engaged. It also meant that the resources, territorial, economic, and human, of these three new Dominions were no longer automatically available to the United Kingdom; it also meant

a yawning gap in the defence of U.K. possessions and Commonwealth interests in Africa, Asia, and Australia, and new problems in the realm of strategy in the Middle East, Indian Ocean, and Pacific regions. The attitude and relationship of these new Dominions, especially the key Dominion of India, to the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth become therefore a crucial factor in determining the future of the Commonwealth.

Another, and perhaps equally important post-war development is the comparatively weaker position of the United Kingdom in both the military and economic spheres. Militarily, the United Kingdom no longer commands bases or armies in India and Pakistan, and her position in Ceylon is not vitally different. Her ability therefore to defend her possessions in Asia or Africa or preserve friendly régimes in the Middle East or come to the assistance of Australia and New Zealand in the event of war with a major power is enormously reduced compared to her pre-war position; and her straitened economic circumstances will compel her to reduce the portion of her domestic resources which she can spend on arms and equipment. Economically, the United Kingdom is no longer able to balance her economy. During the three and half years ending 30 June 1949, the net demand on Britain's monetary reserves has been of the order of £1,912 millions; as much as £1,527 millions of this amount has been met by loans and gifts from the U.S.A. and Canada; the I.M. F. contributed £100 millions, South Africa gave a loan of £80 millions, and the rest has been met by withdrawal from reserves. And yet, the balance of payments continues to be a constant headache; and recently the United Kingdom has had to resort to the desperate expedient of devaluation. Great Britain is hard put to maintain her existing standard of living; and she is no longer in a position to make large investments in the Commonwealth areas nor even in her remaining imperial possessions. In brief, the United Kingdom is no longer the military and economic bulwark of the Commonwealth that she was in the pre-war period; on the contrary she has to lean more and more on outside help, both from within and without the Commonwealth.

Closely allied with this factor is the emergence of the United States as the dominant world power. The United Kingdom herself is heavily dependent on the United States for her economic requirements, and the 'dollar gap' continues to be her chief problem. With the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, she has become dependent on the United States also for military aid, especially in regard to some costly items of equipment. No doubt, the Atlantic Pact is presumably based on equality of the Atlantic powers; but the chief partner is undoubtedly the U.S.A. Canada is increasingly getting integrated with American economy, and has also the closest possible relations with the U.S.A. in the military field; while Australia and New Zealand, after the experience of the last war, tend to look more to the U.S.A. than to the U.K. for their safety; while India and Pakistan still continue to get their supplies of arms and equipment from the U.K., they are increasingly inclined to look towards the U.S.A. for economic aid. Thus, the United States has become an important factor in regard to the problems of both defence and economics in the Commonwealth. In a sense, one can already perceive leadership in the Common-

wealth slipping away from the hands of the U.K. and gravitating into those of the U.S.A.

Another factor, yet more closely allied with the two factors mentioned above, is the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major world power, and the growing threat which the non-communist nations see both in Soviet expansionism and in world communism. The United Kingdom is particularly concerned, because she sees in Soviet expansion the final collapse of her traditional balance of power policy on the European continent, while the onward march of world communism menaces her imperial possessions in both Africa and Asia. Canada, seeing herself as the Soviet gateway to the United States, is deeply concerned with the Soviet menace. South Africa, with her colour problem, is most sensitive to the menace of a dynamic communism that both preaches and practices the abolition of all racial inequalities. India and Pakistan are also afraid of the threat to their internal stability contained in the growth of their local communist movements; and the recent success of the Communist Party in China adds to this threat. The shadow of the Soviet Union and communism thus lengthens over the Commonwealth, and how to meet it has become one of its major problems.

It is clear from the foregoing account that Commonwealth countries, both individually as well as in common, find themselves faced with fundamental changes; and how to act in the face of these changes formed obviously the most important topic for discussion at this conference.

II

There was considerable discussion on the subject of Commonwealth foreign policies, the menace of communism, the Atlantic Pact and the Council of Europe, and attitude to U.N.O. It was agreed that, in view of the sovereign status of the different Dominions and their differing regional interests, it would not be possible to have a common foreign policy. Generally speaking, Great Britain, Canada, and South Africa adopted a conservative attitude in their foreign policy, and showed themselves more interested in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean. South Africa was interested in the Indian Ocean, but had no positive foreign policy. India, Pakistan and Ceylon were more interested in the Middle East and in East Asia, and had a positive and progressive policy; while Australia was interested both in the Pacific and Indian oceans and attempted a positive and, on the whole, progressive rôle in foreign affairs. New Zealand had interests similar to Australia's, but took a rather negative and on the whole, somewhat conservative line. Great Britain, of course, was interested in the Middle East, in Asia, and in the Pacific region, but lacked initiative and a positive approach, and tended towards conservatism in these regions. The two outposts of the Commonwealth, viz. Canada and Australia, did not suffer from much conflict or ambiguity in their foreign policy; but Great Britain clearly revealed in her attitude the doubts and the absence of certainty induced by her dual rôle as a European and a Commonwealth power. Above all, there was the proclaimed attitude of dynamic neutrality on the part of India which gave a combined headache both to the western and

eastern parts of the Commonwealth on either side of her. The western section of the Commonwealth was anxious that India should definitely commit herself on their side in the event of a future war, but were not concerned to pay more than lip service to her sentiments of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism. The eastern part of the Commonwealth was equally anxious that India should play a positive rôle in maintaining her line of communications with its western counterpart, but was not prepared to resist racial distinctions nor give up her 'white' policy. As one Australian delegate put it, 'we Australians are of the west, but not in it; we are in the east, but not of it.' It was difficult to make the white section of the Commonwealth realize that there could be no unity of outlook in foreign policy unless it included both anti-colonialism and anti-racialism as its integral features.

The same impatience, combined with the same difficulty of understanding a different position, was displayed by the Anglo-Saxon members of the Commonwealth in regard to the attitude of the Asian Dominions, especially India, towards the division of the world into the East-West blocs. Again and again, it was pointed out by the Asian Dominions that the menace of communism in their countries was primarily rooted in their inadequate economic development and in the low standard of living of their peoples, and that what was required was economic rather than military action. It was also pointed out that, given the comparative lack of industrialization in their economies and the low standard of living of their peoples, it would be inviting disaster for these countries to take sides in the cold war; liberation no doubt, would come eventually, but what was certain was immediate annihilation. As one Indian delegate remarked, 'what would be the attitude of Canada towards taking sides in a 'cold' or 'hot' war, if the U.S.A. was ranged against the U.K.?' A *sine qua non* for the abandonment of neutrality by the Asian Dominions would be their economic, if not military, preparedness to face war with a major power; and yet there was not much inclination to accept the practical implications of this fact in the foreign economic policies of that part of the Commonwealth which clamoured most for the abandonment of this neutrality. At best, the answer was to ask the Asian Dominions to go to the U.S.A. for help. If this was all that the Commonwealth could do, how could one expect these new Dominions to think of arrangements common with the older Dominions and their mother country in the realm of either defence and strategy or of foreign policy? Quite frankly, I do not think that this question was faced squarely by the Conference, though it was not for want of effort on the part of the Asian Dominions.

The major subject of discussion was the economic position of the United Kingdom. Her balance of payments difficulties and her continued dollar shortage in spite of austerity and controls, U.S. and Canadian loans, and Marshall aid, came in for considerable criticism. It was remarkable—and at the same time, struck me as a little tragic—how the mother country came in for such strong criticism at the hands of her eldest daughter. The Canadian delegates, almost without a dissenting voice, took strong exception to the nationalizations and expanded expenditure on social services that constituted

the economic record of Britain's Labour Government; and they drew pointed attention to the importance of the U.S.A. and hinted rather nebulously at the implications this should have for Britain's economic policy. Behind it all was of course the sentiment and regard which a daughter has for her mother; the daughter's voice had also a slight but noticeable ring of authority as befitting one who was now in a position to give material aid to her mother and had, in fact, been doing so. Britain's so-called 'unrequited exports', incurred in repayment of her sterling debt, came in for specific criticism; and in this the other non-Asian Dominions also joined, as well as some prominent members of the British delegation. The attitude thus displayed was typical of the lack of understanding of the economic position of the Asian Dominions, and the relevance of this position even for the solution of the problems which particularly worried the non-Asian members such as the menace of communism and the ability of the new Dominions to fill up the strategic vacuum in the Indian Ocean caused by the abdication of British power in that area. It therefore became necessary for an Indian delegate to explain the Indian view on sterling balances and the allied problem of 'unrequited exports'. The subject is so important that I think it worth while quoting from the summary records of the session. I quote:

An Indian speaker explained the problem of sterling balances as seen by India, Pakistan and Ceylon. It should be remembered that over many years there had been an export of commodities to the United Kingdom without a corresponding return flow of commodities. There had also been an export of services and returns on investments. In the period 1931-1938 India sent very large quantities of gold, amounting to several hundred million dollars, to the United Kingdom to help maintain sterling. Most of this gold ended up in the Bank of England. He quoted the Bank for International Settlements for the view that India had in this way given considerable assistance. The sterling balances built up during the war were not only the result of expenditures for Indian armies but also in good part a return for commodities such as food, clothing and metals sold to the other allies. During the war, from August 1939 to March 1946, India had a net surplus of \$342 million which went into the sterling pool and became part of the sterling balances.

This, the Indian delegate continued, was a very important point for the Commonwealth. He thought that the effect of war finance on the Indian economy had not been sufficiently appreciated by United Kingdom economists. The inflation resulting from war finance was much higher than in the other Dominions. For example, the general price level stood at 380 compared to the pre-war figure. The cost of living index was between 350 and 400 in the cities. During the war there was over-utilization of India's limited capital reserves. For example, mills worked three shifts, railway transportation was over-used and there was a serious problem created by the deterioration of locomotives. In confirmation of this, he cited the report of a mission from the International Bank, which had been very impressed by the damage to India's capital resulting from the war. Unfortunately, (in one sense) India had not been occupied, her cities had not been destroyed and she had not therefore qualified for UNRRA help in reconstruction.

The delegate pointed to some considerations which should be borne in mind with reference to unrequited exports. There was no doubt that these exports were a strain on the United Kingdom economy and Indian economists and the public were not unaware of the strain. But it was nothing in comparison to the equivalent strain on India during the war. Equipment was desperately needed by India merely to get back to her pre-war position. He thought this was not always appreciated in other countries of the Commonwealth outside of Asia. On the other hand, not only was there no ignorance in India of the strain on the United Kingdom, there was tremendous appreciation of the United Kingdom's efforts. India realized that the United Kingdom was trying its best to release sterling balances and help India. Unfortunately India had the particular problem of food which made her position worse.

It is satisfactory to record that a delegate from the United Kingdom responded immediately by conceding the Indian case to a large extent and stated 'All serious opinion in the United Kingdom recognized the Indian view of the consequences of rundown equipment and shortage of capital. The United Kingdom realized it had a responsibility and a very strong moral liability to enable some part of the balances to be drawn for capital purchases.' In spite of this handsome admission, I gathered the impression that delegates were more concerned with the consequences of this partial repayment on the economy of the United Kingdom rather than on the economies of the three Asian Dominions; and that, in a sense, describes the magnitude of the problem facing the new Commonwealth in adjusting itself to the entry of its three new members.

The increasing tendency of the United Kingdom to turn towards Western Europe and go in for a measure of politico-economic integration with that part of the world also came in for discussion, and specific criticism at the hands of the Asian members. The Asian delegates, who took somewhat seriously the membership of their countries in the Commonwealth, pointed to the imperialistic character of some of these countries in Western Europe and expressed surprise that the United Kingdom, which was gradually liquidating its own imperial commitments, should now be tending to underwrite other colonial empires. It was also pointed out that, generally speaking, political and economic tendencies in ruling circles in Western Europe were somewhat reactionary, and intimate association with them by the United Kingdom may lead to a set-back in her liberal and progressive attitude, which constituted so large a part of her hold on the rest of the Commonwealth. On the part of the British delegates, there was displayed considerable uneasiness on the dual pull of the Commonwealth and Western Europe and I, for one, could not see how an agreeable compromise between the two was possible, especially if the entry of the new Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth was going to have any meaning.

Another subject for discussion at the Conference was the menace of communism and of Russia. There was no doubt that this was an overriding factor in the minds of all sections of the British delegation, labour, conservative

as well as liberal; and similar was the case with both the Canadian and South African delegations. The Australians were somewhat more restrained in the expression of their opinion on this subject, but there could be no doubting the fundamental similarity of their position with that of their English-speaking fellow-Dominions and the mother country. A Pakistan delegate calmly denied any possibility of communist troubles in his country on the ground that Islam was fundamentally opposed to communism, while a Ceylonese delegate drew pointed attention to the increasing influence of communist ideology among the island's University students. An Indian delegate admitted the existence of the communist threat in India but asserted that it had been effectively contained by his Government which was strongly anti-communist and had, in this regard, the overwhelming support of its people. On the whole, it would be true to say that there was Commonwealth unity of outlook on non-acceptance of the communist pattern of life and government, and resistance to any attempt to impose such an order on their peoples. There was, however, a good deal of difference in the approach towards meeting this problem. The United Kingdom and the senior Dominions viewed it primarily as a military problem and seemed to think that arms, equipment, and co-ordinated strategy would suffice; they, therefore, were somewhat impatient with the new Asian Dominions who were not willing to fall in line. The Asian Dominions, on the other hand, were convinced that there was little they could do to meet this menace on a military plane without granting bases or having foreign forces on their soil, and this was hardly possible for peoples who had won their freedom such a short while ago, whose current relations of friendliness with the United Kingdom and the senior Dominions were still somewhat mixed with memories of past conflicts, and who had yet to find that unity of action with the Commonwealth that was already a part of the political inheritance of the senior Dominions. Moreover, the Asian Dominions knew where the shoe pinched them most; they were well aware that even military resistance presupposed continued and overwhelming domestic support, and the continuance of domestic support presupposed at least a partial solution of their economic problems and a significant improvement in the standards of living of their peoples. Hungry stomachs and naked bodies were more responsive to the communist lure of a new heaven and a new earth than were well-fed stomachs and well-clad bodies. Hence their answer to the communist menace demanded action primarily in the economic field. This point was repeatedly made by the delegates of the Asian Dominions; and while it made some impression, I cannot honestly feel that it went home. I am compelled to say this because of the comparative inability on the part of the senior Dominions and a number of U.K. delegates to appreciate the significance of sterling balances for the Asian Dominions, their obvious reluctance to discuss the possibility of Commonwealth assistance for the economic development of these under-developed areas, and the suggestion, quite seriously made by one of these delegates, that India and Pakistan, besides themselves, should share in England's defence expenditure. In fairness, I must add that a partial explanation of this attitude was the weaker economic position of the United Kingdom, an understandable

sentimental interest in the economic health of their mother country on the part of these Dominions, and their natural concern with the problems of their own growing economies.

III

Another important question discussed at this Conference was the strained relationship between some of the Dominions. The two main cases were Indo-Pakistan relations, and the relations between South Africa on the one hand, and India and Pakistan on the other. As far as the first was concerned, it was raised by Pakistan, and the usual arguments were put forward with regard to Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad, condition of Indian Muslims, and water rights. Pakistani delegates expressed disappointment that the other Commonwealth countries had not intervened in the dispute and suggested that this attitude seriously impaired the utility of the Commonwealth. The Indian delegates had decided that this was not the place to ventilate grievances against Pakistan which only the other day had been a part of India; but one of them pointed out that intervention by the Commonwealth could not be countenanced by India. As far as India was concerned, the only member of the Commonwealth she really knew well was the United Kingdom, and while her relations with the United Kingdom were cordial and friendly, her experience of the United Kingdom in respect of the treatment of the Hindu-Muslim question in pre-partition India was not such as to induce in her any considerable faith in England's impartiality in this matter; in fact, the United Kingdom still suffered from the influence of the Englishmen who had, over a period of four decades, taken every opportunity to stimulate and sustain Hindu-Muslim differences; even to-day many people in England seemed to regard Indo-Pakistan relations as a continuation of the old Hindu-Muslim relations and wanted to view the Kashmir question from this angle, forgetting the fact that partition had left as Indian citizens a population over 40 million Muslims, that India was now a secular State and could not any longer accept the two-nation theory based on religion nor proceed on the assumption that every Muslim, including the Kashmiri Muslim, was, *ipso facto*, anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani. In fact, but for the English ruler's policy of *divide et impera*, there would have been no Pakistan in the Indian continent. Not that Hindus and Muslims have no differences; but there are also differences between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians; and there are differences between Afrikans-speaking and English-speaking South Africans. Wisdom and genuine regard for the development of a spirit of national unity would have led to a policy of stimulating points of unity and discouraging points of difference on the part of the English ruler in India. Anyway, there is no use dwelling on the past; but the past has its significance in this that the Indian Government and its people cannot so easily accept Britain as an arbitrator, when they are still uncertain about how far she has shed the attitude of regarding Hindus and Muslims as constituting two different nationalities, merely by virtue of their different religions. As for the other members of the Commonwealth, India did not really know them as yet; they had not played any significant part in her liberation, even by way of moral support; and they had no real knowledge of Indian con-

ditions or of Indian history. India could not therefore possibly entrust the Kashmir dispute to their arbitration either. The Kashmir dispute appeared insoluble at the moment, but only India and Pakistan could solve it by their mutual effort. As the Indian delegate said:

The Indian people accepted Pakistan as a fact, and looked forward to the time when India and Pakistan would perhaps be the two most powerful countries in Asia, besides China. They had much in common, not only in their attitude towards imperialism and racial discrimination but even in their outlook which among the educated classes had been shaped in the same institutions. His own opinion was that when the events of the past three or four years had faded out, those in power in both countries would be able to state the facts before their own peoples and that both countries would be able to solve their problems and work out a full military alliance. The fullest bilateral defence agreement would still allow them to remain independent of the two world blocs. While he did not want to gloss over the differences, he thought that the influences of geography, economics and strategy, the emergence of a communist China, and the links between influential people in both countries would eventually lead to a solution. Leading people in India and Pakistan were getting tired and alarmed at their defence expenditures and the stultifying of the influence of their countries in the world. The solution could not come from the United Kingdom, or the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth had to prove itself before it could contribute. For the time being India did not want Commonwealth interference. Good sense and the logic of geography should be allowed full play.

Enlightened opinion in both countries saw the evil consequences of creating a Franco-Prussian situation in the Indian continent, and were beginning to work for an Indo-Pakistan relationship that would be more analogous to that existing between the United States and Canada.

One of the Pakistani delegates had referred to Pakistan's concern with the condition of Indian Muslims. In view of the importance of this question to the final settlement of Indo-Pakistan differences, it is worthwhile quoting the observations of a distinguished Muslim member of the Indian delegation who replied to the Pakistani delegate. I quote from the precis report of the conference :

A member of the *Indian* delegation made some observations on the position of Muslims in India, in the context of the remarks on citizenship and sovereignty made by members of the United Kingdom and Canadian delegations. The matter was treated lightly before partition, with what motive he did not know, and no answer had been given to the question except the ugly one that the presence of Hindus in Pakistan would ensure good treatment of Muslims in India. Now that India had been partitioned, the government and people of Pakistan seemed to have the Indian Muslims on their conscience. But as an Indian Muslim, he could say that there was no love and no sympathy behind the professions of concern which one heard from Pakistan. These professions were just a stick to beat the Indian Government with, which would be thrown away when it was no longer needed. He feared that before it was thrown away it would break. Partition must be accepted absolutely. Indian Muslims were Indian nationals and in no way a concern of Pakistan. A Pakistan delegate had referred to the development of reactionary movements

in India. There were such movements, but he wanted to ask the Pakistan delegate and other delegates whether the movements would become more anti-Muslim or less, and whether the Indian Government could remain as secular as it wanted to be, if the treatment of Indian Muslims continued to be used thoughtlessly and unscrupulously as a platform for agitation. Indian Muslims were now nothing more nor less than Indian citizens. They were not being patted or petted and they must face their new situation like men, for it was only as men and as citizens willing to co-operate with their fellow citizens and to serve their State to the utmost that they could make a significant contribution to Indian life. His personal experience showed that there was no lack of opportunities if Muslims realized the implications of citizenship. He pointed out that there were Muslim officials in many civilian and service administrations and in educational institutions where men and women of all religions studied side by side and he knew of more than one institution which was popular with refugees from Pakistan who had the greatest reason to hate and distrust Muslims. His own institution had trained 150 refugees as teachers in the last year and very recently the education of children in a refugee camp of 18,000 had been entrusted entirely to his institution. He thought these few instances were significant. The Indian Government had little experience and the tasks before it were stupendous. There was discontent, but it was not confined to Muslims. Indian Muslims were in duty bound to join in building up the life of the nation and they should not now be turned away from a duty which he knew they were competent to perform. They should not be distracted nor deceived.

There was also some discussion on the differences between South Africa and India-Pakistan. Both the Indian and Pakistani delegations sedulously refrained from participating in the debate, for they had already made clear their attitude to the question of racial discrimination, and the treatment of Indians in South Africa was only one part—one in which they had no doubt an especial sentimental interest of this wider question. It remained for a distinguished Liberal lady member of the British delegation to arraign South Africa for her treatment of the racial problem; and she was strongly supported by another British delegate, who had considerable experience of colonial administration in Africa. Some of the other members of the British delegation as well as the delegations of the senior Dominions maintained an uneasy silence. It was clear to me that the Commonwealth Conference was profoundly disturbed not so much over the evils of racial discrimination as such, but over the effect that this was having on the Asian Dominions and, even more, on the stimulus it gave to the spread of communism in Africa. As the British lady member put it, South Africa, by its attitude, was 'rolling out the red carpet'; and yet the Commonwealth did not feel sufficiently unified to take a stand on the question or assert as one of the conditions of Commonwealth membership the denial of racial discrimination.

Some time was also spent on the subject of the partition of Ireland. The Irish delegates spoke feelingly on the subject; and an equally emotional reply was given by the delegate from North Ireland. Perhaps this letting off of steam was done as a matter of routine; perhaps there lay behind it, on the part of the Irish delegation, a distant hope that the Commonwealth would solve

the problem that the United Kingdom had been unable to solve. Anyway it did something to liven up the Conference, and everybody felt better at the end of the debate. But no more concrete result was produced than there was in the ventilation of differences between other Commonwealth countries.

IV

Finally, came the question of what significance there was, if any, in this new Commonwealth. Differences had been expressed, some based on geography, some on history, and some on racial and cultural ties. There had been a certain failure on the part of the senior Dominions fully to understand the position of their Asian colleagues and the rôle that the latter could play in Commonwealth and in world affairs; and there was a general unwillingness on their part to accept any new obligations arising out of the addition of the Asian Dominions. And equally, there must have appeared to the senior Dominions an apparent unwillingness to share in the obligations of Commonwealth membership in the realms of defence and strategy, and an undue tendency to harp on their own problems, on the part of the new Asian Dominions. Everybody shied away from any proposal for a Commonwealth Secretariat or a unified Commonwealth policy in any field; and yet there was no doubt that there was a Commonwealth. One had only to be present at this Conference and take part in its discussions, both formal and informal, to realize that one was not merely attending an international conference. The whole atmosphere was different, and significantly so. Every one was friendly; every one was anxious to learn from the other; and even when there were differences, these were expressed in a restrained and dignified manner, and there was no attempt at mud-slinging. Nobody questioned anybody else's *bona fides*, and everybody was anxious to find points of agreement with the other and evolve a constructive approach to problems of common interest. The Commonwealth undoubtedly meant something to every delegation, and we all felt that we belonged. How did this happen?

The explanation no longer could be the Crown. India had decided to become a republic, and was yet a full member of the Commonwealth; and all the other members welcomed her membership. In fact, it was surprising to see how little the Crown seemed to matter as the unifying link for the Commonwealth even among the older Dominions. One distinguished Canadian delegate took mild issue with a United Kingdom speaker regarding the feeling in that country about the need for some symbol. 'Was that really the United Kingdom view' he asked, 'Was a symbol really necessary?' He continued. 'The Crown caused no difficulty in Canada, but there were other countries that would find a symbol difficult to accept.' And he went on to say that a point of attraction could be found in special citizenship provisions for fellow members of the Commonwealth. At any rate, it was clear that the link that bound the Commonwealth countries was no longer the Crown.

Nor could the link be common ancestry or ties of race or of religion, or even of culture, when the Commonwealth included as full members countries like India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. The real point of contact between the Common-

wealth countries lay, as was pointed out repeatedly both by Asian and non-Asian delegates, in their common acceptance of British concepts of parliamentary government and democratic rule. As was stated by the Hon'ble Mr. Brooke Claxton, Canadian Minister of National Defence, who inaugurated the Conference, 'The members of the Commonwealth have a feeling of community because, irrespective of their origins, they seek their security and their happiness in the framework of the reign of law and with the assistance of parliamentary institutions.' The point was especially made by an Indian delegate that, on the whole and in spite of some of the blemishes on its imperial record, the United Kingdom had been a progressive force in world affairs. Whenever and wherever a wrong was committed or an injustice done, there was always an Englishman who would raise his voice in protest, even if his be a lonely voice and did not command the support of the majority of his countrymen. There was no attempt at regimentation or suppression of different views on the part of authority in England. Britain had always been the home of non-conformists, and the non-conformists had an honoured place in British society. It was this liberal tradition of England, said the Indian delegate, which attracted him and people like him to accept, and indeed support, India's continued membership in the Commonwealth. But the Indian delegate pointed out that this alone was not enough to ensure the continuance of the new Commonwealth. As a Pakistani delegate had stated, the ruling classes in the Asian Dominions were trained in British institutions, knew the English language, and shared most of the liberal and parliamentary ideals emanating from the United Kingdom; but the vast masses of these countries were steeped so much in poverty and so engrossed with the struggle for bare existence that these fine sentiments could not mean the same thing to them. These masses expected from the classes who now exercised political authority in their countries a substantial contribution towards the improvement of their economic condition and living standards. What was the Commonwealth going to do in this matter? An Indian delegate followed up his Pakistani colleague and was more specific. It may be useful to quote from the precis report of the Conference:

The question was what could the Commonwealth do? Financial aid was difficult for all except Canada, although we all expected maintenance of the present policy of making sterling balances available for investment. But provision of capital was not the only way to help. He suggested the application of Mr. Truman's point 4 as an intra-Commonwealth point 4. He expressed, with diffidence, the opinion that some kind of Commonwealth machinery might be set up which would take an interest in and watch over the economic development of the Asian Dominions. Also, the Commonwealth had large supplies of technical resources. Although there was a trend towards the United States, India was still positively linked with United Kingdom technology. He drew attention to three ways of helping India set out, in one of the data papers submitted by the Indian delegation. They were:—

(a) Technical missions. Indians knew the British and the British knew Indians. They could work with the British and it was easier to accept help from them than from others.

(b) Technical training. The Commonwealth could assist if it first examined the problem and then attacked it.

(c) Capital supplies. India would be very much interested if the other Dominions were capable of producing capital goods specifically for the development of India and the other Asian Dominions. The Asian Dominions had programmes of development, but they found great difficulty in getting capital supplies of the proper type and at the proper time. If it were possible for the other Commonwealth countries to regard development of the new Dominions as a common interest, they might be able to influence their industries to make possible supplies of capital goods. The question of payment—whether by loan or cash—would have to be gone into, but even if payment could not be settled immediately, if the new Dominions had some assurance that they could plan their equipment over a period of years, it would be much easier for them to plan their development. As examples, Canada might provide machinery for hydro-electricity, gas, coal mining and chemical production; and Australia was now capable of producing such things as aeroplanes, ships, etc. He suggested that the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, all of which were industrialized and one of which was also in a position to supply credit, should work out the problem in the same manner as the OEEC countries did in Europe. Specific schemes should be drawn up in consultation with engineers, and when the picture for five or ten years had been obtained, the Commonwealth Governments should influence their economy as circumstances made possible to make supplies available over time. In the meantime, India could proceed with her plans with assurance. In conclusion, the *Indian* delegate said that if we recognized the Commonwealth interest in the economic development of the Asian Dominions and if something were done, it would cement relations within the Commonwealth and give it life and force.

The Indian delegate's proposal was greeted with sympathetic murmurs, but none of the senior Dominions were willing to proceed further. Towards the conclusion of the Conference, when the question of the meaning and future of the Commonwealth was under discussion, the Indian delegate returned to the economic theme and made his proposals in a more modest form. I again quote from the precis records of the Conference:

The *Indian* delegate stated that the question was how far could or should the Commonwealth act as a unit on economic matters, in short, could there be a common economic policy? To this question, in order not to leave any doubt in the minds of the delegates, he hastened to answer by an emphatic negative. A modern economic policy involved the question of tariffs, currency control, control of external trade, credit policy and even external relations. At the same time, each country had its own peculiar problems of regional alignments and its own economic ideology; some believed in the conscious control of the economy in order to ensure the welfare of the people, while others still had faith in what, for want of a better term, he would describe as the free enterprise system. It was therefore unrealistic to talk of one Commonwealth economic policy and even of the same Commonwealth policy for all the Commonwealth countries. It would not be unfair to ask, however, that the Commonwealth countries should consider, when framing their own economic policies, the incidence of these policies on both the developed and less developed members of the Commonwealth. They should consider both the adverse effect of their policies on the welfare

of sister Dominions and the advantages which would derive from them to their partners.

There was a great need of a proper study of resources and needs of the Commonwealth, as well as a better understanding of the effects of the war on the economies of the member nations. Some senior members of the Commonwealth had no doubt a fairly clear understanding of the effects of the war on their own economy; but it was also in the interest of the senior members and of the Commonwealth as a whole to know the effects on the less developed economies. Hence it was desirable to arrange for a Commonwealth economic conference. The delegates to such a conference need not necessarily be and, in the speaker's opinion, should not be representatives of their respective governments. He believed that the attitude of the delegates would be different if they were talking on behalf of their governments and before the press. He nevertheless felt that government support would be both useful and necessary. The conference could examine the effects of the war on the undeveloped countries and on the Commonwealth as a whole, the aspirations of native peoples, the economic interdependence of Commonwealth countries and a long-term Commonwealth solution to the dollar gap. It would make the Commonwealth realize that the economic development of underdeveloped areas was essential in the fight against Communism.

Such a declaration could be made stating the interest of the Commonwealth in raising the standard of living of all their peoples, and this would go a long way to creating a sense of mutuality. This declaration should then be followed by some practical steps. The Indians realized that they could not expect a large flow of capital from the Commonwealth, with the possible exception of Canada. But Britain could release sterling balances for the purposes of capital investment in India by the Indians themselves. Experts could be made available to assist in surveys of resources and in studies of possibilities for economic development. Help should be given with regard to technical training; during the war young Indians called 'Bevin boys' were sent to England for training and practical work in the coal mines and industries. This had been particularly valuable because mere training in higher European institutes of learning was not enough and should be linked to practical training, with reference to specific projects of economic development.

The development of India in view of the pressing needs and limited resources was bound to involve a high degree of planning. Without it, systematic economic development and the rational use of resources would be impossible. What India and other members of the Commonwealth needed required the evolution of a Commonwealth Point IV. He did not want to go into details of the machinery that would be needed to implement it; Commonwealth countries should naturally exchange High Commissioners and trade representatives. What was most important was their recognition of a mutual interest in each other and determination to meet the requirements of others in order to raise the standard of living of all peoples in the Commonwealth.

It is satisfactory to record that this proposal received cordial and emphatically-expressed support from all the other Commonwealth delegations.

I, for one, am not dissatisfied, for such a Commonwealth Economic Conference could be a useful first step towards the evolution of some plan on the part of the senior Dominions towards assisting the economic development of their Asian fellow-members; and if this were done, it would give the necessary concrete basis without which the Commonwealth cannot have any real meaning for the vast majority of the peoples of the Asian Dominions.

V

Finally, the Conference discussed the need for better publicity among the Dominions about the facts relating to each other and the common ideals that they all shared and the manner in which each was trying to implement the same in both their internal and external relations. Mutual education was an essential condition for mutual understanding and it was agreed by all that much more needs to be done in this respect and could be done than has been the case so far.

And so we all dispersed, after ten days of pretty strenuous work, feeling very friendly to one another, having discovered new links and having strengthened old ones, and all of us certain that the Commonwealth had life in yet for a long time to come.

And yet, I cannot help asking myself certain fundamental questions, especially now, when I am writing this, six weeks after the event, in my home town 10,000 miles away from the seat of the Conference, possibly when both time and space have done a bit to cool the warmth of the sentiment and emotion evoked at Bigwin Inn. Is the Commonwealth going to endure? Is it not possible that Canada will get more and more integrated with the United States, and similarly the United Kingdom with Western Europe? Is it not likely that the Asian Dominions, once the present generation of their leaders has disappeared, and having no concrete ties with the Commonwealth, decide to leave it or, a more distressing possibility, turn to their big northern and eastern neighbours of Soviet Union and China both for inspiration and for concrete assistance? Or will it be that the United States will give the necessary assistance to these Asian Dominions and thus provide the link with which to keep together the older and the newer Dominions? What is going to happen to Australia and New Zealand, once the Asian Dominions leave the Commonwealth or turn hostile? Will these Dominions turn to the United States and integrate themselves with it politically and economically or will they lead a lonely and unhappy existence, being of the West but not in it and being in the East but not of it? What is going to be the future of South Africa with its white minority trying to fly in the face of time by its doctrine of racial supremacy? And above all, what is the future of the United Kingdom, once the centre and bulwark of the Commonwealth? These are questions that cause a lot of uneasiness to my mind, and I cannot honestly say that I found an answer to them in the Commonwealth Relations Conference. No doubt, we share certain ideals and we all constitute a good club. But this is not enough to build on, in the modern world with its sharp emphasis on economic, political, racial, and social realities. Something more is needed to bind

together over 600 million people of diverse creeds, races, cultures, economic standards and historical memories. The Commonwealth can endure, only if it means something concrete to the vast masses of its citizens who inhabit the Asian continent. Lenin had said long ago that the ultimate defeat of world capitalism lay in the fact that the peoples of Russia, China and India constituted a majority of the world's population. The Soviet Union started communism; China has now gone the communist way. But India still remains in the Commonwealth. Will she continue to do so, and thus help to make of the Commonwealth a third force, liberal in outlook and democratic in its practice, or will she also go the communist way?

It seems to me that this is the question of questions, as far as the Commonwealth is concerned. To my mind, the future of the Commonwealth will be determined not in London or in Ottawa or in Canberra but in Delhi and Karachi. And it will be determined by the manner and speed with which the rest of the Commonwealth will react in its political, racial and economic policies to the aspirations and hopes as also the needs of the Asian Dominions. If only the Commonwealth will give up its present mood of helplessness and dependence on outside aid, and turn inward and purge itself of its past blots and follow a bold policy of anti-colonialism and anti-racialism both within and without, supplemented by an equally bold policy of concern with the economic needs of the less developed Dominions and would-be Dominions and a concrete programme of aid, both economic and technical, in the raising of living standards in all these areas, I have no doubt that the Commonwealth will not only endure, but also serve as a glorious example to the rest of the world in the art of neighbourly and communal living despite differences of race, creed and individual resources. As one brought up in the liberal traditions of British thought and yet overwhelmingly impressed with the urgent need for raising the living standards of his people, I can only express the hope, if not also send up a prayer, that the senior Dominions may see the light, and in time, of the God-given opportunity that they now have by the voluntary membership of the new Asian Dominions, to make of their and our Commonwealth a real success in co-operative living. Only thus can the Commonwealth endure beyond the immediate present.

BRITISH APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS¹

By FRANK K. ROBERTS

INTRODUCTORY

I FEEL some diffidence in speaking at all in public in India where the standard of public speaking is so high, more particularly as members of the Foreign Service have little training for public speaking and are generally like children meant to be seen and not heard, at all events in public. I am also a little diffident of my ability to deal with the rather vast subject for this talk which

¹ Address delivered in New Delhi under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs on 27 October, 1949.

has been suggested to me but I shall try to do so without falling into too many facile generalities and I hope that the inevitable gaps will be filled by questions afterwards.

There is of course a specifically British approach to international affairs but it is I think important also to remember that most if not all countries have the same basic approach to international affairs i.e., the safeguarding and promotion of their essential interests within the framework of international order and security. There are of course important differences between nations in their conception of where their real interests lie and in the forcefulness with which they advance their interests regardless of those of other countries. Also some countries are naturally more isolationist than others. There is also the important consideration that certain countries at certain stages of their development are influenced by what I might call an ideological approach to international affairs, obvious examples are the Soviet Union today, Revolutionary France 150 years ago, still further back the Crusaders fighting for Jerusalem or the Arabs spreading Islam. An ideological approach of this kind clearly has a very great influence on the attitude taken by that country in international affairs but it does not usually change the country's basic approach to international problems. In any case Britain throughout her history has been singularly free from any such ideological influences affecting her policy.

Apart from this general statement I do not, however, propose to indulge tonight in any comparisons between British and other approaches to international affairs and I hope that you will not look for any implied comparisons as they are far from my mind.

At the outset I should like to emphasize that no nation whether Britain or any other has complete freedom to decide what its approach to international affairs should be. This must be influenced, and in the last resort, decided by considerations of Geography, History, Economics, Defence, National Character and Composition, and the Political Set-up within the country concerned. Any country which tries to conduct a foreign policy regardless of or inconsistent with such factors would soon find itself in serious trouble. I shall therefore begin with a review of the essential factors forming the British approach to international affairs under the above headings.

I

The first and probably the most important is *geography*. Britain is a small island which is a part of Europe but has never since the Middle Ages been exclusively a European country. Although British culture and civilization is essentially European, the 20 miles of water which separate her from Europe have completely changed her approach to European problems and have in the past enabled her for long periods to isolate herself to a greater or lesser degree from European developments. Therefore when Europe was relatively quiet and contented and no one power was trying to dominate the others, Britain could remain more or less aloof from European politics and entanglements and pursue a policy of relative isolation. But Britain was

still so much a part of Europe and her interests were so vitally involved with Europe that whenever one power has threatened to dominate Europe, Britain has intervened directly in European affairs in her own interest to prevent a threat developing across the narrow seas and also in the general interest of the freedom and independence of the great majority of European States. The famous historical examples of this are our struggle against Spain in the 16th Century, against France in the days of Louis XIV and later of Napoleon, and most recently against the Germany of the Kaiser and of Hitler.

Although the Channel still remains an important factor as the last war showed and still affects the psychological approach of the British people to European problems, it is more than doubtful today whether Britain can ever again regard herself as being detached from Europe. With new developments in the air, with rockets and atomic weapons, London and the ports of England are more vulnerable than ever before—an airplane went from London to Paris recently in 25 minutes. These factors affect geography and Britain today is more a part of Europe than ever before. It seems certain that this major development in regard to British policy has come to stay and certainly in Britain there is growing appreciation on the part both of the Government and of the people of the fact that we are now effectively a part of Europe and cannot, even if we wanted to, stay out of European affairs. We have shown our realization of the new position by the rôle we have played in the economic integration of Europe through the European Recovery Programme and through the Organization for European Economic Co-operation and in the political, defence, social and cultural integration of Europe through the Treaty of Dunkirk with France and the Brussels Treaty, extending also to the Low Countries and finally on the political side in the Council of Europe. The association of Britain with this is a revolutionary step and although progress has so far been rather tentative there seems little doubt that a start has been made with the establishment of a more united Western Europe, including Britain.

Geography does not only tie Britain to Europe. Through her maritime position and especially through her close connexion with the United States and Canada she is also a member of the Atlantic community. The North Atlantic is the British life-line through which a great proportion of her essential imports of food and raw materials reach her in time of peace and through which all must reach her in time of war. If the North Atlantic were to fall under the control of countries unfriendly to Britain, her people could be starved very quickly. In many ways therefore Britain's position in the Atlantic is even more important to her than her position in Europe. This was perhaps not so obviously the case when the United States and Canada were small countries slowly developing, but now that America at least has far out-distanced us, any British approach to international affairs must begin from the point that a quarrel with the United States is unthinkable and that British and American interests are basically the same. This has in fact been a commonplace in British international thinking for at least 100 years and the reality of the ties has been shown in the last two world wars. But it is only recently

that the geographic reality of the Atlantic community which of course includes other European countries besides Britain, has found formal political expression in the Atlantic Pact. This is really a most important international instrument not so much with reference to the so-called cold war as because it represents a real community of interests between countries with a common background, and common problems and is therefore based on obvious and enduring realities.

I have left to the last, but not because it is the least, Britain's Commonwealth connexions which I am also including under this geographical heading. As you know the Commonwealth extends through the whole world and its members are to be found in every continent. Moreover the ties between members of the Commonwealth, however intangible, are obviously closer than those normally existing between foreign countries. Therefore the British when approaching international affairs, do not simply concentrate upon Europe or the Atlantic but look much further afield to Asia and specially to India, to Australia and Africa as well. This approach must also take in the Mediterranean which remains, as it has been for 150 years, of great importance to the Commonwealth.

Therefore the British approach to international affairs is a world-wide approach and it is likely to remain a world-wide approach. The new developing Commonwealth relationship has done nothing to weaken and much to strengthen this wide approach. The British attitude towards colonial dependencies has been criticized in the past and is still sometimes criticized in India but there is no doubt about the goal of our policy. It is that all such countries should obtain self-government and it is then our hope that they will decide of their own free choice to follow India's example and to remain free and independent members of the Commonwealth. That is why I say that the British approach to international problems is likely to remain world-wide.

Still under the heading of geography, there is a further factor which should, I think, be borne in mind and that is the approach of a sea power to world problems as distinct from the approach of a land power. Great land powers, whether France or Germany in the past or the Soviet Union today, must inevitably think in terms of frontiers and of the effect of changes in frontiers on their vital interests. A country like England whose whole existence is based upon sea power has a much less static approach to international problems. She is free to move about the seas at will and has a mobility and range of interests denied to a land power pure and simple. However powerful a country may be which is based on what has been called the Heartland of Europe and Asia as the Soviet Union is today, she does not naturally and inevitably take the same keen interest in the affairs of the whole world as a maritime country whose interests extend through all the oceans and seas of the world and which has close contacts with all sides of what has been called the rimland i.e., States bordering upon the oceans and the seas.

One final and most important geographical concept is that Britain is what Bismarck called a 'satisfied power.' You in India may well think that in the

past Britain expanded too much and sometimes with little regard for the views of those countries into which she expanded. But the essential point in considering the British approach to international affairs today is that for a long time she has had no desire and indeed no motive to expand further. Her objective is plainly one of progressive evolution, development and adaptation to changing territorially circumstances. It is the unsatisfied powers such as Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy which menace the peace of the world and which consider their own interests to the exclusion of the interests of general international society.

I have said rather a lot about this geographical factor because I think that despite Marxist ideology it is really the decisive factor in deciding a country's approach to international problems. I would suggest that the following conclusion can be drawn. Other countries much bigger than Britain, for example the U. S., Soviet Union or India have very wide interests in the world and indeed no great country today can separate its own interests from what is going on elsewhere. But Britain is the only country which is directly, vitally and inevitably concerned with every part of the world, including even the Antarctic. I saw this clearly when I was Mr. Bevin's Private Secretary in the Foreign Office. There were very few days when I did not have to put in front of him problems extending over every part of the world. This gives us the advantage of a world-wide approach to international problems. But it also means that we often have to reconcile conflicting interests. At all events our interests are so wide that we have never been tempted, not even when the Royal Navy was the dominant power in the world, to follow the disastrous example of old Empire builders like Alexander and try and rule the world. Being a member of such different communities, having such wide connexions, Britain must necessarily be interested in the maintenance of peaceful conditions and prosperity throughout the world.

The second factor is *history*. This has taught us the lesson of moderation and the need for adaptation to new circumstances. Britain being so small an island could never have prospered and maintained its position in the world by trying to impose its own ideas upon a largely unwilling world. We have had so to contrive our policies that our interests generally coincided with those of the majority of other nations. Whenever we have failed to do so, as for example at the time of the War of American Independence, we have found ourselves in trouble. But these are exceptions to our general policy and blots which we have on our record, just as other countries have. Taking a broad view, in most of the great international crises of recent centuries, Britain has found her cause was that of the majority of the other nations of the world, usually in opposition to some individual tyranny and so we have generally overcome our difficulties in co-operation with other nations and forged ahead.

Over the years certain historical factors have become constant in the British approach to international affairs however much international line-ups may modify this temporarily. These are I think as follows:

- (1) The Commonwealth connexion on which I need not enlarge.

- (2) Friendship with the United States of America. Whatever temporary disagreement there may be our relationship with America is a special one and for the best part of 100 years it has been an axiom of British policy that we and America must never be on opposite sides. This is of course closely connected with the Commonwealth tie in so far as the relationship between Canada and America, not to mention other members of the Commonwealth, is concerned.
- (3) Friendship with the Low Countries and with France as our nearest neighbours. We may have had quarrels in the past and shall no doubt have disagreements in the future but this special relationship with France and the Low countries is now part of the British approach to international affairs.
- (4) In the Mediterranean area we have had similar close relations with Turkey and the Arab countries and Persia and the importance of maintaining such relations looms very large in the British approach and must continue to do so with the Mediterranean forming a link between the Commonwealth and with the importance of the oil of Arabia, which is essential to our modern industrial civilization.
- (5) South-East Asia also has a special place in British international thinking because of our long connexion with many parts of South-East Asia but above all because the economy of Britain and Europe and that of South-East Asia are in so many ways complementary to each other. In co-operation and on a basis of full equality, this relationship can be developed and prosper.
- (6) Finally, although you may be surprised that I should mention this now, a constant factor in British foreign policy hitherto has been the maintenance, despite many frictions and differences, of such relations with Russia as will enable us to stand side by side, if necessary in the future as we did against Napoleon and Hitler in the past.

There are also other constant factors historically which I need not discuss at length, such as Britain's special economic relationship with Argentina on which we largely depend for our meat and her treaty with our oldest ally Portugal and our interest in the Spanish Peninsula as a whole.

The conclusion which I suggest should be drawn from these historical considerations is that history has taught us the virtues of constancy and moderation in approaching international affairs. Above all we have never been tempted by the glitter of diplomatic coups which may seem clever at the time but leave soreness behind, and we have found a reputation for consistency and I think honesty more valuable in the long run.

II

I now come to *economics* which Marxists would put first and which should certainly come very high, especially in the United Kingdom. It is a truism that Britain depends upon trade and we have been described as a nation of shopkeepers. We certainly live by our exports, including our shipping and insurance. They are not merely a luxury to enable us to improve our stan-

dard of living but absolutely essential to provide us with our food and raw materials. Our food and raw material imports come from all over the world and our exports must therefore be equally widespread. This means that we must be in the closest economic contact with all countries if we are to prosper or even survive. We cannot be isolationist even if we want to be. This may seem a trite remark but it is well to remember that other great countries, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, India and France, could live without foreign trade if they had to. At all events they would not starve. We on the contrary have an economic system which is very advanced but very delicately poised and extremely precarious. It can only flourish in a world at peace and prosperous. Therefore as traders and shopkeepers we require international peace and prosperity for the most practical and, if you like, the most selfish reasons. This is and must be our major interest in approaching foreign affairs.

I know that Marxists argue otherwise and maintain that the only way in which capitalist economies can prosper is by colonial imperialism and cut-throat competition. I think that our record in recent years and the relations established between us and India on the one hand and between us and the Americans on the other, show that we at least do not believe this and that our approach is based on the conviction that peace and stable conditions are necessary for our trade and that they can be secured in co-operation with other countries and even with our commercial competitors.

I come now to *national character* and the composition of the nation. The British are a mixed race living in a very small country. Our language and civilization represent a mixture between the Latin and the Teutonic with Celtic influences. As Tennyson once wrote, Norman and Saxon and Dane are we, not to mention other earlier stock such as the Celts. We are also a United Kingdom of what was four separate countries, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. All this means that we have developed a habit of getting on together by mutual concession and compromise and we can see a lot of good in other people's views and ideas. But the most important point in regard to international affairs is that the English stock which, in spite of the fact that we usually have Scotch Prime Ministers, is the main element in the British make-up, is a very tolerant one. Of all peoples in the world the English are the most ready to let bygones be bygones, to forget past injuries received or I am afraid committed. This may sometimes be irritating to our neighbours and more particularly to our friends who find themselves weighed in the same balance as our former enemies. But it is a state of mind which enables life to continue with the least possible friction. The British people who usually act in this way at home and have found that it pays them to do so in their public and private relationships, tend to expect other nations, where circumstances may have been different, to forgive and forget in a similar way. Their approach to international problems is therefore apt to be 'if only people could get together round a table they ought to be able to reach agreement by a process of mutual concession and compromise.' At best this is of course

the only way peaceful relations can be maintained. At its worst and in times of really serious international crisis when important questions of principle are at stake, this British approach can sometimes seem and indeed be unrealistic and lacking in the highest moral values. Our Munich policy has been criticized on this account and so have been our not always very skilful efforts to try to draw France and Germany closer together after the first world war. However I think we can reasonably conclude that this English approach to the problems of living together in society whether in a national or in international society is a wise and a good one which is certainly more conducive to the peaceful development of the world than a policy of maintaining grievances and refusing all concession and compromise.

The fifth factor is the internal political set-up in a country which has a very great effect upon that country's approach to international affairs. Clearly an absolute monarch or absolute group of rulers, however benevolent, would approach foreign policy in a different spirit from a parliamentary democracy like Britain where all policy, including international policy, must be decided by or at least secure the active approval of the majority in Parliament and of the majority of the country represented in Parliament. Over important international issues it has always been felt in Britain that such approval should cover both the great parties in the State and that no such question should become the subject of party strife. We have generally succeeded in this although it has become more difficult with increasing public interest in international affairs. But only where the majority of public opinion is behind foreign policy can it be effective in a parliamentary democracy. This means that foreign policy cannot be decided in the seclusion of the Foreign Office by a few people. It must of course be prepared there but we always have to remember that it must then secure the support of Parliament and the electorate. In so far as it is dependent on the support of public opinion, and as democratic public opinion never wants a war, British foreign policy cannot be a policy of aggression or of war except in self-defence and even then the ordinary man in the street has to be fully persuaded that his defence is really in question. His natural inclination is to wait until it is too late which is the great danger besetting democracies. This control of foreign policy by public opinion is a reality in modern Britain where, as a result of two world wars and their effects upon the life of the people, there is now keen public interest at all levels in international affairs. We in the Foreign Office have the closest contacts not only with Parliament and so-called informed opinion but with the workers as represented in their trade unions, with the Press and so on.

Of course such public opinion needs education and leadership and if it does not receive it foreign policy will not be very successful.

The British are often accused of lacking idealism or firm principle in their foreign policy. It is quite true that I could not lay down in any precise formula the main objectives and principles guiding the British approach to international affairs. As a people we do not naturally take to precise definitions. We are suspicious of abstract principles and we prefer to deal

with problems as they arise. This British frame of mind is applied to foreign affairs and we are naturally suspicious of any diplomatic systems. Although as I explained many important factors in international affairs remain constant, nations are living things with often unpredictable reactions and subject to rapid changes in their internal affairs and also in their international relationships. The British therefore prefer a rather empirical approach to international problems enabling us to adapt our policy to varying circumstances instead of risking being crushed in some precise system. But the British people are always guided by the overriding desirability of world peace and British policy is designed to maintain it. In the still imperfect state of the world this policy also means being so prepared as to deter any potential aggressor. This will not I think seem inconsistent to an India which is so wholeheartedly dedicated to the principles of Mahatma Gandhi, but nevertheless finds it necessary to maintain strong armed forces.

III

In the past the British method for maintaining peace was the balance of power. The British looked with suspicion in their own and in the general interest on the growth of any continental power which seemed to be aiming at domination over its neighbours. Britain therefore habitually put its weight into the balance on what seemed the weaker side and thus tried to ensure that any over-ambitious country was deterred from extending its domination or if deterrence was not enough, that it was defeated in any war which it provoked. This principle of the balance of power, although now rather out of fashion, is still a reality in the world today and great nations like India or Britain can only neglect it at their peril. The balance is no longer a continental balance just in Europe or Asia but a world balance. Hence a development which we may not like but which we can no more stop than Canute could stop the waves, i.e., the emergence of two main blocs in the world today one that of communism and the second based on what we consider true democracy, i.e., on President Roosevelt's four freedoms.

But we in Britain no longer think in old fashioned terms of the balance of power and British Foreign Secretaries have publicly rejected such a concept as a basis for policy. Even after the first world war, Britain more than any other country put its weight behind the League of Nations which, it was hoped, would be a world-wide international organization and it was not through any lack of effort or zeal on our part that that organization broke down.

Taking all these factors together and having regard to the immense diversity of British interests and their wide geographical distribution, having in view also the remarkable contrast between the vast scope of these interests and the small size of Britain itself, it is hardly surprising the British approach to international affairs is a complex one and that British foreign policy often appears to others to be inconsistent and even fumbling. These contrasts and complexities also explain why British foreign policy has often been criticized as perfidious and Machiavellian. This is simply not true and a far

juster reproach would be that despite the complexity of their interests the British people tend to over-simplify international affairs. Moreover in their zeal on moral grounds and on grounds of self-interest for general understanding all round the British have been prone to weigh their friends and their actual or former enemies in the same balance and so unwittingly let down the former.

IV

The vital factor to remember is that Britain is at one and at the same time a member of three of the most important world communities, (1) the Commonwealth and as such of Asia, (2) the Atlantic community and (3) Europe. Our connexion with all the three systems is vital to our existence, prosperity and security. We cannot neglect any one of them. It is essential that we should never find ourselves in a position in which we have to choose between them. So we find ourselves in serious difficulties when our friends in one of these systems do not see eye to eye with our friends in another. It is even worse when our friends within one of the three systems are at logger-heads with each other. I will not give examples as these will obviously come to the mind in Europe or elsewhere. If Britain were a country with more limited interests and less intimately concerned with all parts of the world we might and indeed we should probably have to pick and choose in our international relationships some being necessarily closer than others. This is clearly an easier although not necessarily a wiser course. But as it is, British policy must always be to try patiently to promote closer international understanding and to use all our influence in that direction. As this is the goal of all true diplomacy, British diplomacy is in a relatively easy position and knows that it has British public opinion solidly behind it in every effort to pour oil on troubled waters and to bring people closer together. The rôle of the peacemaker is never an easy one and often an unpopular one but it is a very essential one and it is one of the main rôles which Britain in her own interest has to play in a world which we would like to see as one world but which has still a long way to go before reaching that goal.

Our support is equally strong for the United Nations which, despite present disappointments and frustrations, has much more hope of ultimate success than the old League of Nations including as it does most of the principal nations of the world which the League had failed to do. The United Nations is world-wide in a sense the old League never was and this point has been marked most recently by the election of India to a seat on the Security Council. British public opinion sees in the United Nations the best hope of the world for the future. This is also the view of British statesmen and of British diplomats, although we should be foolish to close our eyes to present weaknesses and difficulties. British foreign policy is firmly based upon support of the United Nations and we shall continue to do everything in our power to strengthen that organization. While British opinion regards it as a priceless and essential instrument for world peace and organization it is determined that the instrument should not break in our hands as the League did because too much weight was placed on it at too

early a stage. We in Britain have declared ourselves ready to sacrifice some of our own national sovereignty for the good of the whole. There was a famous debate in the House of Commons in 1947 when Mr. Eden for the Conservatives and Mr. Bevin for the Government said this quite unequivocally. We have since decided of our own free will never to use the veto against a majority vote in the Security Council. We are doing everything we can to strengthen and develop all the valuable activities of the United Nations in economic, social, refugee and other fields.

But the British are realists, and in the existing state of the world and having regard to the fact that the United Nations is still in its early stages, they feel that it has to be buttressed by regional organizations as is provided under the Charter. We regard such organizations, e.g., the defensive and political arrangements known as the Atlantic Pact or the economic organization of the O. E. E. C. under the European Recovery Programme as valuable experiments in international co-operation which we hope will be widely extended. While we have to provide for our defence and essential security our post-war approach to international problems has been mainly economic and in particular we have worked to restore economic prosperity wherever we could. Although we emerged from the war very much poorer in financial resources and very tired we have done a great deal in this direction. In Asia we are responsible for Malaya and Hong-kong, and we take some pride in the amazingly rapid restoration after their war trials and in spite of terrorism in Malaya of order and security in those territories and in the great economic progress both these territories have made to their own good and to the good of the whole of Asia. We have also done our best at considerable risk and strain to our own economy to send the greatest possible proportion of our exports to India and other countries anxious to develop their own economies. Indeed there are many people and not only in England who think that the rate at which the sterling balances have been released for this purpose was too great for us in existing circumstances. We have worked hard at first directly and later as a member of the United Nations and as a friend to both parties to promote a satisfactory settlement in Indonesia. We are encouraged by the recent developments in regard to that most important part of the world. We have encouraged and most heartily participated in E. C. A. F. E. and similar organizations. We have contributed, and are contributing with other Commonwealth nations, to assist the Burmese Government to restore order and economic prosperity after the war and post-war trials of Burma. Perhaps most important of all we set up special organizations to increase food production and distribution throughout South-East Asia. Our approach to Middle Eastern problems has been on similar lines. In Europe we made generous financial settlements with our war ravaged allies and have spent large sums on the reconstruction of Germany. We were generous contributors to all the organizations which have been concerned with the rehabilitation of refugees and generally with the restoration of Europe to normal and peaceful conditions after the war. In the O. E. E. C.

we have been playing a leading rôle in working out with the support of the United States a closer economic integration of Western Europe and we very much regret that we have to say Western Europe as the nations of Eastern Europe refused or were not allowed to participate.

I have laid great stress on these economic factors because British foreign policy today under the special inspiration of Mr. Bevin, a former Trade Union leader, works on the principle that the raising of the standard of living throughout the world and the economic prosperity and social security of the masses everywhere will be the greatest stabilizing factors for peace and international friendship. This is our real objective however much we may be accused of concentrating on defence pacts and the creation of power blocs. Our hope had been that the war would have brought communist Russia and the Western Democracies close enough together to enable us to rebuild the war shattered world in co-operation. But the gulf between the communist approach and our own approach to world problems has proved at this stage too wide and so each side has had to cultivate its gardens separately and we have had to build a sufficiently solid fence round the democratic garden to remove temptation from any over-zealous rivals who might think, no doubt sincerely, that their methods of cultivation are better. The future should show which of us is right.

V

British foreign policy today is perhaps more realistic than it has ever been in the past in its endeavour to co-ordinate all the requirements of the country more especially political, economic and defence requirements. We knew that it would take us many years after the war to restore to the full our financial and economic position more especially as we were determined not to neglect the expensive but essential business of improving the standard of living of the masses. We have tried to avoid wild promises or encouraging baseless idealism. Britain, a small country with world-wide interests which is so vulnerable in regard to its food and its industrial requirements, must be very realistic today especially in the atomic age. We are therefore ready as we have not always been in the past to pay our international insurance premium whether in the form of the maintenance of sufficient armed forces for defence or of participation in the United Nations and other similar activities. We have moved with the times in approaching post-war problems. We think we understand national aspirations in Asia and other parts of the world and we want to meet them so far as it lies with us. But we must do this in an orderly and sensible fashion and avoid as it were throwing the baby away with the bath water.

I have tried to give you some impression of a post-war Britain in which the whole people are closely concerned with and interested in international affairs in every part of the world, a Britain whose main objective in her own selfish interests as well as on wider moral grounds is the maintenance of peace, the restoration of economic stability and the improvement of living conditions throughout the world.

I do not for a moment wish to suggest that other countries do not equally

want peace but it is I think beyond dispute that there is no country more vitally interested in the preservation of peace than Britain. Here, as in so many other fields, British interests and ideals are identical with those of India although we may sometimes express them in different ways.

THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM ITS PRESENT POSITION AND PROBLEMS

By M. RUTHNASWAMY

'CONSTITUTE government how you please,' said Edmund Burke, the famous statesman, 'infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of Ministers of State. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them. Without them your commonwealth is not better than a scheme on paper and not a living, active, effective constitution.' Nowhere is this proved so completely as in India. Here the State as it was made by British rule has been a paternal state, a *ma bap* (mother and father) to its subjects. It has been not only a policeman and magistrate, preserving law and order, but a landlord trying to improve his estate, a school-master, a protector of the health of the people, an engineer. British rule in India has been an enlightened despotism and enlightened despots have everywhere built up a large and efficient administration as an instrument of their political benevolence and beneficence to the people they ruled. And one of the greatest gifts that the British have given India is such a splendid administrative structure—large, roomy well-articulated, tier upon tier, one connected with and leading to the other, the whole system serving the purpose of all good structures which is to make possible the living of a peaceful, comfortable and normal, unsensational life.

As with all structures it is best to begin with description of the Indian administrative system from the foundation. The village is the historic foundation of Indian political life. About 90 per cent of the people of India live in villages and there are about 750,000 of them. The villages were self-government units—little democracies in fact. They governed themselves through the Village Panchayat composed generally of 5 leading men of the village. The composition varied from village to village, sometimes it consisted of the leading men of the village, sometimes it was elected from among the elders of the village. We get here and there in inscriptions glimpses of the assembly of the people. These Panchayats decided the affairs of the village and judged in cases of theft or murder. But as the standard of life was low, the Panchayat had not much to do except to keep the village clean, maintain the small irrigation work, wells and tanks, and manage the affairs of the local temple. Such as it was the Indian village and the Panchayat survived the revolutions of Indian history, the change of Hindu dynasties and the invasions and conquests of the Muslims. They survived because they were largely left to themselves. But British rule was more insistent and interfering than native Hindu king or Moghul emperor. British rule, like

every efficient alien rule—witness the Roman and the Byzantine empires—brought with it centralization. And this centralization together with its benefits like unity and effective articulation of all the units and joints of the administration led to a gradual decay of village self-government. A centralized police, a centralized judiciary, provincial and central departments of engineering, education and health sucked political life out of the village. The individualistic policy of the British land revenue system has broken the social cohesion of the village. Paradox as it looks one of the results of British rule was to kill this important fundamental unit of political life. But a sense of guilt in the last days of the British rulers and Indian revivalism have combined to revive the Village Panchayat. This revival at first took the form of endowing the Panchayats with certain minor judicial functions and powers. More thorough attempts at revival are to be found in the Panchayat Bills that have been introduced into the legislatures of provinces aiming at endowing the Village Panchayat with large powers of administration in regard to village concerns—like the making and maintenance of village roads, providing water supply in the shape of wells, primary education, sanitation and health services. But to make village self-government real and robust the Panchayat must be furnished with sources of revenue in the form of a proportion of the land revenue, collected from the village, local rates and cesses. And all the concerns of the village must become the concern of the village. All matters that concern the life of the village must be within the competence of its governing body—including the trial and judgement of civil and criminal cases except cases in which more than one village is involved. In cases within its competence leading men of the village forming a kind of jury of presentment should be called in to give evidence, for, if anyone could be expected to know anything about the happenings of a village it is the people living in the village. Especially should the village have its own police for the maintenance of its own peace and order—no longer should the village depend for this on the rare, periodical visits of a constable or head constable from a distant police station. The suppression of crimes must be made a village concern and not a thing of which they are, as at present, interested but detached spectators. And the failure in detection of village crimes and the perjury and breakdown of prosecutions in higher courts, one of the blots on the administration of justice under British rule, would have a chance of being eliminated. But the Panchayat, if it is to perform these new duties must be provided with efficient administrative help. It cannot be found in the village itself. Although the traditional village officials the Patel or *Munsiff* (headman) the *Karnam* (accountant) the *Talyari* (the watchman) the *Nirganti* (the irrigation canal-controller) must be left intact, the village requires a superior kind of administrative official, like the Parish or Town Clerk of England. He may be of the Revenue Inspector's grade and may be elected by the Village Panchayat from a list furnished by the provincial government. But his tenure must be independent of the whims and caprices of the members of the Panchayat. And the provincial government should be given powers of supervision, control and sus-

pension such as are exercised in England. Faction is the great evil of village life; suspension of Panchayat rule would be the threat that would bring Panchayats to a sense of their duty. In spite of the evils and defects of Indian village life, the Panchayat system must be tried. For as a villager told Malcolm Darling, an experienced Punjab administrator, Panchayat is better than Cutchery.

For the Cutchery is the office of the taluk or tehsil and the district. And the taluk or tehsil is the next higher unit of administration presided over by an official called the Tehsildar. And above the taluk or tehsil is the district. Both the taluk or tehsil and the district are the creatures of the Land Revenue System which the British inherited from the Moghuls but which they developed and consolidated. The district with the subdivision, the taluk or tehsil is not a natural or historical division of the country. Not tribal settlements nor other historical influences such as created the English country or the French province of the *ancien régime* created the Indian district. It was the offspring, like the French *département* of the Revolution, of administrative rationalization. For the exigencies of the collection of land revenue determined its extent. Its size was determined by the manageability of its revenues by an English official and his staff. Districts have been divided, as Arcot in the Madras province into North and South Arcot, according to administrative convenience. And as land revenue created the district, the district has been organized and administered as a unit of revenue administration. The head of the district was and is called the Collector. And all the first and most important offices of the district were in the hands of subordinate revenue officials. The Collector and his subordinates were and are also magistrates—although the judicial administration of the district was given over to separate and independent district and subordinate judges and *munsiffs*. Below the Collector is the Sub-Collector or the Tehsildar in charge of the subordinate unit of taluk. While the main function of this organization is the collection of land revenue it is also responsible for the collection of other classes of provincial revenue like Excise, now a disappearing class under the policy of Prohibition; it is also used for the registration of land-holdings, the management of indebted estates, the regulation of Government loans, the organization of famine relief. Although the new duties of the State have brought other officials into the district like the Superintendent of Police, the Medical Officer, the Education Officer, the Agricultural Officer, the Collector of the district continues to be the administrative head of the district, the representative of the provincial government in the district. As the chief magistrate of the district, the Superintendent of Police still looks to him for orders, guidance and control. But the other district officials under the growing influence of departmentalism have their own heads of departments at the provincial capital to look to and obey. More and more the District Collector is becoming the ornamental head of the district. Except in revenue matters, he reigns but does not govern. And his power and prestige will still further diminish when the policy of the separation of the executive from the judi-

ciary which will deprive him of his magisterial powers is adopted, as is the present tendency among provincial governments.

Another solvent of the power and prestige of the Collector has been the growing power and influence of the District Board and the Town Municipal Council. Ever since 1885 the policy of fostering and encouraging the growth of local self-government has brought the District Board and the Town Municipal Council into the district. The District Board is an elected body on a fairly liberal franchise with its own elected President and is entrusted with the responsibility of looking after the local roads, sanitation and public health and with the power of levying rates and cesses. So also, the Municipal Council in towns.

This steady deterioration in the power and prestige of the Indian Collector will make him less and less the counterpart of the French Prefect to whom he has been compared by English and French observers. Both continue to be the general representatives of their governments in their local jurisdictions and to be the source of local information to their governments. Both continue to be responsible for the peace and security of their charges. But while the Prefect is still charged with the duty of executing the laws, decrees, decisions and the regular working of all branches of the public service, the Indian Collector has to share this duty with the local officers of the Police, Education, Agriculture, Health departments. In regard to the popular institutions of local government, the French Prefect still continues to be the representative of the Department in regard to its local interests despite the Law of 1871 and takes the place of the conseil-general in the intervals of its sessions. His control over local bodies, the municipal mayor and conseil and the conseil-general is much greater than that of his Indian contemporary. All this change in the power and influence of the Indian Collector has been deplored by experienced administrators like Sir Bartle Frere who as early as 1870 deplored that the functional departmentalism which was loosening the hold of the Collector in the Indian district would lead to the lowering of the prestige and power of the provincial government—a prophecy, alas! which has been fulfilled with surprising decisiveness.

The other problem that awaits solution is that of the relations between the Collector and the District Board. As things are the District Boards have been endowed with too limited jurisdiction having to deal only with district roads, public health, schools, and with too few financial resources which did not go beyond a few cesses to have any vigorous life. And the Collector, who started his relations with the District Board as its President, has in the advanced provinces like Madras ceased to have any connexion or take any interest in the affairs of the District Board. The only way of fostering vigorous political life in the district is to associate the District Board with the Collector of the district in all district affairs and make him the leader and guide of the District Board. He might become the governor of the district with powers of initiative and veto at the beginning, and as District Boards justify this large measure of local self-government he might approximate to the constitutional governor of the modern province.

tion fills the place it does in local life, will continue to loom large in the eyes of the people. To the people of the district he is the government. With his Cutchery he is a formidable factor in the life of the district. Land agriculture being the main if not the only source of the economic and social life of the people and the government acting as the landlord, the district Cutchery and, to a minor extent, the Taluk Cutchery is the office where all land business is transacted. It is to the Taluk Cutchery that the ryot (the peasant owner) comes for the annual *jamabandi* (assessment of rent due) to pay his *kist* as instalments fall due. The Collector's Cutchery gathered in the revenue checked and controlled the accounts, and the registers and reports submitted to him, helped the Collector to supervise the work of his revenue and other subordinates and in general to keep his hold over the government of the district. The Collector's chief assistant, the *Huzar Sheristadar*, was a formidable personage more representative of the might of land revenue administration—especially when the English Collector was ignorant and any Collector is lazy or indifferent. The building of the District Cutchery is the most important building in the district.

From the district we travel on our tour of Indian administration to the capital of the province. The structure of provincial administration dates from the days of the East India Company. The commercial origins of British rule directed that it should be government by council, government by record and writing, a government of delay and detail, as full and elaborate reports had to be sent to distant commercial employees intent on profits and security of their investments. A Secretariat became an important adjunct of provincial administration. Each provincial government began with two or three Secretaries but with the growth of administrative business on account of the increase in the number of duties of the government the Secretaries have risen in number to 6 or 8 the chief of them being the Home, Finance, Revenue, Education Secretaries. And on account of the amount of written work the Minute, the Note and the Report that the administration of the country by subordinates of a commercial company whose headquarters were in London required and on account of the ignorance of the local languages of the English members of the Secretariat, the numbers of the provincial Secretariat have grown to formidable proportions. Armies of clerks people the rabbit-warrens of the Secretariat, receiving and dispatching correspondence, submitting notes, furnishing information, starting the files on their journey to Superintendent, Under-Secretary, Secretary, and Minister. The smooth circulation of dispatch boxes is their constant preoccupation. Bureaucracy is entrenched strong in the Indian Secretariat. The business of the Secretariat is to give advice and information, prepare questions and ripen them for the decision of the supreme executive of the province.

At the capital also are the offices of the Heads of Department—the Board of Revenue, the Inspector-General of Police, the Director of Public Instruction, the Director of Agriculture, the Director of Industries, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the Inspector of Local Boards *et hoc genus omne*.

All the Heads of Departments are individuals except the Board of Revenue, which for historical reasons and on account of the largeness and multiplicity of the questions involved is of a collegial character. The Heads of Departments are charged with the duty and responsibility of administering the affairs of their respective departments. The routine administration of the ordinary affairs of the department is within their competence and discretion. It is only on extraordinary matters and questions of new policy that they have to go to the supreme executive by way of their Secretary and Secretariat.

Till the system of popular responsible government was introduced about 12 years ago under the Government of India Act of 1935, the relations between the supreme executive of the province and the Secretaries and Heads of Departments were smooth and effective. The reason was that both the members of the supreme executive and the Secretaries and Heads of Departments belonged to the same school of administration, the famous Indian Civil Service which, deriving its traditions of administrative conduct from English practice, understood well the conventions that regulate the relations between the supreme executive and the Secretaries and Heads of Departments. These were, that, while the supreme executive should have the right of laying down policy and act as final court of appeal in administrative matters, the right and the duty of the Secretaries was to offer advice out of their information and experience, to place before their chiefs the pros and cons (especially the cons) of a question and to help them to come to right and wise decisions, but once the decisions were made it was their duty to put these decisions into effective orders and directions. Similarly it was the duty of Heads of Departments to look to the supreme executive only for directives of policy and their right was to be left to themselves for the administration of their departments.

All that has been changed. The change began when 30 years ago ; popular elected Ministers were introduced into the supreme executive of the province under the system known as Dyarchy. But the presence of members of the old I.C.S. in that executive kept the change under control. With the coming, however, of full responsible government in the provinces the supreme executive came to be composed wholly of popular, elected members. And the party to which these Ministers belonged came into power with a prejudice against the executive, for that executive had fought them to the ground in their war against British rule. They would make government responsive to the desires and demands of the people. Government should become a sensitized plate prepared to receive impressions of the requirements of the people as expressed through their representatives in the government, the Ministers. Secretaries and Heads of Departments were therefore to dance to the popular tune as called from time to time by the Ministers. Secretaries were therefore to be expected to find arguments and facts and figures that would support the policy announced *en haut* by the Ministers. Heads of Departments were to be expected to arrange even their routine administration in accordance with the wishes of Ministers. Transfers, promotions, the work of their subordinates were to be done at the behest of their Ministers. Orders could be

Departments could be by-passed. All this is being done not out of sheer cussedness, but out of ignorance of the proper relations between Minister and Secretary and Head of Department and out of the idea that because they have the supreme, final power they must exercise also all the subordinate power—forgetful that there are people to exercise the subordinate power that belongs to them. Secretaries finding that their advice or warning is not heeded, that all their experience gathered in 20 to 25 years of service goes for nothing are beginning to fold their hands and write their minutes and notes to order. Heads of Departments, finding that even in routine administration they are being interfered with, are losing interest in their work and are doing just enough to keep their departments going and to earn their pay. This cannot last long, for if this kind of relation between Ministers and Secretaries and Heads of Departments should continue long, it will lead to a breakdown of administration. For neither Ministers nor Secretaries nor Heads of Departments will be able to perform their legitimate functions when this confusion of functions reigns. Ministers will not have the time for study and reflection and thought necessary for the formulation of policy if their working hours are taken up with the details of administration. And Secretaries will not give their Ministers that expert advice which their administrative experience enables them to give. And Heads of Departments will not give leadership to their departments if they find their hands are tied by ministerial interference. And, fortunately, not all Ministers are afflicted by this itch of interference. The Prime Minister and one or two Ministers in each province may be said to be free from this disease.

If we ascend from the provincial to the Central Government we are in a serener atmosphere. Either because the Central Government has to deal with big national and international subjects like Defence, Foreign Policy, Trade and Commerce or because the intellectual and political calibre (not all the members of the Central Cabinet belong to a single political party) are of a superior order, the interference with Secretaries and Heads of Departments is not so great as in the provinces. But the Ministers who are there on account of their party affiliations are prone to interference. And here also even in the last days of British rule, Secretaries had begun the easy habit of writing to please rather than to instruct their superiors. Here again we must look to time and experience, the great teachers in the business of government, for a return to the proper relationship between Ministers and Secretaries and Heads of Department.

The danger of the Central Secretariat at New Delhi lies in its numbers. Those two huge buildings of the Secretariat in the North and South Blocks and which thrust into insignificance the House of the Head of the State and the Houses of Legislature is a symbol of this numerical strength. And those vast numbers strengthen the tendency to the use and abuse of writing (the *paperasserie* deplored by Bismarck) and red tape, the slow and solemn journeys of files and dispatch boxes through the corridors which have dogged the footsteps of Indian administration from the earliest days of British rule.

Here again the imminence of a breakdown of administration might show the Central Secretariat the better and quicker way of the personal interview and talk, the telephone, and the telegraph.

Another anxious problem is that of the administrative relations between the central and the provincial governments. Originally British Administration in India was a centralized administration. The whole of British India was ruled from Calcutta by the Supreme Government of India. The burden of such a kind of administration for such a vast country as India proved too heavy for the burden to be borne long. By successive stages beginning with the financial decentralization reform of Lord Mayo in 1870, and ending with the Reforms of 1919 known as the Montagu Chelmsford Reforms, provincial administrative autonomy was established. Now, under the federalistic influence of the Government of India Act of 1935 and of the Constitution of free and independent India that is being framed in the Constituent Assembly at New Delhi, provincial administration may be said to be as autonomous as the provincial government. But there are certain clauses in the new Constitution of India which provide for the central government sending directives to provincial governments as to action to be taken, for the provincial government acting as the agent of the central government, for the supersession of the provincial government in certain circumstances. The central government through the Federal Public Services Commission still recruits superior civil servants for the provinces, the Indian Administrative Service taking the place of the old I.C.S. And the fact that the provincial governments are composed of members of the same political party as the majority of the central government makes this tendency to centralization actual. The leaders of the political party in power frightened by the consequences of a weak central government are centralists in thought. They are incomplete converts to federalism—as is proved by the constitution they are dictating in the Constituent Assembly. The old Adam of centralization will take a long time to die.

The Indian administrative system is not without its problems and difficulties. It is a magnificent structure. But it is old—it is creaking and cracking in parts. The machinery has never had a thorough overhaul. The time has come for that. As early as the end of the 18th century, the Marquis of Wellesley, one of the greatest of the British rulers of India, said that 'it was difficult to believe that establishments of such magnitude as those of the British empire in India should not in the course of time require frequent revision'. No better way of showing our gratitude to the past can be found than a sympathetic but determined attempt to improve it and make it serve the ends of the government of free and independent India.

THE CULTURAL UNITY OF ASIA

By G. N. ROERICH

NOTWITHSTANDING the bewildering diversity of races, languages and creeds presented by Asia, a careful observer is able to discern a certain cultural substratum which persists into the present day and is common to a large part of Asia. This cultural unity was perhaps more pronounced in the centuries preceding the tenth century A.D. and owed its existence to Buddhism. For it was Buddhism which from the very outset transcended racial and political barriers, and was the first to preach the unity of mankind regardless of race. In many of the countries once penetrated by Buddhism, Buddhism has given place to other creeds and its very name has been forgotten, but its cultural heritage remains, often in a new garb. Thus the Sufi *madrase* in medieval Bukhara was modelled on Buddhist *viharas*, and even the very name of Bukhara goes back to *vihara*, a Buddhist monastic school. Wherever it penetrated, Buddhism moulded the spiritual life and character of the people, enriched their literature and arts, and has given them a certain unity of outlook which is perhaps one of its greatest contributions. From the very beginning of its propagation, Buddhism, mindful of the words of its Founder—'Go ye and wander forth for the gain, for the welfare of many, in compassion to the World'—inspired and allied itself to movements which strove towards social justice and equity. Suffice it to recall the influence of Buddhism on Central Asian Manicheism, its influence on the Mazdakist movement in Iran, and finally a curious and shortlived attempt to redistribute wealth in Tibet during the reign of King Mu-ne Btsan-po (8th century A.D.). Born in India, Buddhism began its onward march in two powerful streams which encompassed the greater part of Asia. One crossed the mighty mountain barriers of the Hindukush and the Himalaya, the other followed the sea route to South-East Asia where it still occupies an unchallenged position of authority. A third stream carried its message to the countries of the Near East and the Mediterranean basin where it contacted the cultural elite of the ancient world and where its influence can be discerned in gnostic teachings. Buddhism began its movement towards the north, beyond the mighty barrier of the Hindukush, in an epoch of lively cultural intercourse between the Hellenistic world and ancient India, facilitated by the formation of the Graeco-Bactrian kingdom, established on the territory of modern Afghanistan. The creation of the mighty Kushan Empire in the first century A. D. which encompassed large tracts of Central Asia besides the greater part of Northern India, facilitated the exchange of cultural ideas. It was during the Kushan epoch that Buddhism established a firm hold on Central Asia, west and east of the Pamir—Tien-shan divide. Sanskrit became the cultural language of Central Asia, and fostered the creation and development of local literary languages into which were translated large parts of the Buddhist Canon. Important local cultural centres sprang into existence, suffice it to mention Khotan in the south of the Tarim basin, and Kucha in the north. In the west the philhellenic Parthian kingdom fostered cultural intercourse. The Gandhara artistic tradition fol-

lowed the trade routes across the Central Asian deserts and reached the shores of the Pacific. Later the same routes were followed by the art of the Gupta period which transmitted the Ajanta artistic tradition to Central Asia and the Far East. Central Asia, the regions of West and East Turkestan, became the meeting ground of Indian, Iranian and Chinese artistic influences, out of which arose a colourful and powerful art which in its later phases influenced the art of Tibet and through it the art of China of the Yuan period (13th to 14th century A.D.). Only the advent of the powerful Sassanian monarchy in the third century A.D., characterized by a revival of an extreme cultural and religious nationalism, severed many of the cultural ties formed during the preceding epoch. Of course, what had been achieved in the preceding epoch could not have been completely obliterated, and we see in the Sassanian epoch the formation of a brilliant Irano-Buddhist art in the predominantly Iranian regions of Central Asia (North Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the Tarim basin). The remarkable archaeological explorations conducted by Prof. S. Tolstov in Khwarezm, between 1937 and 1948, have shown the spread of the Indo-Iranian Buddhist culture and arts to the ancient land of Khwarezm which shows that during the centuries preceding the advance of Islam (the 8th to 9th century in West Central Asia, and the 10th to 14th century in the eastern parts of the region) there existed a continuous belt of Buddhist cultures from the shores of the Sea of Aral in the west to the Pacific in the east. Such a cultural belt could not but foster the ideal of cultural unity. The path of Buddhism from India to the Far East is marked by important landmarks which like beacons illumined the adjacent regions. Such landmarks were Bamyān in Afghanistan with its famous colossal Buddhas, explored and described in recent pre-war years by the French Archaeological Mission under Prof. Alfred Foucher and the late Joseph Hackin, Tun-huang on the borders of Eastern Turkestan and the Kansu province of North-Western China, famous for its cave temples, Wu-t'ai-shan in the Shansi province of North China, and finally Horyūji in insular Japan. An interesting, but little known and almost forgotten, page in the cultural history of Asia tells about the travels of Indian *sādhus*, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, who wandered to Bamyān and distant Wu-t'ai-shan, crossed the mountain barriers of Tibet, and followed the caravan routes past the Pamirs into the desert of Eastern Turkestan. No barriers, either physical, or political, barred their passage. It can be added that Indian *sādhus* still visit many of the Buddhist centres of higher Asia. *Sādhus* are sometimes seen at Bamyān, some visit Tibet and even wander as far as Amdo in the north-east of the Tibetan upland. In the early days of the propagation of the Buddhist faith through Central Asia to the Far East, the caravan route followed most, had been the southern caravan route passing through Yarkand, Khotan to the ancient kingdom of Shan-shan, south-west of the Lob-nur lake. At Miran on the territory of Shan-shan, the late Sir Aurel Stein discovered unique Graeco-Buddhist frescoes. It is noteworthy that the artist who had painted the frescoes had signed his name in Indian script—Tita, a Titus according to some. After the establishment of Chinese political control over the Tarim caravan routes, the desert tracks were followed by numerous Buddhist monks

who went to preach the Good Law in China. It is noteworthy that most of those early Buddhist preachers had been Iranians and Tokharians, natives of Parthia, Soghdiana and the Kushan empire. It was a multinational effort of almost pan-Asian scope. Thus in 148 A.D. a Parthian Buddhist monk named An-shih-kao came to China. He was followed in about 170 A.D. by an Indian Buddhist monk, named Chu-sho-fo, and Chih Ch'an, a Tokharian. These two founded a Buddhist *vihara* in the Chinese capital Lo-yang. Between 223 and 253 A.D. Chih Ch'ien, son of a Tokharian envoy, translated Buddhist texts into Chinese. A number of others translated Buddhist texts into the literary languages of Central Asia, into Tokharian (some prefer to call it Kuchean, after the name of the chief cultural centre of the region in which Tokharian was spoken and written), and East Iranian or Saka (the language of the Khotan area in the south of the Tarim basin). Kucha became an important cultural and religious centre. In the second half of the 4th century A.D. Kucha produced a famous Buddhist preacher and translator—Kumarajiva (344-413 A.D.), with whose name is connected the first period of active Buddhist propagation in China. He belonged to an Indian family settled in Kucha. As a young boy he was taken by his mother to Kashmir to study Sanskrit and the Buddhist Doctrine. This shows that, in the period which followed on the Kushan epoch, old cultural ties were not forgotten and that young men were going to study the Buddhist Doctrine in the country of its origin. On his return to his native Kucha, Kumarajiva resided there till 382-3 A.D. when military events changed the course of his remaining life. He was carried away as a captive by General Lu Kuang and for some years resided at Liang-chou in the Kansu province of North-Western China which had been then and during subsequent periods (especially during the Hsi-hsia Tangut domination and the Mongol epoch) an important Buddhist centre. Kumarajiva availed himself of the given opportunity to spread the Buddhist faith in China and actively propagated the *Madhyamaka* doctrine of Nagarjuna. In this form Buddhism penetrated into Korea (at the end of the 4th century A.D.) and from there in the 6th century A.D. to Japan. The first preachers of Buddhism in that country had been Koreans belonging to the so-called school of the 'Three Treaties' (i.e. treaties by Nagarjuna and his disciple Aryadeva).

Buddhism which had penetrated and established a firm footing among the sedentary Iranian and Tokharian tribes settled in the oases along the caravan routes of the Tarim basin, slowly and gradually penetrated among the nomad Turkish tribes of the north. The recent researches of Russian archaeologists in Kirghizstan have shown that Buddhism was known among the West Turkish tribal confederacy. In Northern China, the Tabgach Turks, settled by the end of the 3rd century A.D. in Northern Shanhsi, founded the North Chinese kingdom of T'o-pa or Wei. In the 5th century the Wei sovereigns powerfully supported Buddhism in their kingdom, and the magnificent rock sculptures of Yun-kang (near Ta-t'ung, built between 414 and 520 A.D.) and Lung-men stand as monuments of their Buddhist fervour. The 6th century A.D. saw the spread of the mystic contemplative school of Ch'an (Sanskrit. *dhyana*) in China which gained in importance during the Sung period and spread

to Japan where it became well-known under the name of Zen (Ch'an). The pilgrimages to India of the Chinese Buddhist monks Fa-hsien (405-411 A.D.) and Hsuan-tsang (629-645 A.D.) speak eloquently about the cultural unity existing then between the Central Asian kingdoms and Northern India which enabled them to carry out their hazardous journeys. In those days the Buddhist university of Nalanda was truly an Asian centre of learning and culture, and its destruction can only be compared to the repeated destructions of the Alexandrian Library. The T'ang period in China was characterized by an intensive activity in the Buddhist field. In the middle of the 7th century A.D. Chinese Buddhism was profoundly influenced by Hsuan-tsang and his school. The influence of the school was also considerable in Japan. The brilliant period of Nara (710-784 A.D.) in Japan, rich in artistic and literary achievements, can be considered to have been the culminating point in the career of Buddhism in Japan. The pan-Asian character of the propagation of Buddhism in Japan is well illustrated by the following fact: when the Chinese Buddhist preacher Chienchen visited Japan in 753 A.D., he was accompanied by fourteen Chinese Buddhist monks, two Iranian monks from Central Asia, a native of Kun-lun (Indonesia), and a monk from Lin-yi (Champa).

In the above paragraphs we spoke about the cultural link that once united Asia along the caravan routes of Central Asia and which was severed towards the 10th century A.D., after which the two Turkestans began to look towards the holy places of Islam. Another cultural link which led across the inhospitable Tibetan upland towards Mongolia and the Buriat country in Siberia, became activated rather late in about the 7-8 century, but lasted longer into the 18-19 centuries. The first knowledge of Buddhism in Tibet came from Nepal, China and Khotan. In the 8th century under king Khri-srong lde-btsan, Buddhism made important gains in the Land of Snows and began to establish itself as the national religion of the land. We know that besides Buddhist preachers from India and Nepal, several hundred Buddhist monks had fled to Tibet from Khotan as a result of troubles there. In studying Tibetan Buddhism one should not forget this dual aspect of the penetration of Indian Buddhism into the country. Nepal and Khotan had been the two channels through which Buddhist cultural influence flowed into the country and this deeply influenced the early stages of the spread of Buddhism in Tibet. From the very beginning of the propagation of Buddhism in Tibet, the Buddhist universities of Nalanda and Vikramashila played a pre-eminent rôle in the spread of the Doctrine. To Vikramashila belonged the famous Atisha who in 1042 A.D. arrived in Tibet, and after a residence of twelve years, left an indelible imprint on Tibetan Buddhism. It is interesting to note that in his youth, Atisha went to Shrivijaya (Sumatra) to study the Vinaya or Buddhist monastic discipline. Tibetan students flocked to the Buddhist seats of learning, and one of them, Tsa-mi Sangsrgyas grags-pa, had the distinction of becoming one of the Sanskrit *panditas* of Vikramashila. The Muslim invasion of Bihar and Bengal in the beginning of the 8th century, and the accompanying destruction of the Buddhist monastic colleges of Nalanda,

Vikramashila and Odantapuri, almost severed the religious and cultural contacts between India and Tibet. True it resulted in an influx of Indian Buddhist scholars into the Land of Snows who came as refugees, among them the famous Shakyashribhadra, the last principal of Vikramashila college, accompanied by his pupils Vibhutipandra, Danashila and others. Notwithstanding the changed scene Tibetan pilgrims and individual students continued to visit India through Nepal, and scholars from India visited Tibet. An Indian Buddhist *pandita* Vanaratna, visited Tibet as late as the 14th century (1426 A.D.) and is known in the Tibetan tradition as the 'Last *pandita*'.

The Mongols were long familiar with Buddhism through the Uighur Turks and the Chinese. During the reigns of the great khans Mongka (1251-59 A.D.) and Khubilai (1260-94 A.D.) who showed a remarkable degree of religious tolerance, Buddhism in its Tibetan form made significant gains in the Mongol empire. In the 16th century the visits of the Third Dalai Lama of Tibet, bSod-nams rgya-mtsho, to the court of Altan khan (1532-85 A.D.) of the Tumed Mongols, resulted in the conversion of the latter to Buddhism. A Khalkha Mongol prince, Abatai khan, present in Tumed at the time of the Dalai Lama's visit, became a zealous convert and on his return to North Mongolia built in 1586 A.D. the first Buddhist monastery in Khalkha Mongolia—Erdeni-Dzu, situated on the site of the ancient Karakorum, the capital of the Mongol empire. After the acceptance by the Mongol princes of the Manchu suzerainty in 1691 A.D., Buddhism, now allied to the Manchu throne and powerfully supported by the Manchu emperors, made rapid progress throughout the length and breadth of the Mongol steppe. In the 18th century, Tibetan and Mongol preachers began to penetrate the adjacent regions of Southern Siberia among the Buriat Mongol tribes of Trans-Baikalia where the first Buddhist monasteries appeared in the middle of the 18th century (the first monastery was built in 1741 A.D.). The Imperial Russian Government looked with favour on the spread of the new religion among the Shamanistic tribes, with the result that the Buriat country became one of the most flourishing Buddhist lands.

The great southern sea route from India and Ceylon to the Far East was never neglected by Buddhist preachers. It seems that Mahayana was the first to enter the field to be later replaced by the Hinayana form of Buddhism. According to the Sinhalese chronicles the conversion of Ceylon to Buddhism goes back to the time of King Asoka who sent his son or younger brother Mahinda to the island. Mahinda converted King Devanampiya Tissa (247-207 B.C.) to Buddhism, and since then king Tissa's capital Anuradhapura and the monastery of *Maha-vihara* to the south of the capital became for a long time the religious centre of the island. King Vatta-Gamani (29-17 B.C.) founded the great monastery of Abhayagiri. According to tradition the Pali Canon was first written down during the reign of this king. The first millennium of our era was a period of a great Indian cultural expansion towards the Far East.

It is difficult to establish the date of the first appearance of Buddhism in Burma. One thing is certain that during the first millennium A.D. Burma was

under a constant flow of Indian cultural influence which penetrated by land and sea. During this period Buddhism seems to have reached Burma in its Mahayana and Tantric form. About the 5th century A.D. Mahayana Buddhism appeared in Arakan, and in the next century it established itself in Pegu. In the kingdom of Prome there were followers of the Hinayana and some of the Pali texts were known. According to tradition King Anawrahta of Pagan (11th century A.D.) carried out a reform of Buddhism in his kingdom, expelled the followers of the Vajrayana (a Tantric form of Buddhism) and invited Buddhist monks from Ceylon. It must be added that a reverse process took place early in the 19th century when Burmese monks were invited to come to Ceylon and established two monastic schools in the island.

The introduction of Buddhism into Siam cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty. The country was early influenced by Indian culture and Buddhism must have penetrated from neighbouring Burma. There is evidence that in the 8th century the kingdom of Haripunjaya professed Buddhism. Inscriptions dating back to 1300 A.D. attest the presence of Hinayana Buddhism. In 1362 A.D. King Shri Suryavamsha Rama invited a Sangharaja from Ceylon.

In the early centuries of our era, Indian cultural influence stood pre-eminent in the kingdom of Fu-nan which comprised the territory of modern Kamboja, the Laos and a part of Siam, and most probably was of Indian origin. The local kings were called by Indian names, and Mahayana Buddhism and Shaiva cults existed side by side. The empire of the Khmers lasted from the 7th century A.D. to the 13th century, and the ruins of its capital Angkor (capital since 802 A.D.) are some of the greatest monuments on earth. The Indian culture of Fu-nan influenced that of the Khmers who adopted Sanskrit and Pali as literary languages.

In the neighbouring kingdom of Champa, known since the 2nd century A.D., Mahayana Buddhism and Indian culture were equally popular. Here also Sanskrit became the language of culture.

In Annam Buddhism was known since the end of the 2nd century A.D., having reached Annam by sea from India and especially from China by the land route. In the 7th century, Chinese Buddhists propagated extensively the Doctrine, and Tonking became an important intellectual centre.

The Chinese Buddhist pilgrims of the first centuries A.D. speak of a country called Yavadvipa on the sea route from India to China. In those days the name Yavadvipa was used for both Sumatra and Java. In Sumatra Indian cultural influence reached its peak under the Shailendra dynasty of Shrivijaya. The Chinese Buddhist monk I-ching who twice visited the island in 672 and 688-95 A.D. speaks about the influence of the Buddhist Sarvastivada school in the island. In the 7th century Mahayana Buddhism appeared at the court of Shrivijaya.

The neighbouring island of Java was since the 4-5 centuries A.D. open to extensive Indian colonization. The early settlers must have been followers of Hindu Brahmanic sects. The golden age of Buddhism in the island belongs to the 8-10 centuries and the ruins of Borobudur (about 750 A.D.) stand witness to the greatness of this period. In Bali, *Vajrayanic* traditions and rites

are still discernible which show that the island must have once been under Buddhist influence. The island's ancient documents (8-9 century A.D.) belong to Tantric Buddhism.

Such is the brief survey of the humanism of Asia. Of all the cultural movements which sprang on Asia's soil, Buddhism has the undeniable right to be designated by this name. In search of unity, attempting to build new bridges to bring nations together, we should not forget the lessons of the past and should carefully preserve the vestiges of a past unity, and wherever possible kindle anew the sacred fire of cultural unity, of cultural exchange which had once been the cherished achievement of mankind, and is so conspicuously lacking in our modern world.

POLITICS AND PARTIES IN MALAYA

By K. P. KESAVA MENON

INTRODUCTORY

A NEW Malaya has emerged out of the last world war. Although much change is not noticeable in the physical appearance of the country, those who are acquainted with pre-war Malaya will hardly recognize it in its new political and social garb. The chaos and confusion that entered in some parts of the country after the capitulation of the Japanese have not yet completely disappeared. It was hoped that the end of the world war would see Malaya on the road towards peaceful progress. But the country is passing through a very critical phase in her history at the present time. Rebel activities hold out a constant threat to the country's security. Innocent people are being mercilessly murdered. Bandits are roaming all over the country. Emergency laws are being freely invoked to meet the unprecedented situation. The authorities are straining every nerve to restore peace in the country. Yet peace is not in sight. What a contrast to the peaceful Malaya of pre-war days!

Formerly, Malaya consisted of the Colony of the Straits Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, the Federated Malay States of Perak, Selengor, Negri-Sembilan and Pahang and the Unfederated States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganau and Perlis. The Colony of the Straits Settlements was directly administered by the British through a Governor. In his capacity as High Commissioner, he exercised his functions through the British Resident in each of the four Federated States. With regard to the Unfederated States in Malaya, he exercised his function as High Commissioner through the Adviser in each State. In the Colony, legislation was enacted by the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements and in the Federated Malay States by the Federal Government. The Unfederated States had each a State Council which enacted the legislation for the State.

With the Japanese occupation of Malaya began the iron rule of a ruthless military power which brought about a sort of artificial uniformity in the administration of the country. There was a rapid growth of political feeling which

never existed before. But this feeling had to be suppressed as it could not be given expression to. There was a sign of relief when the news of the Japanese capitulation reached Malaya about the middle of August 1945. People rejoiced and thought that freedom and plenty would return to Malaya with the defeat of the Japanese. But they were disappointed. Industrial unrest and political terrorism began to sweep over the country with increasing intensity after the reconquest of Malaya by the British.

It was in the midst of this confusion that the British Government sent to Malaya Sir Harold Mac Michael as Special Representative of His Majesty's Government, 'to invite each Malay Ruler's co-operation in the establishment of fresh constitutional organization of Malaya intended to ensure and facilitate the progress of the people of the country towards unity and ultimate self-government within the British Empire.' It was considered necessary that the then existing system of government had to be changed. In view of the increasing complexity of the modern administrative, economic and social developments, there was need for a close political integration of the many separate units of Malaya. So it was proposed that (a) Singapore, being a centre of entrepôt trade on a very large scale, should, at least for the time being, be made a separate Colony; (b) the Settlements of Penang and Malacca should be administered with the nine Malay States in a Malayan Union; and (c) a form of common citizenship to include all those irrespective of race who regarded Malaya as their true home and the object of their loyalty must be established.¹

These proposals, excepting the question of common citizenship, were given effect to on the termination of the Military Administration in Malaya on 1 April 1946. The reforms, however, were not favourably received by the people as a whole. The separation of Singapore from the mainland was seriously objected to by certain sections and the creation of the Malayan Union was bitterly attacked by the Malays in all parts of the Peninsula, on the ground that the country would be dominated by non-Malays. Protracted negotiations followed between the representatives of the Government and the Rulers of the Malay States and the Malay leaders as a result of which substantial agreements were arrived at on major issues.

Accordingly, fresh arrangements were made for the government and administration of the Malay States in conjunction with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca, Singapore having been already made a separate Colony. Agreements were entered into on 21 January 1948 by the British Government with the Rulers of each of the Malay States severally (called the State Agreement) and further with all of them (called the Federal Agreement). That is how the Federation of Malaya came into existence on 1 January 1948.

Before proceeding further it will be advantageous to give a brief outline of the main features of the constitution of the Colony of Singapore and the Federation of Malaya.

¹ *Malaya, Statement of Policy for the Future Constitution of the Malayan Union and the Colony of Singapore.*

CONSTITUTION OF THE COLONY OF SINGAPORE

The Governor of the Colony is the administrative Head of the Colony of Singapore. There is a Legislative Council consisting of the Governor as President and twenty-two other members, nine of them being officials and 13 non-officials. Of the unofficial members four are nominated by the Governor and nine elected as follows:-

Six are elected by territorial and communal constituencies and the remaining three by the European, Chinese and Indian Chambers of Commerce. Voting is by universal adult suffrage of persons who are British subjects above the age of 21 years.

The Colony is governed on behalf of the Crown by the Governor assisted by the Executive Council.

The Governor in exercise of his powers and authority has to consult the Executive Council. But he is not bound to follow their advice and may even act in opposition thereto.¹

There is in and for the colony a court of unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction called the Supreme Court which is a Court of Record consisting of a High Court and a Court of Appeal.

CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA

We will now turn to the constitution of the Federation of Malaya.

The Central Government of the Federation of Malaya comprises a High Commissioner, a Federal Executive Council and a Federal Legislative Council. In each Malay State the Government consists of the Ruler of the State, a State Executive Council and a Council of State with legislative powers. Similarly, in each of the Settlements there is a Settlement Council with legislative powers.

The Federal Executive Council consists of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary as ex-officio members, four official members and seven unofficial members.

The Federal Legislative Council consists of the High Commissioner as President, three ex-officio members, eleven official members, and fifty unofficial members, nine Malay Presidents of the Councils of State and one Representative of each of the Settlement Councils. The unofficial members are nominated to the Council by the High Commissioner to represent groups, interests, and activities. It is intended that nomination should at an early date give place to a system based on election. The allocation of seats would give Malays twenty-two seats, Chinese fourteen, Indians five, Europeans seven, Ceylonese one and Eurasians one. It should not be forgotten that nine Presidents of the Councils of State will always be Malays.

Just as in the Colony of Singapore, there is, for the Federation also, a court of unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction called the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya, consisting of a High Court and Court of Appeal.

There is a State Executive Council and the Council of State with legislative

¹ *The Singapore Colony Order-in-Council*, 1946, p. 48.

powers in each State. The State Executive authority which will be exercised by the Ruler of each State will extend to all matters which are not included in the sphere of Federal authority.

The Council of State may pass laws on every subject other than those in respect of which the Federal Legislative Council has power to pass laws. There is also a Council in each Settlement with similar powers and functions.¹

The qualifications for Federal citizenship have now been made clear. Malays who are the subjects of a Ruler of any State are automatically Federal citizens. A large number of non-Malays born and permanently resident in the Federation are also Federal citizens by operation of law. Provision has also been made for any person who is over 18 and who is not already a Federal citizen to become one by applying for a certificate of citizenship provided he fulfils certain conditions.

THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL

The policies of Government as between the Malayan Union and the Colony of Singapore are harmonized and co-ordinated by the Commissioner-General. Besides the Malayan units and Singapore, other territories such as Sarawak and British North Borneo also come within the sphere of his jurisdiction. The Commissioner-General will not have any direct administrative functions. But he will have the power of co-ordination and direction and also power to convene conferences of Governors whenever occasions arise for the same.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF MALAYA

It will be useful to know something about the composition of the population of Malaya² in order to appreciate the post-war politics of the country. The population of Malaya is 6,034,840 according to the latest official estimate. Out of a population of 5,051,579 in the Federation of Malaya 43.7 % are Malays, 38.6 % are Chinese, 11 % are Indians, 5.4 % are Malaysians and the remaining consist of Europeans, Eurasians and others.

The population of Singapore is 983,261. It has increased under the war but its composition remains basically the same. Of the total population 77.5 % are Chinese, 7.9 % are Malays, 7.6 % are Indians, 4.5 % are Malaysians and the rest Europeans and Eurasians and others.

The three principal races in Malaya are the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. Each race has, of course, its own peculiar traditions and characteristics. The Malays, for instance, are described as 'Nature's gentlemen'. They like simple life and easy ways and many of them work as chauffeurs and policemen. There are also among them some professional men and public servants holding high positions under the Government. The Chinese, unlike the Malays, are very pushful and industrious and hard-working. The business of the country is mainly in their hands. They have a wonderful adaptation

¹ *Federal Government, Federation of Malaya Government Gazette*, 5 February 1948.

² The word 'Malaya' is used here so as to include the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore.

and immense enduring capacity. You will find them in all walks of life in Malaya. Their energy and enterprise contributed not a little to make Malaya what it is today. About 80 % of the Indians are labourers from South India. The rest are made up of merchants, traders, clerks, contractors and professional men. They are politically far more conscious than either the Chinese or the Malays.

MALAYA AFTER THE WAR

Malaya had no politics worth the name before the war. People were interested only in their businesses, clubs and sports. A remarkable change was brought about by the war. There was an immediate boiling up after the war and parties and associations began to spring up with amazing rapidity determined to play their respective part in shaping the destiny of Malaya.

It is well-known that the British, before they surrendered to the Japanese in February 1942, freely distributed arms and ammunition among the Chinese so that they might use them against the Japanese aggressors. During the occupation days these Chinese were living in the jungles of Malaya and carrying on guerilla warfare much to the annoyance of the Japanese.

When the time came for the Japanese to lay down their arms they did the same thing as the British. They too distributed arms and ammunition to these guerillas to enable them to carry on their fight for independence against the British. These guerillas were trained and led by the Malayan Communist Party which came out of the occupation with a programme for national liberation. Columns of Chinese guerillas—the Three-Star Men—paraded through the public roads in some places proclaiming the independence of Malaya. The men wore a head-dress with three stars symbolizing the three important communities of Malaya—Chinese, Malays and Indians. Their objective was the establishment of a worker's Republic in which the labouring classes of all the three communities would equally participate without any distinction. When they found that there was no response from the general public for the Communist Party's objective, they dropped the idea for the time being and retreated into the jungles from there to carry on underground work which they had been successfully doing ever since.

In the meantime, labour was being organized all over Malaya with unprecedented thoroughness and enthusiasm. The labourers cast off their former docility and timidity and began to formulate their demands not only for increased wages but also for guarantees that workers in the rubber plantations and tin mines would not be dismissed except with the consent of the Unions concerned. A new spirit of militancy was clearly noticeable among them.

The situation was further complicated by the blow which was struck when the Japanese currency, popularly known as the 'Banana Money' was demonetized. People, especially the poorer classes, suddenly realized that what they had put by had become valueless. The shortage of food-stuffs, low wages and high prices, all contributed to bring about a situation which stimulated labour troubles and widespread strikes.

The British with their inherent shrewdness correctly appraised the new situation and declared 'that they were working towards the government of

the people of Malaya, by the people of Malaya, for the people of Malaya.' The Commissioner-General of South-East Asia, the Rt. Hon. Mr. Malcolm McDonald in a broadcast speech on 'Britain and Asia' said: 'We shall support with all our hearts any movement seeking to associate the Malays, the Malayan Chinese and other communities, who owe undivided loyalty—unswerving allegiance—to Malaya in a brotherhood of all the peoples of this country inspired by a common patriotism. We look forward to the day when they may take their place beside the other self-governing peoples in the British Commonwealth. That is a promise. We shall not break it.'

POLITICAL PARTIES IN MALAYA

The three major communities realizing that their success in achieving self-government for Malaya will depend on their unity and strength began the work of organizing their political parties with greater thoroughness than in the past.

Political parties in Malaya are organized on communal basis. There are some political organizations such as the Progressive Party of Singapore in which membership is open to all races; but they are not very many. Chinese, Indians and Malays have all their respective political organizations, and some communities have more than one. We will now attempt to give a brief account of the more important of these political organizations.

The United Malays National Organization: The United Malays National Organization (U. M. N. O.) about which we hear a great deal in these days came into existence in March 1946. It was organized by Dato Onn bin Jaffer the 55-year-old Prime Minister of the State of Johore. It will be remembered that Sir Harold Mac Michael arrived in Malaya in October 1945 as the Special Representative of His Majesty's Government and concluded formal agreements with the Sultans of the various Malay States. The Malays opposed the proposals and carried on a vigorous agitation against the Malayan Union. It was mainly due to the efforts of U. M. N. O. that the British Government changed the character of the Malayan Union by making it the present Federation of Malaya. This success considerably enhanced the prestige of U. M. N. O. and increased its influence. The Malays who were politically dormant till then became awake and rallied round the banner of Dato Onn, their political leader who typified in himself 'the emergence of nationalism among the Malays and their new political aspirations.' The U. M. N. O. is about 100,000 strong. Its influence is mostly with the Feudal Chiefs, aristocrats, members of the middle class and the intellectuals. It has little mass following. All the same it is the largest political association of the Malays.

On 31 January 1948, on the eve of the inauguration of the Federation of Malaya, Dato Onn in a message to his countrymen welcomed the Federal constitution, as it would, in his opinion, take the people of Malaya towards the goal of self-government. But a year's working of the Federal constitution appears to have changed the views of Dato Onn. In his address to

¹ *Britain and Asia*, Published by the Department of Public Relations, Kuala Lumpur.

the General Assembly of U. M. N. O. in August 1949, he placed independence as the new goal for Malaya.

In order to give his organization a national character an amendment of major significance was made recently in the constitution of the U. M. N. O. Provision was made in the constitution to permit non-Malays to become members of the organization provided they are Federal citizens. It is doubtful whether this gesture on the part of U. M. N. O. will give it the wholehearted support of the non-Malays. But the amendment referred to above would show that the Malays have realized that the political salvation of the country will depend on the agreement and harmony of all the communities in Malaya.

The Malay Nationalist Party: There is another Malay political organization known as the Malay Nationalists' Party (M. N. P.) It claims far more membership than the U. M. N. O. Its influence is more felt among the masses—the Kampong Malays, the peasantry and the labouring classes of Malays. It is leftist in its politics and it stands for a Federation comprising Malaya, Indonesia, Sarawak and British North Borneo. It wants to allow Malayan nationality to non-Malay residents of Malaya who are prepared to swear undivided loyalty to Malaya. The party was very active before the Emergency Laws came into force. Many of its leading members are under detention. The party rarely shows any activity now.

*The Malayan Chinese Association :—*The Chinese are better organized than any other community in Malaya. The interests of the domiciled Chinese numbering more than half of the Chinese population are not identical with those of the immigrant Chinese. The domiciled class are taking more and more to European ways and culture; but the immigrant Chinese still retain their old Chinese ways and outlook. The Chinese have their provincial associations, their craftsmen and traders guilds. But none of them is a political body. Chinese opinion was usually expressed before the war through local Chinese Chambers of Commerce.

The domiciled Chinese were divided, as they were in their own country, into those who belonged to the Communist Party and those who were followers of the Kuomintang. None of the political parties which involved themselves in Chinese politics is active now. There is only one major Chinese political organization in Malaya to-day—the Malayan Chinese Association (M. C. A.) under the leadership of Mr. Tan Cheng-Lock, a veteran Chinese politician of distinction and experience. Mr. Tan Cheng-Lock was for a long time one of the ablest members of the old Straits Settlements Legislative Council. He was in India during the war and on his return to Malaya after the war he plunged into politics again.

For the first time in the history of Malaya, Malayan Chinese representatives from all parts of Malaya met at Kedah in February 1949 and decided to form 'an organization on a Pan-Malayan basis with the twin fundamental objectives of bringing about cohesion and unity among the Malayan Chinese of all classes and of promoting inter-racial goodwill, harmony and co-operation for the sole good of Malaya and its inhabitants as a whole.'

Any Chinese who has resided in Malaya for five years can become a member

of the Association. It claims a membership of more than 50,000 at the present time and it is the most representative association of the Chinese in Malaya including among its members nearly all the recognized Chinese leaders in the country. It has been a great help to the Government in solving the squatter problem and in suppressing and eliminating the bandits.

On 3 September 1949, Mr. Tan Cheng-Lock made a statement declaring the creation of an independent Dominion of Malaya within the framework of the British Commonwealth as the goal towards which the people of Malaya should work. It is very significant that this statement followed a similar utterance made by Dato Onn as President of the U. M. N. O. in August 1949.

The Malayan Indian Congress: South Indians form nine-tenths of the total Indian population. Malaya depends mainly on immigrant labour for the working of its two key industries—tin and rubber. The Chinese predominate in mines and the South Indians on the plantations and in the Government Public Works Departments engaging labour.

Quite a network of Indian Associations existed in Malaya before the war. But they took little interest in the politics of Malaya. These associations consisted mainly of clerks, business men and a few professionals. They fought shy of politics with the result that the activities of these associations were confined to the social side and sports. It was felt however that Indians must have a central organization to safeguard their political rights and to represent the Indian community of Malaya in all matters concerning their general welfare. A body known as the Central Indian Association of Malaya was therefore created about 15 years ago. That had been doing very useful work to the community before the commencement of the war. There was an attempt to revive its activities after the war. But it was felt that a bigger and more representative organization was necessary for Indians to play their proper part in the post-war politics of Malaya. Accordingly the Malayan Indian Congress (M. I. C.) was started soon after the war.

It was Mr. John A. Thivy who took the initiative in the matter and he became its first President before he took up his present appointment as the Representative of the Government of India in Malaya. The Malayan Indian Congress has a network of branches throughout Malaya and it is the one organization in Malaya which can claim to represent Indians of all classes. It stands for democratic government for Malaya and it appeals to all Indians to co-operate with other communities in working for this end. The membership is open to all Indians above the age of 18 and there is a large number of Indians on its rolls as members, though it is doubtful whether the membership is as large today as it was some time ago. Mr. Thivy led the party with faith and enthusiasm for some time until he was succeeded by Mr. Budh Singh who is now the President of the Malayan Indian Congress.

Mr. Budh Singh feels that the Congress needs revitalizing. There appears to be a growing tendency for disintegration which, if not checked in time, might weaken the Congress. The reason for this tendency is, according to Mr. Budh Singh, the impossibility of framing a programme that can meet the needs of two interests. It cannot serve effectively either the interest of

Indians who do not consider Malaya as their real home or those who do. Accordingly, at the third annual session of the Congress held in Kuala Lumpur in August 1949 Mr. Budh Singh brought a proposal to amend the constitution of the Congress by confining its membership only to Indians who hold Malaya as their home and the object of their loyalty. Other Indians who wished to work for the Congress could do so, Mr. Budh Singh suggested, by becoming Associate-members without the right to vote.

It is said that if these changes are made in the constitution it will strengthen the relationship of Indians with other communities and it will also increase the confidence of Indians in the Congress organization thereby making it more useful and effective.

The proposals were vigorously opposed by a large section of Indians in Malaya on the ground that if they were carried out it would destroy the unity of Indians in Malaya. If the Malayan Indian Congress is not so active and vigorous today as it was in the beginning, the reason for its activity must be found elsewhere and not in its constitution. If it is restricted to the domiciled class only, there is every possibility of its growing weaker and less useful.

Further consideration of this amendment was postponed for the time being. Those Indians who support Mr. Budh Singh feel that the strength of the Chinese Malayan Association is mostly due to the fact that its membership is confined to Malay-born Chinese. A similar adjustment in the Malayan Indian Congress, they think, will help to strengthen it.

The Ceylonese Federation: Though not numerically strong the Ceylonese—especially the Jaffna Tamils—have organizations of their own in different parts of Malaya. The Ceylonese in Malaya are employed mostly in Railways, Government Offices and in the estates. There are also a few professionals and business men among them. They have a central organization known as the Ceylonese Federation of Malaya (C. F. M.) to look after the interest of the Ceylonese communities as a whole. The Hon'ble Mr. E. E. C. Thuraisingam, a Ceylonese lawyer, is its President. He also represents the Ceylonese community in the Federal Legislative Council.

The Communities Liaison Committee: A brief mention may also be made about the Communities Liaison Committee (C.L.C.) Malaya has been always famous for its communal harmony. It became very essential not only to preserve it but also to strengthen it on account of the present disturbed state of the country. To this end some leading men of different communities have combined together to form what is known as the Communities Liaison Committee. The Committee originally consisted of six Malays, six Chinese, one Indian, one European and one Ceylonese. But there is no Indian in the Committee now. Mr. E. E. C. Thuraisingam is its Chairman. It is formed primarily for the purpose of assisting and advising the Government in dealing with matters connected with the Emergency. An attempt is also being made to utilize it as the mouthpiece of the people of Malaya in giving expression to their common political aspiration. It was reported in the papers recently that the Communities Liaison Committee

held meetings at Johore Bahru on 14-16 September 1949 discussing political aspects of the inter-communal problems in the Federation of Malaya and issued a communiqué through the Public Relations Department, Singapore, to the effect that it was the agreed view of the Committee that the aim of the Federation of Malaya should be the attainment of self-government with sovereign status and the creation therein of a nationality.

Though there are some leading men of Malaya in the Committee, it cannot claim any popular support. It is an officially sponsored body. The Commissioner-General attends its sittings regularly as an observer. Further, its meetings are held within closed doors and are not open to the Press.

POLITICAL PARTIES OF SINGAPORE

After the separation of Singapore from the mainland of Malaya, the Colony is having its own politics and political parties. The introduction of the elective system to a limited extent in the Legislative Council and the Municipality of Singapore has helped the formation of new political parties.

The Progressive Party of Singapore (P. P. S.) was organized at the time of the first general election to the new Legislative Council early in 1948. This is perhaps the only political party in the Colony which is organized on a non-communal basis. It is a party of the upper middle class deriving its support from the local-born employees in the Government and semi-Government departments and of the clerical class. The membership is open to all classes and to all races without any distinction—Chinese, Indians, Malays, Ceylonese, Eurasians and Singalese. It stands for the abolition of the colour bar to higher posts in the Government and for the employment of more and more local born people in the Government services of the Colony. The party is led by Mr. C. C. Tan, a Chinese lawyer, who is its President and Mr. John Laycock, a European lawyer who has a long record of faithful service to Singapore and its people. The party has no mass following. All the same, it is the best organized political party in the Colony of Singapore.

The Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce :—Though not a political body, the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce has a great influence in the politics of Singapore. It has the right to elect a representative to the local Legislative Council. Mr. R. Juma Boy, a well-known Indian resident of Singapore, is its President, and he also represents the Chamber in the local Legislative Council.

Trade Unions :—Trade Unions do not come within the category of political parties. But in dealing with the political parties of Malaya at the present time one cannot avoid a brief mention of the Trade Unions of Malaya. In order to understand the Trade Union movement in Malaya it is necessary to know something about its background and history. Labourers are drawn from the three principal races of Malaya—Chinese, Malays and Indians. The standard of living of the average worker in the pre-war days was low, though it was slightly better than in the surrounding countries. There were strikes among the labourers for higher wages and better amenities, but they were not very frequent. With the war an inevitable change was brought about in their

attitude and outlook. The cost of living after the war, it has been officially estimated, has increased by 300 to 400% and the wage increase did not keep pace with it.

The Trade Union movement in Malaya has its connexion with (i) old established Chinese Guilds and Secret Societies (ii) the Pre-war Societies and Associations and Clubs (iii) the Anti-Japanese fighting units of the occupation period; and (iv) the new organizations formed under the Trade Union Ordinances.¹

In 1928, the Malayan Government began the reorganization of societies and many of the societies reorganized under the new dispensation became Trade Unions in function though not in name. Indian labourers in Malaya did not show the same interest as the Chinese to form associations of their own. The few associations they had, were organized on anything but Trade Union basis. Unlike the Chinese Guilds, there were no associations for Indians which could have developed into a Trade Union.

The Japanese occupation had a profound effect on the Trade Unions in Malaya. When Malaya was liberated by the British the labourers who were saturated with new ideals and new ideas of freedom began to organize on a wide scale. Encouragement was given by the Government for the formation of responsible democratic Trade Unions and with this purpose in view, a Trade Union Adviser's Department was opened.

The Communists, however, took the view that they should control the Trade Unions in Malaya, and they did dominate them for a time. It was only after the Emergency that the movement was freed of its Communist control.

According to the Trade Union Adviser of Malaya, Communist activities of the Malayan Trade Union movement were successfully fought out a year ago. It is now free of the Communist influence. Over 62.5 % of the local membership of the Malayan Trade Unions is at present Indian.

The Malayan Communist Party: The Malayan Communist Party was formed in 1928. It was not making much headway until the war started. At the time of the Japanese invasion of Malaya, the party offered its services to the Government, and the offer was accepted. The party consisted mostly of the Chinese. After the fall of Singapore they withdrew to the jungles and there they remained during the occupation period occasionally coming out to the country at night to harass the Japanese and to kill them. During the 3½ years' stay in the jungles of Malaya these young men received thorough training in Communist ideals and tactics. The ranks of the Communists were swelled by all sorts of people including rebels and bandits who sought refuge in the hills. There were also some Malays and Indians among them though their number was insignificant.

While fighting the Japanese in the jungles, they were preparing for the establishment of a Soviet Communist Republic of Malaya, after the war. With

¹ *Labour and Trade Union Organization in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore*, by S. S. Awberry and F. W. Dalley, p. 19.

this object in view they decided to have their men in all labour unions and places of employment. After the surrender of the Japanese forces in August 1945 the guerrillas came out of the jungle and got control of most places in Malaya. "The most gruesome part of the "Communist" programme was the cleaning up of "Traitors and running dogs", the informers, detectives, blackmailers, sub-inspectors, sergeants and third degree experts, under the Japanese régime. Condemned dogs were put into pig's cages, carried all round the town and then butchered before the crowd¹. They were the *de facto* Government of Malaya for about two months after the surrender of Singapore. Their authority was unquestioned until they were either disarmed or disbanded. The party however continued their activities in other spheres with the object of achieving their end, namely, the establishment of a workers' Republic in Malaya. They had their men in almost all the Trade Unions, from miners and plantation workers to sweepers and scavengers. Today the Communists are no longer in the open. Their party is banned. About 95 % of the armed terrorists are Chinese and more than half of them are aliens in Malaya.

To combat the terrorists the Government declared a state of Emergency in Malaya. All persons in Malaya now must have their identity cards with them and their photographs. Failure to obtain a card will mean imprisonment or fine or both. Large number of constables of all races have been enrolled to assist the police and military. Regulations have been made to repatriate any person assisting the Communists in any way. The High Commissioner for Malaya Sir Henry Gurney told the Federal Legislative Council early in October last that over 15,000 people had been eliminated from active participation in banditry during the past year. Of these nearly 10,000 had been repatriated to China, being foreign born Chinese.

Thousands of British troops, Gurkha soldiers, special constables and Kampong guards are engaged in fighting the rebels. Yet the terrorists go on relentlessly with their work of plunder, arson and murder. The Commissioner-General, the Rt. Hon. Mr. Malcolm McDonald said a few weeks ago that the number of terrorists including their sympathizers would not exceed 10,000. Why with all the resources of the Government they are unable to put down the rebels and to restore peace in the country is a question to which we are still waiting for an answer. Sir Henry Gurney frankly admitted before the Federal Council that 'nobody supposed that the final elimination of the trouble from these dense jungle areas is going to be quick or easy'.

The Future of Malaya: More than a year ago, when I was about to leave Malaya for India a British friend of mine asked me how long more in my opinion the British were likely to remain in Malaya. It was a difficult question to answer. I said it might take five to ten years more before the British quit Malaya. My friend was obviously surprised at my answer and said 'Do you think it will take so long as that?' That question came from one who had been in Malaya for over 25 years and who knew the country and its people very well. Considering the rapidity with which events are moving in

¹ *Malaya Upside down* by Chin Kee Onn, p. 203.

Malaya, one would hesitate to predict the future of that country with any degree of certainty.

The leaders of the three important races in Malaya—Malays, Chinese and Indians—have all declared self-government for Malaya as their immediate goal. The existence of many races in the country they do not consider to be an obstacle for the realization of their aim. It is quite possible to build up a political structure in which Malayan tradition, communal amity and progressive democracy could harmoniously unite. 'Multi-nation States like Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Canada provide encouraging examples of countries where different races have succeeded in combining freedom with unity.' Malaya has a tradition of tolerance and inter-communal goodwill. The three great races have been and are like three parallel streams running side by side without meeting each other. They know that racial unity is essential in Malaya before it can get its independence. But this unity is yet to be accomplished.

Malaya is a country with four languages, Malayu, Chinese, Tamil and English. Malayu is the common language for all races and it is a great factor in promoting mutual understanding between the races. The educated people of all the important communities in Malaya can speak English and it is a great help to bring together the leaders of the various races on a common platform to plan their common future and to decide common lines of action.

At present the longing for independence is confined to the intelligentsia of all the races. But they are receiving ever widening support from people of all classes. Momentous changes which are taking place in the neighbouring countries have, of course, influenced and are influencing the course of events in Malaya. Burma has become a Republic. India will soon be one. Siam has been an independent country for centuries. Indonesia has cast off the Dutch domination and is rising up as an Independent Republic. A great struggle is going on in Indo-China to free itself from the clutches of France and join the ranks of free countries in South-East Asia. Dramatic changes are taking place in China under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung which may have far-reaching consequences not only in shaping the destiny of China but also in deciding the fate of the whole of South-East Asia. Would Malaya remain long as a Colony of the British without asserting her right to independence?

Is Malaya able to stand on her own legs when the British support is withdrawn? With all their resources in men, money and machinery the British find it difficult to put down the terrorists and to check the growing menace of Communism. Where would Malaya be without such resources? These are questions which agitate the minds of many well-wishers of Malaya.

What Malaya lacks is a common outlook among the various races and readiness to present a united front. The people are still communal in their outlook and have not yet become national. They consider themselves as Malays, Chinese, Indians or Eurasians and not as Malayans. So long as they have that feeling the advent of independence is likely to be delayed. The factors to bring about a common feeling of unity are already there but it

will take a little more time for those factors to produce the necessary result. Until then the British will have to remain in Malaya. That was why I said to my British friend that it might take five to ten years more for the British to quit Malaya. New factors might intervene to hasten the speed. About this, we cannot be certain now.

The three important political parties—the United Malay National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress—must join together and present a united front. The tendencies which are unfortunately noticeable now are not conducive to achieve this end. The U. M. N. O. which stands for the Malays wants non-Malays to join it in order to give it a national character. Some prominent non-Malays have already joined it. But this fact is not likely to give it a national character. There may be a similar gesture on the part of the Malayan Chinese Association asking non-Chinese to join it, and the Malayan Indian Congress might follow suit. Would this method help to create genuine nationalism in Malaya? These organizations are not likely to lose their communal character by such ingenious methods. The Malays must consider that non-Malays who regard Malaya as their home and their object of loyalty have as much right in the country as the Malays themselves. The various communal bodies, though they all have the same political aspiration, are fundamentally dissimilar in their social outlook and economic ideas. It is not likely that they will all join one political organization to carry on their fight for independence. The next best thing would be for leading representatives of the various communal organizations to form a common political body to speak on behalf of the people of Malaya as a whole. If some such body is created and if it makes a united demand on behalf of the people of Malaya, Britishers will find it difficult to resist their demand. That is bound to come sooner or later, perhaps sooner than later.

Would Communism overtake Malaya when she gains her independence? That will, to a very great extent, depend on the situation in China. There is no doubt that once the British power is taken away from Malaya, the Chinese will become the dominant people of that country. With their numerical strength, organizing ability and adventurous spirit they are bound to play a great part in shaping the destiny of Malaya. With Communism sweeping the face of China in full strength, it is idle to imagine that it will leave Malaya alone. The forces working for a Communist Malaya are already there. They are only kept under control by the British. When that power is withdrawn there is every possibility of Malaya becoming an easy prey to Communism.

LADAKH¹

By DWARKANATH KACHRU

THE object of this talk is not merely to acquaint the members of the Central Asia Group of the Indian Council of World Affairs with the life and social institutions of the people of Ladakh, but mainly to cultivate interest in and draw the attention of serious-minded Indians in this country to some of the special problems of India's foreign policy and defence. For Ladakh has come to occupy a place in Central Asia which makes it extremely interesting from many points of view. Being the principal trade route between India and many Central Asian countries it has become of particular interest to us because of the tremendous political changes and upheavals taking place around it in the various countries and possibilities with which the situation in these regions is pregnant.

The problem of Ladakh has, therefore, to be viewed and understood in the context of a rapidly developing situation which is extremely dynamic.

I. GEOGRAPHICAL AND GENERAL

Ladakh District, speaking strictly from the point of view of the administrative division of the Jammu and Kashmir State, consists of a much larger area. The district as a whole covers an area of 45,762 sq. miles, more than half the area of the entire State. On the north and north-east it is covered by the Great Karakoram Range on the other side of which lies the Chinese Province of Sinkiang. To the east is Tibet with which it has ethnological links. To the north-west lie the Ranges of Hispar, Rakaposhi and Haramosh. Beyond these Ranges lie the various *illagas* of Gilgit Agency. On its western boundaries lie the remaining parts of the Jammu and Kashmir State with the Great Himalayan Range extending in between. Towards its south it is bounded by the territories of the East Punjab and the District of Kishtwar in Jammu.

The District of Ladakh as at present constituted consists of three tehsils—Ladakh, Kargil and Skardu. Ladakh tehsil is the largest with an area of nearly 33,000 sq. miles. It consists mainly of mountains, rocks, rocky low lands and vast sandy belts. Inhabited areas are found at very high altitudes; Leh, the principal town, itself being situated at an altitude of 11,558 ft. It is the headquarters of the district as well as of the tehsil. During the British régime Leh was also the summer headquarters of the British Joint Commissioner who along with the State's *Wazir-i-Wazarat* disposed of all matters concerning the respective Governments. Buddhists form an overwhelming—90%—part of the population of this area.

Kargil tehsil is to the west of Ladakh and to the south of Skardu. It is also mountainous and many of its villages are situated at altitudes exceeding 10,000 ft. The tehsil headquarters is at Kargil which is over 8,500 ft. Its area is a little over 7,000 sq. miles. Balti Muslims form an overwhelming part of the population of this tehsil.

¹ A talk prepared for a meeting of the Central Asia Group of the Indian Council of World Affairs on 4 August 1949.

Skardu, the third tehsil of the district, is situated to the north-west of the district. Its area is 8,522 sq. miles. This area is usually known as Baltistan and Balti Muslims who are largely Shias form the bulk of the population. It is bounded on its east and north by gigantic mountain ranges with peaks ranging from 20,000 ft. to 28,000 ft. Notable among these mountain ranges are Mt. Godwin-Austen—28,250 ft., Gasherbrum—26,470 ft., Masherbrum—25,660 ft. The inhabited areas in Skardu are at a lower elevation than those in Ladakh and Kargil tehsils. The chief town of the tehsil is Skardu proper situated on the Indus river at an altitude of 7,700 ft.

The rainfall throughout the whole district is too small for agricultural purposes. In Leh it is about 3 inches a year. Cultivation is, therefore, confined only to those areas which can get water for irrigation purposes from mountain streams. There are no forests and during the winter and early spring the whole area is intensely dry and cold.

The rivers, Indus and Shyok, are the two principal rivers of the district. The Indus travels from its source, the Lake Mansarowar, at the foot of the Kailash and travels westwards to Ladakh. It enters Ladakh in the south and takes a north-westerly course entering Khalatse and then moving to the north of Kargil to enter Skardu at Marol. At Marol it is joined by the Suru river which comes from Kargil where it is joined by another small river called the Dras river. From Marol the Indus moves northwards towards Skardu and Gilgit. From Gilgit it flows into Pakistan and finally ends in the Arabian Sea. The other great river of Ladakh is the Shyok which starts in the north in the Nubra Valley and enters Skardu through Khapalul. It joins the Indus at Gol in Skardu.

There are about ten routes¹, recognized and unrecognized, which connect Ladakh with the rest of the world. There is firstly the recognized route² from Kashmir over the Zoji-La (11,580 ft.) *via* Sonmarg in the Sind Valley. This is officially referred to as the Leh Treaty Road. It bifurcates about five miles off Kargil near Kharal. The branch goes north across the Kharal Bridge to Skardu while the main road moves south-east to Leh. At Leh the road moves north through the Nubra Valley and over Khardung-La (18,380 ft) and other Passes finally reaching Yarkand and other parts in Sinkiang in Central Asia.

The next important route³ between India and Ladakh is from Kullu in the East Punjab along the Bias Valley and over the Bara Lacha Pass (16,200 ft.).

Other routes which are mostly unrecognized are from Gilgit Agency through the Indus Valley from Bunji *via* Rundu and Skardu. During the summer another route opens up from the Burzil Pass over the Deosai Planes which bifurcates and leads to Skardu and Kargil. There is yet another route from the Indus north of Skardu which goes over the Banka-La (16,290 ft.) leading to Astor. Most of these routes are, however, summer routes and

¹ *Routes in the Western Himalayas, Kashmir etc.* Vol. 1, by Major Kenneth Mason. pp. 66—118.

² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

for the six months of winter the whole of this area is practically cut off from the rest of the world. Mail service is, however, kept up over the Zoji-La from Kashmir through Dak runners who make hazardous journeys during this season. Another route¹, which was, perhaps in great use in the early days of Dogra rule, lies through Kistwar, the northern area of the Jammu Province. This route lay over Umiasi-La and other passes and through Zanakar Valley in the south.

In the Shyok region in Nubra Valley there used to be a good road from Khapalu in the north to Tigur at the junction of the Shyok and the Nubra rivers. This road was, however, destroyed by floods which resulted in the bursting of the Shyok Dam in 1928. Expert opinion on the behaviour of glaciers seems to suggest that there is no likelihood of further floods in the Shyok region for another 15 years. The Chong Kumdan glacier, the cause of floods in Shyok, is said to be in retreat and not expected to advance until 1968 to 1970 A. D.

The total population² of the District of Ladakh, according to the 1941 figures, is nearly 2 lakhs. There is generally very little increase in the population because of the extreme backwardness of the country. It offers very little scope for expansion. Even the present numbers are supported with great difficulty even at such low standard of living. The population of each of the tehsils is: Ladakh—36,307, Kargil—52,853 and Skardu—106,271.

The chief crops of this area are wheat, barley, grim and buckwheat. Trumba and pulses are grown in small quantities. Wheat and grim are the staple food. Rice and maize are imported from Kashmir and other areas.

Fruit grows in all the three tehsils of Ladakh but the production of fruit is greatest in Skardu. Apricots, mostly produced in Skardu, augment considerably the fruit income. Sun dried apricots and kernels are the chief products. Apples, pears and grapes are also cultivated though in smaller quantities. Grapes also are in abundance in Skardu and Kargil; Skardu being the chief area for grape cultivation as also for mulberry and melons. A large area of Skardu is in fact under gardens and orchards.

Cultivation of fruit and vegetables plays an important part in the economy of the people, particularly in Skardu. Vegetables of different varieties are, however, cultivated extensively. The most widely grown vegetable, however, is turnip. Some foreign vegetables have been introduced and cabbages and cauliflower, brinjals, pumpkins and potatoes flourish greatly.

All cultivation is dependent on irrigation which is extremely undeveloped and scarce. If irrigation is improved, larger areas of land would naturally come under cultivation. Means of communication being extremely poor and backward the movement of essential supplies and trade becomes extremely slow and difficult.

There are no large-scale industries in the district. Namdas are manufactured and exported. Weaving of Pashmina and Pattoos is a cottage industry and a little gold washing is also done. The Pashmina wool which is exported

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

² *Census of India Report 1941*. Vol. XXII, p. 482.

in large quantities to Kashmir and other parts of India comes almost exclusively from Ladakh.

Among the minerals we have sulphur and borax deposits in the Rupshu locality of Ladakh and asbestos at Suru in Kargil. Jade is found in Kargil.

Ladakh also abounds in a large variety of wild animals and birds. Some of these are: Ibex, Red-bear, Markhor, Tibetan antelope, wolf, pigeon, Chakor etc.

A flourishing trade goes on between Sinkiang and the rest of India through Ladakh. Leh is the principal market for Central Asian horses, carpets, namdas, dried fruit and other commodities.

II. HISTORICAL

A brief historical review of the people of Ladakh may now be of some interest.

I have so far dealt with the administrative unit which, besides Ladakh, also consists of the areas of Kargil and Skardu. I should, now, like to deal with Ladakh proper, the social and ethnological unit which has social and cultural links with the rest of Tibet.

Though the people of Ladakh are greatly Tibetanized they are in reality a mixture of three peoples¹—the Aryans who were the ancient Mons from north India and who entered this country through Kashmir; the Dards, who came from Gilgit and the Mongolian elements, the Tibetan nomads and shepherds, who came over from Central Tibet and other parts of Central Asia and hills of Ladakh for grazing their sheep and the yaks. The merger of these three peoples gave rise to the present Ladakhi race.

The period when these early nomads from Tibet entered Ladakh must have been about 400 B. C. These people lived a very simple and a wandering life and depended mainly on their flocks. About 200 B. C. Indians² entered Ladakh and settled down there and built waterways and set up villages. They also cultivated fields. As proof of their settling down in Ladakh we have at present inscriptions in Brahmi characters in the ancient monuments of Ladakh dating back to 200 B.C. These ancient peoples were Mons.

King Ashoka in his time had also sent Buddhist colonizers as early as 272-231 B. C. to Ladakh as *Bhikshus* on a religious mission. These Buddhists settled down in Ladakh and brought to the people traditions of Indian civilizations which were assimilated. Religious and social institutions were set up and monasteries and new villages grew up which converted the barren land into a living place. The Mons who had come about the same time had also erected castles and forts. The Mons also took to cultural activities like sculpture and stupas³. These Mons were a brave lot and did much towards the building up of Buddhism in Ladakh. They also introduced improved methods of irrigation and village organization.

After the Mons the Dards who were also Aryans came from Gilgit and settled down in Ladakh. They were war-like and subdued the Mons and

¹ *The history of Western Tibet* by Rev. A. H. Francke.

² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

³ *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*. Part 1, by A. H. Francke, pp. 54-75.

became virtually the rulers of the land. The Dards left some relics¹ behind as evidence of their links with Gilgit. They were great rock-carvers and drew many animals like ibex on stones in various positions and postures. Likewise they carved horses, lions, etc.

Gradually the Dards began to be assimilated in the local population and with the advance of time became thoroughly Tibetanized. Khalatse was the principal locality established by the Dards. The Dards were also great sportsmen and introduced the game of Polo which persists even to this day. During their long settlement covering several centuries the Dards left many valuable gifts of culture for Ladakh. They also improved the agricultural system of the place.

During this long period of Tibeto-Dard dynasties between the 5th and the 8th centuries A. D. many eminent Buddhists from China also made pilgrimages to India. Notable among these were Fa Hian (400 A. D.) and Hieun Tsang (640 A. D.) They also came to know of Ladakh.

About 800 A. D. Ladakh and Western Turkestan came under the Chinese Empire. But the Tibeto-Dard dynasties controlling the several little kingdoms in Ladakh tried to resist the Chinese domination. About 950 A. D. Ladakh was completely Tibetanized. It had also got split up into numerous petty kingdoms. Leh, however, continued to be ruled by the descendants of the legendary and romantic King Kesar. The principal influences about this period were the kings at Leh; the Dards, ruling at Khalatse and further south and Lama Yaru where the monastery was all powerful. The Tibeto-Dard dynasty came to an end about 1000 A. D. after which Central Tibetans came to rule over Ladakh and continued in power up to 1400 A. D. These kings continued to rule up to 1834 but their rule had nothing particularly noteworthy to offer. A good king generally brought with him prosperity for the people and encouragement to religion and monasteries and a bad king brought poverty, misery and suffering.

In 1834 the Raja of Jammu, Maharaja Gulab Singh, developed some interest in Ladakh and marched an army through Kishtwar in the south of Ladakh to conquer that country². The commander of his army Capt. Zorawar Singh entered Ladakh through Zaskar Valley *via* Kishtwar and in the battle of Sanku on 16 August 1834, defeated Ladakhis. In two successive campaigns he subdued the whole country. The last western Tibetan king named King Tsepel capitulated and Ladakh came under the Jammu State. In 1846 under the Treaty of Amritsar the British sold the Province of Kashmir to Maharaja Gulab Singh and Ladakh consequently became part of the bigger State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since then Ladakh has been an important province of this State.

Ladakh attracted the attention of Europeans³ as well. The first European to visit Leh was a Jesuit named Desideri. He went there in 1715. He was well received by the King but the local people particularly the Muslim traders

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48—77.

² *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, Vol. II, by Rev. A. H. Francke, pp. 127—147; 245—269.

³ *Ibid.* Vol. I. pp. 68—71.

got suspicious of him. They prevailed upon the king and succeeded in undermining the Jesuit's prestige. The Jesuit had in consequence to leave Ladakh and go to Lhasa.

The next European visitor to Ladakh was Moorcroft who went there in 1820 and stayed in Leh for 2 years. This was 14 years before the Dogra conquest of Ladakh. Moorcroft's great ambition in Ladakh was to persuade the Ladakhi king to tender his allegiance to the East India Company. He had succeeded ultimately but the East India Company declined to accept the offer. But Ladakh continued to attract the attention of Europeans and large numbers of them particularly the English have been visiting the country for various purposes. Christian Missions have, however, thrived greatly in Ladakh and though they have tried to do humanitarian work like running hospitals they have also devoted much of their time to the conversion of local people to the Christian faith.

III. LIFE OF THE PEOPLE

Ladakhis are generally agriculturists. But as the country is largely barren, it can support only a small section of the population. Sheep grazing is common on the uplands of Rupshu and is the main source of livelihood for the nomads called 'Chang-Pas' who live in tents made of hides and roam about from place to place with their flocks of long-haired goats and sheep including also their ferocious watchdogs. Every year they make trips to the central marketing place of the province to lay in provisions for the year or to settle accounts with the noblemen whose flocks they tend. Their main food is milk, tea and barley flour. They are hardy, independent and hospitable though at times they become extremely wild.

Agriculture in Ladakh is dependent on canal irrigation. Women work along with their menfolk in the fields and at the time of ploughing or cutting the crops the whole family extends a helping hand. On such occasions the Ladakhi family presents an extremely gay appearance. The whole family including even the children work in the fields. Often they collect together for drinking tea and for eating their food. They sing and dance while they work and while men often do the more strenuous part of the work the women keep them happy and cheerful by bursting forth occasionally into beautiful songs and dances so very peculiar to the place. In the evening when the work in the fields is over, the whole family moves homewards leading their herds of cattle ahead of them. Soon the chimneys begin to smoke and the women begin to cook for the evening while men collect together to drink and enjoy.

Ladakhis are born traders and almost all engage themselves in some sort of trade. Women take equal interest in trade. Men also undertake long journeys for business purposes. Ladakh is particularly rich in salt, which is obtained from a number of salt lakes situated in the region of Rupshu to the south-east of Leh. Wool, of course, continues to be the chief product of export. Religion occupies the central place in the life of a Ladakhi and a thriving trade is, therefore, carried on in images and other cult objects.

Ladakhis are generally the followers of the Red Sect of Lamaism which was founded by Padma Sambhava, an Indian monk. Hemis, about 24 miles to the south of Leh, is the principal monastery of the Red Sect. The Yellow Sect, which is the purer form of Buddhism, also flourishes in certain parts of Ladakh and the principal Yellow Sect monastery, which is held in high esteem, is at Rhezhong, about 35 miles west of Leh.

As religion plays the most dominant rôle in the life of these people the spiritual home of every Buddhist is therefore in Lhasa. All religious inspiration and guidance flows from there. Monasteries which are flourishing townships within themselves are the most important factor in the life of the people. The head of the monastery is called the Kushk who, according to the tradition, never dies. When he dies he is re-born as a reincarnation of himself. Intimation about a dead Kushk's rebirth is received from Lhasa where the Oracle gives the necessary instructions about the place and the date of birth of the Kushk. The Kushk after discovery is brought up under careful guidance under tutors trained in Lhasa. According to tradition the new Kushk must recognize and in fact ask for, his belongings of the previous life. During the various ceremonies connected with his installation various objects of every day use are put before him and he must pick up those used by him in the previous life.

Every Ladakhi family, if it has many sons, generally dedicates the youngest to the monastery. He becomes a monk and enters the monastery with due ceremonies. Women also take to monastic life and become nuns and live in monasteries. They are called 'Chomos.'

Social customs in Ladakh are extremely primitive and backward. Deaths and marriages are accompanied by regular ceremonies and rituals. The hunt for a bride generally starts on the boy's side. After a suitable bride has been found the marriage takes place. The bridegroom, strangely enough, does not go to fetch the bride. He does not even go to solemnize the marriage. He deposes one of his younger cousins who goes through the marriage ritual and brings back the bride. The bride is received with due ceremonies in the house. As polyandry is the prevailing custom, the wife becomes the wife of all the brothers. This custom has, however, been abolished by legislation by the Kashmir Government but it still persists in many parts.

Artistic and cultural life in Ladakh is dedicated primarily to the glorification of the religion. Buddhism in its *Tantrik* form, with many rituals including also emphasis on evil spirits, demons and the like, is the prevailing faith of the people. Artistic activity, therefore, expresses the fear or love of the people towards the supernatural.

There has been no social awakening among the people of Ladakh and this is primarily due to the fact that the people are very backward educationally and deeply steeped in religion. The priests, who are extremely backward and reactionary, play the most important rôle in their life.

Educational facilities in Ladakh are extremely meagre. It is only recently that a Lower High School was established in Leh. Vigorous attempts are

now being made by the popular Government of Kashmir to spread literacy among the people.

Public health is equally extremely poor. Medical facilities are meagre. There is a State hospital and another hospital run by a Missionary Society but these are hardly enough for a place which is stinking with disease and squalor.

Socially Ladakhis are a very jovial and an extremely hard-working and honest people. They are gay and take active part in all manner of sports and entertainments. Hospitality is almost a weakness with them and a traveller is bound to receive a warm welcome in a Ladakhi home no matter what time of the day or night he arrives.

IV. POLITICAL AWAKENING AND PAKISTANI INVASION

Political awakening in the past has been practically non-existent in Ladakh. Ladakhis are a peace-loving people whose general attitude to life is that of complete resignation to fate and circumstances. They were, however, awakened from their slumber by the Pakistani invasion of the State. The invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State by armed bands organized by Pakistan is a matter of history and need not be repeated here. After the fall of Skardu and Kargil in the beginning of 1948 the Pakistani raiders spread their tentacles towards Ladakh and made a two-pronged attack on this peaceful country. It was attacked in the north in the Nubra Valley in the Shyok region and in the west on the main Kargil-Leh Road with intense and active infiltration in the south towards the Zaskar Valley. Ladakh was in a precarious way to start with and the raiders, therefore, advanced quite near to Leh. In the north they came to about 60 miles of Leh and in the south and the west reached as far as 20 and 9 miles respectively. All the monasteries and villages *en route* were sacked and pillaged and Leh, the capital of the province, was in imminent danger. The air strip in Leh had not yet been built and the local garrison which consisted of a small number of troops was indeed in great peril.

In the midst of this crisis the Indian Army assisted by the Kashmir Government played the most spectacular and a gallant rôle. Under extremely hazardous conditions an air strip was hurriedly built on the soft sandy bed at Spitok about 7 miles south of Leh. While the aerodrome was still not quite ready a Royal Indian Air Force plane made a landing there. The first to land there was the G. O. C. of the Indian Army in Kashmir, who made a quick survey of the situation. Arrangements were soon put into effect to rush troops to Ladakh from all possible quarters. A company was hurriedly despatched by air and landed. More troops were marched from Manali side in the East Punjab over the high peaks of Bara-Lacha Pass which entered Ladakh from south in the Zaskar Valley. The Indian Army detachments swelled into companies and soon we had a small unit of Indian Army stemming the tide of invasion.

Side by side with the drafting of these troops the officers of the small company which originally landed in Leh set about the task of recruiting local

people into a Militia. Within a few weeks of brisk recruitment and training a few companies of National Militia, drawn up entirely from the local Buddhists, were put into uniforms and drafted to the front.

The Ladakhis were thus shaken abruptly from their age-old slumber and lethargy and inspired by the gallant deeds of the Indian Army they left their homes and vocations and came out boldly in defence of their hearths and homes and, what is more important to them, their monasteries and their religion.

With the mounting offensive of the Indian Army the tide soon began to turn against Pakistan and the first great crushing blow came from Kashmir where in the famous 'break-through' in the Zoji-La in the first week of November, 1948, the Indian Army chased back the enemy right up to Kargil. The enemy could not, however, make any stand at Kargil also and retreated towards Skardu. The Indian Army pressed on its gains and liberated the whole of the frontier *illagas*—over 40,000 sq. miles—in the brief space of a fortnight. With the crushing defeat of Pakistan in Zoji-La, Dras and Kargil the siege of Leh was lifted and the Pakistani hordes retreated from various fronts of Ladakh also.

By now the Indian Army assisted by the local Militia had also grown into a powerful machine of war in Ladakh and many crushing defeats were inflicted on the enemy in the Nubra and the Zaskar Valleys and on the main road between Kargil and Ladakh. Our Army also developed guerilla tactics in this area and the Ladakh Militiamen proved extremely capable and clever in guerilla warfare.

Ladakh can now boast of a very well-knit and a well-equipped and trained Force of National Militia which is a sure safeguard against all future invasions from the enemy. This organization of the National Militia has given a new sense of perspective and outlook to the people of Ladakh and they have developed confidence and faith in their ability to improve their lot and to advance with the rest of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State.

V. LADAKH AND INDIA

It has already been stated earlier that Ladakh as a frontier outpost in the north of India is of great importance to us. Ladakh is connected with India not only through the Jammu and Kashmir State but also through Lahoul in East Punjab. A brisk trade goes on through both these routes between India and Ladakh and vital contacts both social and cultural exist between these areas and Ladakh.

With Lahoul Ladakh has far more vital links because a large majority of the people of Lahoul profess the same religion as the Ladakhis. People in Lahoul are also Buddhists. They have generally Hindu names but it is significant that each Hindu name carries with it its Ladakhi equivalent. The people in Lahoul have, therefore, two names—the Hindu name and the Buddhist name. The social, commercial and cultural intercourse between the people of Lahoul and the people of Ladakh is, therefore, vital and ever increasing.

Ladakh has also links with Tibet in the east and Chinese Turkestan, particularly Sinkiang, in the north. Trade routes which are thriving channels of free intercourse between the people of Tibet, Sinkiang and Ladakh are, therefore, of special significance. People of Ladakh go to Tibet and to Sinkiang not only for commercial purposes but for social and other purposes also. The people of Sinkiang and Tibet also come to Ladakh. There is always a small colony of Sinkiangis, particularly from Yarkand, permanently resident in Ladakh. To this may, however, be added the large numbers who move with caravans between Sinkiang and Ladakh.

The present civil war in China as it approaches its final stage brings the eventual day of decision for the people of Tibet and Sinkiang nearer. Tibet and Sinkiang are technically parts of China. The Chinese revolution under communist leadership is, therefore, bound to influence the future of Tibet and Sinkiang and largely influences the decisions of the people of these areas. This factor raises important questions for us because the outcome of the Chinese revolution with its consequent repercussions in Tibet and Sinkiang is bound to exercise some influence on the northern frontiers of India.

In this connexion, it is also important to note that the boundaries between Tibet and Ladakh and those between Sinkiang and Ladakh are at places not very clearly defined. Besides this undefined nature of the boundary line there is also the problem of the floating populations on the borders which go on shifting from place to place moving freely from one country to the other. The boundary between Tibet and Ladakh is inhabited by a nomadic people in Chan-Thang who have no settled life and who obey no law. This area is extremely barren and inhospitable and is bound to present a grave problem of administration and peace and security the moment the internal conditions in Tibet itself become uncertain.

In the north in Sinkiang it may be fairly correct to assume that that province has practically joined the Soviet Union either as an ally or as an integral part of Soviet Asia. This fact is bound to exercise considerable influence on the internal conditions of the countries adjoining Sinkiang.

These problems, though not very pressing immediately, are bound to attract our attention in the near future.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S 'POINT FOUR'¹

By V. BALASUBRAMANIAN

I. THE EVOLUTION OF POINT FOUR

POINT FOUR as the words imply was the fourth—and also the final—of the major courses of action, in terms of which President Truman stated his 'programme for peace and freedom', just after he took the oath of office for a new term, on 20 January 1949. The four points were:

First, support to the United Nations and related agencies;

¹ Based on the Seminar discussions held on 14 August 1949 with the World Town Hall Seminar Group at New Delhi.

Second, perseverance in the programme for world recovery, particularly full backing to the European Recovery Programme;

Third, strengthening freedom-loving nations against the dangers of aggression, by working out and collaborating in regional security pacts;

Fourth, a bold new programme for making the benefits of scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas.

It is now nearly a year since the idea of Point Four was thus mooted and it has grown in the meanwhile to be the most important and challenging concept in discussions of East-West cooperation for world peace and progress. Nevertheless, it still remains advantageous to present it for discussion in precisely the words—prudent, pregnant and powerful words—in which President Truman first gave it living substance and form.

Said the President on the memorable occasion already referred to:

More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.... I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.... Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.... We invite other countries to pool their technical resources in this undertaking. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies.... Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labour go into these developments. The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a programme of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.

All the basic elements of the concept are to be found in the passage quoted above. First, there is the promise that the United States will be the leading cooperator in extending Western science and industrial facilities to the economic development of backward areas; but, at the same time it is made clear that Point Four is not intended to be a merely American enterprise, that it is based on the expectation that other advanced nations would fully participate in what is to be a truly international endeavour and that in fact, Point Four projects are meant to be executed in a large part through the accredited organs of international collaboration, the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In the next place, strong emphasis is laid on the point that Point Four will not be a one-way street; economic development is not to be organized and imposed on the backward countries by external agencies, but is to be built up in the main by the resources and enthusiasm of those countries themselves, with the advanced countries providing such of those essential tools for the

job, which they are equipped to provide and which the backward areas are not able to do without, or are not themselves in a position to create immediately or in the near future. Finally, a hint is thrown of a suggestion, more elaborately worked out later, that capital investment for the economic development of the under-developed countries is expected to come forward, in the main, not on an inter-governmental basis, but through private channels; and so it is suggested that, as part of the Point Four programme, a favourable climate for a large and sustained inflow of capital into backward countries should be created through reasonable guarantees to investors—guarantees which, be it noted, will be 'balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labour go into these developments.'

About a month after the inaugural address, on 25 February the 'bold new programme' entered its next important operational stage, when Mr. Willard Thorp, the U. S. delegate, placed before the U. N. Economic and Social Council a resolution for implementing President Truman's proposal for extending technical aid to under-developed countries through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The resolution stated, *inter alia*, that it

Calls upon member governments to promote by all appropriate means the expansion of the international exchange of technical knowledge, especially through the United Nations and its specialized agencies; and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the executive heads of the interested specialized agencies, through the Administrative Committee on Coordination, to prepare a report for the ninth session of the Council setting forth:

- (a) A comprehensive plan for an expanded cooperative programme of technical assistance for economic development through the United Nations and the specialized agencies;
- (b) methods of financing such a programme including special budgets ; and
- (c) ways of coordinating the planning and execution of the programme.

The resolution was adopted on 4 March and immediately thereafter the Secretary-General entered into direct consultations with the Chiefs of the I.L.O., F.A.O., U.N.E.S.C.O., W.H.O., I.C.A.O., International Bank, I.M.F. and the I.R.O. As a result of these consultations, a working party of experts was established to prepare a draft report and on the basis of this draft, a report was agreed upon by the Secretary-General and the executive heads of the specialized agencies concerned at a meeting of the Administrative Committee on Coordination on 18 May 1949. The first part of the report deals with the objectives and nature of the programme, with the fields of work covered, forms of technical assistance which the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the executive heads of the specialized agencies believe their organizations can undertake to provide, if the necessary funds are made available, during the first and second years of 'an expanded cooperative programme of technical assistance for economic development.' Although the

material presented takes the form of projects described in detail, it is clearly understood that the character, size, location and costs of the specific projects, which will actually be undertaken, will depend upon the requests received from Governments and on the resulting negotiations between those Governments and the international organizations concerned. The estimated total cost of the technical assistance proposed in the report amounts to the equivalent of \$ 35.9 million in the first year and \$ 50.1 million in the second year. The report further suggested the creation of a Technical Assistance Committee, consisting of a representative of each participating organization, as a coordinating agency at the international level.

The next move came from President Truman. On 24 June he sent a special message asking Congress to appropriate up to 45 million dollars as the U. S. Government's contribution to the first year's operation of Point Four. The sum recommended, it was stated, would cover both American participation in the programmes of the international agencies and the assistance to be provided directly by the United States. He also recommended that the Export-Import Bank should be authorized to employ its free funds for underwriting U. S. private investments abroad. On 1 July Secretary of State Acheson sent to the Congress a draft 'International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949' as suggested legislation to implement the President's proposals. The draft is in two parts: one which would give the Export-Import Bank the new guarantee power; and one which would authorize the Point Four Programme and create an Institute of International Technical Cooperation in the State Department. The draft does not call for the appropriation of a specific sum, but of 'such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.'

Subsequently, Chairman Burnet R. Maybank of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee and Chairman Brent Spence of the House of Representatives Banking Committee, introduced into the respective Houses bills, which would give the U. S. Export-Import Bank new guarantee power, authorizing that institution to guarantee U. S. private capital 'invested in productive enterprises abroad which contribute to economic development in foreign countries against risks peculiar to such investments'. Action on the second part of the proposed legislation is expected, perhaps, early in the new year.

At the international level, Point Four has advanced by another stage since Secretary-General Lie presented his report on 31 May. When the report came up for discussion at the recent session of the U. N. Economic and Social Council at Geneva, the U. S. delegate, Mr. Willard Thorp, suggested that the most that could be spent effectively by the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the first year would be 15 to 25 million dollars, and not \$36 million, the amount recommended in the report. By August 18 the U. N. technical aid programme had received the approval of the U. N. Economic and Social Council and was ready for discussion and further elaboration at the September session of the U. N. General Assembly. One of the items for consideration by the Assembly is a recommendation for a general conference on technical aid, to be held at U. N. headquarters in New York, to (a) seek to determine the total amount of the voluntary contributions which may be expected for the

first year of the expanded U. N. programme and (b) determine more definitely the proportionate shares of the contributions, which would be allotted to the various participating agencies. All U. N. and non-U. N. countries, which may be members of the specialized agencies would be invited to the conference with the right to vote.

II. WHAT POINT FOUR IS

President Truman's Point Four is an integral part of U. S. foreign policy. It comes as the last of a series of four major U. S. programmes, three of which—support to the United Nations, Marshall Aid and Regional Defence Pacts—are now clearly seen to be among the corner-stones of the Truman Administration's structure of international relations. It has, admittedly, a hard core of politics, international politics. The President's inaugural address made no secret of the international context, or even of the background of the mutual conflict between the two great world power blocs. The reference in that address to the 'false philosophy' of communism unmistakably puts Point Four in its setting of American policy.

Although its purposes have a political slant, its means, undeniably, are intended to be the instruments of economic development. In his message sent to the Congress recommending special legislation to implement Point Four, the President referred to 'the grinding poverty and the lack of economic opportunity for many millions of people in the economically under-developed parts of Africa, the Near and Far East, and certain regions of Central and South America' and proceeded to say: 'All these areas have a common problem. They must create a firm economic base for the democratic aspirations of their citizens. Without such an economic base, they will be unable to meet the expectations which the modern world has aroused in their peoples. If they are frustrated and disappointed they may turn to false doctrines which hold that the way of progress lies through tyranny.' Earlier, Mr. Willard Thorp had stressed before the U. N. Economic and Social Council the international flow of capital and of technology as the chief means of implementing Point Four. The President's inaugural address, of course, laid powerful emphasis on the point that the aim was to enable the aided areas 'to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens'.

This economic development is not to be imposed upon the under-developed areas from without; it has to be secured, in the main, by efforts from within. The phraseology of the inaugural address is significant: 'Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, *through their own efforts*'. The U.S. delegate, Mr. Willard Thorp, told the Economic and Social Council that the 'bulk of the effort, the drive, the organization, the planning and much of the financing must come from the people themselves and their own governments. Again, the U. S. Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Charles Sawyer, explaining to U. S. business men what Point Four meant, said: 'We must have a programme for finding out what kinds of technical assistance other nations want. Other nations know best whether they want and can use technical information we have to offer. Our help will be most useful when other nations ask us for

specific kinds of assistance'. And, the President's Message to the Congress was quite definite : 'Much of the capital required can be provided by these areas themselves in spite of their low standards of living'.

The implementation of Point Four is to be mainly on the plane of international cooperation through the United Nations and its specialized agencies, although the U. S. expects to extend direct assistance as well. This is clear from the procedural development of the programme, from the adoption of the technical aid part of it, at the international level, by the Economic and Social Council and the constitution of the proposed special international body, the Technical Aid Committee, which would be the coordinating organ. All nations are expected to participate, but, in actual practice, it is doubtful whether the U. S. S.R. and the group of countries which follow her lead will be able or disposed to give unreserved cooperation to a programme which has been conceived, in the main, as part of a political strategy for 'containing communism'. The accent, of course, is on U. S. participation, not merely because the major inspiration behind the programme is the foreign policy of the United States, but also because it is the United States which is in a position to contribute—in the short period, at any rate—much of the technical assistance and most of the capital investment that must flow into the under-developed areas in implementation of the U. N. programme of technical and aid as well as Point Four measures outside that programme.

Point Four is not a narrow programme for the industrialization of under-developed areas, although the importance of establishing manufacturing facilities in those areas is not lightly regarded. In Mr. Thorp's words:

Looked at in the large, economic development means the continuous improvement and utilization of the resources and productive capacities of a people for the benefit of the people. It applies to farms as well as to factories. It applies to intellectual advancement as well as physical health. It applies to habits of work and habits of leisure, to the saving of capital and its provident investment.....The habits and attitudes that have fostered economic development have been those of work, saving, venturesomeness and adaptability.....In addition to habits and attitudes economic development depends upon the normally unspectacular functions of Government. They are an essential part of any programme for economic progress; the establishment of internal order, security and justice; the creation of money, credit and fiscal systems; the development of basic systems of communication and transportation; the spread of literacy and higher learning in the arts and sciences; the provision of basic health and social services; the assessment and protection of natural resources....

The instruments of Point Four, in other words, will be made available not only for industrialization, nor even merely for economic development narrowly defined, but also for the larger economic and social purpose of creating a climate of opinion, habits, capacities and activities, which would lead a people to work for and build higher standards of living in a crescendo of material progress.

The emphasis of Point Four is, in the first instance, on technical assistance, but it does not overlook the great importance of capital assistance. Thus, Mr. Thorp declared before the Economic and Social Council :

I have already emphasized that the process of development involves a better use of the world's resources. This may require capital, but it always requires something more—the knowledge needed to put resources to work. Economic development inevitably involves the use of better techniques in agriculture, health and education. Progress in industry, transport, communications and other aspects of a modern economy can only come from the application of modern skills and technology.

President Truman further elaborated the point in his message to the Congress:

The aid that is needed falls roughly into two categories. The first is the technical, scientific and managerial knowledge necessary to economic development. This category includes not only medical and educational knowledge and assistance and advice in such basic fields as sanitation, communications, road-building and governmental services, but also, and perhaps most important, assistance in the survey of resources and in planning for long-range economic development. The second category is production goods—machinery and equipment—and financial assistance in the creation of productive enterprises....The two categories of aid are closely related. Technical assistance is necessary to lay the groundwork for productive investment. Investment, in turn, brings with it technical assistance. In general, however, technical surveys of resources and of the possibilities of economic development must precede substantial capital investment. Furthermore, in many of the areas concerned, technical assistance in improving sanitation, communications or education is required to create conditions in which capital investment can be fruitful.

The international flows of capital, which Point Four seeks to promote, are expected to come, in the main, through foreign investment. International institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, are expected to play an increasingly important rôle in providing capital for under-developed areas and the U. S. Government also expects that the facilities that the Export-Import Bank can provide ought to strengthen the capital resources behind Point Four. But, by and large, no financial assistance or capital investment is expected on a Government-to-Government basis. For the present at any rate, the Truman Administration has no intention of asking the Congress for large appropriations towards Point Four loans or grants to governments in under-developed areas. Placing the accent squarely on the rôle of private investment, Mr. Thorp told the Economic and Social Council:

The American economic system is predominantly a private enterprise system and, as a result, investment even in many publicly-owned projects is arranged through the private capital market, subject to limited public controls and aids. We consider it natural, and desirable, to look to these same private sources to service the foreign field as well.... (Nearly all U. S. private foreign investment) take the form of direct investment abroad by American enterprises, who are expanding or starting operations in other countries. In the light of our present discussion, it is worthy of note that this form of capital flow has

certain advantages, since it carries along with the capital a flow of experience and technical knowledge.

But, while the flow of capital into under-developed countries has to be largely through private channels, Point Four recognizes that governmental action would be necessary to eliminate or reduce difficulties in the way of free foreign investment abroad. In the President's message to the Congress, it is pointed out:

In view of the present troubled condition of the world—the distortion of world trade, the shortage of dollars and other after-effects of the war—the problem of substantially increasing the flow of American capital abroad presents serious difficulties.....Since the development of under-developed economic areas is of major importance in our foreign policy, it is appropriate to use the resources of the government to accelerate private efforts toward that end. I recommend, therefore, that the Export-Import Bank be authorized to guarantee United States private capital, invested in productive enterprises abroad, which contribute to economic development in under-developed areas, against the risks peculiar to those investments. This guarantee activity will at the outset be largely experimental. Some investments may require only a guarantee against the danger of inconvertibility, others may need protection against the danger of expropriation and other dangers as well.

Point Four is intended, primarily, to promote economic development of the less fully developed countries. But, it is not expected to function solely as a one-way street. Apart from the political benefits in the form of increased international security, which the orderly development of the poverty-stricken countries is expected to bring in its train, the more advanced countries, it is considered, will also gain solid economic and commercial gains. President Truman gave expression to this view in the following words in his message to the Congress:

Our experience shows that the volume of our foreign trade is far greater with highly developed countries than it is with countries having a low standard of living and inadequate industry. To increase the output and the national income of the less developed areas is to increase our own economic stability....In addition, the development of these areas is of utmost importance to our efforts to restore the economics of the free European nations. As the economics of the under-developed areas expand, they will provide the needed products for Europe and will offer a better market for European goods. Such expansion is an essential part of the growing system of world trade, which is necessary for European recovery.

III. WHAT POINT FOUR ISN'T

Point Four is integrally linked with U.S. foreign policy but there is no evidence to date to suppose that it demands of its beneficiaries an anti-Soviet foreign policy, or any positive alliance, formally or otherwise, with the Western Allies in the world power-bloc differences or rivalries. President Truman, indeed, has made no secret of the fact that the U.S. State Department expects an accession of strength to the democratic forces by checking the spread

of totalitarian and communist tendencies in the poverty-stricken countries by enabling governments in those areas to embark on immediate programmes for raising living standards through all-round development schemes. But nowhere in the pronouncements of the President or other top-ranking American statesmen is any suggestion to be found that Point Four would be employed, directly or indirectly, to win military alliances for the U.S. or even votes in the U.N. Security Council or General Assembly. It is clear that the technical aid programme of the United Nations will be there to be availed of by all the members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Even as regards the direct technical and capital assistance from the United States, while countries which are in the Soviet sphere of influence will obviously be excluded and, indeed, may not be disposed to participate, no sound ground exists for apprehending that the 'neutral' or 'third force' countries—this description may be applied to most of those under-developed countries of the Middle East, the Near East and the Far East which expect great things from Point Four—will be politically discriminated against. On the contrary, it may be expected on sound pragmatic assumptions that, in the ordinary course, once Point Four gets into stride, U.S. opinion may come to appreciate in increasing measure the value of a policy which would take care of the floating votes, while letting the party votes take care of themselves. While it is not safe to prophesy in international affairs, it may be said with some assurance that the direct assistance which the United States may give under Point Four is not likely to be married to any political conditions of the kind, which, it has been alleged in some quarters, has effectively detracted from the sovereignty of some of the Marshall Aid countries. That such conditions will neither be proposed nor accepted under Point Four seems clear if only for the reason that the scale of assistance proposed under Point Four is nowhere near the massiveness of Marshall aid. It is important to note in this connexion that the inaugural address carefully and distinctly distinguished between Point Four and Point Two—which is Marshall Aid—or Point Three—which is military alliances.

Point Four is definitely not the old colonial imperialism under a new label. The American insistence on action largely through the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the emphasis on local initiative and predominant local participation in the provision of capital, technical and other resources, the clear statement that development would be geared to local needs and would be motivated by the twin-purposes of promoting broad-based economic development and raising living standards of the beneficiaries are a reasonable guarantee that there is, here, no intention to mount an economic exploitation of the aided areas or gain controls over their economies for the purposes of such exploitation. President Truman, it would appear, was aware from the outset of the possibility of Point Four being misconstrued, and so it was that he took care, in his inaugural address, to declare categorically: 'The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a programme of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing'. In the course of his message to the Congress, he said:

All countries concerned with the programme should work together to bring about conditions favourable to the flow of private capital. To this end we are negotiating agreements with other countries to protect the American investor from unwarranted or discriminatory treatment under the laws of the country in which he makes his investment. In negotiating such treaties we do not, of course, ask privileges for American capital greater than those granted to other investors in under-developed countries or greater than we ourselves grant in this country. We believe that American enterprise should not waste local resources, should provide adequate wages and working conditions for local labour, and should bear an equitable share of the burden of local taxes. At the same time, we believe that investors will send their capital abroad on an increasing scale only if they are given assurance against risk of loss through expropriation without compensation, unfair or discriminatory treatment, destruction through war or rebellion, or the inability to convert their earnings into dollars.

IV. POINT FOUR—AN ASSESSMENT

Point Four, as is perhaps to be expected, has its critics as well as its enthusiasts. Some of the criticisms are, undoubtedly, constructive and, by assessing its limitations, serve to clarify its practical worthiness and to put it in its proper perspective. But quite a number of them are either not adequately informed or proceed from a distrust of American intentions. Very often, the arguments of these critics, made in the same breath, are obviously contradictory and cancel out in the final analysis. Thus, it is complained that poor Asia is to be hoodwinked or side-tracked with a pale ghost of a counterfeit Marshall Aid Programme; simultaneously, the cry is also raised that the United States and its West European allies are seeking to entangle Asian countries into power politics through the promise of economic assistance. Surely, these two grievances cannot exist. Marshall Aid is both a programme for West European economic recovery as well as one side of the medal, the other side of which is the North Atlantic Pact. If the Asian countries really ask for an Asian version of Marshall Aid, surely they should accept the implications of their demand and be ready for regional defence pacts under American auspices. There is also the other issue of U.S. interest in such pacts. For, it is only reasonable that the Congress should be extremely unwilling to make large appropriations on a Marshall Aid scale for purposes which do not impinge heavily on U.S. security requirements.

Another similar set of mutually irreconcilable criticisms is the argument that Point Four stresses technical assistance at the expense of financial assistance, thus bypassing the acute need of the under-developed countries for capital and its conflicting counterpart that American capital, threatened with a contraction of profitable investment opportunities at home, has now conveniently provided itself with an innocent-looking excuse and is seeking vantage points for high profit business in the under-developed areas.

Criticisms of the above class are easily dismissed. There is however, a seeming appropriateness in criticisms of a different category, which disappear only with deeper scrutiny. Of this kind is the complaint that Point Four is inadequate. This criticism arises out of a general feeling of disappoint-

ment of what is regarded as growing U. S. coldness or conservatism following the initial enthusiasm of the President's inaugural address. To a certain extent, this feeling arises out of an instinctive comparison, often unconscious, between the huge figures of the E. R. P. appropriations and the 'meagre' sum of 45 million dollars, which the President has asked Congress to vote for the technical aid programme. In part, it is also derived from the fact that Point Four does not envisage any spectacular U. S. Government loans to the under-developed countries. The emphasis on the voluntary flow of private capital, stimulated though it be by Export-Import Bank guarantees, is taken to mean that hopes on the part of under-developed areas of massive direct investment of capital for rapid economic development cannot now be fulfilled. Finally, it is argued that the capital needs of the under-developed areas are so vast and urgent that they cannot be made to wait on the leisurely development of foreign lending by U. S. private capital over a period of decades.

This charge of inadequacy springs as much from an insufficient understanding of the implications of Point Four as from an exaggerated conception of the capacity of the under-developed areas for rapid economic development. Point Four is not a high pressure, short-term programme. It envisages a growing plan over a period of years, which would involve no impossible strains on the various factors involved. This means, in the first instance, that the Truman Administration intends to keep firmly in mind what is politically feasible in the present temper of the Congress. No legislature has ever cheerfully voted large appropriations for new purposes with the nation's budget already in the red. In the particular case of the U. S. Congress, the circumstances are all against a generous mood. The billions put into the E. R. P. have not been conspicuously successful in restoring European solvency according to schedule. The millions appropriated for Nationalist China have all gone down the drain. No wonder, therefore, that there is disillusionment and grumbling stock-taking in Washington. Even the Arms Aid demand has been axed and, if Point Four is at all to be sold to Congress, the price must be a very modest one. There is no doubt whatsoever that these considerations of political strategy have had a great deal to do with settling the size of President Truman's initial demand of \$45 million for Point Four.

So much for the American angle. From the point of view of the capacity of the under-developed countries to avail themselves of Point Four, is it likely that the conservatism of the U. S. Congress will prove to be a limiting factor? More precisely, are the under-developed countries likely to make demands for technical aid of the kind envisaged under Point Four which the financial resources likely to be made available in the first year through the U. N. as well as directly by the United States will be inadequate to meet? And, secondly, is it true that the under-developed countries are today organized for the utilization of large amounts of foreign capital for rapid economic development to an extent not contemplated under Point Four? The issue raised here must be clearly understood. It is not whether there is a colossal need for capital investment in the under-developed countries. The need is admitted.

A recent F. A. O. estimate prepared for the very occasion, when the technical assistance programme was discussed by the Economic and Social Council at Geneva recently, put the total capital needs of the under-developed areas (excluding the American Middle West) at \$42.7 billions, out of which \$8.3 billions will have to be in foreign exchange. Point Four, of course, does not propose to organize international flow of capital on this scale over any short period. But, then, the F. A. O. estimates only indicate how much capital investment the under-developed countries will have to secure from abroad if a certain rate of economic development is to be secured. They do not, of course, imply that the other factors for securing that rate of development are present.

These other factors, however, are much more important than foreign financial and technical assistance. A certain degree of internal political security and strong government are the first essentials, whereas, taking South and East Asian countries, for instance, this condition is fulfilled at the present only by India, Pakistan and, possibly, Thailand. Again, the rate of economic development clearly depends upon the efficiency of economic and financial institutions within a country, the habits of organization and work of the people, the existing stage of agricultural and industrial development and above all, whether there is a national will for economic development backed by concrete planning—not necessarily at government level—and specific projects ready to be undertaken once foreign technical assistance and capital become available. It is patent that while some of the under-developed countries undoubtedly possess a more or less favourable climate for rapid economic development, many do not and that the capacity of the latter for making productive use of foreign aid in technique and capital will be extremely limited. In these circumstances, it would be a wrong assessment of adequacy of Point Four to judge it in the light of theoretical estimates of the needs of under-developed countries for foreign capital. No one who has at all carefully followed the record of the E. C. A. F. E. since its inception, or the work of its working parties, or the proceedings of the Conferences organized under its auspices can entertain any reasonable doubt on this point that the more intractable limitations on development are domestic in their origin.

From the precise and practical angle of what the under-developed countries may be able to use, the resources envisaged for Point Four do not appear to be negligible. The type of technical assistance which Point Four is expected to make available is not assistance of a general or routine nature. It would be largely top grade, expert assistance, such as may not be available within the country applying for assistance, and it is expected to be employed primarily for making basic surveys of resources, drawing up the more important projects, giving technical advice on the more complex problems and generally impact the initial planning and organizational impulse to economic development. In the immediate future, the demand for this type of technical assistance as well as the supply of technical personnel of the required calibre may not be more than what President Truman's appropriation or the figures suggested in the Economic and Social Council can comfortably finance.

In case it turns out that present U. S. estimates have actually turned out to be inadequate, the under-developed countries will be in a strong position to press for more liberal provision in the following year. As it is, the possibilities are still unexplored and no useful purpose is served by controversies about the size of the initial budget. What is of vital importance is that a beginning should be made, which again emphasizes the need not to frighten away the U. S. Congress, which happens to be in a cheese-pacing mood, from the idea of Point Four.

The F. A. O. has estimated the foreign capital needs of Latin America, the Near East and the Far East—the three areas which are expected to receive priority under Point Four—at \$2.2 million. There is no reason why this order of private capital investment cannot emanate from the United States over a reasonable period under the aegis of Point Four. The Export-Import Bank has unattached funds amounting to one billion dollars, which can be employed to back guarantees given for U. S. private investment abroad, if President Truman's proposal in this regard succeeds in winning Congressional approval. In 1948, U. S. capital investment abroad amounted to \$900 millions as compared with a gross domestic private investment of \$38.8 millions and responsible U. S. opinion is confident that the rate of foreign investment can be stepped up to \$2 billions under favourable conditions. President Truman himself is hopeful that Point Four can, in due course, develop into a bold, new programme, which would effectively develop those conditions. This ring of confidence is present in every word of that passage in his message to the Congress, where he said: 'The enactment of these two legislative proposals, the first pertaining to technical assistance and the second to the encouragement of foreign investment, will constitute a national endorsement of a programme of major importance in our efforts for world peace and economic stability. Nevertheless, these measures are only the first steps. We are at the beginning of a rising curve of activity, private, governmental and international, that will continue for many years to come. It is all the more important, therefore, that we start promptly.' These are certainly words of optimism, but there is no reason why they should not turn out to have been prophetic, provided the minimum requirements of international peace and a reasonably high level of economic activity both inside the U. S. and in the world generally are fulfilled in the years to come.

V. LOCAL EFFORT

When this question of the adequacy of the technical aid programme or of foreign financial possibilities for the development of under-developed countries is discussed, it is of the greatest importance that the discussion should be related to the possibilities of availability of local capital in those regions. This is not only because the emphasis of local effort is the essence of the Point Four programme, but also because, unless under-developed areas do their utmost to mobilize their own savings, they will have to accept a load of financial obligations towards the capital exporting countries, which may be beyond their capacity to liquidate over a reasonable period of time. Again, foreign

capital generally costs more than local capital, if only because the risk element for the foreign investor is so much greater. The F. A. O. estimate of the total capital needs of the under-developed areas in all parts of the world (excluding only the U. S. Cotton belt) is 42.7 billion dollars, of which only 8.3 billion dollars are needed as external financial assistance, principally from the United States. In other words, for every 5 billion dollars of total capital needs, 4 billion dollars have to be provided through internal sources. This means that, even in a relatively stable area in the East such as India, the rate of saving will have to be stepped up from something like 2% of the national income to about 8%. In more elementary economies, the increase in the rate of capital formation will have to be of a much higher order. As it is only reasonable to suppose that such a high order of capital formation cannot be secured without much State planning and direction over a fairly long period, the amount of local capital which under-developed countries can mobilize will be relatively small. This may ordinarily be taken to emphasize the need for a larger measure of foreign aid to make up the deficiency. But this would be a superficial interpretation. As a matter of fact, a low level of capital formation is, in a considerable measure, an indication of the country's overall economic capacity to make productive use of capital in the short period. The point is that foreign capital has to be used in association with local capital; the global ratio of association, as given by the F. A. O. estimate, is about 4 local dollars for every dollar of external aid.

It would be an over-simplification of the economic problem of under-developed areas to suppose that foreign capital and foreign technical aid between themselves can conjure up productive capacities out of inadequate local resources. India's steel plans may be taken as a case in point. It is estimated that the country can profit considerably from new steel projects, with a total capacity of one million tons per annum. The capital requirement would be of the order of Rs. 100 crores. Currently, this heavy capital investment is believed to be beyond India's short-term capacity to spare funds for any one single industrial project. But even supposing that the financial requirement is fully met by foreign capital and that top technical personnel are also made available from abroad, it may still be difficult to undertake steel projects on a million ton scale immediately. The demand on transport will be great. Every ton of steel involves the transport of at least five tons of materials, raw and processed, in addition to the distribution of the finished product. Then, again, provision has to be made for three million tons of coking and gas coal. This and the mining of the necessary quantity of iron ore will involve a development plan, which is bound to raise its own specific problems of finance, personnel and materials. It would also be necessary to step up vastly the production of bricks and refractory materials and build up civil engineering capacity to many times its present size. All these are significant limiting factors which restrict the scope and timing of development much more significantly than the availability of external aid in men and money.

VI. INDIA AND POINT FOUR

India, more than any other country in the under-developed areas of the world, is favourably situated to benefit from the 'bold, new programme'. She has the blessings of relatively stable political conditions within her frontiers, a strong and popular Government, probably the best organized public services in the East and a promising base of financial and economic institutions and professional, technical and business skills and talents. Her climatic conditions are continental in their range and variety; her mineral, agricultural and power resources are considerable, admitting of much virgin exploitation in the future. And, what may be of greater significance than all things else put together, are the large enthusiasms for economic improvement, which the coming of political freedom seems to have released in the land. Finally, it is of no small account for the foreign policy of the United States that the Indian Union, with its vast and varied resources, is the largest single factor for peace and stability in the South-East Asian world.

The Government of India is definitely committed to a programme of rapid economic development and, in this programme, both foreign technical assistance and capital investment can play an essential rôle. For the mapping out of resources, especially mineral, hydro-electric and irrigation potentialities, for the blueprinting of heavy industries and for the initial organizational and operational direction of new industrial projects, India requires to be provided with top-grade technical advice and 'know-how,' which only technologically advanced nations, such as the United States, can adequately supply. There is also the question of building up a large technical personnel, for whom advanced instruction and training can be secured either at institutions already existing abroad, or in new institutions within the country, which can be organized only around a nucleus of foreign teachers and experts. In all these directions, much valuable assistance can be secured both direct from the United States and from the technical assistance schemes of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, once the implementation of Point Four gets under way. Since it is clear that those countries stand to gain most which come forward with sound and specific schemes and requests, it is urged that the Government of India should draw up as early as possible a well considered list of the types of technical assistance which are most urgently required for the nation's development programme and then proceed to negotiate for that assistance.

Government's policy for seeking the assistance of foreign capital has already taken shape. The purpose in the first place is to utilize fully the services of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and, in the second, to create a favourable 'climate' for private investments from abroad. In recent months, India has secured from the World Bank a loan of \$34 millions for the purchase of U.S. and Canadian locomotives for her railways and another loan of \$10 millions to finance the purchase of heavy U.S. tractors needed for the reclamation of weed-infested lands. A third loan of \$25 millions for financing hydro-electric schemes in the Damodar Valley project is expected to be finalized by the end of the year. More loans are expected to be considered

in the new year. Under favourable conditions, development finance of the order of \$100 millions a year may be forthcoming from the World Bank, the scale of assistance depending both on the ability of that institution to garner funds from the U. S. capital market and on the ability of the Government of India to present technically sound and economically remunerative development projects for financial assistance. But, in spite of its best efforts, the World Bank can meet only a part of the external capital requirements of an adequate Indian plan of economic development. The national economy can be organized to use for basic economic development a sum of Rs. 200 crores, or \$420 millions a year of foreign capital investments in industry and agriculture, in addition to a domestic investment of about Rs. 600 crores. An aggregate investment of this order would be necessary for modest increases in the national income.

Loans from the World Bank, therefore, are only a partial answer to India's capital needs. Ultimately, the major part of external aid must come through private investment. A positive policy for attracting foreign private capital, therefore, is a prime need. In embarking on a pursuit of that policy, the Government of India starts with certain clear advantages. The country fulfils the vital requirement of relatively stable political conditions in an essentially democratic context. The successful culmination of loan negotiations with the World Bank implies the acceptance, at an expert international level, of the credit worthiness, repayment capacity and development possibilities of the Indian economy—an acceptance which has an obvious value for the private capital market. Again, early this year, there was a public declaration of policy, which has greatly helped to define Government's attitude and reassure foreign investors on many important issues. This declaration was made by the Prime Minister on the floor of the Dominion Parliament on 6 April. Pandit Nehru definitely stated that 'Government do not intend to place any restrictions or impose any conditions, which are not applicable to similar Indian enterprise.' That Government means to live up to this assurance has been already practically proved by a recent decision of the Commerce Ministry, on a reference from the Tariff Board, which held that, in view of the Prime Minister's statement, it was not open to the Government of India to restrict the expansion of foreign units even in protected industries. The industry referred to is the motor vehicles battery industry. Equally suggestive is the fact that the subsidy recently given to the aluminium industry is available to the Indian firm as well as the foreign firm operating in this field.

The Prime Minister has also made it clear that, if and when foreign enterprises are compulsorily acquired by Government, compensation will be paid on a fair and equitable basis and reasonable exchange facilities provided for the remittance of proceeds, if so desired. As regards facilities for remittance of profits or even of transfers of capital (other than the proceeds of compulsory acquisition), the statement declares that it is not intended to place any restriction on withdrawal of foreign capital investment, remittance facilities depending only on foreign exchange conditions. It should be noted that these assurances are exactly the ones which President Truman, in his message to the

Congress, indicated that he would try to secure from capital-importing countries by means of commercial treaties, before the Export-Import Bank proceeded to underwrite U. S. private investments in those countries. The deck is thus cleared for a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between India and the United States, which will be the greatest single step forward for the promotion of U. S. private investment in this country as well as for the development of Indo-American business relations in general.

The issue has been sometimes raised whether the promotion of a 'favourable climate' for foreign capital, which, in effect, means U. S. capital, will not involve the acceptance of unwarranted limitations on national economic policy. The argument is that, in its attempts to make the nation 'credit-worthy', the Government of India may have to adopt 'rightist' policies, which may be against the interests of the country. It is true that private capital, whether it is foreign or domestic, will certainly fight shy of entering into large commitments, if Government's taxation, labour, nationalization and other policies are likely to be hostile or even unhelpful to private enterprise. But, then, neither the Government of India, as at present constituted, nor the largest single political party force in the country, nor even the country at large is inclined towards any large shifts towards a 'leftist' economic or political policy. The difficulties imagined in this context, therefore, are theoretical rather than practically significant. Even as regards the particular issue of nationalization, Pandit Nehru has repeatedly made it clear that, while the State may actively participate in the establishment of new industries of national importance, there is no intention either of an extensive acquisition of existing industries or of dispensing with private enterprise over any large area of new economic development. As against this, there is nothing in President Truman's public declarations to show that the U. S. has intentions of asking for an absolute surrender of principle of nationalization as the price of an Export-Import Bank guarantee. The difficulty is not about nationalization as such, but whether compensation would be fair and reasonable in the event of State acquisition and here recent trends in discussions relating to the formula for compensation to be included in the Constitution give good ground for hope that a just attitude will be adopted, even independent of the question of encouraging foreign capital.

In essence, the suggestion that 'a favourable climate' should be created for foreign capital means no more than that the Government should, in general, adopt such economic policies as will encourage private enterprise to play a large part in economic development. This suggestion, therefore, should be acceptable to all but the few who are believers in the collectivist philosophy and to whom private enterprise is *per se* undesirable. To the vast majority, who have no such ideological commitments and who are inclined to hold that private enterprise in the economic sphere can be outlawed only at the price of totalitarianism in the political sphere, the recommendations that budgetary policy should be so framed as to promote saving and capital formation, that fiscal policy should refrain from acting as a disincentive on venture capital and that industrial policy should in general attempt to secure the just rights and interests of labour and the consumers, without at the same time

interfering unduly with the day-to-day management of industries and severely circumscribing the area of managerial initiative and judgement, would commend themselves as being, in themselves, proper and desirable and calculated to promote a flexible, freely functioning high level economy.

Point Four, in the present writer's view, seems to offer to the under-developed areas an effective means of securing technical and financial assistance from the United States and other advanced countries, without at the same time running into the risks of political interference or economic domination so commonly associated with such assistance. Its possibilities will be best realized in an atmosphere of goodwill, cooperation and mutual accommodation, which need not involve a surrender of any cherished political or other values on the part of nations which believe in what is best described as the democratic way of life. It is pertinent to add that India's Prime Minister, by his tour of and public utterances in the United States, has succeeded in large measure in creating this atmosphere, while at the same time convincing the Americans that his country's foreign policy and political collaboration were not 'for sale'. It is significant also that in his forthright declarations that, while India needs foreign capital and technical aid badly for rapid economic development, she is prepared to receive it on no other basis except that of mutuality and of free and equal cooperation and intends to use it only to supplement her own primary efforts, he has spoken in the authentic idiom of Point Four, as propounded in the U. S. President's inaugural address. In this sense, the Prime Minister's visit to the United States may turn out to be of great consequence for the fruition of the 'bold new programme.'

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

OUT OF EXILE. By Soetan Sjahrir 1949 (New York: The John Day Company, \$ 3).

THE major part of this book is a kind of a jail-diary written by Dr. Sjahrir during his long exile, from 1934 to 1942. At the youthful age of 25 he was condemned as a dangerous political and banished to Boven Digoel, which judging from all descriptions was a veritable hell on earth, and meant for hardened and pathological criminals. Later rocked by malaria, he was moved to Banda Neira in the Moluccas. There the diary continued up to his release, as the Japanese seized Indonesia. To this he has added a chapter covering the period of the Japanese occupation, the birth of the Republic and the break-up when the Dutch police action began. Included is a short introduction with a biographical note on Sjahrir by Charles Wolf who is also the translator of the work.

The book is a revealing testament of a great mind and a large heart. The maturity of the author's intellect, his breath of vision, the generous expansiveness of his understanding are unusual and make the book not merely the study of a single mind but of human psychology and world affairs. The most

outstanding qualities of this narrative are the utter objectivity of his approach to problems and the fearless courage with which he writes about himself, his countrymen and Indonesian politics. One is indeed stunned by his completely disarming frankness. Chauvinism is a common failing of most political leaders especially in a colonial struggle generated by the sense of innate weakness in having to oppose with very inadequate means and weapons a superior force, an enemy which they feel is formidable. As a compensation and to provide the necessary strength and courage, they attribute to the struggling people highest qualities, keep indulging in the ancient ideals, revive past glories. Sjahrir is a complete departure from this technique. He is full of a self-confidence that comes of a correct appraisal of each of them. He was neither afraid nor deterred by any power. He was fully conscious of the inherent weakness of colonialism and that it must terminate sooner or later. He wanted to hasten that process. In his analysis of colonialism he says: 'An internment camp is certainly logical in this colonial system. As long as the colonial government shows no inclination to eliminate the causes of the social unrest, so long must they attack the symptoms instead of the disease itself. Finally the colonial government will not be able to cure the disease as long as colonial leadership remains convinced that the art of governing these lands involves the suppression of these millions and that Dutch authority depends on this art—that is keeping the people in the same circumstances that they have been for countless years. The principle itself is basically unsound, because it does not take into account the requirements only of Western capital and industrial progress but of the changes that must take place in the apparatus of government out of practical necessity.'

His continued freedom from any sense of bitterness up to the end and his readiness to negotiate with the Dutch in a spirit of conciliation up to the time of Dutch military action in July 1947 is indeed unusual. 'One can guard against becoming the victim of colonial life on the side of either sadism or inferiority—keep oneself free from senseless impotent hate. I think I am able to do this.' With a rare spirit of detached objectivity he analyses the East and the West: 'After all that I have learned about the West, I certainly cannot and do not idealize it. On the other hand I know only too well that the Eastern attributes really are only the hierarchical relationship of a feudal society—a society in which a small group possesses all the material and intellectual wealth and the vast majority live in squalor, and are made acquiescent by religion and philosophy in place of sufficient food'.

Many a passage on world affairs reveals the writer's strong intuitive powers. Some of his comments read like clever prophecies. Take for instance his reactions on the Spanish issue: 'A disturbing thing is that no one here appears to have any interest in the events in Spain. I consider it the most important thing happening in Europe—events begun in Spain that reach out to France and Belgium and Holland and finally spread throughout Europe. If the democratic forces can maintain themselves, then Europe will feel the effect of a wave of rejuvenated democracy. If the reactionaries win out, then the trium-

phal march of fascism throughout the world will gain further momentum and the defeat of the French, Belgian and Dutch be at hand'. On this he had staked his entire promise of future development of Indonesian-Dutch collaboration against the Fascist onslaught. In this he was doomed to disappointment. As he admits later 'I had become convinced that a reciprocal and cooperative defence with the colonial rulers had not the slightest chance of materializing'.

The book makes fascinating reading and especially to a people who have been through like struggle it has a special interest and value.

LABOUR PROBLEMS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By Virginia Thompson. (New York: Published under the auspices of the International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations, by the Yale University Press).

The basic problem of South-East Asia in relation to world affairs is assuming increasing importance. It is now a recognized region for purposes of study, economic adjustments and cultural relations. Its significance is of more import than the mere passing of the colonial stage of government. It is due rather to the broader problems of their evolution towards self-reliant communities which in the past were largely controlled by outside forces. These countries cannot be expected to play their part in the natural development and progress of the world without drastic improvements in the economic and social life of the people. In fact, there is considerable danger of their continuing to remain under foreign domination in economic matters, and make it the region of further international power politics and rivalries.

In this context the problem of labour policies and standards becomes one of considerable importance. Therefore these studies are of interest not only as economic thesis but of political importance as well.

Even though the basic economic conditions of these countries have a similarity, there are certain differences. We may however say that broadly speaking the labour problems of this region have become intermingled. For one feature of some of these countries namely the inadequacy either of quality or quantity of labour led to large migrations. The exodus was mainly from India and China naturally because of their large populations. Later this trend declined with the growth of social conscience. The conflict born of rising competition between the indigenous people and the newcomers also was a complicating element. The other important factor is labour organization. Even though the numbers concerned are large, an organized labour movement of the proportion in keeping with the size of the working population, was never a feature. The presence of considerable immigrant labour was one of the causes of this nebulous condition. The natural labour solidarity was further broken up by the methods of recruitment and management.

Agents and foremen on the one hand and employers on the other served equally in exploiting labour for their own ends. Although embryonic associations of workers existed in each country they failed to grow and coalesce to become important economic entities. Thus a genuine trade union movement was slow in maturing. Wherever it showed signs of growth the em-

ployers offered resistance. Actually legislation facilitating the functioning of unions was not enforced in Malaya until 1941, even though Britain had one Labour Government and was again a party to a coalition for prosecuting the war.

It is against this background that one has to move through the long and laborious studies by Virginia Thompson. The only new factor introduced into this scene is the spectacular rise of Japan as one of world's leading industrial powers and later its conquest and establishment of rule in most of these countries. This certainly created new problems and developments, that are treated as a special study in the book.

The book presents a detailed study of labour problems and conditions in each country. There are in addition general chapters on the region as a whole, followed by one on post-war problems.

Apart from the presentation of general factors, a detailed study in countries during some of the most disturbed periods as between 1939 and 1945, must necessarily be very limited. Moreover the attempt to maintain political objectivity and detachment in the studies often leads to taking a stand on doubtful premises. But then one need not necessarily accept them or the conclusions contained therein.

The book is full of interesting and valuable material pertaining to labour in the countries of South-East Asia and would prove helpful as a reference book for any study of this region.

MANCHURIA SINCE 1931. By F.C. Jones 1949 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 18s. net).

Manchuria assumed considerable importance as the starting point in World War II. It is once again coming to the forefront as the central fact in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the New China. This study of developments in that country since that fateful episode of September 1931 up to the present day is of special significance today with all eyes turned on China.

The conquest of Manchuria was brought about by the Japanese army chiefs for politico-strategic reasons. It was one attempt of the Nipponese army to profit by the disastrous economic depression that struck Japan from 1929 as also to reverse the trend towards party government as an instrument of finance-capital which had characterized the previous decade. For the worsening of Japan's relations with other powers as a result of the Manchurian affair, gave the Army a real break. It naturally put it in a commanding position. It helped to launch a programme for fostering war industries, accumulate war stocks and generally push forward the plan for Greater Asia, that is Japanese hegemony in the Far East. In this grandiose scheme Manchuria was to be the continental war base. Thus began new history for Manchuria with undoubted repercussions on the future of that region.

Manchuria is an example of a planned industrialization under State directive. Every detail was thought out and executed. The proportion of State-owned, semi-controlled and private industries was carefully worked out.

And even though a good bit of the plan did go through, it was hampered from a fairly early stage by the Sino-Japanese war which had of course to follow Manchurian occupation and in fact augment the Manchurian plans. But imperialist schemes have their own contradictions which ultimately work towards self-destruction. Nevertheless the Japanese succeeded in building up in Manchuria an industrial potential which was far ahead of anything which existed elsewhere in Eastern Asia, exclusive of Japan itself. They had given primary emphasis to production for war purposes. In a sense therefore the industrial and mining enterprises were uneconomic if judged from the standpoint of ordinary peace-time competitive costs. These industries were however all of a piece with Japanese overall plans and were naturally integrated to the industrial pattern of Japan. Its essential weakness lay however in the fact that only the unskilled labour was drawn from the Chinese population, the technical and managerial personnel being confined almost exclusively to the Japanese. Apart from the economic there was also a political weakness in the situation. The settlement of Manchuria had been predominantly by the Chinese and their figure was about 90% or more. The Manchus had largely become assimilated to the Chinese in language and customs. They were therefore poor material as a bulwark of the new régime.

Although Manchuria was the first step to the Greater Asia plan and was to be the corner-stone of the Japanese régime in North China, actually as their conquest advanced, Manchuria was left politically separate and independent and separate puppet régimes were created in Inner Mongolia, North China, Yangtse Valley, etc. This is brought into direct line with later developments. At Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill definitely promised Russia in return for declaring war on Japan, certain concessions in China as the restoration of what she had lost in 1905 which gave her a dominant place in Manchuria. Prolonged Soviet occupation of the territory, during which a large influx of communists was permitted, laid the base for wider communist operations that followed, with what result we already see.

The book makes easy and pleasant reading. Even though it is cramful of facts and figures, it is far from dry and offers a fund of interesting information on all the important aspects of the developments in that country since 1931, including an analysis of the factors that led up to that incident.

The concluding readings of the situation are very disappointing and show an amazing lack of grasp of the Asian political unfolding, and especially of the dynamics of the Chinese conditions. It is incredible that any serious student of social forces should dispose of a country in Asia, especially China, so complacently as to imagine that the U.S.A. would be the arbiter of its fate and to rule out the possibility of a communist success in China simply because America would not acquiesce in it! The West has yet to realize that Asia is now setting her own course and steering towards it.

LAST CHANCE. *Edited by Clara Urquhart* 1948 (Boston: The Beacon Press, \$ 2.50).

The book is built on the answers provided to 11 questions on 'Issues deter-

mining our Destiny' by 26 leaders of thought of 14 nations. The crux of the present day problem as worrying humanity, according to those who undertook this intellectual quest, is that man had ceased to be the measure of life; in our industrial organization, scientific inventions, the productive machinery or any other phase of life, little attention is paid as to the results on man, his psychological or mental make-up. The results are manifested in the general restlessness and misery. On the political level, the growing authoritarian control everywhere is dismaying. Human relationship in general has been reduced to utter stultification. *The Last Chance* is evidently designed to sound a final warning to mankind through the mouths of a varied set of leaders who range from Pearl Buck to Trygve Lie.

The questions are grouped around the usual themes which agitate public minds and earn a fairly wide range from Communism to health, One World, relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., the ethics of the propaganda machine, elimination of want, the concept of democracy, solution to population problem, child education and the like.

Instead of grouping the eleven answers of each leader together, they are divided up into two sections. One gives the answers person-wise under the heading General Statements, and in the other section the answers are given subject-wise which is helpful as a comparative study. We know at a glance what each leader that has been approached has to say on the question posed. The sharp reactions of each, which vary so enormously from person to person, when posed in this comparative fashion becomes enormously more interesting. For a while they lend the illusion of a quizz roundtable—take for instance the answers to question 1 on One World. It ranges from an admission 'I don't know' to four pages on the need for spiritual values! Similarly, on the power blocs, there are those who think it is impossible for the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to live side by side together to those who insist that they can.

And so the book goes on, adding to the literature which we seem to be piling up on the eternal question of how to avoid the rising conflict. There is not very much left to *understand*. The weakness in the present situation lies not so much in the ignorance of the contributory factors as failure to act upon our convictions.

K. C.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE in the Constitution of the United States. By M. Ramaswamy 1948 (Bombay: Orient Longmans Ltd.).

This work is a comprehensive study of the interpretation and application of a clause in the American Constitution commonly known as the 'Commerce Clause'. Section 8, Article I, of this Constitution succinctly states that the American Congress shall have power, *inter alia*, 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.'

As a result of his painstaking research, the learned author is convinced that the Commerce Clause has made two magnificent contributions to American life. 'This clause,' he says, 'has in the first place been mainly responsible for

making the United States one free national market for the products of all the states, by operating of its own force, as a restraint upon state action, whether regulatory or fiscal, which impedes the free flow of commerce across state lines. It has, in the second place, functioned as a source of motive power for the construction of efficient federal instruments for regulating, in the larger interests of the country, the manifold activities which take place in the realm of foreign and inter-state commerce,' (p. vii). To support this thesis he has made references to over 400 cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. One of the outstanding features of the Commerce Clause is that even though in the days of its adoption, the means of communication and transportation were confined to sailing ships and stagecoaches, it has stood up well under the changing demands of the advances of science from 1789 to 1949, including stream-lined electric trains and jet-propelled airplanes. As the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jackson says in his preface to this book, this clause of less than twenty words has proved elastic and dynamic enough in its interpretation so that it has played 'a great part.....in the upbuilding of the United States of America', (p. vi).

That these statements are true becomes evident as the reader goes through the mass of material on the subject which Mr. Ramaswamy has carefully correlated and analysed. With brief but salient paragraphs providing the reader with the necessary historical and sociological background, he traces the development of state and national power over commerce through the many decisions of the Supreme Court under this clause—cases involving such widely differing situations as bridges impeding navigation; the refusal of a steam-boat company to take a negro woman as a cabin passenger; the prosecution of a man under the White Slave Traffic Act for transportation across a state boundary of a woman for his own personal mistress; the supply of water and in another instance of natural gas across state lines; and many more of the curious situations which arise in a large country composed of interdependent units.

A chapter is devoted to the details of the power of individual states to tax railroads, trucks, and even radio waves moving from one state to another, and the vexed question of goods in transit. Finally there is a chapter of cases involving the State Police Power and the Commerce Clause applications.

The book has a useful list of cases under the Commerce Clause, an index, and a Postscript which brings up-to-date the cases decided while the manuscript of the book was in the press. Apart from its value as a reference work and as a study of the development of the application of this Clause, it makes most stimulating reading because of its clear and far from stodgy style.

For students of constitutions, especially here in India, it provides an excellent study of the harmonious coordination of local and central authorities and, therefore, should be a most useful and encouraging model, in our very similar problems.

Mr. Ramaswamy is to be congratulated for his fine work, and the publishers for the satisfying way they have produced it.

C. J. CHACKO

SOUTH AFRICA. By Dr. Keppel-Jones 1949 (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 7s. 6d).

Hutchinson's University Library consists of a series of educational books on a wide range of subjects, and it is claimed that the general aim is 'to provide popular yet scholarly introductions for the benefit of the general reader', particularly adult education classes. This particular volume forms part of a section on British Empire History edited by Sir Reginald Coupland (well-known to Indian readers for his books on our constitution).

South Africa is very much in the news now, since the advent of a government committed to an extreme racial policy. Indian readers should naturally be interested in the background of a country which could give rise to such narrow, exclusive policies.

Dr. Keppel-Jones takes up his story from the days of the early European settlers. In the course of the 18th century, the colonists (an amalgam of the Dutch and French Huguenots) developed a language distinct from the Dutch of the Netherlands called *Afrikaans*, and from the name of the language, the people were styled *Afrikans*. The colonists also called themselves *Boers* or farmers. Dr. Keppel-Jones comments significantly on these names which meant a turning of the back on Europe as heralding an 'exaggerated isolationism.' Colour-prejudice had very deep foundations. We read, for example, that in 1797, when a Hottentot brought a suit against his white mistress for non-payment of his wages, the court dismissed the suit on the plea that a Hottentot had no right to sue a citizen, adding 'if this were allowed, would it not encourage the Hottentots to think that they were of the same standing as a citizen' (p. 47).

Dr. Keppel-Jones tries to be impartial, and his study of the Great Trek is dispassionate. The conflict between the English settlers and the Boers is analysed with detachment. Few will disagree with his judgement of the Jaimeson Raid as an inexcusable crime. He remarks: 'That the two old British colonies and the two former republics of South Africa should have merged in a close legislative union on the eighth anniversary of the treaty of Vereeniging is often regarded as one of the miracles of political history' (p. 153). But, events have proved that this outward unity has not found echoes in the hearts of these two European races, and under the present régime of Dr. Malan, the outlook for the English race is certainly not promising.

Chapter II of the book deals with another, perhaps more important, aspect of South African history—the relations between the whites and the coloured. Hertzog's policy, which the present Government follows, was 'to give a comprehensive legal basis to the exclusion of the black man from the white man's world' (p. 180). It is disappointing that Dr. Keppel-Jones should have contented himself with mainly a factual survey, instead of commenting on the dangerous results of the policy. Apart from the reactions of India to the outrageous treatment of Indians in South Africa, any policy of keeping down the vast coloured races in the interests of the white man's hegemony is fore-

doomed to failure in the light of modern world conditions, and is likely, if persisted in, to plunge South Africa itself into chaos.

T. K. VENKATARAMAN

BUILDING, CIVIL ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE: Record of the First Session, 1948 (Geneva: International Labour Office)

This volume consists of a report prepared by the International Labour Organization for the First Session of the Buildings, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee, as also the Proceedings of the Committee held in Brussels from 26 November 1946 to 3 December 1946.

It is unique in the history of Civil Engineering that such a Committee on an international level has been constituted by an influential Organization like the International Labour Office, for considering the social problems of the industry and for fostering future international coordination regarding the social and economic policies of the industry and help world reconstruction and peaceful development. It goes without saying that the exchange of views, deliberations and recommendations of the Committee, consisting of experts from various countries, will bear fruitful results and be highly beneficial to the participating countries in arriving at suitable solutions of problems confronting them. As such, the constitution of this Committee under the aegis of the International Labour Office should be welcomed by the engineering fraternity all over the world.

This publication consists of 4 parts. The first consisting of four chapters deals with the report prepared by the International Labour Office to serve as a basis for work of the first session of the Committee; it enumerates the scope and functions of the Committee, gives interesting details of the overall labour and social problems of the construction industries with reference to their economic background. Various important aspects of the industry such as housing, commercial and industrial construction, civil engineering projects, problems of execution, safety and welfare, industrial relations etc., and possible solutions, are clearly brought out.

The second part consists of the lists of the Members of the Committee and their Advisers and indicates the judicious selection of the representatives of the Governments, employers and workers for obtaining the best representation of all parties concerned in the industry. In all, 19 countries were represented, and 130 persons made up of 105 Delegates, 25 Advisers and one Observer attended this session.

Part 3 furnishes a record of the proceedings of the 8 sittings of the Committee, including a debate on the general problems of the construction industries, discussions on the reports of the Steering Committee, the sub-committee on industrial relations, the sub-committee on general conditions of work and the sub-committee on general problems relating to production and reconstruction. Reports submitted by the three sub-committees together with the resolutions were finally adopted by the Committee. The proceedings were marked by frank discussions and the resolutions adopted

indicated the keen desire of the delegates to cooperate with each other to further the aims of the Committee, especially to assure the welfare of the workers engaged in the industry.

Part 4 enumerates the various standing orders of the Committee, reports of sub-committees, statements and resolutions adopted by the Committee and makes a very interesting and useful reading; it also shows the valuable results achieved by the coordinated action of representatives of various countries to improve the lot of the industry in every respect, particularly with regard to rural housing, social security, working hours and other conditions. The most important proposals put up by the sub-committee on industrial relations were on the subject of collaboration in the construction industries, the establishment of national committees in the construction industries and a study of industrial relations to be undertaken by the International Labour Office.

BUILDING AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE: Second Session, Rome, 1949, Report I. 1949 (Geneva: International Labour Office).

This Report was prepared by the International Labour Office for the Second Session of the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee and provides an excellent summary of the measures taken by the various countries and the International Labour Office in implementing the recommendations of the First Session of the Committee held in Brussels in Nov.-Dec. 1946, as also the latest developments in the industry. Coming from the expert staff of the International Labour Office, the valuable report usefully serves as a basis for the deliberations of the Second Session of the Committee.

The Report is divided into two chapters. In the first, actions initiated by the International Labour Office and the measures adopted by the various Governments and by the industry are described in a neat and systematic manner. Portions dealing with the studies initiated by the International Labour Office concerning holidays with pay in construction industry as adopted and regulated in different countries are very interesting, and indicate the progress being made for the benefit of the workers. The notes on safety and hygiene, social security, payments by results as successfully adopted in Great Britain since 1941 and reduction of weekly working hours, give valuable information on existing conditions in the several countries. There is a table showing the provision for a gradual reduction of weekly working hours from 43 to 40 as adopted in the Transvaal Province in South Africa, which is intended to prevent the industry feeling bad effects which would otherwise have resulted from an immediate switch over to a 40-hour week.

Chapter II deals with recent trends and progress achieved in the industry in different countries. The organizations of research connected with housing and modernization of construction industries in England, France, Canada, the U. S. A and other countries have been described and great stress is laid on the utility of research in this sphere, for achieving greater efficiency and ultimate economy. The existing acute shortage in building materials and

how it adversely affects the building programme is clearly brought out and the table under this head illustrates the gravity of the situation in this respect. The portions on standardization and modular standardization are very instructive and throw light on the great importance in the development of mass production of materials and in coordinating the dimensions of the various building elements. This would definitely have far-reaching effects in solving the problems of the house-building industry, specially with the latest trends towards 'pre-fabrication'.

Building codes and their importance in guaranteeing a minimum level of safety and hygiene in dwelling houses are enumerated and particular stress is laid on modernizing the existing codes, in the light of the rapid progress made in the industry in recent years, to suit present-day conditions.

Instability of employment in the construction industry due to bad weather and other reasons and remedial measures adopted by some countries, as well as the important problem of settlement of jurisdictional disputes in the U. S. A. are very well explained and provide valuable information to persons engaged in the profession.

BUILDING, CIVIL ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE: Second Session Rome, 1949, Report III. 1949 (Geneva: International Labour Office).

From replies received to their questionnaire and information collected from various other sources, the International Labour Office compiled this interesting report for the consideration of the Second Session of the Building, Civil Engineering and Public Works Committee. The report is ably illustrated by numerous tables and statistical information concerning the availability and distribution of manpower, as well as future requirements under the several categories in the construction industries, for purposes of international comparison. Problems regarding employment in the construction industries, mobility of manpower and utility of employment services are clearly brought out. On account of their great importance in the industries, methods of recruitment and training of personnel are dealt with exhaustively and occupy a conspicuous part in this report. The report as a whole is highly instructive and would be of great use to persons interested in the development and welfare of the construction industries.

This report contains 4 chapters. The first deals with the various aspects of manpower in the construction industries, its distribution under different categories and future requirements, and the problem of foreign labour engaged in the industries in France, Great Britain, Switzerland and Poland in recent years. Instructive tables and statistical data have been compiled with much care and facilitate a comparative study of the manpower position in different countries. In Chapter II, adoption of improved methods of production and its influence on the rate of recruitment in the industries, use of demobilized personnel and other sources of recruitment of manpower such as long-term building policies are discussed in detail. Bad weather resulting in interruptions to work has an adverse effect on recruitment and methods adopted

in some countries to combat this are very important. The question of migrations of workers due to shortage or surplus of manpower on the national and international planes and the important rôle played by employment exchanges are well brought out. Chapter III gives much prominence to the problem of recruitment and training in the industries; efficiency and smooth working of the construction industries depend upon how well this problem is handled. Systems of apprenticeship and efficiency in training, organization of the training of adults, accelerated training, detailed programmes and methods of training, as also the results so far achieved in various countries, are all very ably presented.

The last chapter is on the conclusions suggested by a study of this report and enumerates the salient points for consideration of the Committee.

R. K. N. IYENGAR

EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR FORCE STATISTICS : A Study of Methods. 1948 (Geneva: I. L. O, 75 cts; 3s. 9 d.)

One of the subjects for discussion at the Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians, held in Montreal in August 1947, related to employment and unemployment. The present volume arose from the report submitted to that conference by the International Labour Office. In this excellent volume the whole field of employment, unemployment and labour force statistics is surveyed at expert level. The objectives, definitions and existing practices in various countries are critically analysed against the background of general principles in regard to the collection and compilation of employment and unemployment data. Detailed attention has been paid to the scope and methods in the collection of employment and unemployment data, and the practices that are prevalent in various countries have been explained and compared. The sources of employment and related statistics are explained in detail and their limitations pointed out. Space has been devoted also to a general summary of the labour force survey conducted in the U. S. A. and Canada to estimate employment and unemployment and related matters.

The volume is divided into five parts. Part I explains the uses of employment, unemployment and labour force statistics and deals with the definitions and implications of the various terms used, such as employment, unemployment, labour force etc. The various systems in vogue for the collection of these statistics with their advantages and disadvantages are also described in this part. Part II discusses problems relating to statistics of employment and contains a comparative evaluation of the practices followed in different countries in respect of the collection of these statistics. Employment data available in different countries are discussed in the light of general principles and suggestions given with a view to improving the collection of material. Part III deals similarly with statistics of unemployment. Principles and practices are discussed in detail. In Part IV of the book general questions relating to consistency of data, international comparability etc. are considered while Part V contains the resolutions that were proposed for adoption at the Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians.

The book is a very useful compilation giving in the same place a summary of the problems we face in the collection of employment and unemployment data, statistical methods followed in the different countries to estimate the magnitude of the problem, an enumeration of the various factors that are involved and the limitations to which the different types of material are subject. Like many other contributions from the I. L. O., it is a valuable publication both for officials and others engaged or interested in estimating the extent of employment and unemployment in any country and measuring the magnitude of its labour force.

REPORT OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
LABOUR STATISTICIANS: No. 7, (Part IV). 1948 (Geneva: I. L. O.).

This report of the work done by the Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians held at Montreal in August 1947, contains a summary of the proceedings of the Conference and completes the series of documents, the first three parts of which were Reports on Employment, Unemployment and Labour Force Statistics, the Cost of Living Statistics, and Methods of Statistics of Industrial Injuries. The volume is divided into sections, dealing with different items of the work of the Conference. The first two sections deal with the preliminaries connected with the convening of the Conference and its organization. There is a section each devoted to the work of the Committees on Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Cost of Living Statistics, and Industrial Accidents Statistics. The last section summarizes briefly the work of the Conference as a whole. There are two Appendices, the first giving the text of Resolutions adopted by the Conference and the second giving the list of members of delegations and committees.

The main work of the Sixth International Conference of Labour Statisticians consisted of discussing existing methods and practices in respect of, and formulating international standards for (a) index numbers of the Cost of Living, (b) calculation of frequency and severity rates of Industrial Injuries, and (c) Statistics of Employment, Unemployment and the Labour Force. The three major resolutions adopted by the Conference related to these three subjects. A number of other resolutions were also passed recommending to the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to arrange for the Office to undertake studies on various statistical subjects with a view to facilitating their discussion at future Conferences.

Two of the main subjects *viz.*, Index Numbers of Cost of Living, and Employment and Unemployment Statistics, considered by the Conference concern topics of great importance in the formulation of national economic and social policies. The recommendations made by the Conference on the methods to be used in measuring the movements of retail prices should prove invaluable to statisticians charged with this task of measurement. Similarly the resolution adopted in the case of Employment, Unemployment and Labour Force Statistics sets international standards in this field. In the case of each of the type of statistics discussed at the Conference, the Conference reviewed the work of earlier International Conferences of Labour Statisticians and drew

up new and more comprehensive recommendations for the guidance of statisticians in all countries.

A. N. KRISHNAN NAIR

BANKING, PLANNING AND CONSTITUTION MAKING By Prof. K. T. Shah. 1949 (Bombay: Vora & Co. Publishers, Ltd., Rs. 4/8).

The three lectures on Banking, Planning and Constitution-making by an authority like Prof. K. T. Shah are of absorbing interest. The subject has been made easily intelligible, and animated with a wealth of information and useful ideas. It is of profound value to the citizen and the administrator, as well as to the student.

The first address is a presidential one delivered to the Imperial Bank Staff Conference. It contains a minute examination of the banking organization and legislation in this country. He graphically chalks out the place and functions of banking in national economy. The author then briefly traces the historical development of banking, commercial finance and foreign exchange. He says that banking business in India 'being primarily and predominantly concerned with commercial credit, short-term investment and rapid turnover, it steers almost entirely clear of production finance.' Prof. Shah then sketches the rôle of banks as money-lending and money-transferring agencies and the creation and use of deposit currency i.e., cheques issued on the strength of a client's cash credit. The author then stresses the importance of banks as the stabilizers of price-level and shows how the scope of Indian banks is limited in this direction as well as in the mobilization of capital in expanding production. He next enumerates the contribution of the various parties concerned to the banking organization of a country such as the proprietors, the shareholders, the shroffs, the depositors and above all the Government. This is followed by a close scrutiny of banking legislation and the need to consolidate such legislation in the country along with several amendments which the author later proposed to the Consolidating Banking Bill (it has now become Law) in the Legislative Assembly. The address contains some essential recommendations which, to quote the learned author, 'would make the entire banking system of the country a Public Utility Service, ripe and ready for socialization.'

The second address on the nature and scope of planning delivered at the Scottish Church College, Calcutta, contains useful suggestions on planning from the viewpoint of a comprehensive planner. The author has brought to the fore the agencies that have to be co-ordinated for an integrated National Plan. He has laid great stress on the fact that planning would be incomplete if it was aimed at industrial development only, and that planning should not be confined to Production only but should include both Distribution, of the material wealth produced, and Exchange, national and international. He has also emphasized the necessity of Public Utilities and Social Services in a planned economy. He has probed into the potentialities of planning far deeper than the surface, giving us not only the nature and scope of planning, but its objective and *modus operandi*. He has then pointed out several gaps

left in the National Planning Committee Series consisting of 27 volumes, of which the author was the Secretary and the Editor. The most important gap brought to light by Prof. Shah is the problem of National Defence and the industries and services which minister to it. He has concluded brilliantly with the future prospects of planning and according to him 'it remains still a dream, a distant vision, hazy and fading under the might of vested interests and the trend they are forcing in reactionary directions.'

The last address reviews the work of the Constituent Assembly and gives a unique, critical estimate of the fundamentals of the Constitution and has exposed the weak spots of the Draft Constitution. He has commenced by tracing briefly the history of the events that immediately followed the abdication of power by Britain in order to give a true perspective of the preparation of the Draft Constitution. He has then given a very revealing picture of the actual working of the Constituent Assembly with all its shortcomings and its antagonism to constructive criticism. He has then enumerated the basic principles of constitution-making with all their ramifications such as popular sovereignty, distributions of powers, ministerial responsibility, civil liberties, organs and functions of government and Commonwealth relations. After this comprehensive survey of constitution-making, the author justly concludes that 'a constitution must be built to last, not to bend before the lightest breeze of passing sentiment'.

The entire work is an intellectual treat providing ample food for thought. Prof. Shah has done full justice to all the three themes in all their bearings and implications. It is indeed a mystery as to how Prof. Shah found time for preparing these 3 addresses in the midst of his heavy and laborious work in the Constituent Assembly and elsewhere.

S. KESAVA IYENGAR

1. THE SINO-INDIAN JOURNAL (Vol. I, Part II.)
2. Goodwill Messages to India.
3. China's Civilization and The Spirit of Indian and Chinese Cultures.
4. Inter-Asian Cultural Cooperation and Union of Asia.

(SHANTINIKETAN: Sino-Indian Cultural Society in India).

Any literature on India's relations with China and Asia in general is bound to be increasingly popular in this country. But when it is edited or written by no less a scholar than Prof. Tan Yun-shan, himself a Sino-Indian in the spiritual and best sense of the word, then we may be sure it is well worth reading. Under his guidance the Sino-Indian Cultural Society publishes a bi-annual journal and quite a few cultural pamphlets by various distinguished authors.

The December 1948 issue (Vol. I, Part II) of the *Sino-Indian Journal*, edited by Tan Yun-shan, is chiefly a Gandhi memorial number. In this issue we get such homely pictures of the Mahatma as in Rajkumari Amrit Kaur's 'Bapu' and Chandrashankar Shukla's 'A Talk About God' and also such sublime conceptions

of him as in Will Hayes' 'The Great Crucifixion' and in a *stotra* by the late Tai Chi-tao which can almost be described as a poem about a saint by a saint! The second half of the journal contains articles of general cultural interest. There is a very comprehensive and interesting article on 'Indo-Asian Contacts' by Benoy Sarkar. While tracing the increasing Asia-mindedness of Indians culminating in the momentous Asian Conferences held in India in 1947 and 1948, the author also makes it clear that 'Indian Asianism is but a new phase of India's expansion in interhuman contact and nothing more'. Equally interesting is Narasimhayya's exposition of the 'Art-Philosophy of Asia' wherein he lays stress on the fact that Asian art makes up the very fibre of life and not merely its external trappings. Other articles such as 'Jainism and China' by Kamta Prasad Jain, 'Indian Literature in Central Asia' by Mukherjee and 'Buddhist Secular Literature' by Aiyaswami Sastri, are equally scholarly, though not quite so readable. The essay on 'Buddhist Literature in South India' however, tends to lose itself in dates! Many of the essays, particularly 'The Spirit of Mahayana Buddhism' are interspersed with delightful quotations from Buddhist and ancient Hindu classics and 'A Tibetan Account of Nagarjuna' makes us feel that the system of Indian education was probably more versatile and complete two thousand years ago than it is now! On the whole this is a well got-up journal and perhaps its most salient feature is its eschewing of politics—the bane of this century.

This same cultural and non-political strain is kept up by the venerable Tai Chi-tao in his '*Goodwill Messages to India.*' What he has to say is noble and inspiring, particularly his address to the Maha Bodhi Society, but perhaps much of the beauty of the language, as of all languages, is lost in translation.

In another Sino-Indian pamphlet entitled '*China's Civilization and the Spirit of Indian and Chinese Cultures*', Tan Yun-shan gives us a remarkable summary in seventeen pages of the world's oldest civilization where the pattern of social and political life was laid as early as 2300 B. C. Communists might be interested in the land policy of the Chou period (2200-220 B. C.) wherein 'all land belonged to the Nation and was equally divided among the people'. With typical generosity the author dwells largely on how India influenced Chinese literature, religion, philosophy and art and with typically Chinese humour he marks the contrast between China's contact with Indians and also with Europeans 'who came first with their gospel, then with their merchandise and then with their war-ships and guns'! Comparing the essence of Chinese civilization with that of ours in his 'Spirit of Indian and Chinese Cultures,' Tan Yun-shan points out the essential identity in our moral and spiritual values. In the first article of his pamphlet *Inter-Asian Cultural Co-operation and Union of Asia* he gives an evaluation and synthesis, not only of Indian and Chinese cultures, but of Asian culture as a whole. With characteristic simplicity he suggests a panacea for the present-day ills and evils of the world based, not on the complicated methods of politicians and economists, but on the essential goodness of human nature and the development of Eastern culture, its pacifism and humaneness, which is the noblest heritage of Asia and her best contribution to the world. The second article of the pamphlet makes

a concession to politics. Having suggested cultural development to achieve world peace, Tan Yun-shan now suggests a federation of Governments and the formation of Unions on a regional basis to achieve world unity and a World Union. But even this World Union, he rightly observes, should not be based on political, economic or military strength but on the strength of the spirit.

(MRS.) PARVATHI THAMPI

FOREIGN BOOKS ON INDIA

MEMORY IS THE SCAR. By Dennis Gray Stoll, 1949 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 9/6 net).

Through this novel, Mr. Stoll has attempted to present a realistic picture of India today. It is a story of East Bengal in the spring of 1946. The element of the story is very thin, and the characters are merely pegs to hang the ideas of the author on. Tara Devi, a middle aged widow, is an authoress and Congress worker; Asok, her son, is a civil servant with an unfaithful French wife, Marie; Manik Basu is an ambitious Congress leader with a thoroughly corrupt private life; Benoy is a constructive worker who marries a Harijan girl and leads an ideal village life. All of them move about the countryside of East Bengal, and through the discussions and experiences the observant and argumentative author has tried to reveal a wide range of problems that confront the country.

The novel is divided into four books: the Old, the New, the Shadow and the Real. Under these headings the novelist describes the conflict between the romantic old world and the drab new one. In a way, he has rendered a service by presenting a realistic, though imperfect, picture of Indian society, which should cause a heart-searching among our politicians.

But a careful perusal of the book leaves an impression that Mr. Stoll has neither been completely fair and impartial in his presentation nor correct in his diagnosis. He thinks that political leadership is responsible for the misery of the people. In the character of Manik Basu he has tried to show, in a subtle way, that our political leaders are corrupt both morally and materially; they are trying to exploit a simple, underfed, ill-clothed and backward people for personal greed and lure of office; that honest workers do not find favour with them and are put out of the way by questionable means. On the other hand he presents Geoffrey Warner, a British police detective, as an honest and incorruptible officer as well as a great lover of Hindu philosophy, who impresses Tara Devi so much that she falls in love with him. Anyone who is familiar with the conditions in Bengal in 1946 will be surprised to read such a description, which is not only highly exaggerated and unnatural but a complete travesty of facts.

Certainly a novel is not a medium to propagate such opinions about the political leaders and parties of a country. Mr. Stoll should have attempted a more direct method, so that those who were pilloried might have answered properly.

RAM GOPAL KHANNA

OTHER BOOKS

CHARLES FREER ANDREWS. By Benarsidas Chaturvedi and Marjori Sykes. 1949 (London: George Allen and Unwin. 10sh. 6d).

Truly have the joint authors said of their hero that though he did not write the *Life of Christ* as he had planned, he had most faithfully lived it. In its best and widest sense, Charles Freer Andrews was a 'wandering Christian', wandering from country to country and from one subject to another in the true Christian spirit of charity and service. But wherever he went, whatever realms to see, his heart untrammelled turned to Christ and to India, particularly the poor and the oppressed Indians at home or abroad. A member of the ruling British race and an ordained Christian minister, he came to India to save, but remained to serve. No Britisher had so completely identified himself with India as he and at one time nobody suffered from both sides as he, and finally nobody was more universally loved and acclaimed as he. His was a unique life. His romantic and fascinating story has been told with remarkable fidelity to truth and to his personality by the joint authors, one a Hindu of India and the other a Christian from England, typifying the cooperation between India and England for which Mr. Andrews laboured.

It is not possible in this short review to discuss the great variety of subjects that Andrews handled with rare courage and devotion. He was a pioneer in several of them. As early as 1912 he had expressed his conviction that India should achieve independence. Again in 1920 he wrote in the press that India's self-respect was compatible only with independence from British domination. Perhaps he was the first to think and advocate independence for India!

Another remarkable achievement of Andrews was his almost equal loyalty and devotion to Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi, who in some ways were poles asunder. His own appreciation of Christianity underwent a broadening and tolerant modification as the result of his contacts with these two great heathens. In 1911, in his pre-Gandhian era, Andrews, speaking at the Convention of Religions in Allahabad, proclaimed the uniqueness of Christ, not to be put on a level with other prophets. But later on, in 1914, after he had met Gandhiji in South Africa and seen Christianity as practised in that country, he expressed the view that Christianity seemed to him an outgrowth of Hinduism, and that the world's higher religions were but branches of the same family tree. He realized that his new conception of Christianity would mean a lonely pilgrimage to him, for it meant giving up claims for the Christian position which everyone in the West whom he knew and loved would never conceive of giving up.

The joint authors relate this change to Andrews' experience in South Africa. The late Gopal Krishna Gokhale, who had persuaded Andrews to go to South Africa to help Gandhiji, had warned him that the South African Christianity would shock him, and he soon found that Gokhale was right. On the other hand, he had met heathen Gandhi and found in him a truer Christian. The joint authors describe the incident of Gandhiji being refused admission to

a church in which Andrews was preaching (p. 102). As I heard it in South Africa, perhaps from Andrews himself, it was more dramatic and telling than in the book. It would appear that Andrews, who was living with Mr. and Mrs. Gandhi in Durban, slipped out one Sunday in order to preach the sermon in a Christian church. When Gandhi learnt of it, he sought admission to the church to hear his friend's sermon. But he was turned away at the gate because it was a 'white' church and he was an Indian. He was advised to go to the Indian church in another part of the town. Gandhiji said that he was not a Christian and had not come to attend the usual church service and that his friend, Andrews, was preaching in that particular church and he wished to hear him and his purpose would not be served by his attending an Indian church somewhere else. He was however told that no Indian could be admitted to the 'white' church under any circumstance; it was just not done. Whereupon Gandhiji returned home. Later on, Andrews returned home too. He was full of joy and exaltation and very pleased with himself. Gandhiji told him how he wanted to hear Andrews' sermon, had presented himself at the church door, but was turned back as he was an Asian. Whereupon Andrews threw up his hands in holy horror and exclaimed that at the very moment that Gandhiji was turned away at the gate of the church, he, Gandhiji himself, was the theme of his (Andrews') sermon inside the church!

P. KODANDA RAO

RURAL WELFARE SERIES. By Benson Y. Landis, 1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, distribution in India by the Oxford University Press, Bombay, \$3).

The author has long been active in the field of rural sociology. He was Editor of *Rural America* from 1923 to 1941, Executive Secretary of the American Country Life Association from 1929 to 1941, Director of the Institute of Rural Economics, Rutgers University in 1935 and is now Executive Secretary of the Committee in Town and Country in New York City. Here he gives a brief but comprehensive account of social welfare services in rural America.

America has advanced probably more than any other country in organized forms of social service. One usually thinks of social work, however, only in connexion with slums caused by industrialization. But in this book the author gives a clear, concise and interesting description of numerous social welfare organizations, both private and governmental, operating in the rural areas of the United States. The book is therefore of special interest to us in India, as it indicates the many lines along which work may be done for our village folk.

Primarily, however, so far as our villages go, the problem is one of dire poverty. So our chief means of bringing about happier conditions in our villages will have to be economic. But even when the economic problem is solved, it is obvious, as is apparent from reading this book, that there will still be need for various forms of social welfare services like, for example,

maternity and child welfare, old age assistance, adult education, recreation and schools for the handicapped. So this book has many valuable suggestions for us, and should be read by our Rural Development Officers and by village workers. It gives at the end a useful list of voluntary and governmental agencies carrying on rural welfare services in America, with their addresses, and a very full and carefully selected bibliography.

BHARATAN KUMARAPPA

INDIAN COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY DURING TWENTIETH CENTURY. By N. H. Thakker. 1949 (Bombay: Vora and Co. Publishers Ltd., Rs. 15).

Indian Cotton Textile Industry by Prof. N. H. Thakker is a factual study of this important Indian industry, with special reference to war-time effects on it. It starts with a theoretical approach to the problem and briefly traces the progress of the industry from 1854 to 1945.

The author makes a comprehensive study of the effects of last war on the development and financial structure of the industry. He surveys the labour conditions during the two wars. Scarcity of cloth in the country and consequent control over the whole industry are fully discussed.

With a view to make the work useful to the students, he discusses in detail the organization of the industry. A chapter is devoted to the importance of the handloom industry and its future in the economic set-up of the country. In the last chapter he refers to economic repercussions of the partition on the industry, competition from new fibres, decreasing production and reintroduction of controls.

The book does not constitute either an original or a critical study of the industry. There is no reference to the Report of the Cotton Textile Committee, which envisages stepping up production by starting new mills. It does not make reference to Government's efforts to get textile machinery like spindles and looms from foreign countries.

The economic developments since 1947 make the study out of date. It is useful as a historical account of the industry.

V. RAMAKRISHNA RAO

DIE INDISCHE WELT (Als Erscheinung und Erlebnis): By Helmuth von Glasenapp. (Buhler's Baden—Baden).

Among the orientalists in Europe to-day, Prof. von Glasenapp occupies a unique position, for since the death of Heinrich Luders there is no one in Europe who can be compared to Prof. von Glasenapp in erudition and scholarly activities as far as Indological studies are concerned. As an author of more than a dozen books and innumerable brochures on India Prof. von Glasenapp has been known in Europe nearly for a quarter of a century and those who have read his "*Die Religionen Indiens*" and "*Der Hinduismus*", know well what an amount of patient work he had put in these books in order to give to the world a scientific and exact history of Indian religions and Hinduism. Similarly his great work "*Die Literaturen Indiens*" has brought up

to modern times the history of our national literature and what is most impressive about this book is that in matters of exactitude it even surpasses Winfernitz's remarkable work on that subject in many respects.

Prof. von Glasenapp's famous library of Sanskrit manuscripts was destroyed during the bombardment of Königsberg where he used to live but in spite of this loss and in spite of great hardships he has gone through, he has not remained idle and since the Armistice he has already published four books on India, of which "*Die Philosophie der Inder*" published in 1948 is going to appear in English translation. In the book under review, the author has described with consummate skill and much insight the nature and characteristics of Indian civilization and its influence on various countries of Asia. He qualified himself for this task by his extensive travels in India in 1927-28, his sojourn among the Indian colonists in South Africa and East Africa in 1929 and by his travels in the Far East in 1930-31. His interpretation of the Indian world is not, therefore, purely academic and unlike many European orientalists the author was also keenly interested in the political and social problems of the countries he had visited and what he says springs therefore from his direct experience of the peoples and institutions of our country. During his travels in India he had met also Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore and he has given us in this book two very interesting studies of their work and genius.

The part of the book, however, which will be of great interest to our readers, refers to the Indians Overseas about whom the author has much knowledge and he discusses their spiritual and material problems with authority and conviction. I would also like to draw attention to the chapters relating to Indian influence on Ceylon and South-East Asia for which the Germans have a more appropriate word, for they call this region "*Hinter und Insel-Indian*". And finally, if I may I would like to suggest that some Indian publishing house should bring out at least, in English translation, some of the more important works of Prof. von Glasenapp, so that his remarkable contribution to Indology may be better known in our country.

GIRIJA MOOKERJEE

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INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS*

By M. C. SETALVAD

I

INDIA'S ATTITUDE

'THE United Nations was a kind of bridge between past and present conflicts and a happy future. The hopes of the world rested on its successful operations. A tremendous responsibility lay on the members of the United Nations because if no such bridge existed, it would be difficult to imagine what the state of the world would be like.' These words of the Foreign Minister of India sum up the attitude of the Government and the people of India towards the United Nations.

Among the main objectives of India's foreign policy is the pursuit of peace. In the course of her long history, India has never made attempts to dominate or enslave other countries. India believes that war as a method of settling disputes is unjust. Not only is war morally unjustifiable; but victory in a war fails to attain the real objective of fighting it—the attainment of peace. That is the experience of all wars and has been confirmed by what we see at the end of two World Wars fought in the course of a generation. Such has been the doctrine preached by Mahatma Gandhi; and it is largely accepted in India.

Apart from the rejection of war on moral and utilitarian grounds, a long period of peace and stability is essential to India for her economic development. Her vast natural resources and her reserves of power can be made available for building up higher standards of life for her teeming population only if she and the world have a quarter of a century of respite from the destructive waste of modern war. Thus India's endeavour to support policies and measures which will make for peace in the world has its roots not only in principle and justice but arises also from a vivid realization of her own interest.

India is conscious that the United Nations Organization with all its organs and specialized agencies makes for the widest co-operation among all peace loving nations for the attainment of international security and for the promotion of a new order of social justice. It is true that conflicts between some of the dominant members of the Organization have greatly hampered its effectiveness; these conflicts have prevented it from becoming a real force controlling international peace and security. Yet even in that field it has assembled in debate personalities and nations holding widely divergent views and tried to promote the growth of a common outlook. Appreciating the grave difficulties which have beset the Organization but convinced that it is the greatest single factor in the world today endeavouring towards the establishment of uni-

* A Data paper prepared for the India-America Conference December 1946

versal peace and security and world-wide social reconstruction, India adheres to the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations and gives it her whole-hearted support. Indeed, her confidence in and loyalty to the Organization have led her to bring some of her own problems to it for solution.

II

PART PLAYED AT SAN FRANCISCO

India was represented at the meeting of the Nations held in 1945 at San Francisco to consider the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to found the Organization. India had not then attained her freedom. Yet the part she played at that meeting and the principles which she then espoused were fully indicative of the trend of Indian thought.

In his speech at the Conference, the Chief Indian Delegate 'laid special emphasis on the need for removing economic and social evils which often lay at the root of war. Unless fundamental human rights which were incapable of segregation were safeguarded in all lands and among all peoples, irrespective of colour and creed, world security would remain a dream.' That statement contains two ideas which have since been repeatedly asserted as lying at the root of India's foreign policy; the elimination of racial discrimination and the eradication of disease and ignorance which afflict the greater parts of Asia and Africa.

India made valuable contributions to the task of framing of the Charter. The Indian Delegation put forward an amendment to the Chapter on Purposes, suggesting the addition of a clause 'to promote recognition of fundamental human rights for men and women irrespective of race, colour or creed, in all nations and in all international relations and association of nations one with another.' This amendment was withdrawn on a similar amendment being put forward by the sponsoring Powers which ultimately resulted in the addition to clause 3 of Article 1 which enumerates the purposes of the United Nations the famous phrase 'and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.' Thus was exemplified India's insistence on freedom for the individual irrespective of his race or religion.

Her own grievous experience has led India to uphold at all times the cause of the weak and oppressed nations and set its face in determined opposition to Colonial Imperialism. It was suggested at San Francisco that among the territories to which the trusteeship system was applicable should be included 'territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration.' The idea was that Colonial Powers would themselves bring colonial territories administered by them under the trusteeship system proposed to be established by the Charter. In the course of the discussions in London between Commonwealth countries, which had preceded the Conference, the British Government had made it clear that they did not intend to apply the principle of trusteeship to their own colonial territories. Australia and New Zealand had both expressed dissatisfaction at the

attitude thus adopted by the United Kingdom. At San Francisco, the broad issue was whether the United Kingdom should not accept the obligation of rendering reports to an international authority as is done in the case of trust territories in respect of some of their colonial possessions. The Australian representative took the view that it would be better for the United Kingdom Government not to accept the principle of voluntary trusteeship at all than to accept it and refuse to apply it to their own territories. The Indian representative stated that in respect of the matter in issue he had to voice public opinion in India as well as the views of his Government. He stated that there was a section in India which regarded the last war as an Imperialist war, the object of which was to bring about the establishment of colonial rule by European Powers. He said that 'the refusal of Britain to apply the trusteeship principle in non-mandated territories would lend colour to this criticism. Certain Powers had lost their colonies and were unable to get them back by their own efforts or even effectively to assist their allies regarding them It was illogical for the United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand to fight to restore these Colonies to those Powers without attaching any conditions as to their administration.....If Colonies had been administered in a spirit of trusteeship they would be a burden instead of being a tempting prize and a fundamental cause of future wars would be eliminated.' Thus did India proclaim in no uncertain voice its condemnation of the colonial system at the San Francisco meeting of the Nations.

III

THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

India took an active part in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations which first met in June 1945 at San Francisco and later in November 1945 in London after the Charter had come into force on 24 October 1945.

At an early stage of the discussions in the Committee dealing with trusteeship, the Indian representative contested the proposal to delay the setting up of the temporary Trusteeship Council. He put forward the view that (1) the General Assembly should call upon the mandatory Powers to declare their readiness to place the mandated territories administered by them under the trusteeship system, and, (2) that these Powers should be invited to prepare draft trusteeship agreements and submit them for approval. He suggested that a recommendation should be made to the General Assembly to set up an *ad hoc* committee with the object of considering trusteeship agreements, revising them where necessary, and submitting them for the approval of the General Assembly. A resolution was thereafter adopted by the Trusteeship Committee by which, in effect, the General Assembly of the United Nations called upon 'the States administering territories in accordance with the League of Nations mandates to undertake practical steps, in concert with other States directly concerned, for the implementation of the provisions of Article 79 of the Charter' which provides for the conclusion of agreements in respect of each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system. Thus began India's

struggle for bringing under the trusteeship system all territories held under mandates from the League of Nations. It will appear hereafter how consistently India has fought for the acceptance of the position that States who held territories under mandates conferred upon them by the League of Nations are bound to enter into trusteeship agreements in reference to them by the spirit if not by the letter of the Charter.

IV

LONDON SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946

The report of the Preparatory Commission came up for consideration before the Inaugural Meeting of the first part of the first Session of the General Assembly held in London in January 1946.

In the opening discussion the Chairman of the Indian Delegation, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, emphasized the importance of the Economic and Social Council which is regarded by many as the leading organ of the United Nations. 'It has been truly stated over and over again.....that the Security Council is there in a negative aspect.....to see that aggression does not in any form show its head again in this world. The positive function of securing human happiness, human progress and prosperity is laid heavily on the Economic and Social Council. Wars are but the outward result of something far deeper, a malady far greater, an injury more widespread—the injury that comes, the malady that spreads out of economic maladjustment and of the social injustice. Remove these things that always are at the bottom of all this trouble, see to it that between man and man and between nation and nation there is a common economic fundamental unity. See to it again that among men and women of all races and creeds there is justice based on social equality. Then the fundamental causes of war are removed far indeed.'

He also emphasized the interdependence of the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council which had not been set up. 'The basic problems of the Trusteeship Council are closely associated with the problems of the Economic and Social Council; in fact it would not be too much to say that the Economic and Social Council cannot satisfactorily function unless there is a Trusteeship Council also, that the Trusteeship Council can function effectively in close co-operation with the Economic and Social Council.' He pleaded earnestly for the immediate establishment of the Trusteeship Council.

The importance of the Trusteeship Council lay in the promise which it held out to the non-self-governing peoples of the world of an improvement in their economic and political conditions which would inevitably lead them to self-government. Said India's representative: 'But I am certain that I take back from this hall from the many speeches that have been made by the delegates of European countries the message to the people of Asia and far eastern Asia that there is a quicker realization of their problems in European countries than there ever has been, that there is a greater understanding of those human pulsations, those throbbings of the heart even more than of the head which have come to the people of these countries. And may I not take also with me the

assurance, if assurance were needed, that relations between the non-self-governing countries and others will be on a more satisfactory basis? And may I not hope that the Trusteeship Council which we at San Francisco after a great deal of deliberation sought to establish, will be an accomplished fact, that the lead given by the United Kingdom and I believe by that little country New Zealand will be followed by others?

He also referred to the immediate need for placing mandated territories under trusteeship administration. 'With reference to mandated territories—comparatively a simple proposition in itself—with reference to new territories which after the peace treaty doubtless will come under mandate, and lastly with reference to those dependent and non-self-governing countries which are to come under the trusteeship system, the sooner that happens the better. It will be for the good understanding of all the people of the world and for the prevention of those permanent and lasting causes that lead to misunderstandings and troubles in the world.'

This was said at a time when India had not yet succeeded in shaking off the powerful hold of British Imperialism to which she had been subjected for a century and a half. Yet India pleaded in no uncertain voice the cause of the underdeveloped and economically backward Asian and African peoples.

The General Assembly adopted a composite resolution dealing with the Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter. It drew 'attention to the fact that the obligations accepted under Chapter XI of the Charter by all members of the United Nations are in no way contingent upon the conclusion of trusteeship agreements or upon the bringing into being of the Trusteeship Council, and are, therefore, already in full force.' It requested the Secretary General to include in his annual report a statement summarizing such information as may have been transmitted to him by members of the United Nations under Article 73 (e) of the Charter 'relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are responsible other than those to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.' In regard to Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, the General Assembly welcomed 'the declarations made by certain States administering territories now held under mandate of an intention to negotiate trusteeship agreements in respect of some of those territories.' It invited 'the States administering territories now held under mandate to undertake practical steps, in concert with other States directly concerned, for the implementation of Article 79 of the Charter (which provides for the conclusion of agreement on the terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system) in order to submit these agreements for approval preferably not later than during the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly.' The resolution went on to state that the General Assembly 'expects that the realization of the objectives of Chapters XI, XII and XIII will make possible attainment of political, economic, social and educational aspirations of non-self-governing peoples.' This was a substantial step forward which had resulted from the insistence of India and other countries on the administering Powers accepting some control of an international authority in respect of non-self-

governing territories and the mandatory Powers submitting trusteeship agreements in reference to the mandated territories.

V

INDIA'S POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the second part of the first session of the General Assembly met in October 1946 in New York, India had attained a position in which she could send an independent delegation to the United Nations briefed and accredited by a national Government and speaking with a full sense of responsibility and authority vested in that Government 'by the confidence and sanctions' of the Indian people. The Indian Delegation to this session was led by Shrimati Vijayalaxmi Pandit who thereafter became as it were the accredited ambassador of India to the United Nations. She unequivocally declared that India regarded 'imperialism, political, economic or social, as being inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.'

At the 1947 session Shrimati Vijayalaxmi Pandit made a more explicit and ampler declaration of India's policy in the United Nations. Speaking in the General Debate, she stated, 'we shall offer our support to, or withhold it from the proposals that come before the members solely in the light of our judgement of the merits of the case in question. We stand for peace, and will devote our resources and energy towards the abolition of all causes which lead to war. To those nations, which work with this end, we shall gladly offer our full co-operation.....'

'The important thing today is that we should all observe the spirit and the letter of the Charter faithfully, its principles and procedure, not only when it is convenient to us, not only when it helps us to pursue aims and policies which may have no connexion with the Charter, but at all times and in relation to all problems and difficulties.....'

'Our Organization, The United Nations, has no "ism" of its own; it embraces all "isms" and ideologies. It embraces all civilizations of the West and of the East, its principles cannot be said to derive exclusively from either or any of the contending doctrines.....'

'That is why in these most critical times and notwithstanding the discouraging factors we continue to place our faith in it. We are indeed more firmly convinced than ever before that the only way to save a catastrophe, the only road to peace, freedom and well-being for us all, is through our steadfast and whole-hearted co-operation at whatever inconvenience within the framework of the United Nations and in the spirit of the Charter.'

VI

MEMBERSHIP OF UNITED NATIONS

At the 1946 session came up the question of the admission of new members to the United Nations which has ever since been the subject of an acrimonious controversy between conflicting power blocs in the United Nations.

Six States including Siam had applied for membership. Siam was unanimously recommended by the Security Council for membership; but in regard to the remaining five—Eire, Transjordan, Portugal, Albania and Outer Mongolia—there was a want of unanimity among the Big Five. The application of Eire, Transjordan and Portugal, though supported by a majority of the members of the Security Council, was opposed by the U.S.S.R. on the ground that these countries had no diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. The U.K. and U.S.A. opposed the admission of Albania and Outer Mongolia on the ground that they were not satisfied that those States fulfilled the qualifications laid down in Article 4 of the Charter. That article provides that membership in the United Nations is open to all peace loving States which accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgement of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. It further provides that the admission to membership will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

In consequence of the impasse which had been created in the Security Council, the matter was brought to the General Assembly.

In the discussions in the Political Committee the general opinion was in favour of acceptance of the principle of universality of membership. A majority of States asserted that no criteria other than those laid down in Article 4 of the Charter were admissible in judging of the fitness of an applicant for membership and that the General Assembly had a right to scrutinize and revise the recommendations made by the Security Council.

In conformity with her policy of examining each question coming up before the United Nations on its merits and not aligning herself with any power bloc—a policy which has since been authoritatively declared—India adopted a detached attitude on the subject. She generally supported the view that in regard to the admission of members only the qualifications for membership laid down in Article 4 of the Charter should receive consideration and that no extraneous matters should be looked at. If the Security Council had refused to recommend the States for membership on inadequate grounds it was open to and incumbent on the Assembly to ask the Security Council to reconsider its attitude. India expressed the view that Eire and Transjordan should have been recommended for admission to the United Nations. She further declared that the facts and figures put forward by the U.S.S.R. delegation regarding the sacrifices made by Albania and Outer Mongolia in the struggle against Fascism were impressive and that the case of those countries should also be reconsidered by the Security Council. India showed her love for democracy and her abhorrence to all totalitarian régimes by opposing the admission of Portugal. Her opposition was expressed in these words. 'The Portuguese Government was authoritarian; it had a distinctly Fascist flavour; moreover, her colonial policy as exhibited in Goa, was thoroughly reactionary.'

The increasing tension between the two blocs in the Security Council—the Slav Bloc and the U.S.-U.K. Bloc—continued to make itself felt in the manner in which this body dealt with applications for memberships of the United Nations.

At the Second Session of the General Assembly held in 1947 the number of applicants who had been refused admission had increased. Neither of the two groups of Powers in the Security Council was willing to strengthen the other by recommending for membership countries who would increase the voting power of the other group in the General Assembly. This resulted in shutting out practically all new applicants for membership.

The scheme of the Charter is the universality of membership to the Organization. The tests laid down for admission by Article 4 are only two; the applicant State should be peace loving and that it should be able and willing to carry out its obligations to the Organization. Notwithstanding these clear provisions, attempts were made to go outside them. The view was put forward that it was open to apply other and different tests, not mentioned in the Charter, in judging of the fitness of a member for admission to the Organization. The U.S.S.R. urged that the fact that the applicant State did not have diplomatic relations with her was a good ground for her voting against the admission of the State. Numerous other similar considerations were stated to be legitimate. Extreme views were expressed in the discussions which took place. The Argentine view was that the rule of the unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council did not apply to requests by States for admission to membership to the United Nations. The view at the opposite extreme was that of the U.S.S.R. and Poland who urged that no action was called for in regard to the pending applications for membership as there was not before the General Assembly a recommendation by the Security Council in regard to them. An intermediate view was that the General Assembly could admit a State even though it had not been recommended for admission by the Security Council. The supporters of this view urged that the General Assembly should express its opinion that in regard to certain applicant States the requirements laid down in the Charter for admission to membership had been satisfied, that the Security Council had in refusing to recommend them acted on considerations which were irrelevant to the question of membership and that, in the circumstances, the applications of these States should be reconsidered by the Council.

India, approaching the question on its merits, put forward a clear statement, steering as has been her wont the middle path. Her representative stated that 'there was no doubt that approval by the Assembly (of the application for membership by a State) was subject to a favourable recommendation by the Security Council. The intent of the joint resolution submitted by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, was clearly to reverse that condition and the statement contained in the resolution, namely, that the Assembly considered certain rejected applicants to be able and willing to satisfy the obligations of the Charter constituted an usurpation of the Council's rights and was an attempt to prejudice its decisions.....It was true that the Security Council was faced with a deadlock but the General Assembly should not coerce the Council into taking the decision in accordance with the Assembly's desire. The approval of the Council and of the Assembly in fact constituted two doors which an applicant was required to pass. The attitude of certain members of

the Council merely demonstrated the existence of blocs within the United Nations. If delegations were reluctant to admit new members it was because they did not wish to strengthen the opposing groups. The Indian delegation had repeatedly warned against the formation of such opposing groups.'

In 1948 the question again came up before the session of the General Assembly for that year held in Paris. The Political Committee had before it on this occasion the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice expressed on a reference made to it under a resolution of the General Assembly passed in 1947. Unfortunately the opinion was a divided one. The majority held the view that it was not open to the Security Council in examining applications for membership to enter into considerations other than those mentioned in Article 4 of the Charter. Some members of the Court held that the Council, being a political body, it was not right to require its members when recording a vote on the eligibility of a State for membership to discard political considerations. In the debates which followed divergent opinions of the Court were canvassed by the opposing groups in support of their view. In the result, the question of admitting the new applications to membership remained where it was. On this occasion India again pleaded for a dispassionate consideration of each application for membership on the basis of Article 4 of the Charter and pointed out that the controversy in regard to the admission of new members arising out of the conflicting views of opposing power blocs was affecting the effectiveness of the Organization and preventing it from functioning as a world Organization based on universal membership.

VII

FRANCO SPAIN

The relations between Franco's Spain and the United Nations have been the subject of a heated controversy at the different Sessions of the General Assembly. The ties of Franco with the Axis Powers and his Fascist régime in Spain had rightly created a feeling of aversion to Spain among the members of the United Nations. France, Poland and the Soviet group generally took up a strong attitude and proposed resolutions asking for the intervention of the United Nations in Spain. The U.S.A. thought that it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to resolve that the Franco Government of Spain should be debarred from membership in the International Agencies and the International Conferences organized by the United Nations and that it should be called upon to surrender its powers to a provisional government representative of the Spanish people. The U.K. and U.S.A. opposed proposals for severing political and economic relations with Spain. Their view was that the United Nations could not interfere with the Government of Spain in a domestic matter. The Latin American nations, with their ties of race and origin with Spain, were, broadly speaking, against any action against Spain.

India's attitude in regard to Spain at the 1946 Session showed her love for governments representative of the people and her disapprobation of dictatorial methods. The leader of the Indian Delegation Shrimati Vijayalaxmi Pandit

expressed India's abhorrence of the Franco régime and her whole-hearted sympathy with the Spanish people. She recalled that India was one of the first countries to raise its voice against aggression whether it manifested itself in Manchuria or in Spain. She pointed out that India had no diplomatic relations with Spain and had no intention of forming diplomatic ties while the Franco régime lasted. She, however, doubted whether the mere severance of diplomatic relations would solve the issue. It would only shut off information as to what was happening in Spain. Economic sanctions again were not likely to have any effect unless they were universally and whole-heartedly applied. India, in any case, would support any measure which would effectively help the Spanish people to shake off the Franco régime.

The General Assembly passed a resolution at the 1946 Session recommending that if within a reasonable time there was not established a Government which derived its authority from free elections, the Security Council should consider adequate measures in order to remedy the situation. The resolution further recommended that all members of the United Nations should immediately recall from Madrid their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary accredited there.

When the General Assembly met in 1947 there had not been established in Spain a government deriving its authority from the freely elected representatives of the people. Very little had been done since the resolution of the General Assembly in 1946 to implement that resolution. No country excepting the U.K. had withdrawn its representatives from Spain. The Argentine had on the contrary since the date of the Assembly resolution defiantly appointed an ambassador to Spain.

Resolutions were proposed in the Political Committee broadly to the effect that the General Assembly should reaffirm its resolution on the subject of Franco Spain adopted in 1946 and express the confidence of the Assembly that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities under the Charter should it consider that the situation demanded such action. A joint resolution was presented by Belgium and some other countries which while reproducing in substance the ideas expressed in these resolutions added to it an expression of regret that the recommendation of the General Assembly made in 1946 had not been fully complied with.

India maintained the attitude which she had taken up on this question in 1946. Her representative deplored the conduct of the member States who had not complied with the resolution of 1946, particularly the conduct of the Argentine in appointing an ambassador to the Court of Franco. India moved an amendment to the joint resolution of Belgium and other countries proposing that the General Assembly should not merely express its confidence that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities in the matter but that it should go further and express confidence that the Security Council will consider adequate measures to remedy the situation as recommended in the resolution of October, 1946. The matter was referred to a Sub-Committee which reported submitting an agreed resolution. By the resolution the General Assembly reaffirmed its resolution on the subject adopted in 1946 and expressed

its confidence that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities under the Charter as soon as it considered the situation in regard to Spain so required it. This resolution was adopted by the Committee and eventually by the General Assembly with the omission of that part of it which reaffirmed the resolution passed by the General Assembly in 1946.

The question came up again before the second part of the Third Session of the General Assembly at Lake Success early in 1949. The tension between the two Power Blocs had increased the importance of Spain as a strategic base in the event of a war between the Western Powers and the U.S.S.R. It was roundly alleged by the U.S.S.R. and the allied countries that the U.S.A. had supplied large quantities of war materials to Franco Spain and details of these supplies were furnished. The denials made by the U.S.A. of these allegations were feeble and not convincing. A resolution was moved by some of the Latin American countries which in substance was a modification of the previous attitude of the General Assembly towards Franco Spain. Poland on the other hand advocated a stronger attitude against Spain and sponsored a resolution giving effect to her view. In the debate which followed in the Committee India reiterated her previous attitude in regard to Franco Spain and stated that she would support neither of the two proposed resolutions. The resolution sponsored by some of the Latin American nations, though carried by a majority in the Political Committee, failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. The result was that the attitude adopted by the Assembly by its resolution of 1946 and 1947 remained unaltered.

VIII

THE VETO

The Veto—the provision in Article 27 of the Charter which requires that the decisions of the Security Council on all matters other than procedural shall be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members—was the subject of heated debate in the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly in New York in 1946. The veto of the permanent Five, which had been retained at San Francisco in spite of all the strenuous efforts of the middle and small Powers to get rid of it, had been found as early as 1946 to be an obstacle to the smooth working of the Security Council. As in San Francisco, Australia led the attack on behalf of the smaller nations against what was called the unrestricted use of the power of veto. The attack was directed against the U.S.S.R. Unlike San Francisco, the Big Five did not stand together in the matter of the Veto in 1946. The U.K. and the U.S.A. generally supported the Australian proposal which called upon permanent members to act in the matter of the exercise of the right of Veto in moderation and with increased consultation among themselves and to agree to appropriate forms of procedure which would enable the Security Council to discharge its functions under Chapter VI of the Charter in an effective manner. France and China agreed with the desirability of regulating the exercise of the power of veto by an agreement between the five permanent members. The Soviet Union however remained unshaken in its adherence

to what it called 'the Rule of Unanimity' which it was urged by her was the fundamental basis of the Charter.

India took up the attitude that the Veto, though an anachronism in a democratic Assembly, 'was essentially a reflection of the realities of the international situation. Equally, the use of the Veto was a reflection of the tension which prevailed in the international sphere. The more that tension was eased the less the Veto would be used..... What was needed was not to restrict the area of the Veto but to regulate its use; and that was a matter for the Big Five themselves to consider'.

At the instance of France the debate on the question was postponed to enable the permanent members of the Security Council to study the various proposals made in the course of the debate. They however failed to reach any agreement among themselves. The various resolutions before the Political Committee were thereupon referred to a Sub-Committee which was to try and reconcile the various views expressed in the Committee. When the matter came back from the Sub-Committee India again explained its attitude towards the various resolutions which had been proposed. India, it was stated, 'was unable to support any resolution on the Veto which did not commend itself to all the major elements in the Assembly. The Veto was essentially a symptom of the international situation and not a disease.' Eventually, an Australian resolution was approved by the Committee and adopted by the Assembly. By it the General Assembly earnestly requested the permanent members of the Security Council to make every effort to ensure that the use of the Veto did not hinder the Security Council in carrying out its solemn obligations in respect of the peaceful settlement of disputes and recommended to the Security Council the early adoption of practices and procedures to assist in reducing the difficulties in the application of Article 27 and to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of all its functions under Chapter VI of the Charter.

IX

THE INTERIM COMMITTEE

At the opening of the Second Session of the General Assembly in 1947 Mr. Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of the State, in his speech in the course of the general debate, advocated the establishment of what was called an Interim Committee. He stated that the main reason for its establishment was that many important problems relating to peace and security of the world required to be urgently solved and their solution had been prevented by the unrestricted exercise by the U.S.S.R. of its right of veto. This statement of Mr. Marshall undoubtedly gave rise to an impression that the proposal for the establishment of an Interim Committee, which was put forward *prima facie* to assist the General Assembly in the expeditious disposal of its business, was really aimed at reducing the influence of the Security Council and creating a body rival to it dealing with problems relating to peace and security. When the detailed proposals for the establishment of this Committee were put before the Political Committee the representative of the U.S.A. who sponsored the proposal was

at pains to point out that the proposed body would fully respect the primary responsibility of the Security Council in the matter of international peace and security and would concern itself only with the study of a dispute or situation which had not been placed on the agenda of the Security Council. Undoubtedly the terms of the proposal put forward did not justify the view taken of it by the U.S.S.R. and the Slav countries that the intention of the proposal was to bypass the Security Council. Nor did there exist a substantial basis for the view that the proposed body was unconstitutional and its establishment would be a contravention of the Charter. However, in view of the tension that existed and the suspicions that had aroused it it appeared to be impossible to obtain a dispassionate examination of it by the Soviet Bloc much less its co-operation to it.

India took the view that the establishment of the proposed Interim Committee which was designed only for the purpose of making recommendations which in their turn were to be examined and debated by the General Assembly could not be an infringement either of the letter or the spirit of the Charter. The Indian view was that the Committee would be able to assist the General Assembly in the quick disposal of its business by making a detailed study of questions coming up before the General Assembly or which the General Assembly may refer to the Committee. She, therefore, supported the Australian proposal that the question be referred to a Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee, on which India was represented, laboriously examined the Constitution and powers of the proposed Interim Committee and framed them so as to remove all ground for the suspicion that it may be a body competing with the Security Council. The nature of the functions it could perform and the procedure of voting in it, which required a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Committee before a subject could be taken up by it for consideration, were carefully defined. Though the proposed Interim Committee had been shorn of all attributes likely to give rise to a suspicion that it was intended to be a rival of or substitute for the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. and the other Slav States persisted in their opposition to it. Indeed after the Political Committee had passed its resolution on the subject, the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. made a statement that it would not take any part in the proceedings of the Committee when established.

When the General Assembly met for its Third Session in Paris in September 1948, the Interim Committee which had been working for about a year submitted valuable reports of the studies which it had made particularly in regard to the procedure of voting in the Security Council. These studies had been mainly carried out by Sub-Committees of the Interim Committee and working groups of two or three members appointed by each of the Sub-Committees.

At the Paris Session, the question of the continuance of the Interim Committee which had been constituted in 1947 was debated by the Political Committee. The Soviet and the other Slav States reiterated their opposition to the Interim Committee urging again that it was not within the competence of the United Nations to constitute the Committee which was not provided for by the Charter and allocate to it functions which were exclusively in the domain

of the Security Council. India, while supporting the legality of the constitution of the Interim Committee, pointed out that the useful studies which formed the subject matter of the report of the Interim Committee, had been really prepared by the Sub-Committees and the working groups constituted by them. India, therefore, urged that, in view of the opposition of the Soviet and its supporters to the Interim Committee and their refusal to co-operate with it, it would be wiser to discontinue the Interim Committee and to appoint instead a smaller Committee of eight or ten members to study and report on the problems which were intended to be left to the Interim Committee. However, the Political Committee and the General Assembly reached a decision to continue the Interim Committee for a further period of one year.

X

PALESTINE

Palestine was the most outstanding problem before the Second Session of the General Assembly in 1947. India had stood against the partition of the country and the erection of an independent Israel State in the midst of the Middle East—peopled by Arabs and Muslims and ruled by a number of Arab States. India's attitude meant no unfriendliness to the Jews. She had long admired Jewish enterprise and Jewish achievement. She has and had a considerable Jewish population of her own. What she disapproved of were measures which were bound to unstabilize the Middle East and turn it into a bed of rivalries and conflicts. She was a Member of the Palestine Commission. She had signed the Minority Report of the Commission which put forward a solution which she thought would meet with the desires of the Jews as well as the Arabs. That report suggested a Federal Government for Palestine. The Jews were given complete local autonomy in areas populated by them and the sovereign authority rested in a federation. Feelings ran high at the Session and neither the Jews nor the Arabs would look at the Indian solution which while satisfying the desire of the Jews for a home of their own and conferring on them full autonomy preserved the domination of the Arab world in the Middle East. While still pressing the desirability and justice of the Federal Scheme which she had supported, India expressed the view that, however imperative the need of the Jews for a homeland of their own, it was not proper that the United Nations should force a partition of the country on the unwilling majority constituted by the Arabs. Fully sympathizing with the Jewish desires and aspirations she voted against the partition in the 1947 Session. She maintained this position even at the first part of the Third Session of the Assembly held in Paris in 1948.

The inexorable logic of events has forced a division of the country much against the will of the Arab States. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact. That State is now a Member of the United Nations. India was among the first to welcome her as a Member State at the second part of the Third Session of the Assembly in May 1949.

XI

ATOMIC ENERGY AND DISARMAMENT

On the controversial question of the control of atomic energy and disarmament India has made repeated efforts to find a path which the Anglo-American as well as the Soviet Blocs could tread. Her endeavour at Paris in 1948 and at Lake Success in 1949 has been to find the greatest common measure of agreement between the views expressed on the opposing sides and frame a resolution which would give effect to ideas on which both parties were in agreement. No doubt, her efforts have so far not succeeded. That however does not discourage her in her attempt to 'bring together the divergent points of view and seek to heal a breach which may ultimately spell disaster for mankind.' Such attempts are but the execution of one of the main heads of her policy in the United Nations.

XII

NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

So far what has been dealt with mainly is India's contribution to the problems which have come up before the Political Committee. Perhaps India's efforts in the cause of peoples inhabiting non-self-governing, colonial and mandated territories is more noteworthy.

By signing the Charter Members of the United Nations who have responsibilities for the administration of non-self-governing territories have recognized that the interest of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount. They have accepted the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories as a sacred trust. One of their obligations under Article 73 of the Charter is to ensure the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples of these territories and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions with a view to develop self-government in these territories. Yet, all colonial Powers have struggled to their utmost to prevent the United Nations Organization from obtaining information in regard to political matters in these territories. It has been suggested by them that in respect of these territories the United Nations have no more functions than to act as a recording office for the 'statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions' in these territories provided for by Article 73 (e) of the Charter. India has laboured to make the colonial Powers furnish to the organization more substantial information in regard to the political development of these areas so that the aims laid down by the Charter in regard to these non-self-governing territories may be brought to early fruition.

In 1946 Sir Maharaj Singh, who represented India on the Trusteeship Committee and who has always played a leading rôle in promoting the advance of these territories to self-government, emphasized the need for the colonial Powers furnishing information regarding the political progress of the inhabitants of these territories. A controversy arose as to the manner in which the information transmitted by the Governments could best be utilized in the in-

terests of these territories. Article 73 of the Charter makes no provision in regard to these matters. It was urged by various countries, and India supported this view, that notwithstanding the absence of any such provision in the Charter a liberal interpretation should be placed on the Chapter dealing with non-self-governing territories and that the intention of the Charter was not 'to leave the Metropolitan Powers absolute freedom to run the affairs and to determine the destiny of dependent peoples.' Some countries suggested that the information made available in regard to these territories should be submitted to the Trusteeship Council for examination and for suggestions in regard to its future use. This proposal was however objected to by the U.K., France, Belgium and other Colonial Powers. They contended that Chapter XI of the Charter relating to non-self-governing territories was outside the jurisdiction of the general principle which underlay Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter. The Trusteeship Council had not then come into existence and the Cuban and Indian representatives preferred that the information should be submitted for examination as a temporary measure to a small Committee of experts. Colonial Powers made strenuous endeavours to defeat this idea and the proposal was lost in the Sub-Committee. It was however again pressed in the main Committee and was there carried by a majority notwithstanding the opposition of the Colonial Powers. The objection to the appointment of this *Ad Hoc* Committee was renewed in the General Assembly but the resolution was carried by a large majority. In the result a valuable step was gained which enabled the information submitted in regard to these territories to be examined by the *Ad Hoc* Committee with a view that recommendations may be made to the General Assembly in regard to measures which may ensure that the advice, expert knowledge and experience of the Specialized Agencies be used to the best advantage of these territories. India was appointed a Member of this Committee.

The Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee came to be submitted at the Second Session of the General Assembly held in 1947. It was discussed by the Trusteeship Committee, India taking a leading part in the discussion. India and some other countries pressed the view that the Report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee being before them the United Nations had the inherent right to make recommendations, based on the opinion submitted to them, to the Members who had assumed responsibilities for the administration of these territories. This position was contested by the Colonial Powers who urged that the acceptance of this position would put these territories in the same category as trust territories dealt with in Chapter XII of the Charter. India moved various amendments to the draft resolution submitted by the *Ad Hoc* Committee. These were aimed at the United Nations obtaining greater information in regard to the administration of these territories. A large number of these amendments were accepted.

The resolution recommended by the *Ad Hoc* Committee stated that whereas the International Trusteeship system provided the surest and quickest means of enabling the peoples of dependent territories to secure self-government or independence the General Assembly resolved that Members of the United

Nations responsible for the administration of these territories be requested to submit trusteeship agreements for all or some of such territories as are not self-governed. This part of the resolution was strenuously supported by India and was eventually carried in the Committee with a slight modification.

XIII

TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENTS

India has taken a leading part in the affairs of the Trusteeship Committee. It has been her consistent and repeatedly expressed view that in all trusteeship agreements entered into under Chapter XII of the Charter there should be a definite recognition that sovereignty resides in the people of a trust territory; that the administration of trust territories should as far as possible be assumed by the United Nations themselves and not by any single Power; and that a time limit should be inserted in trusteeship agreements at the end of which the trust territories should attain independence. These points were first stressed by the Indian representative Sir Maharaj Singh at the discussions in the Trusteeship Committee at the second part of the First Session of the Assembly in 1946 and have thereafter been continuously advocated by India.

XIV

STATUS OF MANDATED TERRITORIES

A crucial point of controversy which has arisen under Chapter XII of the Charter is whether it is obligatory on Mandatory Powers to bring the territories held by them under mandates granted to them by the League of Nations under the trusteeship system and submit trusteeship agreements in respect of them. The controversy has arisen by reason of the phraseology of Article 77, which provides that 'the trusteeship system shall apply to such territories now held under mandate as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements.' India has always advocated the view that the effect of the provisions of the Charter is that mandated territories are held in trust by the Mandatory Powers, and that, though the Charter did not expressly so provide, the obligation to place these territories under the international trusteeship system is implicit in the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter. This view has been stoutly controverted by most of the Mandatory Powers and still remains a point of acute controversy in the United Nations.

XV

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

Closely connected with this conflict of views is the question of the status of the mandated territory of South West Africa in relation to its Mandatory Power, the Union of South Africa.

In 1946 South Africa brought forward a proposal for the annexation of South West Africa to its territory. The discussion was introduced in the Trusteeship Committee by Field-Marshal Smuts in the general debate, it being urged that the territory of South West Africa was essentially a part of South African territory and that owing to the physical contiguity of South West

Trusteeship Committee, the contest being carried on mainly between the Indian representatives on the one side and those of South Africa on the other.

The matter has only recently been debated in the Fourth Session of the General Assembly at Lake Success. India proposed in the Committee a resolution expressing regret that the Union of South Africa had decided not to take into account the recommendations of the General Assembly. The attitude taken up by South Africa resulted in the resolution proposed by India being stiffened by various amendments introduced in the Committee. In the result, a resolution has been adopted by 31 votes to 11 which expressed the regret of the General Assembly that the Government of the Union of South Africa has repudiated the assurance it had given to submit reports on its administration of the territory of South West Africa, reiterates in their entirety the previous General Assembly resolutions recommending the placing of South West Africa under United Nations trusteeship and invites the Government of the Union of South Africa to comply with the previous decision of the General Assembly. The chapter of India's efforts in reference to the mandated territory of South West Africa is a record of noble endeavour in the cause of the non-self-governing and undeveloped peoples of Africa.

XVI

FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES

India has also played a leading part in the liberation of the peoples of North and North East Africa. The question of the future of the former Italian Colonies came up for decision before the Second Part of the Third Session of the General Assembly in 1949. It occupied the greater part of the time of the Political Committee during that Session. So great was the division of opinion and the conflict of interests that a two-thirds decision could not be reached in the General Assembly.

Throughout the discussion India maintained the attitude that the question of the future of these Colonies was a matter to be decided solely in reference to the interest and wishes of the people concerned. She repeatedly urged that such of these territories as were fit for independence should be granted immediate independence, and that if any of them were not so fit, they should be put under direct United Nations Trusteeship with a definite time limit. India strongly deprecated dealing with the question as if it was a matter of parcelling out territories between certain administering Powers on considerations other than the true interest of the peoples concerned. She moved a resolution which in substance asked for the administration of these territories as trust territories by the United Nations Organization itself. However, as stated above, the Assembly could reach no solution on the subject at that Session.

The recent debates at Lake Success have again evidenced the leading part played by India in the settlement of the future of these colonies. The proposals put forward by the leader of the Indian Delegation have, in substance, and, with some variations, been accepted. These proposals in effect keep the whole of the large territory of Libya united and enable it to emerge as an independent territory at the end of a specified period of time. Measures have been adopted

to enable the administration of the territory by the administering Power to be supervised by a body representing the United Nations. Arrangements have also been arrived at in regard to Italian Somaliland and Eritrea as favourable as could be arrived at in the circumstances. Here again India has played her usual rôle in helping the liberation of the subject peoples of Africa.

XVII

THE INDONESIAN QUESTION

As has been recently said by India's Prime Minister 'India's championship of freedom and racial equality for Asia as well as in Africa is the natural urge of India's history and geography.' That championship is assumed not because India desires any leadership in Asia but because India is 'convinced that unless the basic problems of Asia are solved there can be no world peace.' The part played by India in the solution of the Indonesian question illustrates how India is compelled by circumstances to support the freedom movement in Asia. Notwithstanding the intervention of the Security Council in the Indonesian question, its solution was deliberately delayed and eventually thwarted by the attitude adopted by the Netherlands. That country had gone back on the assurances given by her to the United Nations and had actually restarted war-like operations in Indonesia. In the circumstances immediate action was needed and India took the lead in checkmating the resurgence of colonialism in South-East Asia. A conference of Asian and South-East Asian countries was convened at Delhi in the early part of 1949 to consider the situation which had arisen in Indonesia by the unjustified action of the Dutch. True to her loyalty to the United Nations India which led the deliberations at the Conference was careful to see that no steps were taken which would tend to show that the authority of the Security Council or the United Nations was being bypassed. Resolutions were adopted which clearly intended to strengthen the hands of the Security Council in the situation which had arisen. At the Session of the General Assembly in April-May 1949 India in conjunction with Australia brought up the matter before the Security Council and also before the General Assembly. Again it was made abundantly clear that the steps which had been taken at the Indonesian Conference and the steps which were being taken to bring the matter before the General Assembly were in no way intended to embarrass the Security Council but were meant to strengthen its hands. There is no doubt that the threat to bring the matter to a discussion in the General Assembly brought pressure to bear on the Dutch and greatly accelerated the solution of the question. India can well claim to have contributed largely to the happy solution of the problem which now seems to be assured.*

XVIII

KASHMIR QUESTION

India has frequently asserted her faith in the United Nations. This is not the expression of a mere idle platitude. The trust and confidence of India in

* The transfer of power to Indonesia has since been made on 27 December 1949.

the ability and capacity of the United Nations to deal with problems of peace and security has led her to practical action in respect of questions which concern herself—the questions of Kashmir and of the treatment of Indians in South Africa.

When the Kashmir question was taken by India to the Security Council in the early part of the year 1948 Indian Armies had entered Kashmir and had overrun a large part of it. The safety of the valley of Kashmir had been assured. Incontrovertible facts showed that Pakistan had clearly aided if it had not organized the aggression by the tribesmen over Kashmir. In fact, later events have justified the assertion made by India that not only had Pakistan aided the tribesmen in their aggression but that Pakistan itself was an active aggressor. Notwithstanding her advantageous military position which India could have further exploited she wanted a peaceful solution of the problem. She took her dispute with Pakistan to the Security Council.

The attitude adopted by India was welcomed by every member of the Security Council. It was indeed the first and perhaps the only occasion when a Member State, virtually in occupation of a territory, had approached the Security Council asking it to decide the true wishes of its inhabitants by taking a plebiscite under international auspices. The course of the debate in the Security Council and the ultimate resolution adopted by it showed that India's point of view in regard to Kashmir had not been fully appreciated by the Security Council. India had requested a just and judicial approach to the question. She was met by a political approach which was dictated by considerations which she thought should not have influenced the Security Council. Even so India has loyally carried out the decisions of the Security Council and of the Commission appointed by it and has adhered to her declaration that she would abide by the wishes of the population expressed in a duly taken plebiscite.

XIX

INDIAN SETTLERS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The status of the Indian settlers in South Africa has always been a matter of the greatest concern to India. She took the problem to the United Nations in 1946. The General Assembly passed a resolution expressing its opinion that the treatment of Indians in South Africa was contrary to the principles of the Charter and the terms of treaty obligations existing between India and South Africa and recommended that the two Governments should meet in order that measures may be decided to put an end to such treatment. The South African Government refused to meet India's representatives for a discussion on the basis of the terms of this resolution. India pressed the matter again at the 1947 Session. Though a resolution was adopted by the Political Committee it failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Notwithstanding this India again brought the matter before the 1948 Session of the General Assembly. In May 1949 the General Assembly passed a resolution in effect requiring South Africa to conform to the principles of the Charter in the matter of its treatment of the Indian population in its territory. Thus has India endeavoured, notwithstanding delays and dis-

couragement, to bring to a solution this question so vital to its honour and prestige, through the instrumentality of the United Nations.

India has also taken a leading part in the working of the various subsidiary organs and Specialized Agencies of the United Nations. She has sent some of her distinguished men and women to represent her in the United Nations and its organs and specialized bodies. Notwithstanding her refusal to identify herself with any of the blocs in the United Nations she has, it is claimed, played an honoured part in the deliberations of the United Nations and made substantial contributions to its tasks.

XX

CONCLUSION

In his address at the Columbia University on 17 October 1949 the Prime Minister of India has defined the main objectives of the foreign policy of India to be 'the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major Power or group of Powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue; the liberation of subject peoples; maintenance of freedom both national and individual; the elimination of racial discrimination; and the elimination of want, disease, and ignorance which afflict the greater part of the world's population.' The activities of India in the World Organization, since its foundation, outlined in this paper, are but the pursuit of these objectives within the ambit of the United Nations. 'The preservation of world peace and the enlargement of human freedom' have been stated to be the ideals for which 'ancient and yet young India' has to strive for. It can safely be asserted that the part played by India and her representatives in the United Nations is true to these ideals.

India is fully conscious of the defects and imperfections of the World Organization. Indeed, she has become alive to them by reason of her experienced relation to her own questions brought before the Organization. It is realized that the Organization has failed so far to grow into the real instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, which its architects designed it to be. She appreciates the situation created in the Organization by the existence of Power Blocs. Yet her faith in the Organization remains unshaken. She believes the United Nations to be 'the hope of the future.' She is convinced that it is the only international body which in course of time and with the co-operation of all nations could build itself up to be a powerful force for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Peace and security are the world's greatest needs; India needs them more than any other country for the development of its vast resources and for the promotion of the standards of life of its numerous population. In that hope and with full trust in its future India associates herself with the main activities of the United Nations.

BOMBAY

December 7, 1949

TIBET*

By DWARKANATH KACHRU

PART I

HISTORICAL AND GENERAL

I. *Land and the people*—Tibet forms a narrow enclave as it lies hidden behind the snow-capped peaks of the Himalayas. It is a strange land of mystery and spiritualism with a legendary past and an inscrutable present and an uncertain future. It has excited the curiosity and imagination not only of the religious-minded but also of the politician and the explorer.

Tibet is the highest plateau in the world. Its tablelands average 16,000 ft. above sea level and the valleys between 12,000 and 16,000 ft. At places the peaks go up to 20,000 ft. even. Its area is about 4,70,000 square miles. Ethnologically it comprises a large region. Ladakh (Kashmir), Bhutan and partly Sikkim are parts of ethnological Tibet; but politically Tibet is a small country and is bounded by China and Mongolia in the east and north, Kashmir in the west, rest of India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in the south. Its total population is about 50 lakhs, mainly Buddhists, who live mostly in the southern and eastern parts near the Chinese border.

Geographically, the plateau could be divided into four natural divisions: The Northern—the Chang-Tang—is a vast expanse of barren land, inhospitable and almost uninhabited. A nomadic class of people mostly shepherds move from place to place over its barren wastes. Except for some patches of grass this area is devoid of all vegetation and the people subsist only on yaks milk and its products and sometimes perhaps on barley imported from the south. The Western Division consists of the regions of the Sutlej and the Indus. These two rivers rise from the Mansarvar on the slopes of the Kailash cutting a north-westerly and southern course and entering India through the Punjab. The Southern Division is known as the region of the Tsang-Po, the Great River of Tibet. Its course lies through southern Tibet and its tributaries run counter to the main stream. This region is the most fertile part of the country and hence the focal centre of all life and activity. Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse, the three foremost towns, which also include many rich monasteries, are situated in this region. Lhasa is the heart of Tibet's spiritual, political and economic life where all the trade routes from Turkistan, Mongolia, Siberia, China and India converge. The Eastern Division consists of the mountains and valleys of the eastern Tibet, between Chang-Tang and the frontier of China. On its eastern slopes rise the great rivers of China, Burma and Siam. The *Hwang-Ho* and the *Yangtse* (Yellow River) flow east through China while the *Mekong* and the *Salween* flow south through Siam and Burma respectively. Tibet also possesses a large number of lakes. Kokonor and Tengrinor are the two principal ones.

* A talk prepared for the Central Asia Group of the Indian Council of World Affairs—30 January 1950.

Tibet has the severest climate in the world. There is more of snowfall towards the west and more of rainfall during the summer towards the south-east. Rainfall varies between $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches to 14 inches. Gyantse gets an average of 12 inches and Lhasa about 14 inches. Vegetation is sparse and scanty and is found mostly in the south and in the Trans-Himalayan regions. In the south the river valleys are warmer and a large variety of fruit and crops are cultivated. Barley, Buck-wheat, radishes, peaches, apricots, apples, plums, grapes and water melons are among the main produce. Among the trees we get poplar, maple, walnut, oak and conifers of various types.

Animals include asses, yaks, musk deer, Tibetan antelope, sheep, goats, wolves, foxes, monkeys, squirrels, dogs and cats etc. The domestic animals are highly valuable to the people. Horses are used for riding; yaks for carrying loads; goats for rearing of wools and dogs for protective purposes.

The chief exports of Tibet are wool, yak hides, yak tails, soft under-wool, borax, salt, musk, medicinal herbs, ponies and mules. Food grains are never exported. Gold is found in the northern plains and in river beds. Other minerals, though their exact extent is not known, include silver, copper, coal, iron, lead, sulphur and saltpetre. Yak is the main pack animal. It travels 10 to 12 miles a day. Imports include cotton goods, hardware, corals, precious stones, tobacco, dried fruits, sugar, matches, needles, soap from India; rice from Nepal and Bhutan; tea, silks, satins, brocades, matches and buttons and opium from China; silver, gold and ponies from Mongolia. Lhasa and Shigatse are the main centres of trade in central Tibet; Cham-do, Der-ge, and Tachienlu in eastern Tibet.

Tibetans have a tremendous capacity to resist hunger and cold. The country being largely barren and capable of supporting only a small population, large numbers of Tibetans, therefore, enter monasteries and live on them.

II. *Early History*—The history of Tibet prior to the advent of Buddhism is a mixture of myth and legend. There are brief accounts of certain rulers, but these are generally disorganized and the rulers are mostly legendary figures. There were disorganized primitive settlements and warring chiefs all over the place and a written language was non-existent. The popular religion was 'Bon' which included devil-dancing among its rituals. Fauni, we are told, founded a village 'Tufa' across the Yellow River in the fourth century A.D. In course of time it came to be called 'Tufan' and subsequently 'Taibot'. Chinese chronicles show a great contempt for early Tibetans and referred to them as 'rapacious savages' and 'reputed cannibals'.

Tep-ter Nagon-Po—'the Blue record'—said to be one of the best Tibetan histories, mentions that an Indian saint visited Tibet and 'saw Tibet under water'. Subsequently he saw the water receding while a little grass was growing here and there and a deer moving about. The Tibetans belong to the Mongolian family of people who with their 'allied Turkish tribes' inhabited these parts. They bear striking resemblance to the Mongols.

III. *Later History*—*Tibet adopts a religion*—Tibet emerged out of 'barbaric darkness' with the dawn of Buddhism in the seventh century A.D. It was during the reign of Emperor Srong-btsan Sgam-Po (630-698

A.D.) that Tibet adopted Buddhism. He suppressed numerous warring chiefs and unified Tibet by bringing under his overlordship many disorganized clans and tribes. He also adopted a new alphabet and thus laid the foundations of a new State and civilization. His reign, therefore, marks the beginning of a new life and culture and of the unification and consolidation of Tibet under one rule. Thereafter the history of Tibet up to the 12th century A.D. is merely the history of the spread of Buddhism in that country.

King Srong-btsan Sgam-Po was a great conqueror also. His territories now extended over the whole of Tibet including Gilgit, Western China, Upper Burma and Chinese Turkistan. He became the Emperor of Tibet and the monarchs of China and Nepal offered him their daughters in marriage.

The two princesses converted the Emperor to the Buddhist faith. Conversion to Buddhism coupled with military conquests opened his eyes to great opportunities of converting Tibet into a strong and a civilized country. He introduced many reforms in the administration and made it efficient and founded a new capital on the banks of Dhur-Chu river which later on became Lhasa. The Princesses had brought with them Buddhist images which were enshrined in two newly built temples. The king further deputed his minister Thonmi-Sam-Bhota to India for the study of the alphabet and the holy doctrine. On his return Thonmi invented the Tibetan character on the model of the contemporary Kashmiri alphabet. He also wrote a grammatical treatise and thus became the first grammarian of Tibet. The king retired to a cave and devoted four years to the study of the new religion and grammar. After completing his studies he invited Buddhist scholars to Tibet to spread the new faith. These teachers were wise and tactful people and instead of trying to Indianize Tibet or make it a replica of China and Nepal, they sought for compromise with the local superstitions and institutions and thereby helped to Tibetanize Buddhism. The new religion was thus presented to the people in a garb familiar to them. With the assistance of Thonmi and his disciples these scholars translated sacred texts and other words into Tibetan. The Chinese teachers devoted their time mostly to the translation of mathematical works and two monks from Chinese Turkistan wrote the king's biography.

The king died after a long reign of 69 years in 698 A.D. and was succeeded by his son from the Chinese Princess. Buddhism had now secured a foothold in Tibet and during the years of the succeeding kings it began to be consolidated in the land.

In 803 A.D, however, it suffered a setback when the 'Bon' party opposition captured power and became a menace to the spread of Buddhism. The sandal wood image of Buddha was removed and buried underground and the temples were converted into slaughter houses. This did not continue long and the opposition was ultimately suppressed.

After some time two Buddhist preachers, Jnanendra and Acharya Santarakshata, also came to Tibet. The Acharya was received with great enthusiasm but shortly, however, his mission was interrupted for a brief period by a national calamity and he had to leave Tibet for some time. He returned soon and under his guidance the first Buddhist monastery was built in Tibet in 823 A.D.

on the model of Udayapuri (Behar-i-Sharif). This monastery took 12 years to complete. On completion monks were invited from China, India and neighbouring countries. A library was also provided for the shrine which by the year 1047 A.D. had grown to be one of the biggest libraries of the Buddhist world. The Acharya also founded the first monastic order in Tibet and 12 Bhikshus from Nalanda came to this monastery for ordination of the first batch of Tibetan monks. The Acharya died in 840 A.D. at the ripe old age of 100 years. He had thus founded the first monastery and the first monastic order in Tibet. His name is revered in Tibet and is referred to as Acharya Bodhisatva.

The next king who came to the throne was something of a philosopher and a lunatic. He redistributed the wealth of the nation equally among all. There was unrest and shortly his mother poisoned him to death. He was succeeded by his brother who ordered all future translations to be undertaken from the Sanskrit texts alone. He also ordered the compilation of a lexicon of Tibetan synonyms and built a Buddhist temple at Skardu far away in Balistan.

The next king (877 to 901 A.D.) was an enthusiastic Buddhist and encouraged people to enter the monasteries. The prestige of the monks rose and they assumed important positions in the administration. The Crown Prince too accepted monkhood and the members of the monastic order began to be regarded as the elite of Lhasa. In 901 A.D. he was assassinated by his brother who usurped the throne. Buddhism was the first to suffer as a result of this. The new king gave all important jobs to anti-Buddhists and ordered the Bhikshus to renounce monkhood and return to lay life. He demolished temples and images and burnt scriptures; he closed down all monasteries and on their walls painted pictures of monks drunk or drinking; he murdered those who refused to obey him and rewarded those who offered to assist him. Shortly after, however, a monk assassinated him also.

After this, internal dissensions increased and warring chiefs began to dominate the country resulting in the dismemberment of the empire. Tibet, again, got parcelled out into small chieftainships but the influence of Buddhism continued to spread and many Tibetan Kings accepted monkhood. Pandit Atisha, a famous Indian Buddhist, visited Tibet and founded a school of pure Buddhism which laid great emphasis on meditation and severe discipline in the monasteries. In 1000 A.D. he presided over a religious council, proclaimed the re-establishment of the doctrine of Buddha and founded a new sect called 'The Yellow Cap Sect'. Previous to him Padma Sambhava had come from Kashmir and founded another school—'The Red Cap Sect'—which was based on Tantrik cult and mysticism. Buddhism thus entered a new phase and people began to accept monkhood in increasing numbers. Buddhist abbots began to take more and more interest in secular affairs and in 1270 Kublai Khan, the Mongol Emperor, became a convert to Buddhism. He conferred the title of Imperial Preceptor, *Ti-Shih*, on the Lama Phags-Pa. Thus began the sovereignty of priest kings in Tibet.

Towards the middle of 14th century Tsong-Kapa had become an ecclesiastical

tical ruler of Lhasa. He was a follower of the Yellow Sect and was succeeded by Ganden-Truppa. Ganden-Truppa died in 1474 and his spirit was believed to have passed into an infant boy. This boy succeeded him and so began the system of reincarnation of the Chief. In 1576, Allah Khan, the Qavan of Tumulud, conferred upon the Grand Lama of Tibet the title of Dalai Lama and recognized the religious supremacy of the Yellow Sect. The title of Dalai Lama is held since then by the rulers of Tibet; each Dalai Lama being the incarnation of the preceding one.

PART II

RULE OF THE LAMA—TIBETAN SOCIETY TODAY

A. *Social Classification*—Tibetan society could be divided into several classes:

(1) *The Spiritual Class*—In the social hierarchy of Tibet the highest place is occupied by the priests. At the head of this class is the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet, the god-king, whose powers are vast and who exercises an undisputed authority over his people.

The Dalai Lama is the sovereign of Tibet. He is also regarded as the earthly Bodhisatva who has attained the right to Nirvana and who will be reborn "for the spiritual benefit of his fellow creatures". His work ranges from sending written messages and blessings for dead relations of a poor man in a distant hamlet to the transaction of the most delicate business of State. He usually delegates his powers to his ministers who are in charge of various departments. He lives in strict austerity and celibacy and does not drink. He is, however, not a vegetarian. The animal killed for his table has to go through a religious ceremony which ensures its birth in a higher state of existence.

As the Dalai Lamas do not marry, they have, as such, no heirs to succeed them. But they are said to reincarnate after their death. The search for a new Dalai Lama is usually a great event. Before his death a Dalai Lama may himself indicate where he would be reborn. The State Oracle might also give particulars about his birth. He must be born in unusual circumstances and, besides, must possess some of the following signs: Long eyes and eyebrows curving upwards; marks of tiger skin on his legs; large ears; two pieces of flesh near the shoulder blades indicating the two additional arms; and some important sign resembling a conch-shell on one of the palms.

After identification the boy is put in the midst of all the earthly belongings of the deceased Lama which, according to the tradition, he must identify. After this he is brought into the palace and at the age of eighteen is invested with full ruling powers.

The Dalai Lama is usually a very busy man and has very little time for rest or recreation. His household officials are: Lord Chamberlain, in charge of Ecclesiastical Affairs; the Chief Secretary, in charge of the Secular Affairs; and the Physician, who looks after his health.

During the day, the Dalai Lama mostly sits on a cushioned throne, cross-legged and calm. His day begins quite early when he washes, dresses and has one or two cups of tea. He then prays, invokes the past Buddhas and offers

sacrifices. He reads the scriptures and ends by pouring blessings on all living beings. This takes about two hours, after which he may spend a few minutes in the garden with dogs and other pets and then hurry to a breakfast of rice, butter, vegetables and meat. This done, he is back to his work, which is mostly official. At this time petitions are also allowed. These are mostly requests for blessings for the dead ones. These blessings are often given on scrolls of paper bearing the seals of the Lama, the 'All Knowing Presence'.

At mid-day the Dalai Lama may hold a religious service with other priests who sit in double rows below his throne. This is followed by lunch. Then work starts again. About six o'clock dinner may be served after which the Lama might again have a short recreation in his gardens. After some more conferences evening prayers and meditation begin and continue till about 10 in the night. During this period absolute silence is observed. After prayers, the Dalai Lama retires to attend to important matters of State and remains engrossed with these till about midnight. As already stated, his decision in disputed cases is final. He does not, however, attend to criminal cases. These are therefore left to the Prime Minister or his subordinates.

Besides these routine activities, the Dalai Lama has also to bless thousands of young priests who have completed their education. Travellers seek his blessings before starting on a journey and on journeys large crowds flock round him and on the roads, each one expecting to be blessed by him individually. He does not generally visit the houses of the people, though his visits to monasteries are quite frequent. The system of blessings is a regular ritual in Tibet. The Dalai may sit on his throne cross-legged in the position of a Buddha. The supplicant then uncovers his or her head, goes forward with lowered head and hands over the ceremonial silk scarf to an attendant and bows still further touching the ground at least thrice. After this he takes a step or two forward and receives the blessings of the Lama. This bowing and blessing is done during ordinary interviews also after which the real business starts. The first type of blessing reserved for high officials, nobles and incarnations of the Order is given by placing both his hands on their heads; while in the second type which is meant for monks and lower officials the Dalai uses only one hand. The third type is meant for the common people and is given merely by touching their heads with a sort of tassel.

Tashi Lama—The second grand Lama of Tibet, Tashi Lama, is second to the Dalai. He is also an incarnation and lives in his monastery at Tashi-Lhunpo in Shigatse. This monastery has 4,000 monks and is a town in itself. He devotes more time to religious duties and is, therefore, often regarded as superior to the Dalai Lama. He also has his share of secular responsibilities and rules over three districts of which curiously enough Shigatse, the town of his residence, is not one.

Lamaism and Monasteries—Besides the Dalai and the Tashi there are also a number of Lamas, who, in their turn, are also incarnations and hence heads of their individual monasteries. They also go through the same process of identification, recognition and initiation. Buddhism in its Tibetan garb has taken deep roots in Tibet and it is, therefore, an ordinary practice for

a family to send one of the sons to be a monk and one of the daughters to be a nun. Rich and poor alike enter monasteries and a person of poorer birth may enhance his prestige in society by entering monkhood. The monasteries constitute the first estate of the realm. Each monastery is a self-sufficient, autonomous unit with its peculiar housing arrangements and departmental organization. It carries on a roaring trade and has its own machinery for the education and training of the monks. The priests constitute an important factor in the Tibetan life. A monk may not be tried by the ordinary laws. He is tried by a Special Court. If, however, he commits a murder or a heinous crime he is beaten and expelled from the monastic order and then handed over to the secular authorities. During the big national festivals the civil administration of the capital is handed over to the Lamas. During these ceremonies Lamas get tea and soup three times a day and gift of a coin each. Those from the bigger monasteries, however, receive two coins each.

2. *Nobility*—The Tibetan nobles own vast estates and occupy important positions in the Government. A vast gulf separates a nobleman from an ordinary Tibetan. An ordinary Tibetan may not address a nobleman in the everyday language of the people and special terms are used for even a pony or a dog of the nobleman. The Tibetan nobility are an ancient class and trace their descent to the ancient families or the families of the Dalai Lamas or even to the days of ancient kings. Special titles are also held by some of them. 'Kung' is the highest and is reserved for the father of a Dalai Lama. This rank carries much prestige. During the lifetime of a Dalai Lama his family is called the 'New patrimony'; after his death, however, the family receives a different name. The nobility pay fixed revenues to the Government though some of them hold their estates free. From their tenants the nobles receive in grain or in service rendered. Their annual expenditure includes large endowments to shrines, monasteries and social festivities. They exercise arbitrary powers and on the whole are parasitic and indolent.

3. *Traders*—Tibetans are born traders. The trading community as a middle class is weak and wields little influence in the social life of Tibet. Women take an equal interest in trade. Business transaction in Tibet is a regular ritual and is carried on in a very leisurely manner through signs conveyed with fingers inside the 'capacious Tibetan sleeve'. After the deal the seller invokes a blessing on the purchaser and the purchaser before paying the money wipes each coin carefully to see that no good luck goes away with it.

4. *The Peasantry*—The peasantry is one of the lower classes of Tibet. They hold land as tenants and cannot leave it at will. The peasants are a backward and hardworking lot. Men and women work together in the fields and during the ploughing season the whole family go out into the fields in the early hours of morning. During winter or when there is little work in the fields the peasants may organize theatrical troupes and travel about. Often they enter the employment of the rich landlords.

5. *The Herdsmen*—The nomadic shepherds known as 'Drok-pas' are a distinct class by themselves. With their large herds of yaks, ponies and flocks of sheep and long-haired goats and a few ferocious watch-dogs, espe-

cially mastiffs, they roam about the northern highlands. Their main food is yaks milk, tea and barley flour. They are hardy and independent and generally hospitable. Once in a year they make a trip to the market places in the province to lay in provisions they need or to settle accounts with the nobleman whose flocks they have undertaken to tend. They are a gay and sensitive lot though at times capable of becoming extremely unruly and wild.

6. *Beggars*—Begging is a hereditary profession. A beggar must be paid only once in a season. Refusal to pay a beggar must invoke a curse which is much dreaded. On seeing a passerby a beggar may pull out his tongue and put up his thumb till he gets the alms. There are mendicants, monks and nuns who beg for their monasteries. Some take to this profession because of some physical deformity. Another section of beggars live in colonies which have walls built of only horns. They remove unclaimed dead bodies and are referred to as scavengers. There is yet another variety of beggars who, according to superstition, are supposed to have died and come back to life for continuing their work.

B. *National Characteristics—Habits and Customs*—Tibetans are a cheerful and pleasure-loving people, always ready to burst forth into a bright smile. A visitor to a Tibetan village finds himself among hospitable people who welcome him with genuine simplicity. Flowers, food and 'Chhang' and often enough bowls of butter are offered. For an important individual the people of the village might come on the road with drums and trumpets and offerings in their hands, bowing down to him as he passes.

Tibetans are fond of games and sports, picnics and theatrical entertainments. They are short-statured and women are shorter still. They have clear brown hazel eyes, high cheekbones with thick noses sometimes depressed at the root.

Tibetan Home—Tibetan houses are generally low and broad with a flat roof with holes for the smoke to get out. Every house has its own chapel. The well-to-do live in comfortable buildings. The houses of the peasantry, though dark and dingy and much inferior in quality, are nevertheless comfortable. Inside, the house may have a few rooms depending on the position of the owner but generally there are two rooms: the living room which is partly used as a kitchen and partly for sleeping purposes and a private chapel which is specially furnished.

The chapel on the top-floor may have a few statues and images of Buddha, the Bodhisatvas and the local deities. On the walls are hung beautiful 'Tan-kas' inscribed with prayers and images of gods and spirits. The chapel also is a storehouse. In one corner incense may be kept burning all the day and night. Tibetan houses in the western regions have, however, characteristics of their own. This is more marked in the ornamental details which decorate their exterior. The shepherds and herdsmen live in tents of yak hair and yak skin.

Tibetan Dress—Tibetan dress for both males and females consists of a full gown with a high collar and long loose sleeves. A thick cotton or woollen band is tied round the waist and is puffed out to form a capacious pocket in which Tibetans carry their tea cups, spoons, knives, tooth picks and other

oddities. In their waists they generally carry what is called 'Chakmak', a leather case ornamented with brass containing flint, steel and timber, or, a dagger, a knife or a pen holder. In central and eastern Tibet women have now taken to aprons. Under the gown they may have shirt and trousers. The boot is of leather and rises to the knees. The upper class often prefer Chinese velvet boots and modern hats which may be fur-trimmed for winter.

Ceremonial and Etiquette—Tibetans are very particular about the due observance of ceremonial and etiquette. The central feature of Tibetan courtesy is the Ka-ta—the scarf of ceremony—a loosely worn silken piece usually white, with fringes of silken threads on ends. The Ka-ta is offered on every occasion and the mode of presentation is determined by the social status of the individuals concerned. It may even be presented to a deity in the chapel.

While presenting Ka-ta to the Dalai Lama it is given to the Lord Chamberlain or the Chief Secretary who is in attendance. When a high dignitary passes by people on both sides of the road must stand to attention and those riding on horses must get down to bow. Invitations to friends go in the name of the host and are communicated through a servant accompanied by a Ka-ta. In diplomatic and official intercourse the same courtesy is observed. Despatches to foreign governments are carried by a delegation of representatives from the Ecclesiastic and Secular Departments. A high personage may be received by the dignitaries of the town a few miles outside and conducted into the town with due ceremonies. When leaving he is again seen off a few miles to a wayside garden.

Return visits have an important place in Tibetan social life. One of the lower ranks takes the initiative and among equals the visitor calls on the resident. The host goes out to receive the guest when he is of a higher rank or up to the door if the rank is not very high. When treating a visitor of low ranks the host may not even move from his seat. The guest on being seated is presented with gifts and eatables accompanied by a long speech of self-deprecation on the part of the host. It is considered good manners to refuse refreshments at first and accept them reluctantly after persuasion. Calls are usually paid in the forenoons which is auspicious. Return visits are essential and the sooner they are paid the more polite it is. High personages may return a visit within an hour. The Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lama, however, do not pay return calls. Tibetans usually speak in low tone as it is a mark of good breeding. When an inferior person speaks to his superior he puts his hand in front of his mouth to prevent the foul breath from reaching the 'Great Personage'.

Marriage—Customs relating to marriage vary from place to place and from class to class. Polyandry is the prevailing practice, particularly among the poor. There are many instances of monogamy and polygamy also. Divorce is allowed and resorted to quite frequently. Tibetan marriage is a lengthy feast of ceremonies and festivals. It begins with the middle man and passing through various stages of acceptance by the Lamas and the deities and the high priests it ends in the ceremonies at the house of the groom. After the marriage the bride and bridegroom have to be accepted and blessed by the family deity.

Food—The usual Tibetan food is yak's meat, mutton, barley flour, cheese, tea and vegetables and fruits when available. To this may also be added tobacco, beer and snuff. Meat and barley are the main articles of food. Animals are usually killed by suffocating them. Meat can be, and actually is, preserved for at least a couple of years. This is due to the Tibetan climate. Grain can also be preserved similarly. Green vegetables are very scarce and hence costly. Turnips, radish and potatoes are also available.

Drinking and smoking—Tea and beer are the chief national beverages of Tibet. Tea is consumed in large quantities. When working outdoors people carry their tea and beer with them. Tea comes to Tibet from China in the shape of bricks. Indian tea is also available but it is not popular. Tibetans prepare tea by boiling tea leaves. The whole mixture is then churned and butter and salt are added to it. Tea is usually drunk with barley flour which is moulded into balls.

Beer—'Chang' is the alcoholic drink of Tibet and is manufactured locally. Well-to-do families have breweries of their own. Both men and women drink and *chang* is served on all important occasions. Smoking is prohibited by religion, particularly for the monks. Snuff is also very popular.

Births—The customs regarding birth are interesting. The expectant mother is confined to a dark corner. The infant, when born, is not washed; instead its body, especially the head, is annointed with butter. Then follow the 'Naming Ceremony' and the introduction of the child to the patron deity. This is an occasion for much feasting and merriment.

The last rites—Tibetans are supposed to face death with a peculiar cheerfulness. Life never ends and death is regarded only a link 'in the long chain of lives'. The dying man is asked to forget all worldly anxieties and turn his thoughts to the 'Three Rare Ones'. At the time of death a service is conducted for the soul to escape. This is followed by a continuous service for some days. Tibetans have five different ways of disposing off the dead: burial, for babies and those who die of smallpox and infectious diseases; cremation, for high priests and Lamas of note. It is considered sacrilegious to cremate the body of a layman. Such an act would bring calamity to the countryside; illness to the people and the hailstorm attacking the crops. The actual reasons, however, would seem to be the scarcity of wood in Tibet. After cremation the remains are kept in the Lama's monastery. Water-burial is more common in the districts. Poor people, beggars and babies are often confined to rivers and streams. Throwing the dead to the birds is the commonest form of disposal. Embalming is reserved for very high Lamas and the high priests. Most of the Dalai Lamas from the 5th onwards have each their mausoleum in the Potala. The early kings of Tibet were also embalmed and were placed in tombs.

Women and their position—The position of women in Tibet is unique. They have a status and a natural charm which many of their sisters in the neighbouring Asiatic countries might well envy. Boys and girls are brought up together and a Tibetan woman is naturally less self-conscious and at ease with men. They are gay and cheerful. They have dark eyes, long black hair, flat noses,

high cheekbones and often fair complexions. To Tibetans their women are beautiful. To them women with European noses are ugly. Only in the selection of her husband a woman has not much to say: otherwise she enjoys almost equal status with men. Buddhism has done much to elevate the position of women. Buddha had admitted nuns into his Order and in the early days they held quite influential positions. In the absence or in the event of husbands' death women often manage the family estate or business with tact and intelligence. If a family has one daughter and no son then the daughter's husband is adopted into the family. He takes the family name and attends to the affairs of the family. He usually takes up a position subordinate to his wife.

Women plait the hair of men and also help them to wash their hair. They also participate in all the social activities. During summer months outdoor entertainments, sports and picnics and excursions are quite popular. They dance and sing and both husband and wife may dance with the servants. In the fields women also work a lot. During feasts it is customary to employ beautiful women to serve wine. They put on gorgeous dresses and are always in attendance. They joke with guests and press them to drink more. Tibetans believe in pressing a guest to drink to an excess and as a compliment put a Ka-ta round a drunk guest's neck. Women are also shrewd at business transactions. Some of them may even work as a butcher's assistants.

The highest and the holiest woman in Tibet at present is called Dor-je-pa-mo, 'the Thunderbolt sow'. She is regarded as a goddess and an incarnation. She is the highest among women and is entitled to one hundred blessings from the Dalai Lama. She lives in the Sam-ding monastery which has no nuns. She is the only woman, the rest, about 60, are all monks. There are, however, many nunneries in Tibet; but the monks outnumber the nuns; 40 monks for each nun. These nunneries are situated in secluded villages. Some of the nuns, particularly of the Yellow Sect, shave their heads: others grow hair.

Tibetan women are also particular about their beauty and make-up. Tibetan hair styles are varied and different. Married and unmarried women have the same style: it may be arranged into a number of little plaits descending down or a large plait may be made. In central Tibet women part their hair in the middle 'fluffed out on each side and increased artificially to make a good show'. Tibetan women also have a variety of ornaments. Their head dress, called 'Pa-rhakh', is the most picturesque of all. Its shape varies from place to place. It is a wooden framework or is made of some other hard stuff with corals, turquoises and pearls studded on it. Rings of gold, silver or pearls adorn the hair. Ear-rings may be of gold, silver or pearls on a wire loop with a few additional turquoises. Necklaces may be of corals, turquoises fitted with pendants or of light green jade or corals with strings of beads. From the breasts are suspended Chatelaines of gold or silver which carry tooth picks, ear spoons and tweezers at their ends. Girdles carry cases for needles. From the hips also hang on each side a pair of chains of gold or silver. Each chain has three arms, set with turquoises in the centre and are generally used for tying up a shawl or cloak. Then there are the charm boxes (talisman) which are

worn round the neck. Finally there are the neck-clasps of gold, buttons of gold, bracelets of silver or shell, rings of gold and silver studded with turquoise and corals and rosaries of wood, seed, bone, glass, crystal, coral, turquoise or ivory.

C. *Art and Culture*—Tibetan art is entirely religious. As religion plays a dominant rôle in the life of the people it is solely devoted to the glorification of the Buddha's life. Being the meeting ground of the artistic traditions of China and India Tibetan art bears marked impressions of the culture of these two countries. In the past Tibet had an indigenous primitive art of its own. The Indian scholars who went to Tibet and the Tibetan scholars who visited India brought with them not only Buddhist scriptures and doctrines but also samples of Indian art and culture. At present there are two chief kinds of artistic activities in Tibet: the first, the south-western school, with its centre at Shigatse and considerably influenced by the Indian tradition. The second, North-Eastern School, has its centre at Derge and is organized near the great caravan route from Mongolia and Western China.

The most characteristic production of Tibetan art is the Tanka or temple banners produced by means of transfers and bearing a close resemblance to frescoes. These are carried in religious processions also. Various scenes are depicted on these Tankas: some dealing with the scenes from the life of Buddha and free from Tantrik elements while others deal with the life of Buddha though in a different form. In the second variety the Lord occupies the centre of the picture with other scenes surrounding it and arranged in groups and separated from each other by winding rivers, clouds and trees. The Tibetan artists have also borrowed largely from the Indian Shilpa-shastras, the iconometry of Indian gods and goddesses. The pose, the dress, the jewels and the lines of the figure in Tibetan paintings could easily be traced to Indian origin.

This artistic movement between India and Tibet, however, slowed down considerably towards the close of the 13th century after the advent of Islam in India. After this period Chinese art and culture exercised a great influence on Tibet. It must, however, be admitted that Tibetan art is a mixture of the influence of India and China. These two influences form the foundations of modern Tibetan art and culture which has evolved definite native styles and which received great encouragement during the reign of the 5th Dalai Lama in the 17th century.

PART III

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

As already stated, Dalai Lama is the supreme spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. He attains maturity at the age of 18 and till then the administration is carried on by a Regent, appointed by the National Assembly. The Regent—Gyaltshap, Po Gyalpo, Sikyong Rimpochhe—is appointed by the National Assembly. He is often an incarnate Lama of one of the big monasteries. The Regent's authority is limited by the National Assembly which appoints him and which can even remove him. He is often referred to as 'Kikyong Rimpochhe', the 'precious protector of the State'.

The Kashag or the Cabinet consists of four councillors of whom three are laymen and one a monk. The monk is usually treated as a senior member. None of the Ministers holds any special portfolio. The Cabinet exercises a general control over the civil administration and in all matters, political, revenue and judicial. In foreign affairs it acts generally in an advisory capacity to the Dalai Lama and on important occasions consults the National Assembly also. The Ministers are appointed by the Dalai Lama out of a panel of names and during his minority by the Regent. A recent innovation, however, has been the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chingye Le-Khung). There is no permanent office of the Prime Minister in Tibet though very often Dalai Lama may have a Prime Minister called Lonchhen Silon who functions between the Cabinet and the Dalai Lama.

The National Assembly—Tsong Du—is a gathering of all Government officials both lay and ecclesiastical except for the Cabinet Ministers who do not attend its sessions. In the National Assembly are also represented the three great monasteries of Drepung, Sera and Ganden which are represented by their abbots (three from each monastery). A full Assembly is summoned only on important occasions and ordinarily a Committee of the Assembly only functions. Important matters may be referred to the Assembly by the Cabinet for advice before tendering advice to the Dalai Lama.

The Ecclesiastical Council—Yiktsang—consists of four monk officials and is the ecclesiastical counterpart of the Cabinet. It deals with the appointment of monk officials and with the general administration of monasteries throughout Tibet, except perhaps the three great monasteries referred to above. The Minister who serves as a link between the Council and the Dalai Lama is called Chikyap Khenpo.

Bureaucracy—Each important department is managed by a Board of Officers which includes at least one monk. All the officials of the Government get low salaries. Bribery and corruption is, therefore, rampant. Appointments of lay and monk officials are made by the Cabinet and the Ecclesiastical Council respectively subject to the Dalai Lama's confirmation.

Administratively Tibet is divided into five parts: Central Tibet, consisting of the provinces of U, where Lhasa is situated, and Tsang with its capital at Shigatse; Eastern Tibet (Nagri Khorsum) with its headquarters at Gartok; Eastern Tibet (Kham) with its headquarters at Chiamdo; Northern Tibet (Chang) with its headquarters at Nagchukha; and Southern Tibet (Lhokha) with its headquarters at Lho Dzong. The officers in charge of these five Divisions are Commissioners (Chikyap), the most important being the Commissioner in Kham in Eastern Tibet. He also commands the Army in Eastern Tibet. In Central Tibet the principal officer of the district administration, the Dzasa Lama of Tashilhunpo, is appointed by the Lhasa Government to manage the affairs which had been originally in the hands of the Tashi Lama. The two Governors of Shigatse are also under the direct administration of Lhasa. There are, besides, the Tibetan Trade Agents at Gyantse and Yatung. Subordinate to these Commissioners are numerous officers, two for each district: one layman and the other a monk. Undeveloped communications and primitive

feudal economy permits these local officials to be corrupt and dishonest preventing also the Central Government at Lhasa from exercising vigilance and control over them.

PART IV

TIBET IN WORLD POLITICS

Tibet occupies an unique position in Asia. In the past it had attracted the attention of all the Powers, particularly its three neighbours—Russia, China and the British in India. The independence of India coupled with the success of the Communist revolt in China has now brought about the emergence of new and powerful factors in the politics of Asia. This has changed the situation regarding Tibet also. In the past, however, these three Powers have fought many diplomatic battles over this country. Its theocratic Government, its inherently weak and disorganized public opinion and above all the backwardness of her people had for generations rendered her an easy prey to the designs of these three Governments. The fight for supremacy in Tibet went on for nearly 200 years and it was the main preoccupation of these three Imperialist Powers.

(a) *Anglo-Tibetan Relations*—The history of the Anglo-Tibetan relations dates back to the days of Warren Hastings and could be divided into several stages. The first stage, 1774-1888, saw the British striving hard to penetrate into Tibet in order to establish 'political and commercial relations with the Hermit Nation'. These attempts did not succeed though the British made show of force also on various pretexts. The second stage, 1888-1900, covers the period from Dufferin to Curzon when the treaty of 1890, between India and Tibet, recognized British suzerainty over Sikkim. This enabled the British to control the internal and external affairs of this State. In 1893 Yatung was recognized as a trade mart for British merchants.

The third stage, 1899-1906, covers the period from Curzon to Minto. During this period British intentions were completely unmasked and Tibet was not only opened to British trade but was also subjugated and humiliated. Lord Curzon's Imperialist thirst presented the Anglo-Tibetan situation to the Home Government as 'extremely serious'. It was said about him that he 'assumed rule over others as cross of duty and discharged that duty as a vice'. He had said 'I will annex not territory, but the incarnate Buddha; I will have divinity in my service. That is what I will do for my country'. To check Russian expansion in Tibet and for other reasons the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of mutual aid was brought about in 1902. The Government in Britain was informed of an alleged secret treaty between China and Russia regarding Tibet and much was made out of the audience of a Buriat Buddhist with the Czar and the visit of an eminent Russian Orientalist to Tibet. Lord Curzon was also anxious about the trade mart, which he wanted to Phari, and about the fixation of the frontiers. He also wanted an extradition treaty between India and Tibet. His proposals were, however, turned down by the British Government, though he had the support of the British merchants. He tried to establish direct communications with the Dalai Lama who refused to com-

municate with him over the head of his suzerain the Chinese Government. Lord Curzon was furious and he regarded the Chinese position in Tibet as a 'constitutional fiction'. He succeeded in persuading his Government to send a Mission to Lhasa. By the end of 1903 the British Mission headed by Sir Francis Younghusband and accompanied by sufficient military force left for Tibet. The Mission was instructed to occupy the Chumbi Valley in case of any opposition.

On nearing Gyantse the Mission was met by the representatives of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama would not talk unless the threat to the integrity of his State was removed but the Mission would not listen to any of these persuasions and marched on, reaching Lhasa in the summer of 1904. This resulted in a great turmoil and disorder in the Tibetan capital. The Dalai Lama fled 18 miles to the north and the people were caught in the grip of panic and alarm. The Chinese, anxious for settlement, facilitated negotiations and on 7 September 1904, the Lhasa Convention was signed between Tibet and the British. It was a dictated peace. Under this Convention all previous agreements were renewed; Gyantse and Gartok were opened to British trade; as an indemnity for breaches of treaty and insults Tibet was to pay a sum of Rs.75,00,000 payable in instalments of Rs.1,00,000 each year. During the 75 years of its payment it was further agreed that British should occupy the Chumbi Valley as security. The Tibetans were further to demolish all fortifications on the border and to check Russian expansion into Tibet. The Lhasa Convention which was a crushing blow to the Tibetans was, however, modified by a declaration of 11 November 1904, which reduced the indemnity to Rs.25,00,000 and the period of occupation of the Chumbi Valley to three years. The result of this Convention was that the British got a foothold in Tibet and the Chinese suffered a great loss in prestige and power.

The fourth stage, 1905-1912, saw a period of comparative aloofness on the part of the British. The Russo-Japanese war had eliminated the 'Russian Menace' and the continental diplomacy had entered a critical stage bringing Russia, Japan and England closer together. Towards the close of 1908 the Dalai Lama, who had been in exile since the Younghusband Mission, expressed a desire to return to Tibet. The British communicated the Dalai Lama's request to the Chinese and the Russian Governments adding that Britain wished to put no difficulties in the way of the Dalai's return to Tibet. At last the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1909. On reaching Lhasa he learnt that the Chinese had turned hostile to him and a Chinese Army was already advancing towards his capital. The Chinese refused to listen to his entreaties. He ran away once again and in February 1910 reached Yatung and sought British protection. Lord Minto in return gave him protection but treated his visit as private.

The fifth stage, 1912-1923, saw a period of activity which was dominated mostly by the fear of Chinese and Russian expansionism. In 1912 Russia signed a Convention with Mongolia which placed her in effective control of that region. This was followed by a treaty in 1913 between Mongolia and Tibet. These incidents frightened the British. Britain, therefore, decided

to convert Tibet into a Buffer State and brought pressure on China to recognize its autonomy. This is the genesis of the Simla Conference of 1913 and 1914.

The Conference opened in Simla in October 1913 and for the first time the Tibetan representative met the Chinese delegates on terms of equality. Under the provisions of this Convention Tibet was divided into two zones: the outer and the inner. The outer zone, which included all regions in the Western Tibet,—Lhasa, Shigatse, Gyantse, etc. etc.—was to be autonomous with the Chinese enjoying no rights of sending troops or officers. The inner Tibet consisting of the regions in the east—Batang, Liteng and Tachienlu—was put under Chinese control. Here Chinese could control the administration though the ecclesiastical authority of the Dalai Lama over this area would remain intact. The Convention further recognized the Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet. China could keep her representative the Amban in Lhasa but his bodyguard was reduced to only 300. The British on their part engaged not to annex any Tibetan territory or send their troops or officials to Tibet.

This Convention though signed by the Chinese delegates was, however, not ratified by the Chinese Government. Soon war broke out and the Tibetan question was shelved once again. The friendly relations between Tibet and Britain, however, developed still further and the Dalai Lama offered 1000 Tibetan troops to the British and ordered special victory prayers in all the leading monasteries. British engineers visited Tibet to open Tibetan mines and arrangements were also made to open an English school at Lhasa or Gyantse. A few Tibetan boys were also sent to England for higher military training and education in engineering. The Tibetan Army was fast coming under the control of the British. After the war the rise of Bolshevism in Russia brought Britain and Tibet still closer. The war between China and Tibet in 1917 further added to the strengthening of the relations between the two. The period after the first world war, therefore, marked a steady growth in the British influence and power in Tibet. The Bell Mission to Lhasa after the war was calculated to bring Tibet completely under the British sphere of influence. When Bell left Lhasa the Dalai Lama wrote to the Viceroy that the people of Tibet and Britain 'have become one family'. Shortly the British telegraph line was extended up to Lhasa. Tibetan Army was reorganized. Tibet was thus brought gradually within the British sphere of influence though no attempt was made to annex it formally.

In 1923, conditions in Tibet became rather grave due mainly to the flight of the Tashi Lama from the country. The Dalai Lama again appealed to the British for help. In July 1924 the British deputed Colonel Bailey to visit Lhasa. This officer stayed in Lhasa for over a month. Shortly, however, the political situation in Lhasa took an adverse turn for the British. The Nationalist and anti-British elements became powerful in the Government and the Dalai Lama began to turn cold towards the British. One of the reasons for this development was the inability of the British to help the Dalai out of the situation created by the flight of the Tashi Lama. Military officers trained in India were removed from their posts and the newly organized police force was also disbanded. The English schools were closed down and military

ing on the British model was also discontinued. Import of tobacco was banned and the mail service introduced by the British was also stopped. This continued for nearly five years.

In 1930, the relations between the British and the Dalai Lama began to improve once again mainly because of the help rendered by the British in resolving the deadlock between Nepal and Tibet. British Political Officers were again sent for by the Dalai Lama and their help was sought in important matters. The knotty problem of the Tashi Lama, however, remained unresolved. Thereafter the British Political Officers began to be invited to Lhasa and consulted on all important matters. After the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933 the British deputed another Political Officer to go to Lhasa in 1935. Britain now began to take more interest in the affairs of Tibet and tried to bring about a rapprochement between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese and the Tashi Lama. Besides the question of the Tashi Lama, other questions dealing with the influence of Chinese in Tibet; the installation of wireless communications with Lhasa; reorganization of the Tibetan Army; opening of trade relations on a much larger scale with Tibet; medical work and other forms of assistance also began to assume great importance.

(b) *Relations with Nepal*—Relations between Tibet and Nepal were not very amicable for a very long time. In 1792, Nepal invaded Tibet. This attack was repelled only with Chinese assistance. In 1855, the Nepalese again invaded Tibet on the plea that the Nepalese subjects in Lhasa were being ill-treated. This war led to an agreement under which Tibet had to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 annually to Nepal and also to admit a Nepal Representative at Lhasa. The agreement also conceded free trade and extra territorial rights to Nepal. In return, Nepal agreed to assist Tibet, if she was attacked. But in spite of all these agreements friction between the two countries continued and various allegations were brought against each other. In 1929, the arrest of a Nepali, alleged to be a Tibetan subject, led to a grave crisis and the two countries came almost to the point of declaring war on each other. This crisis was, however, averted with great difficulty.

(c) *Sino-Tibetan Relations*—The relations between China and Tibet are not only commercial and political but essentially racial, cultural and historical. The first contact between the two countries was established in 225 B.C. During the long history of Tibet there have been great kings who developed their country and also annexed large areas of China. But these duels in the battle-field cemented the social and cultural contacts between the two countries and it became quite the fashion for early Tibetan monarchs to marry in the Chinese Royal families.

During the reign of the Manchu dynasty in China, towards the middle of the 17th century, Tibet, however, accepted the suzerainty of China. Later on, the Manchu Emperor came to be regarded as the temporal ruler of these areas and the Dalai Lama as the spiritual ruler of the Buddhist world. This was the beginning of the consolidation of the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In 1720, when Mongols attacked Tibet and occupied Lhasa China came to the help of Tibetans. This was followed by the grant of a new seal and title to the Dalai

Lama. In 1723, a local disturbance in Kokonor was suppressed with the aid of the Chinese troops. This was again followed by the grant of another title to the Dalai Lama, the stationing of Chinese troops in Lhasa in aid of Dalai Lama's Government and the appointment of two Chinese officers to exercise general control and superintendence over the Government of Tibet. Towards the close of the 18th century the Nepalese invasion of Tibet was repulsed by the Chinese. More troops were sent to Tibet and the Chinese representative in Lhasa was invested with larger financial and military powers. The Chinese now began to interfere more and more and the Dalai Lama was reduced to the position of a mere ecclesiastical head.

Towards the end of the 19th century the Chinese influence and power in Tibet, however, began to decline. The tottering Chinese Empire could no longer compete with the rival Imperialism of Britain and Russia. China was becoming financially weak and economically disorganized and was faced with the prospect of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. The later day Ambans at Lhasa were also corrupt and inefficient officials and they added largely to the Tibetan's disgust for the Chinese. This decline in Chinese prestige gave great opportunities to Britain to advance her interests in Tibet. Subsequent events in Tibet have, therefore, to be looked in the light of these facts.

The Lhasa Convention was a great eye-opener to the Chinese. It convinced them that a rival Imperialist Power (Britain) was interested in Tibet. They now tried to win over the Dalai Lama but their technique was obsolete, authoritarian and clumsy and out of tune with the growing consciousness among the Tibetans. The attempt therefore failed. The Chinese next tried to consolidate the regions of Eastern Tibet which belonged to them. They appointed an Imperial Resident at Chamdo and reorganized the administrative machinery, but their methods were again authoritarian and the suppression of monasteries and tribes only brought forth the united opposition of the Tibetans of this region. The Imperial Resident along with a few French Catholic Missionaries was murdered. Tyranny and suppression followed in the wake of these developments but no substantial result was achieved. During the voluntary exile of the Dalai Lama after the Younghusband Expedition the Chinese again tried to win him over, but without any success. He got disgusted with the treatment meted out to him. He refused to bow to the Chinese authority and the result was that on reaching Lhasa he found a Chinese Army entering his capital. As already stated, he ran away to India and the Chinese resented his action and condemned him as 'proud, extravagant, slothful beyond parallel.'

With the downfall of the empire in China the accumulated resentment and hatred for the Chinese came to the forefront. There was wholesale looting of the Chinese colony. The Chinese soldiers also looted the monasteries and there was much bloodshed in Lhasa. The new Chinese Republic sent a military expedition to reconquer the Chinese districts on the Tibetan border line and simultaneously made overtures to the Dalai Lama to join the new China. He was restored to his former dignity and all his honours and decorations were returned back to him. The Dalai Lama was confirmed as a sovereign of Outer Tibet and the Chinese suzerainty over the Inner Tibet was also confirmed.

China's legal sovereignty over Tibet was recognized. The boundary dispute, however, remained unresolved.

But the Sino-Tibetan relations remained hardly amicable and the main provocation for acute differences between the two countries was provided by the increasing prestige and influence of the British in Tibet. The Chinese Governors and Military Generals on the border, however, made serious attempts on various occasions to come to terms with the Dalai Lama and to win him over. After the flight of Tashi Lama from Tibet differences between Tibet and China began to grow still deeper. The Tibetans feared that the Tashi Lama might return with the armed aid of the Chinese. This fear of the Tashi Lama made the Tibetans turn more and more towards the British. Often enough there were armed clashes between the Chinese and the Tibetans brought about at places by the suppression of Tibetan monasteries in Eastern Tibet. In effect the Chinese authority and prestige in Tibet began to wane gradually and this fact became more pronounced with the rapid development of civil war in China. Tibet became of secondary importance to the Chinese Government and if the Kuomintang ever tried to assert its position in Tibet it was only a reaction to the growing influence of the British in Tibet. Chinese Government often protested against the supply of arms to Tibet by the British.

In 1933, the Dalai Lama expired and Chinese hopes of re-establishing their prestige in Tibet revived once again. A high ranking military officer was appointed Special Commissioner for ceremonial offerings to the late Dalai Lama and posthumous titles were conferred on the late Dalai by a special mandate. Soon after a Mission was also sent to Lhasa with adequate military escort. The other foreign Governments were also represented on this occasion. The leaders of the Chinese Mission tried to impress the Tibetans and paid many visits to the Tibetan monasteries and began to show great reverence for the holy places. Presents and entertainments became the order of the day. But indications of Chinese haughtiness and superior indifference towards the Tibetans undid much of the work done by the leaders of the Mission. The leader of the Chinese Mission next tried to discuss with the Tibetan Government in order to incorporate Tibet within the Republic as one 'of the five races of China'. The Tibetan Government refused to be incorporated into the Republic and thereupon the Chinese put forward the threat of Tashi Lama marching into Tibet at the head of an Army. More negotiations followed and in the end it was agreed that Tibet might be considered subordinate to China in law but that she should have the right to negotiate directly with other foreign Powers without any reference to China. Further, in view of the religious ties with China, Tibet agreed to keep China informed about the appointment of senior officers.

The victory of Communist forces in China and the recognition of the Communist Government as the legal authority in China has, however, not altered the situation in regard to Tibet. The Chinese Communist Government is as emphatic as its predecessors regarding Tibet as part of Chinese territory. This introduces very dynamic and significant factors in the relationship between

Tibet and China and the day may not be far off when the people of Tibet will have to take a decision for the future of their country.

(d) *Russo-Tibetan Relations*—Towards the close of the 19th century, Imperial Russia having been freed from her preoccupations in Europe, turned her attention towards Asia and began to develop plans for expansion in that direction. Her ambition in Central Asia brought her into clash with Britain. Soon the 'Russian bogey' began to loom large over the Indian political horizon. But this did not prevent Russia from annexing almost all the Central Asiatic countries north of Afghanistan, Persia and Chinese Turkistan. Russia tried to bring about a co-ordination within her far-flung empire and linked up her capital with the distant dominions by a network of railways. Since Buriat Russians were Buddhists, the Russian Imperialists were said to be anxious to exploit their position to develop contacts with Tibet. Regular diplomatic relations were, however, not established; only intimate contact was reported to have been established through Russian Buriats and other unofficial expeditions.

At the end of 19th century, some prominent Russian explorers and army chiefs visited Tibet along with many Buriat Russians. Among these there sprang up a notable person, A. Dorjjeff, who later on became a tutor of the Dalai Lama and came to exercise considerable influence on him. This period synchronized with the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon in India and the climax of the Anglo-Russian conflict. This was also the period when the Tibetans were greatly suspicious of the British and were thinking of seeking help from other Powers. Dorjjeff paid a number of visits to Russia in the beginning of the 20th century and he was received in audience by the Czar. Through him greetings, presents and letters were said to have been exchanged with the Dalai Lama. Establishment of normal diplomatic relations was also discussed. It was also alleged that a treaty had also been signed between Russia and China regarding Tibet. The news of this treaty accelerated the pace of British aggression against Tibet and the Younghusband Mission, as already stated, was the result of this tense situation.

Soon after, however, the Russo-Japanese war broke out and there was also an abortive attempt at revolution in Russia. Out of this war Russia came out considerably weakened and humiliated and had, in consequence, no energy or time left to advance her interests in Tibet. Besides, the international situation after 1905 forced Russia and Britain into each other's arms resulting in goodwill and amity between the two Powers. Unity of interests in Europe led Britain and Russia to conclude a treaty over Tibet in 1907. It secured the territorial integrity and inviolability of Tibet and acknowledged the suzerainty of China over Tibet. Further, the Russian railway development schemes were stopped and Britain's interests in Tibet with right of direct relations with Lhasa were recognized.

PART V

TIBET AND ITS FUTURE (Retrospect and Prospect).

For the first time in her history Tibet is faced with a grave problem. It is the problem of her future existence: existence under modern conditions and

in a dynamic situation. The recognition of the Communist Government in China as the legal and sovereign authority of that country has given rise to a new and a powerful factor in the world politics of today. This is bound to release vast human energies in Asia contributing thereby to the complexity of the international situation. Tibet, which in law has been recognized to be Chinese territory, though it enjoyed internal autonomy, has to choose between accepting to be a part of the Chinese régime or facing the prospect of a large-scale civil war.

Geographically speaking, Tibet occupies a unique position in Central Asia. It is a vast table-land of uninhabited and desert tracts with fertile and populated areas mostly in the Eastern, Central and Southern regions. The Government of Tibet is theocratic and ecclesiastical elements play a dominant rôle in her affairs. Administration is undemocratic and inefficient and communications and transport services are extremely undeveloped. Militarily her position is equally precarious. Apart from its terrain and climate, Tibet has no army worth the name to defend her against external aggression. A small, ill-equipped and disorganized force of over 9,000 people is no doubt in existence for a long time, but this can hardly be regarded a match against an army, equipped and trained to fight in a difficult terrain and under modern conditions.

To the east of Tibet, the Chinese Communists reign supreme. Add to this the areas of inner Tibet which have also now come under their sway. Tibetan People's Provisional Government is said to be functioning in these areas of inner Tibet and the young Panchen Lama of the Tashi Lampo monastery in Tibet has been installed as the spiritual ruler of the people of Tibet. To the north and the north-west of Tibet lie the territories of Soviet Russia and the recently Sovietized Sinkiang. To her west lie the territories of Ladakh (Kashmir) and to her south the areas of Nepal and Sikkim and the sub-continent of India. To her south-east, though distantly, are the areas of Burma and Siam caught in the grip of internal strife and disorder. Thus we see that Tibet is surrounded on her east and north by forces and régimes which constitute a great threat to her ways of life and to her present system of government.

The Chinese Communists, even before their legal authority over China came to be recognized, had made their intentions regarding Tibet quite plain. General Liu Pocheng, Commander of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, announced at a rally: 'From now on the work to be carried out in the military field is to liberate our compatriots in Tibet'. On July 8, 1949, when the Tibetan authorities were reported to have demanded the withdrawal of the Kuomintang Mission from Lhasa and closed down the Chinese school, the Chinese Communists denounced this act no less emphatically than the Kuomintang authorities themselves. Recently a Foreign Ministry spokesman from China was reported to have said that Tibet was Chinese People's Republic territory and any Mission sent abroad for 'splitting' territories by the authorities in Lhasa would be considered illegal. 'Any country receiving such an illegal Mission,' the spokesman added, 'will be considered as entertaining hostile intentions with regard to the Chinese People's Republic'. Further 'The Lhasa

authorities have undoubtedly no right independently to send any Mission and more than that, to prove the independence of Tibet.'

Recently also the Manchester Guardian of London reported that a pro-Communist Tibetan Government had been formed in Changhai, formerly a part of Tibet, and now the most westerly of the Chinese Provinces. It was further reported that an army of four divisions was being created in this area. A bank, it was stated, had also been opened in Changhai with a loan of 10 million dollars, repayable in 20 years. There were also reports that this provisional Government of Tibet had concluded a treaty with the Chinese Communist Government whereby after liberation of Tibet the Chinese Communists would exercise control over foreign affairs and communications and also enjoy mining rights in the country.

Another important fact which must be borne in mind at this stage is that the Dalai Lama, the head of the theocratic State of Tibet, is still a minor. The Panchan Lama, who is now reported to be with the Communists and at the head of the new Tibetan Provisional Government, is also a minor. They are 15 and 12 years of age respectively. In the past, the relations between the Dalai Lama and Panchan Lama had never been cordial. Personally they had both great regard for each other, but the parties and elements who advised them have deep rivalries among themselves as a result of which co-operation and unity between the Dalai and the Panchan has been made well-nigh impossible. The result of these intrigues has been that Panchan Lama had to run away from Tibet in 1923 and all attempts to persuade him to go back to Tibet had failed.

The present situation in Tibet has, therefore, to be looked at from this point of view also. We must not forget that though a large majority of the people in Tibet have a blind loyalty to the Dalai Lama, there are still some influential sections in Tibet who owe allegiance and loyalty to the Panchan Lama. Is it, therefore, surprising that these followers of Panchan Lama should get more and more organized and thereby constitute a very powerful fifth column for the furtherance of the aims and designs of the 'Provisional Government of Tibet'? The situation, as it is likely to develop in Tibet in the event of Tashi Lama marching at the head of a 'liberating force', can very easily be imagined. If the Dalai Lama could not withstand the presence of comparatively smaller and ill-equipped forces of the British and the Chinese in 1904 and 1910, it is highly unlikely that the boy Lama and his régime can withstand the assaults of a 'liberating force' of Tibetan nationals backed up by the military machine of the new Chinese Republic.

PART VI

TIBET AND INDIA

Tibet and India are neighbours and it is therefore natural for both to know each other. Their past association, though extending over centuries, has been mainly in the cultural field and although the British Government developed close commercial relations with Tibet, the two countries have practically remained unknown to each other. The British tried to convert Tibet into a Buffer State and while their policy went through successive stages of threat, aggression

and cajolery, India as a whole remained in the dark about Tibet and her people. The Tibetans too, ever conscious of their inherently weak Government, loose and inefficient administration and above all with living memories of aggression and exploitation, suffered mercilessly in the past, have evolved a characteristic policy of national aloofness. This outlook on their part has become more pronounced because Tibetans are a deeply religious people and are averse to introducing any such changes in their life or Government which would lower the status of their religion or their veneration for their god-king, the Dalai Lama. And so while facilities are given to a selected few to visit their monasteries and copy scriptures no real and effective contact is allowed between the Tibetans and the world outside. Thus while we have abundant material about Tibetan history we really have no authentic information and as such perhaps no correct appreciation of the Tibetan life and people; of their growing social and political consciousness and of their reactions to the gigantic revolutionary changes taking place outside their borders.

A host of questions are thus posed as one thinks of Tibet. In the theocratic Government of Tibet the dominant factor is the religious hierarchy backed up by vested interests. This is in reality the situation there though the new consciousness and awakening which has now spread among its more awakened classes has to some extent put the theocratic régime of Tibet on the defensive. In the context of the new development in China and in the eastern parts of Tibet and with the northern neighbours completely under Communist domination it is not difficult for us to imagine the great crisis which the Tibetan people are facing today.

Because of the peculiar position of Tibet and the revolutionary possibilities of the future India should be keenly interested in Tibet. Tibet is to the north of India and weak and unrepresentative Governments of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim separate parts of Indian borders from Tibet. For over 2,000 miles we have an almost open border between ourselves and Tibet. If Tibet goes the way of the Communist China India will be face to face with a very serious frontier problem. This problem is not merely of strategic and military importance but of great political significance.

It is interesting to note here that geographically India is surrounded in the east and in the north by great countries which are all in the grip of internal strife and bloodshed. There is civil war in Indo-China, in Siam and in Burma and the establishment of Communist régime in China will no doubt exercise considerable influence on the course of events in these countries. Civil war in Tibet, if it ever develops, would thus envelop the whole of the north from Burma in the east to Ladakh in the west, a whole belt of thousands of miles, into a strangely confused situation. It will raise problems not only of political complexity but also of law and order and of the defence of our ill-defined borders against lawlessness and marauding bands.

Internally the situation in Tibet is not such as to provide a basis for a strong civil strife of any major dimensions. The danger to Tibet lies not from these internal factors but essentially from external factors and influences.

These are important considerations which India cannot afford to ignore. India, consistent with her traditions and her political outlook, should naturally

stand for the freedom of the people of Tibet. She would certainly accept the right of the people of Tibet to have a Government of their choice and political institutions shaped according to their own traditions and requirements. This has no doubt been the stand of the people and the Government of India. But India has also to take into account its peculiar position and the extreme necessity of safeguarding her frontiers and securing the integrity of her boundaries. This will naturally be the most important consideration before India and it will therefore be quite legitimate for India to say that while she honours the freedom and security of all peoples within their own territories she would expect her neighbours also to honour her territorial integrity. As India and Tibet are neighbours and have had close associations in the past it would be very advantageous for Tibet, being backward and undeveloped, to have closer friendly relations with India. Friendly relations will no doubt, in course of time, give rise to increasing co-operation in important matters of national importance to both countries.

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FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY*

By RAYMOND ARON

THE first thing to be noticed about French foreign policy is that for several centuries it seems to have been dominated by certain factors which are found to be constant. Its chief characteristics were that it was opposed to all attempts at imperialist domination by all the other continental powers, namely Spain, the Hapsburg dynasty, Prussia and Germany of Kaiser or of Hitler. On the other hand, this policy also caused conflict with England when she went in for colonial adventures in India or in America. It, therefore, seemed to oscillate between two kinds of opposition: (1) hostility to the Hapsburg dynasty and Germany on the one hand and (2) opposition to naval supremacy of England on the other. According to varying circumstances, one or the other of these conflicts served French interests.

There is no doubt that some French Governments, whether it was the Government of Louis XIV or that of Napoleon, were not satisfied only with the resistance to the ambitions of those continental powers who were rivals to France. They in their turn took up the Imperial dream and they threw themselves into the vain and expensive adventure of hegemony over the Continent, as a means of unifying Europe by force. Besides, they also dragged France into a dreadful fight with England, who was the traditional guardian of the equilibrium between the European States, inspired no doubt by her interest. These tentatives, however, did not correspond to the real vocation of the country. Monarchical France at the very beginning fought against the souvenir of the Roman Empire, and then against the pretension of complete sovereignty of the King, as France is fighting against the efforts today to

* The original text of this article was in French. It has been kindly translated into English by Dr. Gijra Mookerjee.—Ed.

create an Empire of economic ideology, in order to maintain the complete independence of the nation.

It is only since the beginning of this century that France made a radical choice between these two traditional opponents and became reconciled with Great Britain and placed all her forces against the danger which came from the East. Even towards the end of the last century and at the time of Fashoda, the colonial rivalry in Africa became so tense that an armed conflict with Great Britain and France had seemed possible. In less than ten years, these rivalries were settled in such a radical manner that *l'entente cordiale* began to be considered as a positive acquisition. This rapid reconciliation was not surprising except in appearance. Great Britain was not always and everywhere an enemy of France, but only under definite circumstances; and these circumstances arose when France became so powerful that she seemed to be capable of destroying the equilibrium and to dominate the Continent, and again when France acquired for herself or tried to acquire for herself overseas possessions which England also wanted to have. The situation named above first was the cause of the origin of the wars against Louis XIV and Napoleon. The second was the cause of the wars of the eighteenth century and the conflicts which arose towards the end of the nineteenth century, but which were settled peacefully. All these causes, however, had disappeared at the beginning of the twentieth century and both France and England agreed on the distribution of zones of influence and the danger to the equilibrium did not come any more from France but from Germany. *L'entente cordiale*, which reversed apparently the traditional diplomacy of France, was in reality the logical result of the same conceptions, and of the same fundamental interests which had provoked the secular conflict.

During the whole period, between the conclusion of *l'entente cordiale* and the end of the Second World War, the French foreign policy was directed against one single enemy and was magnetized by almost an exclusive anxiety, namely Germany. It is true, that France and England had decided on a common policy which was not very satisfactory because, although they desired the same objective, there were divergencies regarding the choice of means and because their interests in certain parts of the world were conflicting, for instance in the Near East and with regard to the Mandate to Syria. But these quarrels remained so far as public opinion was concerned, however, secondary. German propaganda, during the last war, tried hard to awaken hatred in France against the 'Perfidious Albion' and it tried also to suggest to the French that by giving up their overseas possessions, in order to concentrate all their resources on the fight on the Continent, they were giving up the substance for a shadow; but this propaganda could do nothing against an evident fact, namely, that a country could not preserve its Empire beyond the seas, when it lost its independence at home. That is to say, in the eyes of the French it appeared that Germany, and Germany alone, was endangering the existence of France.

When the Third Reich totally collapsed, the French of all classes looked at the problem of peace in this old spirit. Germany continued to represent the permanent danger in their eyes and the French wanted to reduce this danger by all sorts of precautions, namely, a Federal Constitution for the Reich, the

international control of the Ruhr and the limitation of Germany's industrial potential. In 1945 and 1946, the French Communist Party, which at that time played the game of integral nationalism, joined the Parties of the Right in these common demands, whether these demands referred to reparations or to security.

The rapid dissolution of the coalition of the victorious powers and the appearance of what I have called the 'great Schism' rendered very soon this attitude, valid in the past, almost obsolete. Obviously, Germany, deprived of her provinces in the East and divided into two, was no more the centre of the world and the nucleus of future danger. It was also clear that Germany was no longer able in the foreseeable future to take the initiative alone of a new aggression. But it was obvious also that together with the Soviet Union she could become the vanguard of communist expansion. It, then, became essential that France in her turn should be able to avoid the danger whether it came from outside or it became the danger of being delivered inside to communist influence. To upset future Russo-German alliance, should it be necessary, therefore, to pursue a foreign policy which France pursued before, namely, to stand up against German imperialism, as it was? In any case, should not French policy, first of all, and above all, define itself in relation to the global conflict instead of being obsessed by the future conflict with a defeated Germany, when such a conflict in the context of the present situation, appeared to be a quarrel between two mendicants?

II

The various French Governments which came into power hesitated for a long time to take sides in the quarrel of the two Big Powers. Until 1947, they had hoped against hope that the unity of the victors would survive the necessity of a common struggle. At the first conference of the Big Three, M. Bidault, at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered his services willingly to be a mediator between the East and the West. He also submitted tentative proposals in this connexion, for example, with regard to Trieste and again regarding some clauses of the treaties with the satellite powers. When French interests were not directly involved, he played the rôle of a conciliator and he maintained with regard to the German question that the French demands should be respected although it was not very clear whether those precautions were against Germany or against a future Russo-German collaboration.

The aggravation of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, the rejection of the Marshall Plan by the Soviet Union and the formation of the Cominform forced French diplomacy to take a very definite attitude. One was, however, very apprehensive of the internal consequences of this attitude, because of the breakdown of the coalition government composed of the Communists and the non-Communists and the social unrest which followed that breakdown. The tactics adopted by the Cominform eventually precipitated that attitude. The French Communists left the Government in the Spring of 1947 and in Autumn serious strikes paralysed the entire national life. But the crisis was overcome. France could not have afforded not to take part in the Marshall Plan, and as M. Molotov interpreted the mere participation in

the Marshall Plan as an hostile act towards the Soviet Union, France found that she had made a choice, without wishing it.

From that time, the consequences followed logically. By signing the Brussels Pact and then, afterwards, the Atlantic Pact, France adhered to the Western system, the result of which was that France was denounced as an Imperialist Power by Moscow and France came to know, on several occasions, strikes which amounted more or less to insurrections. But this adhesion is not the least irrevocable. The real questions which were posed since then were: What is the reaction of public opinion? Does it approve of the attitude taken by the statesmen? And then, what is the special character of French policy within the Western system? What are the interests, specifically French, which France was trying to maintain, while at the same time, trying like all the countries of the West, to stop the expansion of Soviet imperialism?

To the first question, it is difficult to give a categorical answer. Certain facts, however, emerge as positive. The French nation seems to be divided within itself as it is the case with the whole world. The world-wide schism has cut the country into two. There has emerged also a minority after the elections, who numbers about 25 per cent of the population and who puts its confidence in the Communist Party and who, in theory, at least, recognizes Soviet Russia as the headquarters of socialism and the citadel of peace. Would the Communist voters obey the party-line? Would they welcome, whatever be the circumstances, the Soviet armies as liberators? One can go on discussing this question. The reasons, however, which influence the voters have often but far-fetched relation to the theory, specially the theory of foreign policy. People vote for the party of the people or of the proletariat, or for the party which passes for the most advanced and the most revolutionary. One does not realize that the victory of that party will bring with it the rule of the police, probably even the Soviet police. Whatever it may be, one fact cannot be doubted. The upper stratum of the militants, that is perhaps several hundred thousands of people, will obey, in case of a conflict, not the legal government but men whom they consider to be their leaders, that is to say, the leaders of the party and, through them, the Government of Russia. This fact is as tragic as incontestable. No purpose will be served by denying this fact and to dissimilate it.

Do the non-Communists, that is to say about 70 to 75 per cent of the nation, at least agree with the Western orientation of French diplomacy? One would not dare to affirm it without certain reservations. Let us, however, be clear. Generally speaking, that agreement exists. When the Institute of Public Opinion, by applying the Gallup method, asked the French if they were in favour of a Western Union, one found as many positive replies as, and sometimes more than, the number of non-Communist votes, that is, 70 to 80 per cent, which were cast during the elections. But these partisans of a Western Union had not considered all their objectives in the same manner, although outwardly they seemed to be identical.

Without pretending, however, to analyse in detail all the expressions of opinion, possible or real, regarding the European Union or the Western Union,

one is, however, able to distinguish some conceptions which are relatively more positive. Some Frenchmen saw and eventually see still a third force in the European Union which is an intermediary between the Soviet Union and the United States. They wish that France should not join any of these two camps but should contribute to peace by separating them either by creating a neutral zone or by creating a sufficient force in order to render the accumulation of excessive influence, or military aggression coming from one side or the other, impossible.

The theorists of European neutrality or of the third force are more or less conscious of the limitation of their hopes but unfortunately they accuse people, instead of recognizing the major obstacles arising out of the circumstances. A disarmed zone is not neutral but powerless and is wide open to the adventures of one mischief maker or the other. Europe could not be neutral without becoming a third force, that is without creating a military force capable of drawing respect from all. But such a rearmament of Europe cannot be thought of without the support of the United States. One cannot forget that the Soviet Union maintains that those who are not in her favour are against her and that she has come to the conclusion that European rearmament is directed against her. Thus Europe will have lost all chances of neutrality. In other words, disarmed Europe is nothing but a pawn in the conflict between the giants, whereas Europe cannot rearm without belonging to the Western camp.

Many Frenchmen, who, a few years ago, dreamt of inaccessible neutrality, are conscious today of the ineluctable logic of the present situation. But their disillusioned hopes survive only in the form of bad humour. Admitting that resistance to communist expansion is necessary, does it also mean that the American tactics are the best? Would it not be possible to create a *modus vivendi*, if a real pacification is impossible? A section of non-Communist opinion accepts the participation in American policy and in the Atlantic Pact, more with resignation than with enthusiasm.

The bad humour has never been a good counsellor but it is humanly understandable; because geography has put France in a situation which, to say the least, is not favourable. Only a few years ago, when Germany was the aggressor, it was France who received the first shock. Today, if war breaks out, it will be France again who risks to be occupied before the Anglo-Saxon democracies have had enough time to mobilize their forces. It is true that no one knows what form the war, in which the Soviet Union and the United States will be implicated, will take. It may be that the first bomb will fall on Detroit, New York or Chicago, rather than on Rome or Paris. It may be also that the North Pole will become the first battlefield rather than Western Europe. Nevertheless it remains possible that Western Europe will become the first objective of the Soviet army for political reasons, if not for military reasons. Europe remains, in spite of her weakness, as one of the three big industrial concentrations of the world, and still superior to the industrial potentialities of the Soviet Union. By which miracle will the belligerents be able to disinterest themselves from such a booty? Moreover, the Soviet Union will carry also an ideological war. A social revolution, which the march of the Soviet

troops will cause, will lead anyhow to a communist victory even in the eventuality of a final defeat of Russia.

From these doubts one can explain the major preoccupation of French policy to transform progressively the Atlantic Pact, in such a way that it can become a guarantee against an invasion, while at the same time it might also become a guarantee against war. What in reality is the Atlantic Pact? That an aggression against one of the signatories shall be considered by the others as directed against all of them. The European countries have, therefore, acquired the quasi-certitude that a military attack coming from the East will be regarded by the United States as a *causus belli*. The Pact affirms the already existing situation rather than it creates a new situation because the men who are at the helm of affairs of Polit Bureau do not ignore the fact that military assistance beyond the line of demarcation will let loose a general war. Western Europe, disarmed and powerless, owes its security to American protection. The Atlantic Pact promises Western Europe the prolongation of that protection. All will be well to the extent that solemn declaration of intention suffices to maintain peace. But if, in spite of everything, war breaks out because the Soviet Union, owing to the possession of the atom bomb, is no longer afraid of the final struggle or because of some very violent skirmishes in some part of the world between the two giants, then what will be the destiny of Europe? The American Air Force will probably "atomize" the towns but which army will be in a position to oppose the advance of the Russian Army? The Atlantic Pact signifies that the Americans will fight *for* Europe but it does not mean that they will fight *in* Europe.

This uncertainty is intensely resented in France and this also explains the divergent criticisms of the policy followed in the West even by the sincere supporters of the Atlantic community and a United Europe. The objective which French diplomacy seeks within the framework of allied diplomacy is precisely this assurance that Europe will be defended, that Europe will have an army and that several American divisions will immediately be available for the old continent. But this normal anxiety gives rise immediately to a new sense of importance to the German problem. This sense does not arise in the same way as it did before but it has not become more easy either; on the contrary materially and morally it appears to be more redoubtable and still more inextricable.

III

Germany is divided today in two unequal parts: the Eastern part which contains almost a third of the population and which has a régime called Popular Democracy imposed by the occupying power. Men in power in this region have all come from the Socialist Unity Party, that is to say, the Communist Party, and they have all been nominated but not elected. The popular German Republic is recognized by the Soviet Union and by its satellites but it has not any legal existence as far as the Western Powers are concerned. The second part which contains about two-thirds of the German population and where the main German industries are concentrated has, elected by universal suffrage, a Federal Parliament. Democratic institutions have been created in conformity

with the Constitution voted by the representatives of the Laender. In short, each of the two camps holds a part of Germany in which it has introduced a régime in conformity with its ideology.

In the context of the present situation, Germany thus appears to be a pawn which is decisive because she may eventually become the arbitrator. In reality, if Germany becomes communist, the Soviet conquest will not stop at the Rhine; it will very soon reach the Atlantic. If, on the other hand, a non-communist Germany goes back to the Rappalo tradition, then also the Western part of the old continent will be condemned. In both the cases, the Third World War becomes inevitable. The conclusion which one has to draw, from the point of view of the West, is that one has to prevent by all means Germany from not drifting into the Communist camp and into the Russian camp. The Americans, the British, and the French all easily agree on that point. But what are the best means of preventing this catastrophe?

The first are those thought out by the Americans in a simple and direct manner. Since we would like to stop communist expansion and, for that purpose, bring Germany into the Western camp, we should treat Germany resolutely and that as soon as possible, not as an enemy but as a potential ally. We should, therefore, soften as much as possible the statute of occupation, and we should give as much prestige and popularity as possible to the Bonn Government by surrendering to it a large measure of sovereignty and by supporting the reconstruction of its economy. The attraction for prosperity and liberty will be irresistible to the Germans. The peaceful competition in which both the camps are engaged in the country of our former enemy, will be, they maintain, in favour of the West rather than of the East, in favour of Bonn instead of Berlin, in favour of Adenauer instead of Pieck, if only the Western democracy has the courage to play the cards of which they are in possession.

The French did not reject entirely this argument but they do it with a 'nuance' partly for reasons which are intelligible though not valid, and partly for sentimental reaction. For nearly three-quarters of a century, the French have known only one enemy, that is, Germany. Because of Germany, the French have suffered three times the horrors of invasion. Is it therefore surprising that their way of thinking and specially their sentiments do not change as quickly as the present world situation demands? Even those who are intellectually convinced of the necessity of integrating Germany into Europe hesitate when the steps which would lead to its realization are discussed, and this hesitation is justified by arguments. They say: What is there to prove that reconstituted Germany will choose the good side? Has not there been always a tradition in all the political parties in Germany to have an alliance with Russia? Is it not a fact that Russia alone is in a position to open the way for expansion to German industries and to industrialize the agricultural countries and to supply food and raw materials to German factories? Is it not a fact that parliamentary democracy is still singularly fragile in a country which has been ruined and proletarianized and where nearly 10 million people have been hounded out of their homes and who remain uprooted in a land which is too narrow for them? Is it not a fact that Russia alone is in a position to remedy the wrongs which

have been inflicted on Germany by giving back to her a part of the German territory annexed by Poland? Owing partly to the fear of eternal Germany and partly to the fear of an eventual Russo-German alliance, the French, without being opposed to the reconstruction of Germany, demand guarantees, namely, the limitation of Germany's industrial production, international control of the Ruhr, etc. And they also maintain that reconciliation is not strictly incompatible with guarantee. But it cannot be doubted at the same time that the demands for too many guarantees will end by making the desired reconciliation impossible. One always requires two in order to reconcile. Germany today has no means of rejecting the orders of the Allies but she is not obliged to subscribe to them voluntarily. Germany will only agree to the degree the Western offer seems to be compatible with the national aspirations of the German people.

This is, it seems to me, the state of the present negotiations at the end of 1949. All the different French Governments have repeated, and that very sincerely, that they wish the integration of Germany into Western Europe. They have, however, added to this declaration a desire for an understandable slowness and the maintenance of guarantees, namely, the international authority of the Ruhr, limitation of certain industries and a special régime for Saar. The Bonn Government, on the other hand, has made many declarations, which are undoubtedly sincere, in favour of Franco-German *rapprochement*. The Chancellor Adenauer has not concealed the fact that he is ready to satisfy French desire for security in exchange of concessions which he has asked for and which he has already begun to get. These concessions are: putting an end to dismantling, the return of sovereignty as quickly as possible, consular representations in foreign countries, etc. Should we, therefore, say that we are, at least this time, on the good way to reconciliation between France and Germany, by surmounting the past of many wars and the inheritance of deep resentments? Should we also say that we are on the verge of renewing the perspectives of the future of Europe? One certainly wishes this and one would like to believe also in it. Without, however, giving proof of an excessive pessimism, one, however, should be on guard against too much confidence because there will still be many obstacles to overcome. If we can obtain agreement with regard to the objective, the differences regarding the means will not be always a great hindrance. France will demand guarantees and Germany will ask for the equality of rights.

And then, one must say that the suggestions repeatedly made regarding the integration of Germany into Europe do not offer at the same time a solution of the economic problems. As some one has said often, Germany is 'a Continental England'. Like England and even in a more limited degree Germany is unable to feed her population with the produce of her soil. She does not possess all the raw materials which her factories require. She must export or perish. Germany must also acquire by her exports necessary exchanges for buying foodstuffs and the raw materials, that is to say, she must have hard currency. Forty-seven million Germans, concentrated in the three zones of occupation of the West and altogether 70 to 75 million Germans, who will

one day again be united, will not be able to have a decent standard of living without entering into the sphere of world economy. But at the same time, would not they enter into competition with the other countries of Western Europe who also have the need of exporting their manufactured products for paying their indispensable purchases? Before the War of 1939, Germany had a privileged position in the Balkan and the Danubian countries. Germany supplied all the countries of these regions, which are mainly agricultural, with manufactured goods. But today, the Soviet Union has taken her place. In any case, the economic problem of Germany has aggravated. Separated from Eastern Europe, divided into two, Germany is obliged to buy again from other countries and Germany has fewer markets for the exportation of her goods at her disposal, because all the other countries of Europe are hard-pressed by the same necessity. Would not the rivalry for external markets compromise the relations between the nations of Western Europe who are united today before the communist menace but who are often more competitors than collaborators in the economic sphere?

It is true that the establishment of normal relations within the border of the old continent, the suppression of quantitative restrictions and an eventual monetary convertibility will to some extent ameliorate the situation. At the present moment, the European countries buy in the dollar zone only those goods which they do not find elsewhere. A sort of intra-European free exchange system will, perhaps, reduce the need for dollars. But it will not make things better and it can be only mere palliatives. Agreements between the European countries are desirable by themselves, but they do not solve the European crisis which is related to the problems of the rest of the world. In reality, the integration of Europe will have a double function; first, to create favourable conditions and, secondly, to inspire confidence in the American public opinion. After all, only the United States is in a position to reconstruct the international economy by playing the rôle which was played by Great Britain in the last century, that is to say, by giving dollars in the form of credits to the countries which are being industrialized and, indirectly, to European countries. It is by contributing to the industrialization of Africa and Asia that the United States can enable Asia and Africa to find a zone of expansion for their industries and at the same time, the dollars for assuring supplies for men and machines.

As long as Europe seems incapable of living on its own resources and as long as the industrialized countries appear to be impatient to increase their exports, while at the same time the markets seem to shrink, the economic recovery of Germany, although by itself inevitable and desirable, will eventually cause worries because it will aggravate economic competition among the Allies who are politically united at the moment.

The inter-dependence of world affairs has caused a kind of disequilibrium for the European countries. The countries within the old continent, who were great powers only yesterday, have inevitably been surpassed on the day when the Continent States (*Etats-continentals*) and the States composed of many

nationalities, capable of producing thousands of tons of coal per year, and consisting of 150-200 million of human beings, began to play a vital rôle in world affairs. At the present moment in Europe, there are no more Great Powers. But perhaps even the notion of Great Powers has become an anachronism. In reality, there are today only two world Powers and, if one includes Great Britain and the Commonwealth, only three. The other powers are only regional and they will no longer be able to play a decisive rôle in the world. In one sector of the world only they constitute a specific force and an influence of weight only. This is, however, the case of France. There is a part of the world in which French policy continues still to count and that part is Europe and Africa and, particularly, in the Western Mediterranean area.

The vagueness of French policy arises from this new situation. Our diplomats are fully conscious of the remarkable originality of this conjunction and that is why they have adopted the slogans of 'European Unity' and the Atlantic community. But, on the other hand, they find themselves face to face with the amazing fact that those who were our enemies yesterday are to be our partners tomorrow. Conscious of the fear and the resentment of public opinion, conscious equally of the risks which the recovery of German means, a Germany which oscillates between East and West and as aggrieved as ill-treated, our politicians hesitate to slow down, and ask for guarantees.

In spite of everything, one need not be suspicious either of the deep inspiration or of the real objective of French policy. The majority of our people and all the men in power today have openly and honestly adhered to the Western camp. They think that close collaboration among the European countries and their collaboration with the United States is the only policy which is in conformity with the interests of France and which alone is likely to increase the chances of peace. France today looks forward and not behind.

The anxiety shown by the world, because of the fact that the danger coming from the East has not effaced at a stroke the memories of three wars, is unfair to France, because the neighbouring power was an enemy only yesterday.

PARIS

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CONTROL OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY*

By PITMAN B. POTTER

I

THE somewhat awkward title employed above has been adopted deliberately for a very definite purpose. Nevertheless, or for that very reason, it requires some explanation. It is hoped that this discussion may be interesting and useful to all who are concerned with the development of the foreign relations of India, by virtue of a comparison with the experience of the United States

* Substance of an address delivered at New Delhi under the auspices of the Council on 23 November 1949.

in this respect. Although the international situation is somewhat different today from that which confronted the United States in 1789, and although India has already had more experience in this field than the infant America had had at that time, the parallel between the two cases is striking. An effort will be made to tell the story of the American experience here, leaving the Indian reader to draw his own conclusions for his own country.

By the key words in the title of this paper, it is intended to refer to the agencies which exercise control over both the foreign policy and the diplomatic activity of the United States and their *modus operandi*. The foreign relations of a country—relations of all kinds with other countries—more or less come to it unbidden, but over its foreign policy and its diplomatic activity it should be able to exercise some control. This involves both the political organization or machinery needed for formulating and executing foreign policy (a department of foreign affairs and a foreign service come to mind most readily although, as will soon appear, they are far from being the most important elements in this matter), and the procedure or methods of operation thereof.

A word should be said at once concerning the idea of *control* of foreign policy and diplomatic action. The term is a little too strong to reflect with entire accuracy the realities of the situation. The people of a country naturally intend to bestow control of their foreign policy and international action upon certain agencies but in the event it will almost inevitably appear that these agencies fail in some degree to realize the degree of control intended. Competing forces—interested groups within the country, various features of the international situation, and other countries—also play their part in determining the foreign policy and action of a given country, and we should avoid any oversimplification of the picture.

Another preliminary consideration bears upon the way in which the power in question is conferred upon this, that, or another agency. The most obvious method of dealing with the matter would, of course, be to insert various provisions in the national Constitution. And this is exactly what was done by the statesmen who framed the Constitution of the United States in 1787—the present Constitution, which went into force in 1789. The problem of the control of foreign affairs was a rather new one at that time and it would not have been surprising if it had been somewhat neglected by the framers of the Constitution. Actually, as will appear more fully in a moment, these gentlemen did neglect the matter somewhat in principle, but the really surprising thing is that they inserted in the Constitution as many detailed provisions as they did dealing with foreign affairs; on certain points the framers of that document had very sharp and strong ideas. On the other hand, it soon became obvious that the results as a whole would depend not merely upon the provisions of the Constitution but also upon the interpretation thereof and, finally, upon practice and usage, sometimes not closely related to any specific Constitutional provision.

An important question of choice or values arises here; is it better to try to define clearly in advance the powers of various governmental agencies in the conduct of foreign affairs or is it better to have this to be worked

out in practice? In the United States a mixed solution was adopted; other countries will decide for themselves. It should also be remembered that the Constitution of 1789 has never been amended since that time in any section or provision dealing with foreign affairs; that such an instrument, one hundred and sixty years old, should still be workable at all is somewhat of a miracle—for good or bad—but the result of failure to revise that instrument naturally throws a great deal of importance on the process of interpretation and development by practice. There being no provision in the Constitution which expressly confers control of foreign policy and diplomatic action in general upon any one agency, it is necessary to work out the results in this respect by building upon details of law and practice, and this is precisely what the various branches of the American Government have been doing ever since 1789, aided and abetted by students of the problem and the legal profession in general. The literature on the subject is copious¹ and all that can be done here is to sum the matter up as briefly as is consistent with adequate coverage.

Bearing all of this in mind we now proceed to analyse the situation in the United States, first with regard to the Executive branch of the Government, then with regard to the Legislative branch, then the Judicial branch, to which may be added for convenience the States of the Union, and finally the electorate. A few brief conclusions will be added at the end.

II

In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 a controversy continued to rage which had been under way ever since 1774, when national action in the field of foreign relations was formally established in place of action by the individual colonies or States. This was the controversy between those who wished to see the foreign affairs of the country conducted by the Congress, as had been the case since 1774, and those who wished to have the task turned over to the Executive. In the end the view that the conduct of foreign affairs is essentially executive in character prevailed. As already mentioned, no statement of this principle was incorporated in the Constitution, however, and it is only when we turn to the detailed clauses of that document that we discover the predominant position given to the President, the extent of that predominance, and the limitations imposed upon it.

Four provisions of the Constitution explicitly confer upon the President powers relating specifically to foreign affairs. He is made 'Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,' is given the power 'to make treaties,' to 'appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls' and to 'receive ambassadors and other public ministers.'² The significance of the first item hardly needs to be mentioned; a few students have indeed argued that by use or abuse of this power the President could do anything which pleased him in the foreign affairs of the country, but this fear has actually

¹ J. M. Mathews, *American Foreign Relations: Conduct and Policies*, 2nd Edition, New York, 1938.

² *Constitution*, Art. II, Sec. 2, para 1; Art. II, Sec. 2, para 2; Art. II, Sec. 3.

proved to be somewhat exaggerated, though perhaps logically sound. The second item involves, in view of international law and practice, signature of a treaty, ratification, and exchange of ratifications, the second and third being very closely related. The third item includes the powers to remove the appointees and also possibly the power to instruct them. We shall return shortly to the question of the exact scope of these powers and limitations imposed upon them. The seemingly simple fourth item involves the important power to recognize foreign States and governments, although this may be done in other ways also, as by the second and third items, just mentioned.

Two other provisions of the Constitution confer upon the President powers which are important in the conduct of foreign affairs although they do not bear specially or exclusively thereon. Thus the President has the power to sign or refuse to sign (called 'veto') all legislation passed by the Congress, subject to the power of the Congress to pass the measure over his veto by two-thirds majorities, and also to 'give to the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.'³ The former is very important because so much legislation is necessary today for the execution of treaties and otherwise implementing the conduct of foreign affairs, the second for the same reason and because it also opens the door for recommendations of a declaration of war, although this problem should rather be approached from the point of view of the Congress to which we shall turn later. The two items just mentioned cannot be regarded as intentionally aimed at the conduct of foreign affairs but they do have an importance in that field nonetheless on that account.

One other *de facto* prerogative of the President in this field should be mentioned here; it is not mentioned in the Constitution in so many words but it is no less real. That is the prerogative of proclaiming the principles of American foreign policy, or more simply, the prerogative of making speeches dealing with questions of foreign affairs. This sort of thing was almost unknown at the end of the eighteenth century, but has become extremely important today. It is, however, precisely that form of action in respect to foreign policy which appears to be most hazardous and unreliable to critical students thereof, actually leading to the view that such attempts to formulate and proclaim foreign policy in general terms in advance of the event is to be avoided if at all possible. It must be remembered, however, that when he addresses the Congress on such matters under the Constitution, the President is in fact often doing the same thing—the message of 2nd December, 1823, containing the Monroe Doctrine, is the most famous, but by no means the only, case in point—albeit subject to somewhat more serious restraint and responsibility. In any event it is highly probable that the Presidents will continue to address Chambers of Commerce and Rotary Clubs on foreign affairs and this feature of the situation cannot be overlooked, especially as it coincides with the growing idea of democratic control of foreign affairs to which we shall return later.

³ *Ibid*, Art. I, Sec. 7, para 2; Art. II, Sec. 3.

Another prerogative of the President which would be strongly emphasized by some observers, favourably by some, with bitter condemnation by others, is that of concluding Executive Agreements with officials of other countries, either personally or through subordinates—the Postmaster General, the Surgeon General, or some such official. This may be done under Congressional authorization (as in the case of the important Reciprocal Trade Agreements),⁴ or on the basis of the President's Constitutional position in general. The Executive Agreements relate to secondary matters at times but at other times to very important items. In part this is a deliberate effort (sometimes with majority Senate consent) to evade the requirement for two-thirds Senate approval (the Agreements are not literally 'treaties' though binding internationally). On the other hand this device is somewhat limited in respect to the extent to which it can be used to influence, direct, or control, major lines of American foreign policy or diplomatic action.⁵

The general result of the eight items described above, particularly the first four and the last two, is to give to the President the predominant rôle in the conduct of American foreign affairs and this is no longer disputed today. On the other hand some consideration must be given to the Secretary of State and the Department of State at this point, and then we must turn to the limitations imposed upon the President in the exercise of his powers.

It would constitute somewhat of an oversimplification to say that the Secretary of State is merely the alter ego of the President and that the President may tell the Secretary and the Department of State what to do and how to do it at any time and remove the Secretary and any official in the Department having to do with matters of policy whenever he sees fit. Yet that is legally the situation (waiving the question of who are policy officials in the Department) and the actual situation is nearer to this end of the scale than the opposite. Neither the Secretary nor the Department are mentioned in the Constitution (having thus no 'Constitutional Status') and, although they owe their position to Congressional statutes, these statutes do not pretend to interfere with the President's control of the Secretary and the Department in policy matters. The result has been that on many occasions a President with strong views in the field of foreign affairs has been content with a relatively unassertive Secretary, and *vice versa*; examples will readily come to mind. Another result is that the President actually does constantly impart his views to the Secretary and other higher officials in the Department and these views are followed.

We should probably include in what is said above the foreign service, particularly the diplomatic branch thereof. The legal situation is the same. And in numerous cases, the President issues special instructions to United States diplomatic representatives in the field, particularly ambassadors and other more important ministers and delegates to conferences. From the items treated in these two paragraphs, the enormous power of the President comes out even more clearly than it appears on the surface of the Constitution.

⁴ *Trade Agreements Act of 1934, renewed in 1937, etc. to 1949*; United States Code, Title 19, para 1351.

⁵ W. M. McClure, *The International Executive Agreement*, New York, 1941.

It should also be added that the President stands in the same relationship to the other Executive Departments (Defence, Treasury, Commerce, and so on, not to mention many independent agencies such as the Atomic Energy Commission) as he does to the Department of State, and that he can to some extent direct their actions also in so far as they bear on foreign affairs, which is very extensively, as will easily be appreciated. This simply adds further material to the general picture given above and in these days, when international problems extend so widely in the fields of economics and finance, armaments, and all sorts of matters, this aspect of the situation is extremely important.

The great qualification upon the power of the President in dealing with the Secretary of State and the Department of State, and this applies to all of the other Departments as well, is that no President can follow all that goes on in the Department. Nor does he try. The Secretary receives diplomatic representatives, and even engages in negotiations, many times for the President's once, and all of the officials of the Department are busy all the time on matters of which the President never hears. Of course it is understood that any problem of importance, for which the lines of policy have not already been laid down, will be taken up to the Secretary or even, if advisable, to the President, but it is obvious that execution of this principle turns on the exercise of judgment by the Secretary and his subordinates. It is, moreover, both accurate in fact and important as well to recall that such officials have many opportunities for committing the United States in foreign policy and diplomatic action, if they wish to do so—sometimes with the very highest motives—without 'bothering' their superiors in the matter. This is one explanation of the difficulty which observers sometimes have in reconciling the actions of the Department of State with the policies proclaimed by the White House. In other words the President is largely dependent upon the Department of State and the Foreign Service, functioning either in the familiar fashion by individual posts or by the new and very interesting method of regional conferences in the field, not to mention other Departments and agencies, for loyal aid in formulating and executing American foreign policy. By the information and advice and other forms of co-operation which they give or do not give these branches of the government may add to or detract greatly from the President's control of foreign affairs and this not because of legal limitations on the President but for purely practical reasons.

III

When we turn to the Senate and the House of Representatives, together making up the Congress, we have in some ways a simpler problem but in other ways a more difficult one. There are fewer Constitutional provisions to be taken into account—if we lump together as we should. On the other hand it is somewhat more difficult to appraise the exact importance of each, and also the aggregate result.

The best-known power of the Senate in this field is its power to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties.⁶ This power was conferred upon the

⁶ *Constitution*, Art. II, Sec. 2, para 2.

Senate as one expression of the mistrust felt by the framers of the Constitution toward the Executive branch of the government. This grant was not so much a grant of power to the Senate, enabling it to take action on its own, as a grant of power to check the President. The Senate may not take the initiative in the making of a treaty (though it might urge the President to do so, as we shall see—probably with no effect), nor may it take the final steps of ratification and exchange of ratifications, or the supplementary steps of proclamation, publication, and so on.

It will thus be noted that the Senate does not 'ratify' treaties, although this misstatement will be found in many periodicals and books of the highest standing, and even in the language of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Senate approves (advises and consents) and the President ratifies. The Senate has never ratified a treaty and could not do so if it so desired. This is absolutely sure as a matter of law and terminology and the point has very practical importance, for the President may refuse to ratify after the Senate has approved, and this has happened on a certain number of occasions. The point is a small one but it is absolutely clear and it is not without its importance.

For the Senate by virtue of its power to approve may also refuse to approve, and may, finally, attach conditions or reservations to its approval. If the President sees results of this type impending he may withdraw the treaty from the Senate before that body has acted, but then, or if the Senate refuses approval, he may not, of course, proceed to ratify. It has been the character of reservations actually adopted or (more rarely) threatened by the Senate which have, on a few occasions, led Presidents to refuse to ratify. From the point of view of international law consent to the reservations must be obtained from the other signatory State or States prior to the exchange of ratifications.

It should be interpolated here that the President may make or suggest reservations also, prior to and dependent upon Senate approval. This may seem odd but it merely means that the Executive has had a serious second thought or is trying to anticipate Senate criticism.

Statistically the Senate has not interfered—although the term is used without any derogatory implications—very frequently in this manner. Nor have relations between the President and the Senate been badly strained, as a rule, in this connexion. The great controversy over the Treaty of Versailles, in the winter of 1919-20, has created an exaggerated impression in this respect. At the same time the power of the Senate at this point is very real and very important and, needless to say, it has its influence on the President and the Secretary of State all during the process of negotiating the treaty. It might be added that this provision in the United States Constitution, or this practice of submitting treaties, signed by the Executive, to a representative body for approval before ratification, has spread rather widely in the world in the past generation.

Finally, it should be added that importance of Senate action is greatly enhanced by the Constitutional requirement for a two-thirds vote on approval of a treaty. This requirement is open to severe criticism and can produce

in most undemocratic effects. Without it much of the importance of Senate action in this situation would disappear.

The power of the Senate to approve or confirm Presidential appointments in the Department of State and the Foreign Service while definite, clear, and constantly practised, is much less important.⁷ By legislation under another clause of the Constitution, the appointment of subordinate personnel in this Department has been taken out of the hands of the President and conferred elsewhere, but all nominations of higher Foreign Service and Department officials are made under the old procedure. The fact is that unless there are very strong reasons to the contrary—though these reasons may at times be of a personal or political order rather than relating to the competence of the nominee—the Senate seldom questions Presidential nominations on this plane.

It should always be remembered that in the exercise of its power to approve treaties and confirm appointments—or to refuse to do so—the Senate is in part animated by a desire to maintain its Constitutional position *vis-à-vis* the President as well as, to, or rather than, exercise its judgement on the substantive issues involved in any given case. This is somewhat regrettable but it is unavoidable and in part sound.⁸ The same is true in regard to relations between the President and the Congress as a whole, to which we now turn.

When we come to the power of legislation, however, we encounter a situation of another order. Here the powers conferred are important, potentially decisive, and very extensive. The only problem is that of the nature of the connexion between the legislative powers of the Congress and the conduct of foreign affairs. There is, as already noted,⁹ also a provision in the Constitution on this score which brings the President back into the scene and even sets up a potential conflict between him and the Congress.

In general, legislative power in the United States is vested by the very first Section of the Constitution in Congress as a whole, and the two Houses share this power equally except from one item (all revenue measures must originate in the House), a democratic reservation which has proven to be of little practical importance.¹⁰ Then, in a separate Section, a rather large number of items are listed to which the legislative power of Congress may apply and among these are many which obviously relate to foreign affairs, such as import duties, defence, naturalization, piracy and 'offences against the law of nations,' and other matters.¹¹ What is almost equally important is that the legislative power in other matters, such as payment of 'the debts . . . of the United States,' patents and copyright, and indeed almost the whole range of that power, may be involved in the conduct of American foreign affairs because necessary

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ W. M. McClure, *The International Executive Agreement*, New York, 1941; K. Colegrove, *The American Senate and World Peace*, New York, 1944; R. J. Dangerfield, *In Defence of the Senate*, Norman, Oklahoma, 1933; and D. H. Flewelling, 'The Role of the Senate in Treaty Making' in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 583.

⁹ *Constitution*, Art. I, Sec. 7 para 2; Art. II, Sec. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Art. I, Secs. 1 & 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Art. I, Sec. 8.

for implementing treaties concluded by the United States or otherwise involved therein.¹² Two famous clauses of the Constitution, occurring in this same section, the 'general welfare' clause and the 'necessary and proper' clause, whereby Congress is given power to provide for the general welfare of the United States and make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested in the Government of the United States, amply reinforce these detailed stipulations.¹³

Finally in this same Section occurs the provision granting to the Congress the power to declare war¹⁴ and whenever war has been declared by the United States it has been done by means of a joint resolution of the Congress which is one form of a legislative act. It is true, as already noted, that this has always been done after a recommendation by the President. It is also true that it would be difficult for the Congress to refuse to follow such a recommendation. It is true finally that the President could 'veto' such action or refuse to approve it, as he may—and we have already noted—veto any legislation of the Congress, subject to reversal. But the President would hardly risk making such a recommendation unless sure of his position, negative votes have been cast in the Congress in such cases, and there is little or no likelihood of a veto. The net result is that final power in declaring war rests with the Congress although once more the President has a prominent part to play in the matter.

Likewise both Houses of the Congress have the power, as incidental to their general legislative authority, to adopt resolutions, and, in the absence of any clause confining conduct of foreign affairs to the Executive, as noted at the beginning of this discussion, they do not hesitate to adopt resolutions bearing on questions of foreign affairs. These resolutions usually take the form of 'concurrent' resolutions (passed independently rather than in co-operation), if passed by both Houses—resolutions are also passed by each House separately—are intended to express the opinion of the Houses, and do not constitute an exercise of legislative authority, are not sent to the President for signature. They therefore have only such effect as the President or any other official concerned may see fit to give to them, and, as may be imagined, the President is not likely to respond favourably to any effort of the Congress to tell him what to do—make a treaty, recognize a new government—in this field. Nevertheless this power of adopting resolutions constitutes another democratic means of bringing Congressional opinion to bear on foreign affairs.

Finally both Houses of the Congress, as incidental to the exercise of any of their powers, under common parliamentary law, hold 'hearing' and conduct investigations through committees or subcommittees for obtaining information and advice on any proposed action. In these hearings and investigations, which are very numerous and are constantly going on, officials from the Executive branch of the government, the President excluded, are questioned and invited to testify on matters in which they are concerned. The President also consults voluntarily with members and committees of the Congress in this

¹² *Ibid.*, para 1, 8 etc.

¹³ *Ibid.*, para 1 & 18.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, para 11.

manner. Finally private citizens are called in, and also permitted to intervene on their own initiative, to testify on questions of foreign affairs on which they are supposed to have evidence of value to contribute or in which they are interested. This is not strictly a case of the exercise of power by the Congress over the nation's foreign affairs but it is so closely related thereto that it should not be disregarded and we shall also return to it in another connexion.

In the preceding paragraphs we have dealt with the legislative powers of the Congress in respect of foreign affairs. The Senate shares fully in the exercise of all this power with the exception mentioned, and, in addition feels slightly better justified than the House in adopting resolutions relating to foreign affairs because of its share in the treaty making power. So does the House of Representatives, however, and in some ways the House may be regarded as the most vital branch of the legislative machinery, but we must add a word or two concerning its special position.

On the one hand there is some disposition—in the Senate but also elsewhere—to exclude the House from interfering in the field of foreign affairs. On the other hand this attitude is weaker today than formerly for reasons easily perceived from what is said in this paper. The exclusive power of the House to originate revenue bills has been mentioned as also the fact that this is not of great practical importance inasmuch as the Senate may freely propose amendments thereto and as any Senator can usually find a Representative to introduce a bill for him—apart from the fact that revenue bills are not lightly introduced in these days of already very heavy taxes. Finally, the House still retains a certain prestige as the more democratic of the two Houses and this tends to balance the prestige of the Senate as a participant in the conduct of foreign affairs. On the whole the actual situation does not differ greatly from that pictured in the terms of the Constitution.¹⁵

IV

It may seem somewhat surprising that it should be thought necessary to include any reference to the judicial branch of the United States government in a discussion of control of American foreign policy and diplomatic action, and still more surprising to encounter reference to the States of the Union in this connexion. Nevertheless in any country which professes to live under a government of law the courts are likely to make themselves heard at every corner and in any federal union the States have always to be considered.

Actually both national and States courts are involved in this problem in the United States, in view of the Constitutional provision that they shall both be bound by all treaties made under the authority of the United States.¹⁶ This would follow at once from the step taken to make such treaties an integral part of 'the supreme law of the land' which was rather a novelty at the time when the Constitution was framed.¹⁷ In addition the difficulties encountered under the Articles of Confederation, when individual States yielded less than com-

¹⁵ B. Bolles, *Congress and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1945. Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XX, No. 21.

¹⁶ *Constitution*, Art. VI, para 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

plete respect to agreements made by the Central Government, led to special care being taken in this direction.

Questions of foreign affairs might not seem to be such as to fall naturally into the hands of the courts but the fact is that much litigation over diplomatic privileges,¹⁸ customs entry, navigation, ownership and inheritance of property, nationality, belligerent and neutral rights, and all sorts of other matters involves problems of international law and relations. Litigants may challenge the validity of a treaty or of an Executive action or a Congressional statute in this domain. The government may seek confiscation of property under the laws of war, or under national neutrality legislation. The courts of the United States, Federal and State, actually render scores of decisions annually which relate to such items.

In fact, however, most of these decisions relate not so much to the content of American foreign policy or American diplomatic action as to the relative powers of the President, the Senate or the whole Congress, the States, and so on—in short just the questions discussed in this paper. Indeed it might be said that the courts have nothing to say, and admit that they have nothing to say, concerning the content of the national foreign policy, and are only too glad to leave such political questions to the 'political departments,' sometimes thereby shirking some part of their responsibility in this connexion.¹⁹ The main provision of the Constitution which relates to this matter confers jurisdiction on the courts in terms of the law involved ('this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made . . . under their authority') or the parties in litigation ('ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, . . . all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . controversies . . . between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects').²⁰

It might be added that, while the courts have at times been quite strict in such cases, in the main they have upheld the hands of the President and the Congress in dealing with other countries. They have never declared a treaty to be *ultra vires* or invalid, and only on rare occasions have they disallowed executive or administrative acts. As intimated above, they have, if anything, been altogether too co-operative, relying, of course, on their lack of authority in matters political, and perhaps feeling very keenly their lack of political support.

As already indicated, reluctance of the States to conform to agreements made with foreign countries by the government of the Union was one of the problems to the remedying of which the Constitutional Convention of 1787 addressed itself. Conduct of national foreign affairs have been in principle turned over to the national government in April, 1774, but the States did not wholly live up to this decision in the fifteen years following.

Now strong provisions were inserted in the new Constitution to the effect that no State should 'enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Art. III, Sec. 2, para 1 & 2.

¹⁹ P. C. Jessup, 'Has the Supreme Court abdicated one of its functions?' *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 40, 1946, p. 168.

²⁰ *Constitution*, Art. III, Sec. 2, para 1 & 18.

letters of marque and reprisal; lay any imports or duties on imports; keep troops, or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact . . . with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.'²¹ In some of the items listed, the States might take action if they could obtain 'the consent of Congress'²² but this has never been attempted in any of these matters although a similar condition has been fulfilled frequently in the analogous matter of compacts among the States, mentioned in the same Section, and indeed has been 'interpreted' almost out of existence by the course. We have already seen that it was provided that the States should be bound by national treaty agreements, and this is probably more important than the foregoing.

In one matter the States seem to enjoy, either by Constitutional provisions or by custom, or both, a veto power over the treaty-making process. This arises from the provision that nothing in the Constitution 'shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims . . . of any particular State.'²³ It cannot be asserted unequivocally that this deprives the national government of power to cede territory belonging to any State without its consent, but the balance of evidence and opinion runs in that direction. The record on this issue is too thin to provide sure guidance, and probably the issue is so unlikely to arise in a foreseeable future as to be unimportant, but the problem is an interesting one in the theory of the foreign relations of any federal union.

Finally, it should be noted that at times the action of the Union in foreign affairs is hampered by the discrepancies among the States in size, wealth, and character of interest (industrial and financial, commercial, agricultural). The conclusion of particular treaties has been impeded by this factor. At one time a group of very responsible jurists urged that individual States be permitted to conclude treaties with foreign countries, with the consent of Congress, as indicated above. No such action has been taken, however, or at present seems likely to be taken, in spite of experiments and intimations of devolution in the conduct of foreign affairs in other parts of the world. This is not to say that such devolution would not be beneficial to the nation and the world at large in more ways than one.

V

By the electorate we mean, of course, the whole body of persons who may vote, in this case in the United States as such, in fact this means all persons over twenty-one years of age, subject to exceptions for insanity or criminal status and State requirements for registration. The weakness of the definition lies in the need for an answer to the question: vote for what or for whom? To this we shall return in a moment. Nevertheless it is still possible to conceive of a national electorate in the United States and important to inquire concerning its power of control over national foreign affairs. The relationship between the electorate and public opinion remains to be explored later.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Art. I, Sec. 10.

²² *Ibid.*, para 3.

²³ *Ibid.*, Art. IV, Sec. 3, para 2.

In 1789 no importance was attached to popular or democratic control of diplomacy. Indeed the framers of the Constitution were rather opposed to such an idea although they did, as has been seen, provide for representative control, or checks, over the Executive. A decade later a law was passed making it a criminal offence for a citizen to discuss with a foreign government any question of importance to the United States.²⁴ Certainly nothing in the way of popular control of diplomacy was envisaged by the modest democratic checks contained in the Constitution of 1787.

This state of affairs persisted substantially unchanged until World War I. Then, as a result of general and fundamental changes in the national life, and of the very specific criticism to which 'diplomacy' was subjected in the years 1914-1917, there developed in the United States, as elsewhere in the Western world, a strong demand for democratic control of foreign affairs, which made itself felt at the time of the Peace Conference of Paris and for some time thereafter. It was summed up in President Wilson's demand for 'open covenants openly arrived at.'

As already indicated, no changes have been made in the United States Constitution in regard to the conduct of foreign affairs. Nevertheless it has proven quite practicable to satisfy to some degree the new demand for democracy in diplomacy by utilizing the old machinery. Voters may, and do, exercise some influence in this matter in Presidential contests (indirectly) and directly in Senatorial and Congressional elections, either simultaneous with Presidential elections, or in other years. This is quite in accord with the principles of the Constitution. On the other hand, no opportunity is ever given to vote on specific legislative measures or proposed diplomatic action. The voters also have no occasion to express their choice for the Secretary of State, Foreign Service officers, or delegates of the United States to international conferences or the United Nations, and this last gap may appear to many to be somewhat serious.

This being the case it is, obviously, difficult for voters to pass upon international issues as such. In any given Presidential or Congressional election—such as those in 1916, 1918, and 1920, when sharp differences of opinion existed in regard to foreign affairs—domestic and international issues are so intermingled that no referendum on the latter, let alone on any single issue, is possible. This is a very unsatisfactory and even unsafe situation, although it does not mean that the electorate has no influence in the premises because the candidates—already in office or trying to get in—are guided in their actions and their utterances at all points by the desire to please the electors even if the latter have only a rather clumsy way of retaliating.

Finally voters may try to hold the President, Senators, and Representatives to their campaign pledges after election; although there is no provision in the Constitution to this effect, it is certainly in harmony with democratic principles. And much is done along this line by letters or telegrams to the officials concerned and by other devices. Such communications are inconclusive in

²⁴ Sogán Act of 1798: *United States Code*, Title, 18, para 5.

their effect, of course, but not negligible. Action through political party organization or other private organizations may be more effective but that brings us to another problem.

The concert of 'public opinion' is so familiar today that we need not pause for its definition, perhaps, even though familiarity does not necessarily mean either precision or agreement. In any event we now have to add a word concerning public influence over American diplomacy apart from voting or similar formal means.

The same evolution is noticeable here as was recounted above: in the past thirty odd years both the government and the public have come to favour the operation of public opinion in this domain as never before. Every President for fifty years has pleaded for increased public interest in foreign affairs and even the Department of State has swung around in the past twenty. It was once difficult to obtain materials for study and public discussion of American foreign relations; now a postcard to the Department brings a flood of documents and pamphlets (some propagandist, of course, but they can be used with discretion). The Department holds quarterly conferences in Washington where scores of representatives of civic organizations (Rotary, Y. M. C. A., League of Women Voters, American Political Science Association, and so on) listen to Department officials and quiz them freely and vigorously. And the efforts of the Department to spread information and interpretation of American policy at home and abroad by radio is well known.

For Americans the private organizations just mentioned, including the Foreign Policy Association, similar to the Indian Council of World Affairs, provide the most important tool in this connexion. Such organizations can and do bombard the President and Secretary of State and Congressmen constantly with letters, telegrams, petitions, and resolutions, and unquestionably exercise a good deal of influence thereby. These activities are supplemented by messages from individuals to the officials in question and also to newspapers, whose editorials, in addition, reflect the opinions of their readers—the Department compiles daily a digest of press opinion on current issues—and by the testimony given in the hearings before Congressional Committees as already described. A large part of this change is traceable to the fact that the public, or the average citizen, has finally waked up to the importance of foreign affairs; the older gap between public and government in this field was largely the fault of the public.

Of course it must be admitted that along with any and all public influence on American diplomacy directed presumably at general national, or even international welfare, goes an immense amount of lobbying by private interests designed to influence President, Department, Senate, and so on. This, however, is nothing new, and the newer developments tend to correct it somewhat. There is no room whatever to believe that such influences are in control of the situation, or even are much, if any, stronger than the influence of the newly aroused public interest. Such lobbying—undertaken, incidentally, by civic organizations as well as manufacturers and bankers—is a part of the democratic process and cannot be excluded; if the voters and citizens cultivate their

opportunities as just suggested there is no need to despair concerning the result.²⁵

VI

In sum it may be concluded that the control of foreign policy and diplomatic action in the United States rests mainly with the President, checked primarily by the Congress, especially the Senate, checked to some degree by the Courts and the States, and ultimately by the electorate and public opinion. The situation is a complicated one but for that reason alone not a dangerous one: no dictator can lead the country astray to suit his obsessions. And, as numerous observers have recently testified, the American public is sincerely devoted to peace and international co-operation.

DISCUSSION

Q. 1. GURMUKH NIHAL SINGH: When the party to which the President belongs is in a minority in the Senate, to what extent is the Senate able to influence the foreign policy of the United States? Is such control effective?

Ans. The fact that the President's party is in a minority in the Senate does not greatly increase the power of the opposition to influence treaty-making in view of the requirement for two-thirds consent for approval of treaties (the hostile majority will almost never be that large). It does, however, increase the danger of opposition in ordinary legislation relating to foreign affairs, though the Presidential veto is always in the background and may only be overridden by a two-thirds vote. As indicated in the main discussion, Senatorial influence is considerable but rarely constitutes decisive interference in either treaty-making or legislation.

Q. 2. T. T. KRISHNAMACHARI: How does the country take the bipartisan foreign policy now being followed in America?

Ans. Public opinion seems to approve the bipartisan attitude in foreign policy on the whole, although a few voices have recently been raised alleging that the programme is not entirely honest in execution and also unduly interferes with free discussion and opposition.

Q. 3. GURMUKH NIHAL SINGH: Is it not true that the non-partisan foreign policy had its origin in America on account of the Great War owing to an emergency? Is it, therefore, likely to continue in the absence of an emergency?

Ans. The international situation is still so difficult that continuation of the bipartisan technique is deemed by many to be desirable; there is a disposition in some quarters to convert the emergency technique into a permanent institution.

Q. 4. K. P. KARUNAKARAN: What influence do the defence services of America exert on her foreign policy, especially in relation to the National Security Act passed recently?

²⁵ T. A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street* New York, 1948.

Ans. There is no doubt that the defence services exercise a good deal of influence on both the President and the Congress in matters with which they are concerned, and this seems to be normal and useful within reasonable limits. It does not appear that the people of the United States or their representations in the Congress or the Presidency are very likely to be led to extreme lengths by the spokesmen of the armed forces.

Q. 5. STUDENT: What view have the courts in America taken regarding the executive agreements, as different from treaties, to which the lecturer referred?

Ans. The courts have come to accept executive agreements as practically on a par with treaties in respect to their binding force, at least when concluded under Congressional authorization and even in general. The situation would have serious elements of danger if public opinion were not so vigilant and so influential in controlling the President in all such cases.

Q. 6. GURMUKH NIHAL SINGH: To what extent is there free consultation between the President and leaders of opinion in the Congress and between the leaders of opinion in the Congress and senior officials of the Department of State on foreign affairs?

Ans. There is now very free extensive constant, and reasonably cordial consultation between the President or Department of State, on one side, and leading members of Congress on the other.

Q. 7. A. APPADORAI: Is there any specialization among the members of the legislature and among the electorate regarding the study of foreign affairs? Considering the fact that the study of foreign affairs in modern times has become a very complicated matter as there are regional studies and topical studies worth pursuing, do you think the specialization which exists is adequate?

Ans. There is some specialization as to topics in foreign relations in both Houses of the Congress although this is almost entirely spontaneous accidental and unorganized. At times committees or sub-committees will deal with special topics, regional or substantiation. In the country at large there are numerous individuals and groups devoting their attention to special aspects of foreign relations such as the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Middle America group, the friendship with Russia organizations on one side and, on the other, the America Peace Society, United Nations Association, Foreign Service Association and others, not to mention the Chamber of Commerce and the American Federation of Labour (and other similar bodies) which watch over foreign relations in their particular fields of interest.

Q. 8. CITIZEN: How far does the descent of the Senators from particular countries of Europe affect their outlook on foreign policy?

Ans. Undoubtedly their descent from particular national stocks (Irish, German, Italian and others) affects the outlook of members of the Congress as it does that of individual voters in the United States, although this feature is on the decline following recent restrictions upon immigration.

Q. 9. T. T. KRISHNAMACHARI: Is it likely that the fact of the United Nations Organization and many of its specialized agencies being located in the United States of America will act as a factor against the revival of isolationism in the States?

Ans. The location of U. N. headquarters in the United States has undoubtedly had an educational effect in foreign relations upon the American people. This must tend to act as a prevention against revival of isolationism in the United States although the extent of that attitude in the United States has always been exaggerated by observers in other countries and even by Americans, particularly always excessively proud politicians. On the other hand some Americans, who had an erroneously simple and sentimental picture of international relations and co-operation, have been somewhat disillusioned by the U. N. experience and are not quite so keen on the enterprise as they formerly were; this will not lead them back to isolationism, or their less sentimental fellow-citizens, but it may modify their zeal and lead to a healthier attitude toward the necessity for organized international activity in spite of its difficulty.

SWISS EXPERIENCE OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY*

By A. DAENIKER

HISTORICAL ASPECTS

I feel indeed greatly obliged to the Secretary General of the Indian Council of World Affairs for offering me the opportunity to address such a select meeting on the subject of Swiss neutrality and its meaning and consequences for my country in the course of history. As a matter of fact, during my comparatively short stay in India, I have often noted utterances in public, in the Press and even in parliamentary debates which betray a fundamental misapprehension of Swiss neutrality. It is often assumed that neutrality is, in our case, solely based on pledges and guarantees granted by the neighbouring powers, and that it has therefore been imposed on our territory and its people. It is quite true that twice in history Swiss neutrality was recognized by the powers and that such declarations have even been enhanced by guarantees. Yet such declarations were only meant to sanction an established institution which our ancestors had chosen on their own free will; moreover if we were anxious to obtain a solemn recognition of our neutrality, we never had to apply for an implementation of its guarantees. Neutrality for us is a mainstay of our policy, a constantly followed political maxim, and therefore, it has to be distinguished from such institutions in international law when neutrality is imposed on a newly born or a vanquished State or when a certain territory is neutralized. The old

* A talk delivered under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, on 15 October 1949.

Swiss Confederation itself, in the course of history, has been a party to such neutralizations of towns and neighbouring places by that very peculiar security device known as the Federal Bastions. It had become almost an article of faith that outlying neutral districts afforded the best protection. A belt of neutralized zones in which all military action should be prohibited was to form a protective girdle round the Confederation of the ancient 13 cantons; it was believed that the Confederation would thus be safeguarded from severe frontier clashes in the European turmoil. The fact that this protective girdle lasted for centuries is sufficient proof for its effectiveness. Only in the period of great nationalist wars was this neutral security zone washed away, and whereas a number of these neutralized frontier districts, like the bishopric of Basle and Neuchâtel, joined the Confederation, as a natural development, others were attached to neighbouring States. It is in connexion with such neutralization, the neutralization of Burgundy, that the term neutrality makes, in the 16th century, its first appearance in history. We have therefore to distinguish between neutrality which is a political principle freely chosen by a nation, and neutralization which is agreed upon by several States for certain international reasons as, for instance, the creation of a buffer zone. If our neutrality dates from its first recognition by the powers, in 1815, we could hardly speak of permanent neutrality. It was in 1674 that, for the first time, the federal Diet declared that the Confederation, as a body, would regard itself as a neutral State and intervene on neither side in a war which had just broken out. This principle of neutrality had emerged very slowly from the treaty policy of the old Confederation which had awakened gradually to the realization of its own nature. It had taken two hundred years of painful experiences for the Swiss cantons to grasp such essentials, to abandon a policy of expansion and to get used to political abstinence. And, for a long time to come, it remained an elastic formula which quite often changed its aspects.

How is it then to be explained that the Swiss cantons so early, even in mediæval times, adopted a principle which they have never abandoned by their free will and which even now has to be considered one of the most generally recognized and undisputed axioms of their Constitution? It is said, although not on authentic proof, that in 1481, Saint Nicolas de Flue, a saintly hermit who acted so successfully as a mediator between the urban and rural cantons in their dispute over the rich spoils won in their common victory over Duke Charles of Burgundy, exhorted them with the words 'Do not mix in the quarrels of others.' His intervention is often quoted to demonstrate that neutrality as a State axiom was prized because as a policy it made for *internal peace* even more than for external security.

Let us realize for a moment the anarchical conditions in Europe during the last centuries of the Middle Ages. The Swiss cantons, protected by high mountains and narrow valleys, devoid of all natural resources and without any appreciable treasures, inhabited by a fierce race of proud and independent peasants, with a passionate love of their freedom, had two alternatives before them:

to live in peace, make the best of their scarce resources and concentrate on the defence of their territory which nature made not too difficult; or to organize as a strong military power, under a central leadership, and to overcome by conquest the poverty of their country by extending its boundaries so as to include sufficient resources for their economic needs.

The Swiss always practised general military service and during their wars of independence acquired such a universal reputation for the valiant and heroic defence of their homes that many powerful princes courted these tiny Alpine republics for their military support and alliances. Such a policy of territorial expansion inevitably meant international entanglements, the risk to be taken into 'the quarrels of others' and to be used as implements to their policies.

Now we shall not forget that the old Swiss Confederation was a very loose political organization which did not possess the necessary strength either for a uniform foreign policy or for clear cut military aims. During more than 500 years it was nothing more than an association of small rural communities and some rising cities bound together by treaties among each other which aimed at mutual aid and assistance in case of aggression; it was a well conceived system of collective security which needed constant negotiations and adjustments; there was one common organ, the *Diet*, which took its decisions by unanimous vote; therefore, as with the Security Council of today, the veto expressed by one unit, theoretically, was able to obstruct a common scheme. The experiences made by the Confederates during their campaigns taught them some painful lessons. Any continuation in that direction implied the centralization of their State organization. Indeed every State which entered in the path of power in foreign policy first had to go the way of internal union; let me remind you of the cases of Spain, France, Italy and Germany. But for the Swiss Confederation, at the end of the Middle Ages it meant the surrender of its cardinal constitutional principle, namely: federation, it meant the sacrifice of regional or communal autonomy, the abandonment of institutions so vital and characteristic for the Swiss. It was for internal reasons, for the sake of the federal State, that the ancient Swiss abandoned their policy of aggression and approximated to the political principle of neutrality at a time when other countries were turning their energies outward in wars of conquest or adventuring on the high seas to open far distant lands. There is, indeed, a great affinity between freedom and neutrality.

Our ancestors were hardly conscious of the ultimate motives of their actions when the great religious cleavage occurred in the 16th century. Those amongst you who made some study of European history of those times will know that the importance of that religious conflict can hardly be over accentuated. It caused territorial chaos and undermined the cohesion of those rising national States in the centre and the west of the European Continent. The religious split in Christianity threatened the very existence of the Confederation; the internal disintegration could not but contribute to the paralysis of any external action. The two faiths could only live in a reciprocally neutralizing equilibrium. If either side, Catholics or

Protestants, took up the cause of its co-religionists abroad—and from the outset there were many attempts to draw the Confederation into the European wars of religion—it would have meant the disruption of the Swiss Confederation. Political common sense always succeeded in averting such a disaster; the Confederates held aloof from the wars of religion in the 16th and 17th centuries. Their neutrality during the 30 Years' War in Europe has certainly been a factor which helped the growth of industry and international trade within that period and laid the basis for the prosperity in our towns.

The fact that the Confederation is composed of different racial and linguistic groups was of no importance in the development of neutrality; up to the 19th century Switzerland was of the Germanic tongue only and the difference of languages never proved to be a hindrance in the relations between the cantons and their allies and subordinate units. Yet it is true that the rise of national power States in Europe during the 19th century, and the awareness of cultural affinities between component units of the Confederation and the neighbouring national States became a danger threatening our national unity. Yet, happily, the very principle of neutrality engendered forces strong enough to overcome such disruptive tendencies from outside and to strengthen the bonds of our common union; in fact the existence of aggressive dictatorships on our boundaries during the régimes of Hitler and Mussolini was no danger for our national unity; on the contrary, it made our population cling more closely to the common heritage.

We have now won from historical aspects a truer understanding for our neutrality and found that, as a political principle, it can be traced almost to the foundation of the Confederation; that it was not born out of weakness but was freely adopted by the cantons to defend the federal-democratic structure of their union. Given the profound differences amongst its component parts, urban and rural communities, given the difference of faiths since the Reformation and later the awareness of the growing importance of cultural ties with surrounding national States, Switzerland did not favour a centralized form of government and was also against an ambitious foreign policy; in the interest of the preservation of freedom she was opposed to the principle of the supremacy of foreign policy. The old Confederation, until Napoleonic times, never knew a unified Government or a unified supreme Military Command.

IMPLICATIONS

Let us now consider some of the implications of permanent neutrality and see how much, in the course of history, it changed its meaning.

The very essence of neutrality requires from a neutral State that it does not take sides in an armed conflict and abstains from giving its support to either party. It seems to follow that a permanently neutral State has to keep aloof from any kind of alliances which would bind its future policy in a way that, with the outbreak of hostilities, the obligation to support its allies would be a foregone conclusion. Today it is universally recognized that the duties derived from permanent neutrality are incompatible with a military alliance. Curiously enough the cantons under the old Confederation took no objection

to a network of treaties which threatened to enmesh them completely. Both, Switzerland as a whole and the various groups and members which composed her, had entered into foreign alliances in all directions. The most important of these was the protective alliance with France, concluded in 1521. In this treaty the Confederation committed itself never to permit its soldiery to be used against the King of France, to close the Alpine passes to his enemies; it allowed the King to recruit on Swiss soil a few thousand soldiers for his own armies and obliged him to send artillery and cavalry to the help of the Confederation if it should be attacked. At the same time there existed the Eternal Compact with Austria whose contents were similar to that of the Treaty with France and, in some respects, hardly consistent with it, as, for instance, it obliged the Swiss to keep the Alpine passes at all times open to Austria. The situation was, however, much more complicated because the individual cantons also had formed alliances in many quarters, so with Savoy, Spain, the German principalities, Holland and the Pope. It was the Swiss statesmen's task to steer a clear course through such inconsistencies and entangling complications. These treaties were meant as an additional security system, implying the recognition of the privileged position as a neutral State, but gave to the allied partners the right of passage through Swiss territory and the right to engage troops on our soil. Very happily the system of taking service in foreign armies has been abolished, a hundred years ago; it is even punishable under the Swiss Military Penal Code. We consider it today inconsistent with our national dignity and the duties derived from neutrality; moreover, it implies a diminution of our defensive strength to allow Swiss citizens to do military service in foreign armies. But in former times the pressure of overpopulation was so strong, the poverty in natural resources so disproportionate to the available manpower that mercenary service in foreign armies was considered a necessary economic outlet, particularly when the Confederation had decided to abstain from an active military policy in foreign countries.

There was also quite an interesting development of the idea of territorial neutrality until it was generally accepted. We consider it today as an essential feature of the sovereignty of a State to dispose of and to defend its territory and the aerial space above it; a neutral State cannot allow the troops of a belligerent to pass through unless it is ready to renounce voluntarily the recognition of its privileged position by the opposite camp. To violate the territorial sovereignty of a neutral State is considered a grave breach of neutrality and, therefore, of international law. Yet as we have already observed the agreements undertaken in treaties of the old Confederation and its cantons provided the use of the Swiss Alpine passes for military transit; nevertheless such transits meant a grave threat to neutrality and by granting the right to any belligerent, they risked to have their country drawn into the theatre of war. Yet even that famous authority on International Law, Hugo Grotius, upheld in 1625 in his famous work *De jure belli et pacis* the right of transit in all circumstances; he did not admit any grounds of refusal by the neutrals. Only the unhappy experiences of the Confederation in the 30 Years' War put an end to such a lenient practice; in unanimous resolutions Catholics and Protestants

decided to grant to none the right of passage through Swiss territory and to prevent anyone from so doing with all their might. They continued ever since to abide by this stricter practice and subsequently there occurred only slight violations of territory until the invasion of Switzerland at the time of the French Revolution. The theory of international law on the subject matter also changed to the contrary; it was vigorously upheld by the Swiss Federal Council in 1920, during the Vilna Crisis, when the Council of the League of Nations decided to organize a plebiscite under the protection of international troops and asked Switzerland to grant the right of passage for these contingents through its territory. The Swiss Government refused this demand, lest a dangerous precedent be given. The radical change of view demonstrates moreover an interesting alteration in the conception of warfare. In earlier times the quality of belligerent was attached to the prince only and to his army during a campaign; legally the local situation of these troops was almost irrelevant; slowly and gradually the aspect of belligerency broadened, comprising also the country where such troops were stationed or passed through and not only the country in its full extension and with all its resources, but also its civil population, irrespective of nationality. Under the modern totalitarian view of warfare which keeps pace with the modern weapons of war, the utmost military preparedness and greatest vigilance is required to defend the territory of a neutral State, including its aerial space, against a foreign intruder. The responsibility of a Government which claims the privilege of a neutral has greatly increased in our times; indeed it is not sufficient to declare neutrality, one has also to be willing and capable to uphold this privilege by the most efficient means.

In one respect, the practice of economic neutrality, our ancestors held almost stricter views than we do today. Under the old Confederation the supply of arms and munitions to belligerent countries was prohibited, foreign armies were just allowed to revictual themselves on an equal basis in Switzerland; it is said that Switzerland then as now had rather well stocked markets and her practice of free trading was among the reasons why the belligerents supported Swiss neutrality. According to modern rules governing the economic position of a neutral State, there are practically no restrictions to trade with either belligerent side; Switzerland had to insist during both World Wars that this right was expressly recognized to her; she would otherwise have been exposed to conditions of starvation—as two-fifths of her need of foodstuffs are imported—and her industries would have been brought to a standstill. As further both belligerent camps insisted more and more on the supply of commodities which were useful for the increase of their military potential, Switzerland, very much against her own will, was not allowed to ban or to restrict the exportation of arms and munitions; care had, however, to be taken, that both belligerent camps were treated on an equal basis.

As much as our ancestors, the Swiss today maintain that there cannot exist anything like a neutrality of conviction; living in the midst of Europe, they never looked with indifference on world events; as in former times, they discussed them in the guildhouse in the tavern, at market fairs and even at their

Landsgemeinde, our Press today takes the keenest interest in the international situation. A neutral outlook means that we judge events in the political world free from any passionate partisanship, with an intention to do justice and to approach men of another race with understanding. The obligations of neutrality by no means include the regimentation of public opinion. We do not mean to hold our tongues when our conscience demands free expression. Our late Foreign Minister, the Federal Councillor Motta, defined the liberty of opinion in a neutral world, in 1938, in the following words: 'We reject the doctrine which attempts to confound the neutrality of the State with the neutrality of the individual; on principle only the State is neutral, the citizen remains free in his views and judgement; dispassionate discussion is always allowed to him; the question of sympathy has nothing to do with neutrality.' From this conviction we rejected any attempts of surrounding dictator States to have our public opinion brought into line with the tendencies of their politics and to allow influences from abroad to interfere with our free Press.

There is one further consequence of neutrality which was exercised from early times: the right of asylum; it has been granted to religious refugees as much as to political exiles. As an expression of true tolerance and human compassion it has been given to all in equal measure, to partisans and opponents. There was no sacrifice we were not ready to bear to uphold this principle and often we were brought into open conflict with our mighty neighbours, even on the threshold of war; so when Louis XIV chased away his Protestant subjects from his realm, when Metternich persecuted his opponents all over Europe, when Bismarck, the ruthless Iron Chancellor, pretending that Switzerland was pledged for the enjoyment of her neutrality to the powers, insisted on the expulsion of some German exiles, or when Hitler or Mussolini's agents succeeded in capturing on Swiss soil by surreptitious means some unfortunate victims of their régimes.

In opposition to the view held earlier that the right of asylum did not apply to fugitive troops and they should therefore be refused admittance, modern practice, as stipulated in the Hague Conventions, does not prevent a neutral State from admitting armed forces on the condition that they be disarmed and interned; the neutral has a right but no obligation to grant asylum to armed fugitives. Even today we cherish in Switzerland the souvenir of an instance of compassionate devotion of our whole nation when, during the Franco-Prussian war, the Swiss Army was to disarm the miserable army of Bourbaki of a double size—more than 90,000 men—who were washed on the saving soil of Switzerland.

As I have mentioned before, the only serious breaches of Swiss neutrality occurred during the period of the French Revolution and the ensuing Napoleonic War. Before the onslaught of the victorious revolutionary armies which swarmed over the European Continent and to which so many mighty empires and kingdoms had to surrender, the loose organization of the old Confederation was not able to resist. The French Directory under Bonaparte's leadership overturned the whole federal structure and erected on its ruins a new centralized State, the Helvetic Republic. Instead

of the old defensive alliance with France the Helvetic Directory was made to sign a new treaty providing for mutual military assistance, obliging Switzerland to keep her roads open to France and depriving her foreign policy of its freedom and suppressing the right of asylum. The best part of Swiss military forces came into French hands and the country was made to submit to the blockade against England. Neutrality had a purely fictitious character; to the Head of the Swiss Government who complained to the Emperor Napoleon for withholding an explicit recognition of Swiss neutrality, he gave himself a very clear explanation with these words: *Vis-à-vis de moi, cette neutralité est un mot vide de sens qui ne vous sert qu'autant que je le veux.*

Napoleon's domination over Switzerland lasted for 15 years; when finally at Leipzig the Emperor was beaten by the combined English and Continental armies, the Federal Directory, without delay, declared that they would 'maintain a perfectly neutral and impartial attitude towards all the great belligerent powers.' Yet its military preparations were still far too inadequate to be able to defend neutrality with any chance of success. The newly restored Confederation succumbed again to the overpowering pressure from without and the disruptive forces from within. But these renewed breaches of Swiss neutrality by the Coalition of Powers, in 1813 and 1815, were justified for the sole purpose to allow their armies, by passing through Swiss territory, to hasten the defeat of the régime of the French Dictator, and they were made under the explicit promise of the restoration of neutrality and the territorial integrity of Switzerland.

As a matter of fact the painful experience of those 15 years proved to be a blessing in disguise; the upsurge of patriotic feelings in the cantons paved the way to the Constitution of 1848 on which our federal State is now firmly built, and it also led to the formal recognition and guarantee of Swiss neutrality in the Treaty of Vienna and the Declaration of Paris of 1815. In fact the powers, after proceeding to some territorial adjustments, issued on 20 March a statement to the effect that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland should be recognized and guaranteed on condition of acceptance by the Swiss Diet; and in the Declaration of Paris of 20 November 1815, they made again a formal and authentic recognition of the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and guaranteed the integrity of territory within its new frontiers against any violation. This recognition by the five powers meant that the state of neutrality hitherto based on custom was now part of the international law. The powers did not create neutrality, they recognized it as a traditional political principle. The explicit guarantee refers to the integrity of Swiss territory; its object is to protect that territory from an attack by other States. Should Swiss territory be violated the guarantors commit themselves to restore its integrity, because territorial integrity is the substance of neutrality. But Switzerland has at all times maintained that she has the sole right to claim a help against its violators. The guarantor powers cannot infer a right to independent intervention from the guarantee they have assumed. During the first World War, in 1917, the Swiss Federal Council has decidedly rejected an inference to that effect. No right of control or interference shall be deduced from such a guarantee.

The Acts of 1815 also provide that the neutrality, integrity and independence of Switzerland from any interference are in the true interests of Europe. To demonstrate the implication of this statement it may be well to consider for a moment the geographical and strategical position of Switzerland. She holds an enviable and dominating key position in the Alpine massif, in the very heart of Europe, with partially open frontiers, yet exposed to the pressure of her neighbours. Whoever holds the Alpine passes has a dominant strategical position. Suppose two European nations are at war, with their fronts along the Rhine; it is essential for each party to have her southern flank, leaning against the Alpine Wall, protected and to prevent the enemy to acquire such an advantageous position. If this position is in the hands of a neutral nation commanding over the means to hold it, both parties profit by this circumstance and it allows them both the economy of a few army corps. You will remember the decisive importance of the northern flank position during both world wars. It is true, matters are no more so simple today on account of the development of modern warfare.

This demonstration also shows how rightly Switzerland assumed that to have her neutrality respected she must be able to defend it; therefore we took relentless care that our defence should conform to latest requirements. Our army and the sound military tradition in Switzerland have been the shields to give efficient protection to our neutrality, more so than any written guarantee could ever afford.

The period of 100 years from 1815 onwards was a comparatively quiet one compared with subsequent events in Europe and in the world. Whenever there was a conflagration, Switzerland mobilized her army to watch over her frontiers, there were many threats of infringements on her sovereignty from those very guarantor powers which were invariably and firmly rejected by the Swiss Government.

The development of the balance of power in Europe coincides generally with the rise of Swiss neutrality. Switzerland can feel secure as soon as the European family of States lives on a basis of equilibrium, and not under the predominance of one power. Thus, at all times, the small States have profited by the disputes of the great. The rivalry of the great powers offers fertile soil on which the neutrality of the smaller States thrives while the rise on the part of one of them is a grave threat to their existence. The policy of Switzerland consistently sought to prevent the ascendancy of any one power; it was our interest to join the opponents of any power aiming at hegemony. That may be the reason why, at all times and particularly during the 19th century, English political thought found a striking response in Switzerland, why the Swiss found in England which followed in its European policy a similar tendency for the maintenance of the balance of power, such a genuine understanding for their life interests. Yet a perfect harmony among two or more of the surrounding powers constitutes even a more dangerous threat than the ascendancy of one. The policy of the Holy Alliance led to infringements of Swiss neutrality and a disregard of Swiss sovereignty hardly less onerous than those under Napoleon's protectorate. And the constellation

wrought by the Axis Pact, from 1938 to 1945, was equally perilous for Swiss independence whereas that happy period of almost 50 years before the first world war, when the Concert of Powers drove more or less harmoniously at cross ends, conveyed to the Swiss the feeling of an almost absolute and permanent security under the shield of their neutrality.

This careless state of mind was heavily shaken by the outbreak of the first world war and by the violation of Belgian neutrality. Miraculously the war passed without any major challenge to Swiss neutrality; in Art. 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, its signatories recognized anew Swiss neutrality as an international obligation for the preservation of peace. When towards the end of that war the idea of a League, embracing all nations took shape, it found an eager echo in Switzerland. Could the Swiss stand aloof when all peace-loving nations aligned themselves into a defensive alliance against any aggressor? Were not the very ideals of the League of Nations shaped on the traditional lines of federalism and collective security which had so successfully been worked out by their own Confederation? Was there any risk that the same principles would not work with similar results within the new brotherhood of nations whose headquarters even were to be placed on Swiss soil? There was, however, strong scepticism in certain conservative quarters, and it was evident that a majority for the entry of Switzerland in the League was only to be obtained if a recognition of Swiss neutrality within the framework of the League would be secured. By the Declaration of London of 1920 the League of Nations Council acknowledged that Switzerland held a peculiar position owing to her traditional policy. It was explicitly declared that Swiss neutrality was consistent with the League. The Confederation would therefore not be called on either to participate in military actions, or to suffer the transit of foreign troops or even the preparation of military operations on her territory. Switzerland, however, was bound to join in the economic sanctions applied against any law-breaking nation. On the strength of this compromise which placed the country on the basis of differential neutrality, the majority of the cantons and citizens ratified on 16 May, 1920 the Bill providing for an application to be admitted to the League. Her membership within the League gave an outlet to many forces of our national life which so long had sought to liberate themselves of the burden imposed by our long neutral attitude, an opportunity for a fertile activity on an international field. Switzerland gave its active support to the economic, humanitarian, hygienic, social and scientific work of the League while keeping cautiously aloof from its political activities. This is the reason why Switzerland never accepted a seat in the Council which was repeatedly offered to her.

Under the enlightened direction of its Foreign Minister, Mr. Motta, Swiss diplomacy strove for the completion of the legal structure for the preservation of peace by the conclusion of a great number of treaties of arbitration and mediation.

It was, however, clear almost from the outset, that the system of collective security which the League could afford was so incomplete and inefficient that it did not offer real security to its members and could not prevent a law-breaker

from pursuing his own ends. When during the thirties not only Japan but also two of her mighty neighbours had broken away from the League, the Swiss people could not help examining anew whether her life interests were not better protected under the shield of absolute neutrality, and whether she should not entirely rely on her own strength. Her particular situation was illustrated during the Italo-Ethiopian incident, in 1935, when, under her obligations as a League member, she was bound to take her share in the economic sanctions against Italy; this implied to her a disruption not only of traditional trade relations but also of communications with some of her natural ports of entry. The Swiss Government decided thus to participate in the embargo on the export of arms and war goods and in the refusal of credits but did not join in the boycott of Italian goods. Her attitude was widely criticized in League circles; but it is well-known that other nations, with less scruples, while abiding officially by the League resolutions against Italy, continued with their prosperous trade relations.

This incident and the rapid worsening of the international situation strengthened the movement for a return to the island of absolute neutrality; in May 1938 the League Council relieved her from participating henceforth in any way in the application of sanctions provided under the covenant. This decision was certainly due to the high international standing of the late Foreign Minister, Mr. Motta, who was, during his term of almost 20 years, head of the Swiss Delegation. It is almost symbolical that this highly idealistic statesman who fought so courageously for the establishment of peaceful relations among nations, for strengthening the powers of the League and for the admittance of all nations, eventually brought back his country to the old harbour of safety, realizing that the experiment of welding traditional neutrality in the wider frame of collective security had proved illusory.

On the outbreak of the second world war Switzerland declared again her neutrality; she was well prepared for the oncoming tidal wave. An army of 400,000 soldiers, assisted by auxiliary troops of equal strength, was called for the defence of her frontiers; never public opinion had been so firmly united, so steadfastly determined not only to resist aggression to the last but also to accept any sacrifice for the sake of the nation.

As Switzerland kept neutral throughout the war, she was not invited to participate in the San Francisco Conference where the Charter of the United Nations has been worked out by the delegates of the formerly Allied belligerent powers; neither has she subsequently applied for U.N. membership. She has, however, authorized the U.N.O. Secretariat to take over the former League's buildings and to have their European offices established therein; Switzerland is a member of the F.A.O., of the U.N.E.S.C.O., of the W.H.O., she has adhered to the I.R.O. and takes a share in the activities of many of the technical committees of the U.N.O.

But there is very little chance that the Swiss people will in a near future be ready to apply for full membership with all its political implications; such tendencies have but a few adherents, mostly in leftist quarters. Could our Government ever persuade a majority of the population that the U.N.O. makes good

the deficiencies of the former League? Could anybody pretend that it provides a more efficient protection than our traditional State maxim of neutrality? Would our population, after the experiences made with differential neutrality, allow their Government to have the principle of neutrality modified to have it adapted to the structure of the new world organization? Can there be any doubt that absolute neutrality as the Swiss maintained it during more than five centuries is not compatible with Article 43 of the U.N. Charter which stipulates 'that all the member nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a special agreement, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including the right of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace.' It is true, this Article provides for a special agreement with each member for the implementation of its obligations to assist the U.N. But it can hardly be argued that the Council can make such an extensive use of such an agreement as to exempt a member from all the obligations which form the very substance of this article. Let us admit frankly that U.N.O. constitutes a military alliance and that neutrality is incompatible with its scope.

Shall we conclude from it that neutrality and international co-operation cannot fare together for the attainment of those ideals which the U.N. aim at? It is wrong when recently an English paper characterized the Swiss of today as the very incarnation of insularity. We know only too well that mental burden which all neutrals must bear. Therefore we give to neutrality a deeper meaning. Neutrality in the modern world demands as its complement the readiness for *solidarity*. Switzerland is ready to turn the neutrality imposed upon her by fate into a creative and living thing, to inspire it with a higher, supernational significance. Thus we are paying a small part of our debt of gratitude to the fate which has granted peace to our homeland. It is our privilege to serve unconditionally the idea of humanitarianism. You will all know of the existence of the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva which took the initiative for the four new Red Cross Conventions recently adopted by a diplomatic conference; you will have heard of its manifold services during the last war for the care of prisoners of war and civilian internees and the assistance to distressed populations. Is it conceivable that an organization with such a universal scope will be able to continue its activities if its seat will be placed within a belligerent nation? The Swiss Red Cross and Swiss Relief (*Don suisse*) have been able to spend huge private and public funds in welfare work for the war stricken populations of practically all European countries. Thus the cold repudiation implied in the neutral attitude is compensated by the acceptance of limitless philanthropic tasks.

Immediately after the end of the last war the Swiss Government granted extensive credits to former belligerent countries to allow them to make good for the shortage of goods and for purposes of reconstruction. Switzerland has also not refused her participation under the European Recovery Plan solely for the co-ordination of her economy with those of other countries of Western Europe without asking any funds for herself. She accepted during

the last war the manifold and onerous duties implied in the discharge of foreign interests: exchange of diplomatic staffs and disabled soldiers, visitation of prisoners and internees camps, formation of mixed medical missions, repatriation of foreign labourers. The rupture of diplomatic relations on the outbreak of war requires the existence of a neutral State to look after the belligerents' interests. The Swiss authorities supported by public opinion have of late years always been ready to carry on the noble tradition of asylum within the provisions of international law. For so many thousands Switzerland became the favourite country of asylum.

Permanent neutrality has enabled us to view international events with a detached mind, to keep our outlook free from the limitations and fallacious tendencies of nationalism.

It is certainly in the interest of the world—not only of Europe—that in its midst there is a country whose destiny it has become to promote reconciliation by helping to prepare an atmosphere of understanding, a country where bridges and bonds which elsewhere were destroyed under the tidal waves of wars, are still holding fast. It is quite natural that more than a hundred international organizations have placed their seat or working centre on Swiss soil, that so many international conferences have successfully been held in our cities.

We do not pretend that permanent neutrality is an article for exportation; we do not measure other peoples by our own standards. It will be the vocation of other nations to expand, to assert and bring to its full value their national culture. We do only ask for the right to maintain neutrality as a means of self-preservation for our political independence in a world which knows no supernational means of keeping the law and securing peace. It is our duty to defend it and to transmit it unimpaired to oncoming generations.

NEW DELHI
15 October 1949

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

STATE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE IN THE NETHERLANDS

By M. C. TIDEMAN

THE last war caused strong tendencies toward nationalization of key industries to spread in many Western European countries. Socialist trends of thought were adhered to in broad circles which previously clung to the strict maintenance of private ownership. In the Netherlands, too, this movement made itself felt, but it did not carry effect as far as change of property rights was involved. This may be explained by the fact that here many industries, which in other countries were high upon the list for nationalization, were already under the State management. The foremost of these are the purveying of public utilities (gas, water, electricity), mining and transportation.

Public utilities have been supplied in Holland by public owned companies for half a century or more. The larger municipalities organized their own gas-works which were managed directly by the Municipal Board through a

Director who had the status of Civil Servants. All matters of production and sales policy (wages, price of gas etc.) were decided by the Board. The smaller communities, if possible, contracted with a larger town in the neighbourhood for the supply of gas. In the last decades the maintenance of so many production centres created a demand for centralization. In the south-eastern part of the country this demand was met by an agreement between the cokes and gas-works of the State-managed coal mines on one side and a great number of municipalities on the other. Through pipe-lines, communities up to a hundred miles from the coal-pits are now provided with gas. Each municipality, however, retains full freedom in fixing the sales price within its own boundaries.

The water works are also wholly controlled by the municipalities. The smaller ones often join to form companies with limited liability, the shares of which are held by the respective municipalities, in order to render the supplying of rural areas possible.

The purveying of electricity started at a later date when the disadvantages of too great a decentralization had become evident. The construction of a great number of power-works was evidently uneconomical. Only the large cities (f.i. Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam) could afford it. Of course, smaller communities tried to join forces with larger ones, but the provincial authorities, who saw here a suitable field for activity (the authority of the provincial administration is limited by law to a limited field) passed ordinances prohibiting such combinations. Gradually they brought the provision of electricity under provincial control. Here, too, use was made of the limited liability corporation form of financing and management. The shares are owned by the municipalities, a limited number being reserved for the province.

The often conflicting relationship between the provinces and the municipalities was settled by an Act of 1935 which delimited the sphere of influence of provinces and municipalities, guaranteed to the municipalities the right to provide for the supply in their own territory and placed all power-works and managing corporations under State control.

Mining

Some of the oldest coal-pits of the world are on Dutch territory, for instance at Kerkrade. Large-scale development of the industry began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Belgian and French capital undertook the exploitation of the coalfields near Heerlen in the province of Limburg. The undesirability of leaving this important section of production wholly to foreigners (Dutch capital was little interested, because it found full employment in trade and overseas enterprises, American as well as Indonesian), caused the Act of 1901 to be passed by Parliament. Under this Act the State reserved the remaining coal deposits for State exploitation barring further extension of private enterprise.

A number of State-managed coal mines are now in operation. The State provided the necessary capital. The form, again, was that of a limited liability corporation. For part of its capital (43,000,000 guilders) the State holds shares that do not bear interest, part is provided against interest bearing bonds,

The State exerts its control through the 'Mining Board' (Mijnraad) appointed by the Crown. The instruction of the Crown directs the Board to manage the enterprise strictly on commercial basis. Gradually the authority of the Mining Board was extended to the supervision of private-owned mines. War-time and post-war difficulties brought further extension of control. Consequently all mining in the Netherlands is supervised by the State who also is the biggest producer of coal.

Under these circumstances a need for socialization did not seem to exist. On 26 November 1946, a Commission was installed to advise the Crown on the desirability of nationalizing the private owned mines and of changing the management system of the State mines. But with 11 votes against 2, this Commission decided against nationalization. It considered public interest to be sufficiently guaranteed by the existing regulations and institutions.

Transportation

The first railroads in the Netherlands were built by private enterprise, which was first stirred to action by King William I in the thirties of the last century. A few Belgian and Dutch-German companies built other railroads in the southern provinces. The *Hollandse Spoorweg Maatschappij* (Dutch Railroad Company) and the *Centraalspoor* (Central Railroad Company) did the same in the central and northern part of the country. The nature of the soil made the construction work extremely expensive in the western and northern parts. Private investment was not very alluring as the profits never could cover the interest on the construction cost in addition to the expenses for exploitation. Consequently the Government decided to undertake the building of the railroads which then were turned over for exploitation to private enterprise. Thus, the society for the Exploitation of State Railroads came into existence. Gradually, the number of companies was reduced to two. In 1917 these two companies concluded an agreement for joint management. In 1920 this combination entered into an agreement with the State, under which the State acquired the majority of the shares of both companies. This situation lasted until 1937. Then a new railroad company was formed, the *Maatschappij voor de Exploitatie van de Nederlandse Spoorwegen* (Society for the Exploitation of Netherlands Railroads). All shares except two are owned by the Government, but the company is strictly managed on business lines. The remaining two shares are practically owned by the Company itself.

As a result of this reorganization, the State exerts a double control on railroad transportation:

(a) as all public transportation is subject to State control, the Government, through the Ministry of Transportation and Waterways, imposes regulations for the safety and the uninterrupted continuance of railroad traffic.

The Railroad Act permits the Minister to order repairs and new installations, to demand that a minimum of service be provided, to approve or reject the prices of fares, to fix minimum requirements for wages of the personnel. The Minister also has the authority to direct the personnel back to work, in case of strike and to order that traffic be resumed,

(b) in the course of his functions as representative of the State, which is the owner of the Company, the Minister of Transportation issues directions to the management of the Company.

In the exercise of this power of function the Minister may forbid or approve the participation of the Railroad Company in other enterprises. All new construction work and all replacement or increase of material needs his consent.

A yearly meeting of shareholders is held, which is attended by one representative of the State, representing 9,998 shares and one of the Company itself, representing 2 shares. This meeting appoints the Directors and receives the accounts of the company for approval. It fixes the dividends, if profits have been made. The following figures constitute an account of losses and profits during the last ten years:

| | Profits (in Dutch guilders) | Losses |
|------|--------------------------------|------------|
| 1938 | | 23,335,000 |
| 1939 | | 17,456,000 |
| 1940 | | 14,876,000 |
| 1941 | | 5,359,000 |
| 1942 | 14,309,000 | |
| 1943 | 53,912,000 | |
| 1944 | 22,282,000 | |
| 1945 | | 1,462,000 |
| 1946 | 400,000 | |
| 1947 | 1,407,000 | |

In order to insure a business-like management of the Company a Board of Control was instituted. This Board is composed of representatives of the Government and of business. It supervises the management of the Directors and its approval is necessary for all decisions involving expenditures above 10,000 guilders, the selling or buying of property and the final redaction of the balance sheets. It usually exerts its function through a commission of three delegates two of whom are representatives of the Ministries of Transportation and Finance.

The Dutch system of managing State-owned enterprise differs widely from the management of nationalized industries. Nationalization aims at the management of industries for the better provision of the social needs of the people, with only second thought to profits. The Dutch system retains the business concept of management with due regard for social needs. This necessarily obliges the State to extend credit to its own enterprises to insure them against the financial consequences of such a policy. The Dutch system has the advantage of always permitting an exact appraisal of the economic position of the industries concerned.

THE HAGUE

15 September 1949

THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

By B. H. M. VLEKKE

ALL over Continental Western Europe a reaction against the post-war political trend is in progress. The war caused a general swaying to the left among most political parties. In countries where parties on a denominational basis used to exist, attempts were made to break through the denominational fronts and to group progressive, nearly always socialistic, elements together in a Labour party on the British pattern. These attempts seldom succeeded, but the movement was strong enough to cause several of the re-established denominational parties to enter into coalition with the moderate socialist groups. This happened in France, in Belgium, in the Netherlands (where the largest of the denominational parties, the Catholic Party, allied itself with the broadened socialist group, now called the Labour party), in Italy and, after re-admittance of political activity, in Western Germany.

At present, these coalitions tend to break up. The denominational groups draw towards the so-called Liberals, the exponents of the bourgeoisie. In Belgium and Western Germany the socialists are thrown back into the opposition. The same change of fronts seemed imminent in the Netherlands several times during the last years and it was only the Indonesian problem that prevented it from happening.

Dutch party life goes back to 1848, when the Constitution was amended to introduce a parliamentary system of government. At the time, the Liberal point of view dominated among the masses of the franchise-holders who then included, besides the bourgeoisie, only a small part of the working class. The term 'Liberal' must be understood in its Continental European meaning; the Liberals adhered to the laissez-faire theory of economy; they insisted on the restriction of State intervention in public life; they called for extension of educational opportunities but objected to State aid to denominational or private schools.

The educational problem caused the first strong opposition against the Liberals to arise. The people of the Netherlands at that time adhered for 60% to one of several Calvinist churches and for 35% adhered to the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholics who had gained freedom of worship only fifty years earlier were still too little trained for public life to make their numerical force felt in politics. Among the Calvinists there was a wide gap, which had existed for three hundred years, between those who objected to strong ecclesiastical influence in political affairs and those who wanted their religious convictions to influence all aspects of life. The latter group was strong enough however, to mobilize about 25% of the electorate against the anti-clerical Liberals and the educational problem provided an opportunity for a first test of strength. A Calvinist denominational party was founded under the name of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, because its leaders opposed, not only the actual educational policy of the Liberals, but their whole philosophy of life, which, according to the founders of the Anti-Revolutionary

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Party (ARP) was directly derived from the principles of the Revolution (in this case the French Revolution of 1789).

The ARP insisted upon the maintenance of the Protestant character of the Dutch nation. In this, they were opposed by the Roman Catholics, who also rejected the Liberal viewpoint on schools and education, but who even more strenuously objected to schools in which all children would be instructed on the basis of Calvinist theology. The Catholics demanded 'freedom of education,' which meant the equal division of Government educational funds among all schools by whomever founded, if these schools met with certain requirements for a decent standard of instruction.

Around 1880 the two denominational groups entered into coalition against the Liberals. It was not until 1896, however, that a Roman Catholic Party was founded. In the meantime the ARP had split over certain points relating to Church matters and the extent to which public action of its members ought to be influenced by ecclesiastical points of view. Basically, it was a split between the more aristocratic, traditional section of the party, and the more democratic one. The first group organized itself into the Christian Historical Party (CHP). Gradually the CHP became the party of the moderate conservatives.

The Liberals, too, had suffered from dissension in their ranks. Social problems and the first signs of Marxist-Socialist activities among the working classes were the cause. From then there was a continuous falling apart and re-uniting of the Liberal group which as a whole gradually shifted more and more to the progressive side.

Marxism gained political recognition when the revisionist point of view obtained the upper hand in most European countries, at the end of the century. A Social Democratic Party was founded in 1894 from which a revolutionary socialist group split off in 1907 to form shortly afterwards the first Communist Party in the Netherlands.

The Constitutional Reform of 1917 introduced general suffrage and rendered possible the granting of the vote to women which was enacted by law in 1919. This reform partly resulted from the impact of the world war and coincided with the growing tendency towards democratization caused by world events. The Liberal group split once more: part of its followers clung to traditional viewpoints on political economy, part tried to go along with the democratic movement but without associating themselves with socialism even in the moderate form presented by the Social Democrats. The Roman Catholic Party, which included workers as well as middle class people and industrialists, took the lead among the denominational parties in the movement for social reform. The coalition of the denominational groups which ruled the Netherlands Kingdom from 1920-40 although known as the Right-wing of Parliament, actually followed a middle-of-the-road course. The Liberals, the Progressives and Socialists formed the Opposition and therefore but not wholly accurately were known as the Left.

The economic crisis of the thirties, however, sharpened the antithesis between the denominational 'Right' and the non-denominational 'Left.' The leader-

ship of the Right fell to Mr. Hendrik Colijn of the ARP, whose views on economic policy concurred to a large extent with those of the old Liberals. Under his leadership the ARP lost its former character of a party of small middle class and peasant people of strict religious views. The Christian Historical, and, less explicitly, the Catholic Party went along with him. Colijn's political trend of thought most clearly found expression in his policy of stalling the evolution towards self-government, pursued in Indonesia.

The war brought the temporary disappearance of most parties. A general feeling of national unity resulted in attempts to build up a general, non-denominational movement, but the Anti-Revolutionary Party never took part in the discussions. The first outcome was the transformation of the pre-war Social Democratic Party into a Labour Party (*Partij van de Arbeid*), which included, besides the Socialists, the Progressives and a small section of the Catholics and some former members of the ARP and CHIP. The Catholic Party was revived under the name of the Catholic People's Party. All the remaining Liberal groups were fused into the Party for Freedom and Democracy (*VVD: Voor Vrijheid en Democratie*). The Communists who never had considered giving up their political independence, emerged in greatly increased strength.

The first elections for the Second Chamber of Parliament were held in 1946. A second election took place in 1948. (The Second Chamber is directly elected by the people according to a system of strict proportional representation, introduced in 1917. The members of the First Chamber are appointed by the Provincial Assemblies, again on proportional basis).

| The results were: | 1946 | 1948 |
|---|------|------|
| Catholic People's Party | 32 | 32 |
| Labour Party | 29 | 27 |
| Anti-Revolutionary Party | 13 | 13 |
| Christian Historical Party | 8 | 9 |
| People's Party for Freedom and Democracy | 6 | 8 |
| Communist Party | 10 | 8 |
| Smaller parties | 2 | 3 |
| | 100 | 100 |

There is a considerable, but in Western Europe quite normal, discrepancy between the number of votes obtained by the respective parties and their active membership. The following figures were obtained through an inquiry with the party secretariats:

| | Members | Votes in 1948 |
|----------------------------|---------|---------------|
| Catholic Party | 400,000 | 1,531,000 |
| Labour Party | 119,000 | 1,265,000 |
| Anti-Revolutionary Party | 101,000 | 651,000 |
| Christian Historical Party | 50,000 | 453,000 |
| Liberals | 25,000 | 391,000 |
| Communist Party* | — | 382,000 |

Membership to all parties is open to all Dutch citizens who subscribe to the party's programme of action. Some parties (the Catholic, the Anti-Revolutionary and the Labour parties) maintain the principle that membership in a local club is primary which automatically includes membership of the party as a whole. This is a reminiscence of the time when representatives were elected according to the district system and local organizations were of great importance. Other parties, such as the Liberals, have introduced membership of the national organization. The Communist Party distinguishes between local and factory groups. The latter have a more or less autonomous position within the regional organization.

All parties reserve the right to eject members from the party to the National Committee, usually with safeguards for the rights of the accused to bring their objections to the forum of the party. The Communist Party is the only one which maintains a strict system of supervision over its members and the party committee through a control committee. It is also the only one that enforces a strict party discipline and does not permit public discussion of the party methods and aims by its members. It also differs from the other parties in that its Central Committee appoints the candidates for representative functions, which right is reserved to the members, at least formally, by all other parties. Naturally, the party committee strives for a balanced representation of all social groups, represented among the membership, and therefore reserves a certain influence on the composition of parliamentary representation, which they hope to achieve, but nevertheless, members have the right to reject from or add to the list of candidates, names of their own choice.

The political principles for which the individual parties stand are sufficiently clear from these historical developments. According to their views on economic and social policy they may at present be grouped from right to left as follows:

| Right | Centre | Left |
|------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| A. R. P., C. H. P., V. V. D. | Cath. P. P. | Labour, Comm.P. |

Before the war a combination of the ARP, CHP and Cath. PP controlled the Government. After 1945 two Cabinets (the Cabinet of Schermerhorn 1945-46, and the Cabinet of Beel 1946-48) were formed by a combination of the Cath.

* The Secretariat of the Communist Party replied to our inquiry by referring to a periodical, where, however, the figures we were looking for, could not be found.

PP with Labour. In 1948 a Cabinet on a broader basis came into power, composed of members of all parties exclusive of the ARP on the extreme right and of the Communists on the extreme left.

It remains to be seen whether the general shift in power in Western Europe, from Left-Centre to Right-Centre (compare with Western Germany, Italy, Belgium) will also bring about a change in party alignment in Holland.

THE HAGUE
15 September 1949

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By M. N. Roy. (Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta: 1949, pp. 631, Rs. 18/-)

COMMUNISM today is a house divided against itself. Paradoxically enough Soviet Russia's victory over Fascism has not meant any accession of strength to the ideology which the Russian people have passionately believed in and practised since the Bolshevik Revolution. On the contrary, it has created—schism in the ranks of the professed friends and followers of Soviet Russia. These, too, have contributed, since the war, in no small measure, to the mounting chorus of capitalist hatred against Stalin and Soviet Russia. Roy's *Russian Revolution* is significant as representing both these tendencies.

The book deserves the closest and most careful attention. Its author is possessed of qualities which rare in themselves are rarer still in their combination. Roy is reputed to be both an original and versatile thinker and courageous man of action. His record in both fields is too well-known to need repetition here. What is more to the point, however, is that Roy has devoted the greater part of his life to a close study of the theory and practice of Communism.

The Russian Revolution, it must be confessed, hardly comes up to the great expectations raised by the author's reputation. To us it appears to be wrong in conception and unscientific in execution; and its practical conclusions, to say the least, are naïve in the extreme.

Roy's object is to assess the significance of the Russian Revolution for Russia and the contemporary world up to date. He has been writing the book for over a period of ten years, 'recording history in the process of making.' He avers that his book stands the test of scientific objectivity. It is illuminating to glance briefly at his notion of scientific history: 'To analyse the experience of a particular period objectively, instead of interpreting it from this or that point of view, is the scientific method of writing history.' Of course no historian can be 'entirely free from subjectivism, for knowledge presupposes the existence of the knower.' Nevertheless, within such a limitation, what is the test of objectivity? 'It is the readiness to change one's opinion when subsequent experience challenges its validity.' But of course, experience too has to be objectively analysed, the sequence of facts understood in their

logical significance, not by interpreting them from a fixed point of view. Any fact is not to be judged by its supposed purpose or imaginary cause, but by its logical implication.' We suppose the discovery of the logical implication of facts requires certain major premises; one wonders where these are to be derived from if facts are not to be interpreted from a fixed point of view! Apparently there seems to be no way out of the meshes of the subject-object relationship; still Roy declares that his present attempt stands the test of objectivity presumably because he has been so ready to change his opinions. May one ask if men, especially practical politicians, are not seldom ready to change their opinions for reasons less scientific than an objective analysis of subsequent experience? After all this, Roy coolly declares: 'This is not history written from a personal or any theoretical point of view. At the same time I do not make the absurd claim of having started with an open mind. I had a distinct theoretical predisposition and corresponding expectations of the Revolution. Concretely, I began the study of what I believed to be the constructive phase of the Revolution as a Marxist; and it was also as a Marxist that I was driven to the conclusion that, pragmatically, the Revolution was not conforming with its *a priori* theoretical pattern.' We leave the reader to work out for himself Roy's idea of scientific history. It is clear from the above that he had a 'theoretical predisposition' if not 'a point of view'; and further that he carried on his studies as a Marxist. Marxism is presumably not a *fixed* point of view for has not every student of Marxism insisted that it is no closed system but is essentially dynamic? That is why Roy has ventured beyond orthodox Marxism to a new Humanism, which in his view perhaps is its latest avatar.

It is evident that Marxism does not furnish for Roy a criterion of scientific objectivity; else he would not have been so much obsessed with the subjective element in knowledge. If any doubt still remains, it is dispelled by the following: 'If consciousness is determined by the physical existence, (it is not clear whether reference to social existence is deliberately excluded) then a really Marxist study of history should not be theoretically hide-bound. Empiricism is nowhere more valid than in the study of history' (cf, Preface p). That a writer of Roy's intellectual stature should make the elementary confusion between Marxism and Empiricism is simply amazing. It is no doubt true that Marxism sets great store by facts as against the abstractions of *a priori* theory. But what is more important to remember is that Marx and Engels have defended 'theory' and 'proper philosophy' against the attacks of positivists, empiricists and pragmatists.

It is precisely because consciousness is a function of existence that empiricism becomes a dangerous method in the social sciences. Lynd has well explained how the empiricist studying facts with an air of scientific neutrality in the simple belief that facts will tell their own story, ends by sanctifying the *status quo*. Being inside the going system he unconsciously accepts its criteria as to the significance of facts and problems. And as he states the problems so are his remedies. An objective economist studying the facts of capitalist crisis, for example, regards it as essentially a deviation from the normal, and suggests monetary, fiscal and other remedies to overcome it. It cannot occur

to him that it is a normal phenomenon inherent in capitalism, and can be overcome only by scrapping the capitalist system. This is what the solipcists and empiriconomists mean by saying that knowledge is relative to the knower. Is it not possible then to achieve objective knowledge? Lynd explains the distinction between frankly biassed objectivity and true scientific objectivity by an apt illustration: An anthropologist studying Negro Voodoo must, of course, first of all, analyse it as it exists in the consciousness of the Negroes themselves; but he must also set it in a wider context of relationship and meaning; he must analyse it also as sophisticated science knows it to be.¹ It is the failure to take this second step which is responsible for the biassed objectivity of current social research.

Lynd is quoted to show that the distinction is well-known to bourgeois scientific method also. The Marxists explain the same thing by their doctrine of necessary false consciousness. 'Necessary false consciousness is necessarily false consciousness genetically determined so as to be false by necessity. It is false not as a fault of consciousness but by fault of a historical order of social existence causing it to be false. It is also necessary pragmatically, for the perpetuation of a social order which is historically necessary. The false consciousness of the ruling bourgeoisie was necessary for early capitalism to play its revolutionary rôle of freeing mankind from the fetters of feudalism.'² The whole of bourgeois economics as it has developed since the day of Adam Smith, is one vast illustration of this same false consciousness. When Plato and Gandhiji preached their idealistic theories of social change, they were quite sincere and true to the still, small voice within. The true significance and essentially reactionary quality of such doctrines at the present moment can be realized only when they are set in the wider context of the Marxist laws of dialectical social development.

We have stressed at some length these theoretical niceties because we are convinced that Roy has been a victim of the common bourgeois consciousness. His reading of contemporary history suffers from a naïve acceptance of the values of the going system. He comes to conclusions which completely belie his former beliefs and practice. This makes his book all the more dangerous. He captures the sympathy of the reader by the air of injured innocence and righteous indignation which informs his book. Vile treachery to the sacred cause of Revolution on the part of his erstwhile comrades has turned Roy into their implacable enemy. He stood steadfast by Stalin even when the latter made a pact with the accursed Nazis. It can be no small feat on the part of Stalin, the reader is left wondering, to have alienated the sympathies of so staunch a supporter. That is sufficient condemnation of Stalin's policy. On the other hand, may it not be, the discerning reader might ask, that there is a complete *volte face* on Roy's part, which constitutes an interesting phenomenon for the psychologist to investigate? A brief examination of his criticism of Stalin's policy and his constructive suggestions in the cause of socialist world Revolution will bring out the justice of our remark.

¹ Lynd, *Knowledge for What*, p. 122.

² *Modern Quarterly* Vol. II, No. 4, 1947, p.

According to Roy the world scene since the Soviet-German pact is strewn with the wrecks of lost opportunities by Soviet Russia in the cause of Revolution. Instead of seizing the occasion for attacking Germany, thereby putting an end to their moral isolation, and appearing on the stage as the saviour of Europe, the Russians callously watched the fall of France. This meant a setback to the policy of Red Napoleonism which would have made Russia the leader of post-war Europe (p.357). In the second place, the Russians should have welcomed, during the Peace conferences, the British Labour Government as an ally in the task of reconstructing Europe on a new foundation. The economic foundation of British Imperialism had been blasted; and it was an incredibly foolish policy to denounce the Labour Government as reactionary, engaged in anti-Soviet conspiracies in the tradition of British Imperialism (p.364). In a similar spirit, Russia should not have embarrassed Britain by indiscriminately supporting colonial nationalism. Such a policy is reactionary from a Marxist point of view. Stalin's home policy was equally reactionary. He merely substituted State capitalism for private capitalism (p.382). Breaking away from the Leninist tradition, he scrapped the New Economic Policy and launched upon forcible collectivization of agriculture which amounted to a war upon the peasantry. This emphasized the dictatorial character of the Soviet State (p.388-90). This type of totalitarian internal rule found expression, according to Roy, in the new policy of Russian expansionism at international conferences in post-war years. This was the reason why Russia sabotaged the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers. The aggressive character of Russian nationalism led to the formation of the American counter-offensive. To meet the American danger Russia tightened her grip on the countries of South-Eastern Europe. Henceforward Russia was defiantly non-co-operative with any plans that emanated from America: she refused to accept the Marshall Plan which offered her jointly with Britain the leadership of democratic Europe. Only Communist cussedness stood in the way of a democratic commonwealth of Europe at the Paris conference (p.474).

Communism is thus degenerating into aggressive nationalism and actually promoting the revival of Fascism (p.493). The Communist Party of Soviet Russia has been dictating their policies to the Communist Parties in Europe and Asia. In France and Italy Communist tactics failed to seize power. In Czechoslovakia they staged a successful 'bloodless revolution'; but Yugoslavia continues to be a thorn in Russia's side. The tide is on the turn; there may be a third world war, but no Proletarian Revolution. Thus has history been marred by the miscalculations and lust for power of a single man.

What then is to be done? Marxism has been weighed and found wanting. The Russian experience has exposed its fallacies. Like Fascism, it stands for medieval barbarism against the values of modern civilization. The Marxian theory of leadership which regards the proletariat as the revolutionary class *par excellence* is also all wrong. That class is too dense to appreciate 'the great technological, material and intellectual achievements of modern civilization; its interests are not identical with the interests of modern civilized society. Socialism can no longer claim the monopoly of the ideals of political liberty,

economic equality and social justice. These are not the ideals of any particular class; they are human ideals. Therefore a party of the working class is not the only instrument for their attainment. All the educated, cultured idealistic members of society the world over are being attracted by this New Humanism, while the culturally backward toiling masses are responding to the Communist appeal to the base human instincts (p. 538). The Americans, too, whatever may be their ulterior motives, in helping Western Europe to its recovery, are not in the least degree curtailing the rights and liberties of their beneficiaries. In the event of the Russian Colossus provoking a war between itself and America, the duty of the common people, therefore, is clear. They must organize people's parties and mobilize public opinion solidly behind the Western Union, which constitutes in the present context, a Third Force in the field of international politics. That is the only hope for maintaining peace and helping civilization to survive its worst crisis, and building a new world order under the banner of a New Humanism (p. 531).

To do full justice to Roy's conclusions, both critical and positive, would be beyond the scope of a review article. Fortunately it is neither necessary nor useful. The line of thinking which has been developed at length in the present book is familiar to people in this country. The surprise that Roy and his followers created by dubbing the war against Germany 'a people's war' is still fresh in the people's mind. That was one of the chief reasons why the Royists became isolated from political life and speedily became a spent force in this country. It is difficult to say if Nationalist India secretly desired the triumph of Germany or Japan, but in any case it was not above viewing England's difficulty as India's opportunity. That is why the Royists found no quarter with the Congress. Now this concept of 'the people' seems to be a crucial one in Roy's thought: The British Labour party is a party of the people; so is the Communist party of China. Russia should have supported the people's parties in colonial countries instead of the parties of bourgeois nationalists. The idea seems to be that with the triumph of the Allies, Imperialism would have been as dead as the dodo; the people's movements in all countries would have been strengthened and socialist ideals would have speedily filled the vacuum. In Roy's view India's freedom is an unmitigated curse both to India and the world. Had India remained a British colony, with Britain going socialist after the war, she too would have travelled on that road. Having become an independent national-capitalist State she is inevitably moving towards Fascism and providing a new home for capitalism when it is decaying in other parts of the world (pp. 369-70). Such is the tragic conclusion to which the concept of the 'people' leads.

To reason thus is to reckon without Lenin's 'law of the uneven development of capitalism in the epoch of imperialism'. In such a view there is no reason why the war between Germany and the Allies should not be regarded as an imperialist war for colonies and markets, and then Russian neutrality at the time of the German invasion of France becomes easily explicable. There is no reason why younger capitalist nations like America should not aspire after the hegemony of the capitalist world. The notion that socialist ideals

will spread simultaneously in all countries is also reminiscent of Trotsky's notion of a world revolution, following a final clash between capitalist and proletarian forces. The shape of events since the war has confirmed Lenin's insight. In an exhaustive survey of *European Recovery and United States Aid*, J. J. Joseph points out that the vast upheaval of the Second World War has given birth to fundamental and historical changes in forms of economic development. There is a new form of imperialism which encompasses the smaller dependent nations. These are nominally sovereign nations that are economic vassals of one or more powers. They are accurately described by the term 'semi-colonies'. The new form of imperialism includes control of production, trade, economic policy and standard of living of these semi-colonies.³

Roy is also mistaken regarding the rôle of the British Labour Party. It is of course clear to everybody that Britain today is actively collaborating with American Imperialism. But even a cursory glance at the history of British Labour will convince anyone that nothing better could have been expected of it. British Labour had always had a reformist leadership. While the rank-and-file worker could possess only the 'spontaneous trade-unionist consciousness', the leaders openly adopted policies of their employers. During the inter-war years 'the leaders were driven into more active collaboration with business and empire, until in 1945 they actually took over official responsibility for it. With full responsibility the old carefree slogans passed by conference after conference, anti-imperialism, friendship with the Soviet Union, internationalism, indeed even socialism itself—had to be dropped.... A Minister of Food defended the British Empire.... while a Colonial Under-Secretary rejected colonial industrialization'⁴....

Soviet Russia has always been considered a dictatorship; now her foreign policy is referred to as Red Imperialism. It is strange to find that Roy shares this common bourgeois prejudice. In the first part, he thought that Soviet Russia had achieved the fundamental condition for the establishment of socialism, viz. the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production; however, after Stalin's collectivization of agriculture, he considers Soviet economy as no better than State Capitalism. We thought that that term referred pre-eminently to the Nazi economy. Is there no difference then, as Hayek assures us, between Fascism and Socialism, even assuming both are totalitarian? Is the question of dictatorship to be analysed only in terms of the degree of party monopoly of political power? Does the nature of the State under capitalism, 'the private ownership of Government by business' make no difference? Roy seems to have curious ideas about the relation of Surplus Value to socialism. He makes Marx say that production of Surplus Value is the specific feature of Capitalism. Since Surplus Value is produced and invested in industries in Soviet Russia, it is no better than State Capitalism. In this sense Capitalism has a very hoary origin. We can date its beginning ever

³ Joseph, *Science and Society*, Vol. XII, No. 3, pp. 380-81.

⁴ Hobsbawm, *Trends in the British Labour Movement*, *Science and Society*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, p. 311.

since the time man was able to produce more than was necessary for his subsistence. Not production of surplus value but its appropriation by private individuals is the specific feature of capitalism. And once private property in the means of production is abolished, the very instrument of exploitation is taken away. It is for this reason that Marxists assert that true freedom and democracy is compatible only with socialism. Those who have denounced Russia's foreign policy as aggressive nationalism have not produced any evidence of Russian exploitation of her so-called satellite nations. That Russia should desire to be leader of the Communist world and do everything in her power to safeguard her frontiers is easily understandable and was even recognized and conceded by the Anglo-Americans in the post-war conferences. This and no more is the meaning of Russia's foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Asia.

There is another important consideration to be borne in mind in evaluating Russian aggressiveness internally and externally. The conduct of an individual or the policy of a government is as much self-determined as determined for them by circumstances. It is usual to denounce the Communist for acting on the Machiavellian maxim, 'the end justifies the means'. He is alleged to be unscrupulous and intent on violent means to accomplish his end. We do not think that Communists specially love to gloat over violence and blood; they, like others, have to use means which in context of the situation are *adequate* to realize the end. But driven into a corner even a worm will turn. Communists are after all flesh and blood and suffer from all the weaknesses to which flesh is heir. May one ask whose responsibility is it if they take to violence and bloodshed when denied the rights of ordinary citizens? When conflict between Capitalism and Communism is imminent, is it unreasonable for Russia to desire that Communists everywhere should close their ranks and stand solidly behind her as their leader? Stalin, as the originator of the idea of 'Socialism in one country' would respect different types of Communism in consonance with national peculiarities, but cannot allow any division in the ranks of Communism at a time of crisis. After all nothing more is insisted on than that Tito should stand by the verdict of the majority in the Cominform. When danger threatens them all, prudence requires that the Cominform countries must stick together and must not challenge Soviet leadership. At a time of crisis even the so-called democracies take on a totalitarian character.

It is from this standpoint that the doctrine of the Third Force and the pretensions of neutrality generally should be viewed. A period of conflict can ill afford the luxury of compromise and balance-of-power politics. At such a time he who is not for us is against us. Even if a semblance of neutrality is maintained its only effect is to strengthen the *status quo*. To remain passive in a society based on violence, injustice and exploitation is to throw your weight in favour of its continuance. This will expose the reactionary quality of Roy's doctrine of the Third Force.

Finally Roy's gospel of New Humanism is the limit. Reaction can go no further. Roy believes in 'the humanist tradition, the liberal ideas, democratic ways of life and moral values of modern civilization'. The defeat of Fascism

made the peoples of the world passionately devoted to these ideals. They are not the ideology of any particular class; the proletariat cannot be expected to appreciate them fully. It is therefore not qualified to be the leader of the Revolution. Since socialism proposes to reorganize society, it is an ideal for the whole of humanity. There can be no more complete break with Marxism. The fundamental nature of a class society is ignored and the doctrine of class war given a decent burial. Lenin's teaching on the rôle of the Communist party in educating the worker into political consciousness carries no meaning and the necessity of a political revolution, violent or otherwise, to change the structure of social relations is conveniently forgotten. It seems the ghost of Proudhon, the petty-bourgeois *par excellence* is resuscitated to life again in Roy. So much is he in love with the bourgeois ideals that he hopes by their help to remove the contradiction implicit in the social structure. Once more there is a new *interpretation* of the world, but no attempt to *change* it. From Revolution to Renaissance—that is a neat summary of Roy's thesis.

15 February 1950

N. A. MAVLANKAR

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A Secular State — How it was built and how it works *By* M. Ramaswamy, (Bangalore, Gokhale Institute of Public Affairs, July 1949, Price Re. 1/-).

This is a small booklet of 37 pages and is of topical interest to the people in this country, where like the United States of America an attempt is being made to build a Secular State.

The booklet describes the unfortunate conditions of religious persecution prevailing in the American Colonies and the efforts made, by Madison and Jefferson to establish religious freedom and to secure the separation of the State and the Church first in Virginia in 1786 and later in the United States by the first amendment to the Constitution in 1791.

Para 3 of Article VI had laid down:—

'No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States', and the first amendment categorically stated:—

'Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ———'. This prohibition was extended to the individual States by the fourteenth amendment made in 1868.

The rest of the booklet is devoted to the exposition of the 'establishment of religion' clause and to the description of the manner in which the provisions of the Constitution in this respect are enforced by the law courts. Writes Mr. Ramaswamy:—

'The absence of any religious conflicts in the United States ever since its foundation as a federal union one hundred and sixty years ago is a testimony to the wisdom of its founders who not only believed, as Mr. Justice Rutledge has well observed in a recent case, that "the great condition of religious liberty" is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the State "but, in fact, staked the very existence of the new State" on the faith that complete separation between the State and religion is best for the State and best for religion.'

This is a lesson which needs to be driven home in India, where, in spite of the terrible happenings of 1947, there are powerful sections of the population bent upon the establishment of a religious State and sabotaging the secular ideal.

18 January 1950

GURMUKH NIHAL SINGH

FRONTIER LAND SYSTEMS IN SOUTHERNMOST CHINA: By Prof. Chen Han-seng. (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1949. \$2.)

This is a comparative study of the social organization and agrarian systems prevailing among the two non-Chinese communities, the Pai Yi people of Yunan and the Kamba people of Sikang. Yunan lies near the Burmese and Kamba within the Tibetan Borderlands. In 1940, the author conducted detailed field surveys in these two agrarian regions and the statistical data presented in the report is the fruit of his laborious work.

The social and economic history of the Pai Yi and the Kamba is the least known in India. It will be, therefore, interesting to give here a brief summary of this informative, scholarly and thought-provoking report. The Pai Yi people are widely scattered in the four provinces of Kwangsi, Kweichow, Kwantung and Yunan and the Kamba live in Sikang, Chingai, Northwest Szechuan and North Yunan. These regions are commonly known as the West Borderland of China. The Pai Yi people total about six lakhs and seventy-five thousand and the Kamba about twenty lakhs, which is two-thirds of all Tibetans in China. Both profess the Buddhist religion in its Mahayanist and Lamayist creeds. The Pai Yi are of Thai (Shan) or Siamese nationality and the Kamba of Tibetan nationality. These people came under Chinese jurisdiction during the Manchu period, 17th century A.D., and continued to be ruled by the National Government until it was paralysed by Communist penetration from Yenan a few months ago.

The Pai Yi and the Kamba peasants are subjected to several inhuman social disabilities and customary laws. Both are feudalistic in political and social structure and the latter has particularly a long record of slavery. The peasant family has no right of land ownership, and they are subjected to a system of forced labour. The local chieftains and the top-ranking high officials own all the land. The population is very thin, with a great scarcity of labour. Consequently forced labour remains part and parcel of the land ownership. The Kamba peasants must work for their masters, the feudal chieftains and the high officials under the system of forced labour. This labour includes cultivation, transport, domestic and other kinds of menial labour. In Tibetan this is known as ULA which means the working animal. Besides field work, the peasants, whether males or females, must carry water, cut grass, chop wood, feed animals, cook food, wash clothes, attend to the personal comforts of the landlords and serve in their family. When male peasant members become Buddhist monks, the females must meet all these requirements.

Tribute and rent, trade and usury have demoralized the socio-economy of the

peasant population. Three major forms of tribute exist in the Pai Yi. They are: tribute in labour or work; tribute in kind or products and tribute in cash payment, which often takes away 27 to 30 per cent of the peasant's annual crop income. The peasants are overburdened with the two-strata administration; one of the hereditary chieftains and the other of the Government. The Chinese feudalistic Government has not in any way helped to improve their livelihood. These evils have made the peasants' standard of living appallingly low.

The chieftains hold the land for payment of Government salary in permanent law holding and hereditary tenure of office. There was no private ownership of land. In India, such feudalistic agrarian systems existed in the Jagirdari Estates of Rajasthan and the Talukdari Estates of Agra and Oudh.

The author who is an authority on Chinese agrarians problems thinks that redress could be brought to the peasants only through the immediate abolition of the system of forced labour. Besides, political power should be taken out of the chieftains' hands and a locally elected democratic administration with autonomous political power should be granted to the people.

The author's report and recommendations are highly valuable for ameliorating the distressed conditions of the Pai Yi and the Kamba peasants. But whether they could be brought into fruition in a country paralysed by continued internecine wars and ruled by a weak Government is very doubtful. Let us take a lesson from the past. Many experiments to solve the agrarian problem had been tried in ancient China. But the results were most unsatisfactory. The failure of these experiments was primarily due to internal chaos and from natural calamities such as famines, droughts, earthquakes and pestilence. Foreign invasion and the machinations of the wealthy and the landed aristocracy were the other greatest impediments against the successful working of agrarian reforms in China. Unless a country is free from all internal and external disorders, no reforms could be worked out successfully. The time factor is most important for creating an orderly well built socialistic society. Revolution brings in chaos but peaceful and gradual developments will herald the dawn of peace and plenty.

China first introduced land reform under a scheme known as Ching-tien or 'well-field' system. It was widely put into operation during the Chou period when China was feudalistic in social and political structure. But it gradually disintegrated and passed away. Later much of the land was held in great estates and high rentals charged from the cultivators. Wang Mang, the usurper (1st century B. C.) attempted a sweeping agrarian reorganization. He declared the nationalization of the land, thus annihilating the big estates. The purchase and sale of land was forbidden. The land confiscated to the State was divided into equal tracts and given to the cultivators. But Wang Mang met with serious opposition from the wealthy and he was killed. The next was Wang An-Shi of the Sung period in A. D. 1067. But he also failed miserably. Then came Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of the Chinese Republic. He laid great stress on the importance of introducing immediate agrarian reforms and raising the living standards of the peasants. Unfortunately he died early

and the subsequent events are well known to all students of Chinese history.

The system of forced labour or semi-slavery is the greatest blot on civilization. The evil should be wiped out wherever it is found to exist. In Rajputana, a bloodless revolution is now taking place, thanks to the tried and experienced officers of the State Ministry. Ere long, the evil will be obliterated from the Indian soil by legislative enactments and through gradual and peaceful developments.

The report under review merits the consideration of the States Ministry, Government of India, which has a similar task in Rajasthan. It also deserves careful study by students of agricultural economics. We congratulate Prof. Chen Han-seng and the Institute of Pacific Relations for bringing out this highly interesting work.

15 November 1949

V. G. NAIR

THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH. By R. T. E. Latham. (Royal Institute of International Affairs. Oxford University Press, 1949, 7s. 6d. net).

This essay of some 120 pages was first published in 1937 in the Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Volume I, Problems of Nationality, 1918-1936, by Professor W. K. Hancock. The essay contains a penetrating analysis of the nature of the association now called simply Commonwealth of Nations. It discusses the difficult questions of the extent to which Commonwealth Relations rest upon Law and Conventions, the nature and content of Commonwealth Law and Conventions and as to whether Commonwealth agreements and treaties are also international engagements and as such subject to international registration and adjudication. The position taken up by Mr. Latham is generally sound and his exposition of the situation as it existed in 1936 is masterly but in several respects the position has since altered materially. The passing of the Nationality Act in Canada in 1947 and of the British Nationality Act in 1948 has almost reversed the position on the subject of nationality. The British Nationality Act, which came into force from 1 January 1949, has made the local citizenship in each Dominion the operative nationality—those who enjoy it shall also have the status of 'British subjects' or of 'Commonwealth citizens' as they are designated in the Act.

A very important change has been introduced by the decision of some of the Commonwealth countries to take issues and disputes between them to the United Nations and not to refer them to the *ad-hoc* Commonwealth Tribunals envisaged by the Imperial Conference of 1930. One such issue is the Kashmir question which is actively engaging the attention of the Security Council at this moment. As stated by the Indian Prime Minister, India's first loyalty is to the United Nations and her co-operation in the Commonwealth comes next—provided it does not detract anything from India's obligations as a member of the United Nations.

Lastly, the decision of the 1949 London Conference of Commonwealth Premiers to keep India as a free and equal member in spite of her adoption

of a republican constitution, which comes into force from 26 January 1950, has altered the basic conception of the Commonwealth—in which members are said to be 'united by a common allegiance to the Crown.'

It is no doubt true that Mr. Latham would have taken note of these and other changes which have taken place since 1936 if his life had not been cut short, at the early age of 33 years, in August 1943 when his aircraft and its whole crew were reported missing—Mr. Latham having joined the Royal Air Force in 1941.

However, as stated by Professor Hancock, in spite of the changed situation, the essay of Mr. Latham 'in its original form contains so much fundamental thought that it will not, in this generation at least, grow out of date.'

18 January 1950

GURMUKH NIHAL SINGH

OTHER BOOKS

REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL, I. L. O., 32nd Session of International Labour Conference, Geneva, 1949, Report I

The report presents a comprehensive, well balanced and objective analysis of the recent trends in social policy and the multifarious activities of the I. L. O. to defend and promote the well-being of the peoples in all areas of the world. The first chapter, dealing with the current economic background of social policy, contains a careful review of the post-war structure of the world's economy and the recovery plans of the various Member States. However, the information regarding the present economic problems and reconstruction plans of the less-developed areas, particularly some of the Asian countries, appears to be rather cursory as compared to those of the highly industrialized countries of the West. In this connexion, the Director-General's proposals for the expansion of the Organization's executive, technical and regional work to be able to face the changing circumstances arising from the urgent need of direct assistance to the underdeveloped countries are to be welcomed. 'Mirrored in this report the reader will find a seething, restless world.' And it is rightly concluded that unless the numerous man-power problems, which are outpacing the action taken to deal with them are solved, the I. L. O.'s objective of social justice throughout the world will not be achieved.

2 December 1949

V. K. M. MENON

LABOUR LAW JOURNAL (Edited and Published by Sri R. Venkatraman, 1/174 Royapettah High Road, Madras).

The number of legislative measures that have come on to the Statute Book in recent years is indicative of the awareness on the part of the State of the importance of labour in a national set-up. Alongside such an awareness there is the growing consciousness on the part of labour of their rights and place in the scheme of things.

For students of social problems and those engaged in administering and implementing statutory measures relating to labour, the Labour Law Journal will be a useful aid. A well codified and documented compendium has been

a long-felt need and it is gratifying that timely action has been initiated in promoting a journal of this type.

The journal has been well-planned and readably edited. It contains recent decisions given by the Madras High Court, awards of Tribunals and articles bearing on legislative measures by persons who could speak with authority. The journal also deals with proposed legislative measures. The statistical part of the industrial survey has also found a place. A brief summary of the point of law involved in each court decision will, it is felt, considerably help.

The reader will find in it a thoughtfully documented journal which should prove highly informative and a useful guide to those handling labour.

27 October, 1949

O. T. J. ZACHARIAS

THE AGRARIAN PROBLEMS OF MADRAS PROVINCE *By* V.V. Sayana.
(The Business, week Press, 173 Lloyd Road, Madras 14, 1949, Rs. 12/8).

The book is a specialized study of the agricultural economy of the Madras Province and deals in detail with the problems of land tenures, rural indebtedness, farm tenancy and agrarian labour. The difficulties which such works involve while being handled by the research scholar single handed are numerous and the author has done well in confining his field investigations to the eleven districts of Andhradesha. Besides being an authoritative work on the subject, the thesis 'is marked not merely by deep study and laborious research but displays a living interest in the problems dealt with,.....'

The author has, doubtless, made a valuable contribution to the literature on this aspect of Indian economy, of which, despite its great importance in the context of the present conditions obtaining in the country, there is still a dearth. A brief summary of the conclusion and the reforms suggested by the author to overcome the problems covered at the end of the book would have, perhaps, enhanced its value especially for a general reader not particularly interested in all the details. The glossary of the common vernacular terms, the comprehensive bibliography and the index are both informative and useful; but space could have been found to give the contents of the tables, diagrams etc. and also the questionnaire issued by the author in the course of his enquiry. Though the get-up and printing is good, the price appears to be rather a little taxing for the pocket of the student and the general reader alike.

2 January 1950

V. K. M. MENON

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THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION—A BRIEF STUDY*

By S. VARADACHARIAR

I

THE new Indian Constitution has been before the public, even in its final form, for more than three months now, and its main provisions have been generally known for a much longer time. The opening declaration of the Constitution records the resolve of the people to constitute India into a 'sovereign democratic republic.' The words 'sovereign' and 'republic' are negative in their content, signifying that there is no longer a political superior nor a monarch. They merely mark a break with the recent past. The positive and basic feature of the Constitution is, therefore, the creation of a State that can be described as democratic. As the term 'democracy' is often loosely used and vaguely understood, it may be useful to examine the implications of the claim that the Indian Constitution is a democratic Constitution. We may then consider how far the Constitution Act, in its several parts, justifies this claim or falls short of it. How vague the concept of democracy is one can realize when one remembers that the United Kingdom claims to be a democracy, the United States of America claims to be a democracy and Soviet Russia claims to be even more democratic than the other two. Whether 'democracy' itself is an ideal form of government, whether it can ensure good government, are fundamental questions on which opinions have differed and will continue to differ. Pope represented the school of thought which considers all controversies about forms of government foolish. The less cynical and the more generally held view is that democracy is less objectionable than other contemporary forms of government.

The oft quoted dictum of Abraham Lincoln requires that a democracy should be a government *by* the people and *for* the people. The first part refers to the mechanism of government, and the second to the aim or purpose of the administration. As it is conceivable that though in form or profession a Constitution or administration may seem to be democratic it may yet fail in substance and effect to be a democracy, the above requirements may be sub-divided so as to require (i) that the structure of the Constitution should be democratic, (ii) that the method of its working should be democratic, (iii) that professedly its aims should be democratic, and (iv) that the Constitution should, in practice, be capable of achieving these aims. This four-fold requirement is emphasized by statements like the following: that democracy depends not on the form of the State but on the share which the people take in the working of the State and that the idea of democracy is not so much a form of government as a recognition of human brotherhood, of common aims and duties and of mutual obligations.

* The address was delivered under the auspices of the Patna University during its Convocation Week and is being published with the kind permission of the Vice-Chancellor of the University.

The necessity for emphasizing each of the above four requirements will be appreciated if we consider for a moment the history of the democratic movement. Some of the early Greek City States are sometimes spoken of as examples of democracy; but they were democratic only in a limited sense because they rested on a large section of the population being slaves who had no political rights. The conception of democracy in a truer sense must be traced to the days of the American and the French Revolutions when the formula of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity was enunciated. These terms were, however, not very clearly defined at the time and the history of English political thought and practice during the nineteenth century shows how a theoretical adherence to this formula may nevertheless fail to produce the desired result. One writer defines 'Liberty' by reference to political or cultural progress, 'Equality' by reference to economic or material progress, and 'Fraternity' by reference to moral or religious progress. It will be more exact to relate liberty to individual freedom of thought and action, equality to social relationship and fraternity to the principle which would reconcile individual freedom with social welfare. The English utilitarians of the nineteenth century beginning with Bentham thought that they would be giving effect to this formula by their theory of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. They believed that this end would be best achieved by allowing the fullest measure of individual freedom to every citizen; they thought that the free play of liberty would secure both equality and fraternity. They ignored the fact that the uncontrolled sway of the principle of liberty would set in operation the principle of 'competition' with a view to individual success involving the exploitation of the weak by the strong, thus endangering both fraternity and equality. Adam Smith, the great advocate of the principle of free competition, hoped that under the 'invisible hand' of Providence, the principle of competition would, in the long run, redound to the general good. Providence has evidently preferred to keep aloof and allow mankind to evolve in its own way: the acknowledged failure of the *Laissez faire* régime has belied this expectation. The reaction to the social injustice resulting from this régime led to the growth of Marxism. Like all reactions, it went to the other extreme and totalitarianism tends to lay almost exclusive stress on the aim of equality, ignoring the ideal of liberty which is a necessary part of the democratic formula.

History has all along been the history of oscillations between the principles of individual freedom and of social organization. Can means be found to bring about a co-ordination between them? The reconciliation between the two extremes must be brought about by due emphasis upon the third element of the formula, namely, the principle of fraternity, which substitutes co-operation in place of competition and social welfare in place of individual success. Restating the aims of the State and the definition of its form in the light of this discussion, it would follow that they should be such as to secure the welfare of all citizens and promote a sense of equality and brotherhood amongst them even while allowing to each citizen sufficient freedom to develop his own personality, and that these results must be attained by co-operation among all citizens.

II

The aims of the Indian Constitution are set out in the opening declaration, as being to secure to all citizens Justice (Social, Economic and Political), Liberty (of Thought, Expression, Belief, Faith and Worship) and Equality (of Status and of Opportunity) and to promote among them Fraternity, assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. This declaration, it will be noticed, is, in substance, an amplification of the French declaration with all its necessary implications. Not content with a mere statement of these aims, the Constitution has proceeded to give positive and detailed directions to the State in this behalf in Part IV (Sections 37 to 51). In the very nature of things, these directions are not such as can be enforced in a Court of Law; but if the control of the people over the administration be effective, pressure may, in due course, be brought to bear on the administration to give effect to these directions. Roughly, it may be stated that the directions in this part comprehend what may fall within the scope of the principles of equality and fraternity in the French formula, e.g., a fair distribution of the wealth of the community, the right of all citizens to full employment and adequate livelihood, the provision of education for all and public assistance during sickness, unemployment and old age, just and humane conditions of work, including opportunities for the full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural development. The third limb of the formula, namely, liberty, differs from the other two in that in several respects it can be protected by judicial remedies. Several aspects of this principle of liberty or freedom have accordingly been particularized under the heading of 'Fundamental Rights' in Part III, e.g., freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom to acquire and own property and to practise any trade or profession, security of person and property, &c. Express provision has been made (section 32) that the Supreme Court can be moved by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of these rights. The Constitution has thus endeavoured to state its aims and to ensure as far as is humanly possible that such aims shall be capable of practical realization.

III

There have been differences of opinion as to whether it is necessary or expedient to enact provisions of the above kind in the Constitution Act. The answer to this question will depend upon the meaning that one may give to the word 'Constitution.' If it is to be limited to the mere mechanism of administration, these provisions may seem out of place. But, in the peculiar circumstances in which the new Constitution was enacted for this country, to mark the departure from the previous order as clearly as possible, and to place before the citizens and the administration alike their duties and responsibilities as well as their hopes and aspirations, it was expedient to set them forth in definite and unambiguous terms. Many of the provisions in Part III relating to Fundamental Rights form part of the law in other systems also; only, they are taken as common law rights in some systems. There have been doubts in this country as to the availability of appropriate remedies in respect of some of them (especially remedies like *mandamus* and *certiorari*) and the courts which are com-

petent to award such remedies. It was in that sense necessary to make express statutory provision in respect thereof, and, having regard to the importance of the subject, it was as well to include these provisions in the Constitution Act instead of relegating them to some law of procedure.

Much of the rest of the Act deals with what may be called the structure or mechanism of the Constitution and the manner in which it is to secure that the will of the people shall prevail. Before referring to them, a few special groups of provisions may be noticed. There are two groups of provisions relating to the administration of Justice, one group relating to the Supreme Court, and the other group relating to the High Courts in the several States. Doubts have sometimes been expressed whether these provisions should find a place in the Constitution Act. I fail to see anything inappropriate in their being there. The division of the activities of a State into executive, legislative and judicial is well-known, and if the first two sets of provisions can appropriately find a place in the Constitution Law, there is no reason to consider that the third will be out of place there. It is true that in other countries there is a separate Judicature Act containing many of the provisions now found in the Indian Constitution Act. That is merely an accident of the way in which the Constitution came to be framed in those countries. Even in this country, the High Courts Act of 1861, was a separate enactment, distinct from the Indian Councils Act of that year. But, later on, the British Parliament thought it better to consolidate the two sets of provisions into one enactment. In the present Act there were also other reasons which made it appropriate that the provisions relating to the Supreme Court and the High Court should find a place in the Constitution Act. The Supreme Court is a new creation and it was desired to clothe it with kinds of jurisdiction which no court in the land heretofore possessed. It was also thought necessary to place the provisions relating to it beyond the possibility of amendment by the ordinary process of legislation. This has been achieved by including it in that group of provisions which can be amended only by the special procedure relating to constitutional amendments. It is with the same intent that certain provisions relating to the High Courts also have been included in the Constitution Act. It was also thought fit to make it perfectly clear that the independence of these Tribunals should be secured in every possible way; and, as the principle of the independence of the Judiciary is one of the fundamental principles of any modern Constitution, its enunciation rightly forms part of the law of the Constitution. The Constitution Act definitely accepts the principle of separation of executive from judicial functions. All judicial officers, whether administering civil justice or criminal justice, will henceforth be brought under the protection and the administrative control of the High Courts.

The provisions of Part XVI (special provisions relating to certain classes) and Part XVII (Official Language) have become necessary by reason of the special conditions obtaining in this country, and they are more or less of a temporary character. The principle of equality, however sound in theory, cannot be allowed to ignore historical realities; and, as it has been recognized that the provisions of Part XVI should be regarded not as exceptions to the

general principle but only as aids to give effect to it, there is nothing there that calls for criticism. Another special set of provisions have become necessary by reason of another historical accident, namely, the division of the country into two parts, one directly under the British Indian administration and the other under the administration of the Indian Rulers. In the attempt to integrate the latter with the former so as to create a united India, it has been found necessary to accept several compromises in view of the special circumstances of each area, and the provisions relating thereto have varied accordingly. It can only be hoped that in due course they will all come under the same general pattern. No purpose will be served by examining these admittedly exceptional provisions to see how far they satisfy the conditions of democracy. Care has been taken to see that they are as near an approach to democratic ideals as the circumstances permit.

We may now turn to what even in the narrower sense constitutes Constitutional provisions. Dealing first with the structural aspect thereof, it comprises two sets of provisions corresponding to the two divisions, the executive and the legislature. As the country decided upon having a Federal Constitution, two-fold provision had to be made in respect of each of these heads. We thus have four groups of provisions, those relating to the Union executive, those relating to the State executive, those relating to the Union legislature and those relating to the State legislature. As an essential part of the Federal scheme, a further set of provisions have had to be enacted to define and regulate the relations between the Union or Centre and the States, both in the executive sphere and in the legislative field. The expression 'Government *by* the people,' however apposite to the small city States of Greece, where all citizens were not merely entitled but even bound to participate in the administration, has to be understood in a special sense in modern politics. As it is no longer possible for all citizens directly to participate in the administration the theory of representative government has been evolved and 'government *by* the people' has to be understood as government by representatives elected by the people. Elaborate provisions have, therefore, become necessary to provide for the election of such representatives; some of them are found in the Constitution Act itself, but many more will have to be enacted in a special law relating to elections. Even when government by popular representatives takes the place of government by the people, these representatives cannot all take a direct part in the administration. A body has therefore to be found who may be regarded as the nominees of these representatives but sufficiently compact to take a direct part in the administration of the State. This is the theory of Cabinet government, consisting of Ministers who are placed in office by the vote of the popular representatives and who remain in office only as long as they command their support. The administration of the country, however, requires a large number of people to attend to its day-to-day routine; hence the differentiation between the Ministry and the permanent services has become a recognized feature of all modern Constitutions. It has been found in practice that the permanent service would best serve its purpose if it is kept outside the pale of popular influence. Hence, its recruitment as well as its rights and

duties have had to be specially provided for. As recruitment is expected to be free from improper influences when entrusted to an independent body, Public Service Commissions have been provided for both the Union and the States.

In the field of legislation, however, a larger number of people could participate than in the strictly administrative field. The elected representatives are therefore constituted into legislatures. Detailed provisions have been made as to their powers, functions and procedure. Both in theory and in practice, there have been differences between various thinkers and countries as to the necessity or desirability of having a double Chamber system, one directly elected by the people and another constituted in a different manner. As conditions in different parts of this country are varied in this respect, the new Constitution has provided for a single Chamber system in some States and for a double Chamber system in other States. So far as the centre is concerned, it has preferred to adopt the double Chamber system; but care has been taken to see that the popular Chamber will be the controlling authority in the last resort. Though in name they are called legislatures, these bodies, particularly the popular house, by their control over the Cabinet, are expected to control the general administration; and, in that sense, the administration becomes government by the elected representatives of the people and therefore by the people.

While, by the several groups of provisions referred to above, the administration is vested in the people through their representatives, the executive authority of the State is in legal theory vested in a single individual, called the President in the centre and the Governor in each of the States. In form, his powers are left undefined and unlimited; but he is expected to play the rôle of a constitutional head who abides by the advice of his Ministers. It may as well be said that he acts as their adviser. In England, this Constitutional head is the King who occupies the place by hereditary right. In America, the office of the President is filled by election. Under the Indian Constitution, the President of the Union is to be elected by an electoral college consisting of the elected members of both houses of Parliament and the elected members of the legislative assemblies of the States. There was some difference of opinion as to whether the Governors of the States should be elected or nominated. The ultimate decision was against election. Section 155 now provides that the Governor shall be appointed by the President.

A well-known feature of written constitutions, especially of Federal constitutions, is the distinction between ordinary legislation and constitutional legislation. The U.S.A. having come into existence as the result of an arrangement in the nature of a treaty, it was natural to provide that the terms of such a treaty should not be modified by a mere majority vote. Likewise, in the case of Subordinate Constitutions, like those of Canada and Australia and of India under British rule, it was natural to provide that the Subordinate Legislature should not have power to modify some of the fundamental provisions of Imperial Legislation governing its own constitution or powers. On the other hand, a sovereign legislature like the British Parliament can pass what law it likes and the British Constitution knows no distinction between ordinary legis-

lation and constitutional legislation. An intermediate position has however been taken in some countries even when their legislatures are sovereign bodies. A certain sanctity or permanence has been attached to the provisions of the Statute embodying the constitution and special provisions have been enacted requiring a larger majority or laying down other special safeguards in respect of attempts to change the provisions of that Statute. Some constitutions have gone further and provided for a *referendum*, or general consultation of all voters, before any changes in the constitution can be made. This is strictly in accord with the theory of democracy, but it is cumbersome and has not found much favour, particularly in the case of large countries. The Indian Constitution has (by section 368) provided a special rule of majority in respect of constitutional amendments and in a few cases it has also insisted on the ratification of such changes by not less than one-half of the Legislatures of the States affected.

IV

Before referring to some criticisms of the Constitution, I must mention that there are some who think that nothing less than a revolution will meet the needs of the situation today: one cannot hope to convert or convince them by arguments to the contrary. Apart from a vague desire to follow the ways of Communist Russia, it is not clear whether they have a constructive scheme in view. After all, even a Revolution need not be one brought about by violence: in English history, we have heard of the 'bloodless revolution' when James II abdicated and the absolutism of the Stuarts gave place to constitutional monarchy. A revolution only implies a drastic and major change in the ideas and institutions which constitute the framework of society. It may as well be peaceful and democratic as violent and totalitarian. The view that the analogy of the laws of biological evolution inevitably imports the element of 'struggle for existence' and the survival of the strongest is no longer accepted as wholly applicable to human society, in view of the possibility of guiding social changes by considerations of morality and humane sentiment. One may well appreciate the impatience of those who think that what are called 'vested interests' cannot be persuaded by reason to change their ways and outlook, but those who stand by moral principles and look for long-term results should prefer a peaceful revolution even with its inevitable slowness and imperfections.

The Constitution Act has been subjected to criticism from various points of view. It may be well to consider some of them. It has been said that it is much too long, that it has practically followed the unpopular Government of India Act, 1935, and that it is a hotchpotch made up of bits taken from different Constitutional enactments in different parts of the world. The criticism as to its lengthiness has in substance been dealt with in the observations I have already made in connexion with the Judicature provisions in the Act. It cannot be said that any large number of the provisions in the Act are altogether unnecessary; and, if they are necessary, it can make little difference whether they are all grouped in one enactment or are enacted in different statutes. Countries which have not attempted to embody the whole of their constitutional

law in statutory form but have left much of it to common law and conventions stand on a different footing. The framers of the Indian Constitution did not start with a clean slate. For more than a century, detailed provisions in respect of the Indian Constitution had been enacted in different parliamentary statutes and when they came to be consolidated in the Act of 1935, their size and number were considerably increased in the attempt to meet the special situation created by the attitude of the Muslim League and the claims made on behalf of the Indian States. When a new legislation attempts to replace existing legislation, it will give rise to doubts and difficulties in interpretation if matters specifically dealt with in the earlier legislation are simply ignored by the later. There was also the fact that the country had for a long time become familiar with the provisions of the pre-existing law and its working; and, except to the extent to which a departure therefrom was intended, it was the more prudent course to reproduce the existing provisions. After all, this criticism about lengthiness is merely one of form. The mere fact that the new Act follows the lines of the 1935 statute is not by itself a crime except perhaps in the eyes of those who think that anything smacking of the British connexion should be avoided.

The criticism that the Act is merely a copy from the Constitutions of other countries is, even to the extent to which it is well-founded, devoid of substance. Constitution making has been the subject of so many experiments in the course of history that there is very little that can be said to be new; and it would be unwise, if, out of a craze for originality, the framers of a Constitution should decline to benefit by the experience of other countries. A careful comparative study of the provisions of the Act will also show that wherever either local conditions or future needs or the practical experience of working other Constitutions showed that a departure from existing examples was necessary, such departure has been made by the framers of the Act. There has unfortunately been very little constructive criticism from this group of critics beyond a vague, though vehement, suggestion that the country requires an indigenous Constitution, or a Constitution framed in accordance with Gandhian ideals. What exactly would have satisfied this group of critics, it is difficult to see. There is no doubt a sincere longing in some quarters that this country must go back to its ancient ways and ideals, reviving a simplified self-sufficient village life with a complete decentralization of governmental administration. Those who hold this view forget that unless a substantial majority of people in this country are prepared to go back to that kind of life, no constitutional mechanism can compel or persuade them to go back to it. A Constitution can be framed only on lines related to the existing social order and social ideals. To the extent to which a revival of village autonomy is possible in these days, the Constitution Act expressly casts upon the administration the obligation to encourage the growth of village self-government. It would be an act of purblindness if we totally ignore the difference between world conditions as they existed fifteen or twenty centuries ago and world conditions as they exist today. In the days of the jet plane, no country can seriously think of limiting itself to the bullock cart. Isolationism, even if desirable, is no longer practicable. Foreigners came into India not because the inhabitants of the country wanted them but

in spite of their wishes. The result has been that willynilly the country has been very largely westernized. It is common knowledge that barely a century ago Japan desired to exclude the intrusion of foreigners. Once that attempt failed, that country became more westernized than the west in about half a century. It is a difficult problem of sociology and the history of civilization whether a community can adopt an alien civilization partially without being drawn on step by step into adopting it as a whole. Anyhow, there is nothing in the Constitution that prevents people who are so minded from living in accordance with the Gandhian ideals; but these very critics must be aware how many in India today are prepared so to live.

Apart from general criticisms like the above, specific objections have been urged against particular portions of the Constitution Act. One of the most important among these relates to the distribution of powers between the Union and the States. There are many who think that Provincial autonomy has been greatly diluted in the scheme of the Act. This criticism assumes that in all circumstances Provincial autonomy to the maximum extent is good and necessary. There is very little to justify this assumption. That in other systems, e.g., the U.S.A. or Australia, the centre has more limited powers than under the Indian Constitution, even to the extent that this is true, is of little significance. How the powers are in any particular case to be distributed between the centre and the units will largely depend upon historical and geographical factors. In this respect, there is a fundamental difference between the situation in the U.S.A. and the situation in India. In the U.S.A., the Federal Constitution was the result of an attempt on the part of pre-existing autonomous States to federate for certain purposes. It was a federation in the true sense and the autonomous States naturally entrusted to the centre only such powers as were considered absolutely essential for the purposes for which they thought fit to federate. In India, the Federation is a wholly artificial creation and in the main does not deal with autonomous units already in existence.

The geography and the history alike of India seem to have conspired to make it difficult for the country to choose between unity and disunity among its parts. The main geographical boundaries undoubtedly favour the unity of the whole area enclosed within those boundaries. But the physiographical features of the country, varieties of climate and the difficulties of access between one part and another when taken along with the distances, almost compel the existence of separate units. The early history of the country starts with a large number of independent and often warring political units; and even in the best days of Hindu or Muslim power, there has hardly ever been anything like a centralized administration. The so-called empires were, except for short periods, little more than suzerainties over subordinate kingdoms enjoying virtual independence. The problem of a united India has been made more difficult by differences in religion, racial affinities, levels of civilization, &c. The one service which the British administration of India rendered to this country was the creation of an administrative unity, which, by its very completeness, produced, by way of reaction and opposition to it, a measure of

political unity. From the early years of this century, the British administration, out of its dislike of this growing political unity, has been attempting to encourage fissiparous tendencies in the land. The very immensity of the task of centralized administration over a country of the magnitude of India led to the scheme of decentralization, embodied in what are known as the Devolution Rules, which formed part of the scheme of the Montague Chelmsford Reforms. But it is important to remember that this was an arrangement of administrative convenience and not one arising out of disunity or illwill as between different parts of the country. The idea of a Federation or a Confederation took shape only with a view to bring the Indian States into some kind of unified organization, and it was no wonder that those who were responsible for that scheme were anxious to preserve the separate identity of the States. Even this would not have of itself or necessarily involved the autonomy of the British Indian Provinces which were only administrative units of one centralized government. It was the attempt to secure the consent of the Muslim League for some all-India political scheme, even while reducing the extent of the British control over India, that brought in the antithesis between the centre and the provinces, and the growth of the spirit which culminated in the partition of the country. If this history is borne in mind and it is realized that the attempt in India, though the Constitution is called federal, is not an attempt to bring together pre-existing autonomous units but an attempt to break up a pre-existing centralized administration, the difference between the Indian situation and the situation of the States which formed the U.S.A. will become apparent. In India, the division between the centre and the units should be one based not on hostility or suspicion but on mere considerations of convenience. No one who pays any heed to the present international situation can welcome the prospect of India being split up into a number of units, each suspicious of the other and unwilling to clothe the centre with effective powers of central administration. The experience of the food crisis during the last few years and the difficulty of financing the large industrial and engineering projects which are so essential for the progress of the country must bring home to all thinking men the imperative necessity of having an efficient central government in this country. The prudent course will be to determine from time to time the relative strength of the centrifugal and the centripetal forces and use statesmanship in the way best calculated to secure the proper equilibrium between the two. Whether a particular subject should be assigned to the centre or to the provinces, or should be in the Concurrent field, is a matter on which opinions may honestly differ. But, even the decision on such a question must be reached on considerations of practical convenience and not on any arguments founded upon a theory of provincial autonomy.

Much the same argument as the above underlies the criticism that the emergency provisions of the Constitution Act practically nullify provincial autonomy. The foregoing considerations are themselves sufficient to answer this criticism. It may also be mentioned in this connexion that even in countries like the U.S.A. and Australia, the courts have, by the principle of necessary implication, recognized the necessity for the centre being permitted to exercise

extensive powers in an emergency. It may however be added that it would be a healthy convention if it was understood that the emergency powers were not to be lightly assumed or exercised without due consultation with the units.

A criticism that deserves more serious consideration is that relating to the suitability of the system of Cabinet government to the circumstances of this country. In England, the Cabinet system was the result of a slow historical growth. We have had very little like it in this country. It is so intimately connected with the growth and organization of political parties in England that it may well be doubted whether in the absence of a similar structure in the political life of the country the Cabinet system can be successfully worked. Most critics of the British Constitution seem to be agreed that such success as it has had has been due not so much to the merits of the constitution as to the qualities of the statesmen and administrators who have worked it and of the people who have lived and prospered under it. But, if the experiment of democracy is to be given a genuine trial, the alternative of an irremovable executive would hardly be considered sufficient. The absence of an organized opposition party in the country cannot be remedied by the artificial creation of an opposition. Till such opposition comes into existence in the natural course, a heavy responsibility will rest on the Cabinet to ensure that even in the absence of an organized opposition, dissentient opinions receive due attention and that the essential condition of democracy, namely, government by persuasion, is not ignored merely on the strength of the majority vote. I must add that even the party system is not without its dangers and possibilities of abuse. A multiparty system will result in instability of government. Even a two-party system may degenerate into a caucus government and representative government may be reduced to a farce by party solidarity. Parties may care more for power than for principles and voters may care more for persons than for ideas. Party politicians have a way of persuading themselves that the interests of their party represent the true interests of the country.

Genuine apprehensions have been expressed as to the risks involved in the recognition of the principle of adult franchise and universal suffrage. Full fledged democratic theory undoubtedly requires universal suffrage: but it may well be doubted whether in the conditions obtaining in this country it would not have been safer to reach it by degrees. The capacity for self-government, it is said, cannot be created by law; people must be trained to it. Democracy presupposes a well educated mass of citizens; otherwise, it may become what Shaw described as 'election by the incompetent many instead of appointment by the corrupt few.' On the other hand, it is felt by some that the risk of trial and error must be taken and that the people will not become fit for the franchise until they have actually had the franchise for some time. The very foundation of democracy is the faith that if given the opportunity the community will progressively develop the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action. Left to themselves, the great majority of people would not wish to govern but prefer to be governed. Absence of participation in any responsible decisions would only emphasize this lack of interest. At any rate, this emphasizes the urgency of the problem of mass education. It

also imposes on all agencies and persons engaged in political propaganda and electioneering campaigns an obligation to refrain from taking unfair advantage of the ignorance or political immaturity of large sections of voters.

There are again those who think that even with universal suffrage the Constitution is not likely in its practical working to ensure the fundamentals of democracy, namely liberty and equality. As regards liberty, they feel that the provisions relating thereto in Part III of the Constitution Act are hedged in by far too many restrictions which the government of the day, aided by a subservient legislature, may avail itself of much too readily. This is a question which goes more to the spirit in which the Constitution must be and is likely to be worked than to the frame of the constitutional provisions. Though in a sense the legislature is supposed to represent the people and to control the executive, this is true only in a long-term sense, namely, that at the time of each election the voters are at liberty to replace their representatives if they have ceased to represent the will of the people and that once in a way Parliament can turn out a ministry which no longer commands its confidence. But, so far as the day-to-day administration is concerned, the truth is that an executive, which claims to have been put in its place by the will of the representatives of the people, effectively controls Parliament by the majority behind it. The question of danger to liberty is more likely to arise in times of stress or emergency, and they are just the occasions when the majority in Parliament may for one reason or another yield to pressure from the ministry even to the extent of enacting repressive legislation. The test of democracy is not the freedom of those who agree with those in office, but that of those who disagree with them. But the remedy for this does not seem to lie in a denial of necessary powers to the executive or the legislature. Those in authority as well as those in opposition must cultivate a spirit of compromise so that the defeated party may not feel a sense of humiliation and the majority may not press their advantage to the point at which it is likely to provoke a revolt.

The relation of the Executive to the Legislature as above described involves the possibility of a conflict between the judiciary on the one hand and the Executive and the Legislature on the other by reason of the power of the court to declare certain laws to be *ultra vires* the legislature which passed them. Such a crisis actually arose in the U.S.A. when the Supreme Court declared parts of the New Deal legislation sponsored by President Roosevelt to be invalid. When the combined will of the Executive and the Legislature seems to be thwarted by the judiciary, it is easy to hold up the latter to popular disapproval. The Executive and the people should learn to respect the independence of the judiciary for its own sake and not allow themselves to be upset by such differences of opinion.

The conferment of a power of legislation (called Ordinances) on the President and the Governors has been naturally criticized as inconsistent with democratic principles. The practice had its origin at a time when conflicts between the irremovable Executive and the expanding Legislatures of British India were anticipated and it was thought fit to arm the Executive with power to pass a law which the Legislature may decline to enact. A plausible reason was found in

the circumstance that the British India Legislature was not continuously in session and emergencies might arise which might not brook the delay involved in summoning the Legislature. The sting was contained in the provision that the Legislature even when it met could not repeal, amend or affect the ordinance passed by the Governor-General or Governor. The provisions in the present Act (sections 123 and 313) recognize the supremacy of the Legislature and give the power to the Executive only as an emergency arrangement. The emergency contemplated by these sections must be distinguished from the more serious emergencies provided for in Part 18 of the Constitution, i.e., threats to the security of the country. The scheme of the latter set of provisions is to vest in the Union powers which in normal circumstances would be exercisable by the States. A further provision (enacted in section 358) is that during emergencies of the latter kind fundamental rights and remedies in respect thereof may be suspended. This provision rests on the principle that the safety of the State when that is threatened is more important than the liberty of the individual, the former being the *sine qua non* of the latter.

Apart from the question of repressive legislation, the problem of Liberty understood in the wide sense of individual freedom of action and private ownership of property raises questions which partly bear on the problem of equality and partly also on the relations between the executive and the citizen. Recognition of the right of private property in the Constitution, in so far as it bears on the theory of equality, requires separate discussion: but at this stage the point of the criticism is that with the acceptance of the principle of the welfare State, there are bound to be serious interferences with individual freedom and rights of property, notwithstanding their recognition in theory. Against such interference, the citizen ordinarily relies upon the judiciary for protection. But the growth of the tendency in recent times to exclude the jurisdiction of the court in a variety of matters imposes a serious limitation on the effectiveness of judicial intervention. This has been the subject of discussion in England for over a generation now. Even if, as held by some, many heads of quasi-judicial duties discharged by non-judicial officers are not capable of being done or controlled by the ordinary courts of the land, it may be a question for the future whether, as many jurists even in England recognize today, the increase in the power of the bureaucracy and the expansion of the sphere of their activities should not be accompanied by a system of administrative tribunals similar to those existing in the continent of Europe. Dicey's opinion on this question is regarded by many as outmoded. The efficiency of writs of mandamus prohibition and certiorari is very limited, because they can only check abuses of jurisdiction and procedure.

The whole problem of the relation of the permanent service to the people must receive a different orientation if democracy is to be a reality. With the development of a socialist policy, even if it does not amount to a communist policy, the sphere of executive action with its inevitable interference with individual freedom and individual rights must continuously expand; and unless such interference is tempered by a due recognition of the principle that every public servant is a servant and not a master of the people, the theoretical recog-

niton of the principle of Liberty or individual freedom will be of little value.

It is an even more difficult problem how to give effect to the idea of equality with due regard to the principle of liberty and individual freedom of action; any attempt at a compulsory levelling, whether direct or indirect, will offend against the principle of the dignity of personality. The endeavour should be to bring about a sublimation of individuality, not its destruction. If there is to be a levelling, it should be a levelling up and not a levelling down. Whatever may be the psychological satisfaction to be derived from seeing other people deprived of advantages which one does not oneself enjoy, it is doubtful if this process will of itself materially contribute to the common good. It is presumably in this view that the Indian Constitution only postulates equality of opportunity for all and equality before the law. It is not likely that those who may be described as leftists will be satisfied with the provisions in section 39 which merely enacts that the State shall direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good, and that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. I do not consider this occasion appropriate to enter into a discussion of the relative merits of capitalist democracy, socialist democracy and communist democracy; but I proceed to make a few observations on the assumption that full-fledged communism with the methods of administration associated with it today is not to be the immediate objective of the Indian Constitution. First and foremost, there is the question whether 'equality' can ever be more than an *ideal*. Many maintain that it is neither possible nor even desirable to achieve an absolute equality among all citizens. They hold that society must inevitably be differentiated on the basis of man's personal worth, qualities, etc., and all that can be abolished is differentiation in terms of social classes or with reference to property. Bertrand Russell has pointed out that the lure of 'power' is even greater than the lure of wealth, that the mere abolition of inequalities of wealth will not bring about social equality and that every increase in the sphere of the State's activity will only emphasize social inequality by increasing the number of men who by reason of their official status will wield power over their fellowmen. The communist experiment in Russia does not so far seem to have succeeded in producing a 'classless' society. 'Social justice' is one of the declared objectives of the Constitution, but it is well to bear in mind that in the attempt to eliminate social injustice the methods adopted should not be such as are likely to bring in new injustices or abuses in place of the old. Even where pressure or coercion is necessary, a gradual and non-violent application thereof is likely to yield better and more permanent, though not quick, results.

The principle of 'fraternity' will come into play not by any trick of constitution-making but only when every citizen will learn to put the good of the community first and his own only second. Social welfare must replace individual gain as a motivation for activity. In other words, people must learn to think in terms of their duties and responsibilities and not of rights and privi-

leges—a principle that Gandhiji was never tired of teaching. Restraint voluntarily accepted is superior to constraint imposed by authority. Free society is the self-disciplined society; for the only true freedom is that which is achieved by self-limitation and obedience to a moral law. In this sense, the solution of the problem is fundamentally moral and educational and not political or economic. In other words, the social and economic revolution of the times calls for an ethical revolution. One writer has gone so far as to say that to expect a change in human society without a change in human nature is an act of lunacy. The general social character of the nation will determine the calibre of its administrators.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES*

By B. SHIVA RAO

THERE is much misunderstanding about the respective implications of the terms 'trust territories' and 'non-self-governing territories'. Both terms are used in the U.N. Charter. Chapter XI deals exclusively with non-self-governing territories, while Chapters XII and XIII with the international trusteeship system. A common error is to imagine that the jurisdiction of the Trusteeship Council extends over both categories.

According to the original scheme of the Charter, three classes of territories were intended to be brought under the trusteeship system, namely :—

- (1) territories held under mandate after the first World War;
- (2) territories detached from enemy States as a result of the second World War; and
- (3) territories voluntarily placed under this system by States responsible for their administration.

So far as the mandated areas are concerned, all are now under the trusteeship system with the sole exception of South West Africa. South Africa, the mandatory Power responsible for its administration, has so far declined to bring it under trusteeship. It was argued at successive meetings of the General Assembly of the U.N. that the meaning of Article 80 of the Charter was clear beyond any ambiguity or doubt. This Article lays down that nothing in the Chapter shall be construed in or of itself as altering in any manner the rights of any peoples, or the terms of existing international instruments, to which Members of the U.N. may respectively be parties. It proceeds to say that the first paragraph of the Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system.

South Africa's persistent refusal to accept the generally-held view regarding the obligations of mandatory Powers under the two Articles of the Charter

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mentioned above compelled the General Assembly, at its fourth session in 1949, to make a reference to the International Court of Justice for its advisory opinion. The Court is expected to give its verdict in the course of this year on whether, with the extinction of the League of Nations, the mandate has ceased to have an operative effect; and secondly whether the Union Government of South Africa has a unilateral right, without reference to the U.N., to alter the international status of South West Africa.

So far as trust territories are concerned, the powers and authority of the Trusteeship Council are considerable. Article 87 defines the functions and powers of the Council. It may consider reports submitted by the administering authorities; it may accept petitions and examine them in consultation with such authorities; it may provide for periodic visits to trust territories by missions appointed by the Council and at times agreed upon by the administering authorities; and lastly, it may take any actions which, in its opinion, are in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

The discussions of the reports of the Trusteeship Council which take place annually, first in the Fourth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly and later in its plenary sessions, are of great value in ensuring that the administration of trust territories is in accordance with the principles of the Charter. An issue of vital importance has arisen whether it is open to an administering Power to combine a colony under its own administration with a trust territory. It has been argued that such a merger is not prohibited by the Charter and that it makes for greater economy and greater efficiency in administration. On the other hand, apprehensions have been expressed by the Trusteeship Council that such a policy may result in a blurring of the responsibility of the U.N. for trust territories.

In general, it may be observed that the authority of the U. N., exercised through the Trusteeship Council over trust territories, is far more intimate than in the case of non-self-governing territories. There is no doubt that the authors of the Charter, in providing for the voluntary transfer of non-self-governing territories to the international trusteeship system, had visualized a process whereby a number of non-self-governing territories would gradually pass under the direct supervision of the United Nations under Chapter XII and XIII. That hope has not materialized in respect of even one such territory. There are, at the present moment, many more territories described as non-self-governing than those which come under the trusteeship system. From the standpoint of population, there are only 15,000,000 people in trust territories as against about 200,000,000 in non-self-governing territories.

It is both interesting and significant to follow the developments which have taken place in the U.N. during the five years of its existence in regard to non-self-governing territories. In the first place, the U.N., in dealing with this problem, showed greater concern for the peoples of what are popularly known as colonial areas than the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League of Nations referred benevolently but vaguely to the need for 'the just treatment' of the indigenous peoples. No attempt was made to give precision to the

term 'just treatment', and the Permanent Mandates Commission was precluded from raising any questions in regard to the administration of colonial areas.

In comparison with the Covenant of the League, the declaration regarding non-self-governing territories in the U.N. Charter seems a comprehensive and far-reaching statement. Members of the U.N. responsible for such territories have recognized the principle that the interests of the indigenous inhabitants are paramount. They have accepted as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost their well-being. To that end, they have pledged themselves to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic and social and educational advancement, their just treatment and their protection against abuses; to develop self-government and to assist them in the progress and development of free political institutions; to further international peace and security; and, finally, to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research and to co-operate with one another and with specialized international bodies for the practical achievement of the social, economic and scientific purposes mentioned in Article 73.

The Charter went even further in giving practical shape to its intentions by laying down a procedure for administering Powers. They were to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General a good deal of information regarding the administration of non-self-governing territories. To safeguard their own rights and to prevent any attempt on the part of the U.N. to impose a system of supervision or control, representatives of the administering Powers succeeded in inserting a number of safeguards and reservations. It was specified that this information would be only for information purposes; that it would be subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require; that it would be statistical and technical in nature and relate to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories—thus excluding information of a political nature.

Notwithstanding these reservations, the U.N. General Assembly has, during the last five years, proceeded by the establishment of conventions to demonstrate its practical interest in the administration and progress of non-self-governing territories. At its first session was brought into existence an *ad hoc* Committee to analyse and classify the information supplied by the administering Powers for its better utilization by the General Assembly. In other words, by implication, it was accepted that such information would be used in a practical manner by the General Assembly and not pigeon-holed for reference in the library of its Secretariat. The *ad hoc* Committee was then assigned the task of drafting 'a standard form'—a questionnaire—to simplify and facilitate the task of administering Powers. The optional part which these Powers were at liberty to ignore referred to political conditions in such territories, while the compulsory part dealt with economic, social, educational and cultural conditions. The General Assembly, impressed by these preliminary efforts of the *ad hoc* Committee to its useful potentialities, entertained the suggestion that this Committee might legitimately go a step further and make a preliminary scrutiny of the annual information submitted by the administering Powers and even make recommendations of two kinds: firstly, those of a

procedural character and secondly, substantive ones in respect of functional fields generally, such as education, health, agriculture, etc. A condition was, however, laid down that no criticisms were to be permitted of the administration of individual territories.

Encouraged by the support of the General Assembly, the Special Committee has been enlarging the field of its activities. It may study not only the reports of the administering Powers under Article 73(c), but, in addition, any relevant documents available with the Secretary-General, and in particular the reports of the Specialized Agencies, such as UNESCO, ILO, ECOSOC, WHO, etc. It has gone a step further now in the same direction: by a resolution of the fourth session of the General Assembly, it is authorized to seek the active assistance and co-operation of the Specialized Agencies in regard to particular problems in any or all the fields mentioned in Article 73.

Thus, from being an *ad hoc* body, with a subordinate rôle and functions, the Special Committee has developed in stature and influence. The question arose in 1949 whether it should be continued or wound up as having fulfilled its various tasks. Administering Powers have been perturbed about the growing authority of the Committee and voted for its dissolution. Some delegations (India, Egypt, Brazil and the U.S.S.R.) on the other hand suggested the Committee being placed on a permanent basis. It may be pointed out that the Charter provides for the establishment of subsidiary organs, in addition to those already in existence. A compromise was finally reached giving the Committee a three years' lease and leaving the decision in regard to its future to the General Assembly session in 1952.

In general, it is a Committee similar in composition to the Trusteeship Council, consisting of an equal number of administering and non-administering Powers. In order to provide for a possible contingency, namely of a diminution in the number of administering Powers, a certain elasticity in procedure was adopted last year electing four non-administering Powers for a full three years' term, two for a two years' term and two for one year's term. The total number of members of the Special Committee at the present moment is sixteen, eight to represent administering Powers and an equal number on behalf of non-administering Powers.

As at present constituted, the Special Committee is an advisory body, scrutinizing the annual reports of the administering Powers in the economic, social, educational and cultural spheres. Political information is not specified in Article 73(e), and therefore it is not obligatory for the administering Powers to include it in their reports. Some of them, however, (the U.S.A. and Denmark), have in practice ignored this restriction, while others, in particular the U.K., France and Belgium, are very rigid in their observance. It must be noted that the Committee has none of the authority of the Trusteeship Council, such as the examination of petitions from the peoples of the non-self-governing territories or sending visiting missions. Nevertheless, even with these limitations on its functions and authority, there is little doubt as to the practical usefulness of the Committee. Of particular significance is the fact that its proceedings

are followed with growing interest by the peoples of the non-self-governing territories.

A stage has been reached in the U.N. General Assembly in regard to the study of problems relating to non-self-governing territories at which administering Powers feel apprehensive about the powers of the Committee. Briefly but pointedly the question is asked: Will this Committee grow in course of time to become a permanent organ of the U.N. with powers and functions in regard to non-self-governing territories now exercised by the Trusteeship Council over trust territories? This fear has been sharpened by the vigorous criticisms of the U.S.S.R. of the administration of individual territories, regardless of the fact that such criticism is, properly speaking, beyond the terms of reference of the Special Committee. In consequence, administering Powers have been resisting, during the last two years, any suggestions for the expansion of the authority of the Special Committee, whether by resolutions or by conventions.

The opposition of the administering Powers has been reflected in particular in regard to two matters. One is in regard to the domestic jurisdiction clause contained in Article 2(7) which says: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter'.

The question is whether the activities of the Special Committee can be regarded as an encroachment on the rights of Member-States under Article 2(7). At every step the Committee has secured the approval and support of the General Assembly through resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities. So far as this point is concerned, a view expressed by Dr. Lauterpacht, Professor of International Law, Cambridge (England), seems to be authoritative. In view of its importance, the relevant passage is quoted below from an address delivered by him to the International Law Association in September 1947:

The Charter does not authorize intervention. This means that it does not authorize compulsive legal processes on the part of the Organization. It does not authorize peremptory demands accompanied by enforcement or threat of enforcement in case of non-compliance; for this is the accepted meaning of intervention. But Article 2(7) does not prevent the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council from discussing and investigating situations arising from complaints of violations of human rights. It does not preclude a general recommendation addressed to Members of the United Nations at large and covering the subject matter of the complaint. Neither does it rule out a specific recommendation addressed to the State directly concerned and drawing its attention to the propriety of bringing about a situation in conformity with the obligations of the Charter. None of these measures constitutes intervention. None of them amounts to legal compulsion.

A second point which has been raised at meetings both of the Special Committee and of the U.N. General Assembly has been the cause of much controversy; namely, what, for the purposes of the Charter, is the definition of the term 'non-self-governing territories'. The Charter in Article 73 provides little real guidance. It refers to peoples who have not yet attained a full measure of self-government—implying, in other words, those who have not qualified them-

selves for membership of the U.N. Secondly, paragraph (e) of the Article lays down that information is to be transmitted by the administering Powers in respect of territories for which they are responsible, other than those to which the Chapters on international trusteeship system apply.

In 1946, after inconclusive attempts at a precise definition of the term, it was left to the various members to decide for themselves which territories, in their view, came within the purview of Article 73. Accordingly, 74 territories were so listed, and these were accepted by the U.N. as a working basis. Within two years, however, the number dropped from 74 to 63. No explanations were offered by the Member-States for their omission to furnish information in respect of the eleven territories. Two questions inevitably arose in this connexion: (1) at what stage in the development of non-self-governing territory does Chapter XI cease to be operative; and (2) who is to determine whether information is to continue to be furnished—whether action is to be unilateral on the part of the administering Powers concerned, or would the General Assembly have a voice in the matter?

The British viewpoint on this problem is best illustrated by a concrete reference to Malta. This territory was mentioned in the original list in 1946, but was subsequently dropped. The reason now urged by the United Kingdom is that though Malta is not fully self-governing (because His Majesty's Government continues to be responsible for her foreign policy), for the purposes of Article 73(e), Malta is fully responsible for the matters covered therein, namely, her economic, social, educational and cultural progress. The United Kingdom is, therefore, not in a position, it is argued, to supply such information.

The French approach is different from that of the British. From time to time France absorbs a non-self-governing territory into the metropolitan area and gives it direct representation in the French Parliament. It thereupon becomes an integral part of France, an overseas possession though it might have been in the past. The fact that it is separated from metropolitan France by sea and land does not, according to the French argument, make any difference in the constitutional position from that of contiguous territories absorbed by administering Powers.

The problem of a precise definition of the term 'non-self-governing territory' to cover all cases has not yet found a solution. At the last session of the General Assembly in 1949, the Secretariat of the U.N. was asked to produce a working paper, to be studied at the next session of the Committee. For the peoples of the non-self-governing territories it is a matter of vital concern. If no practical solution is found, administering Powers may resort to a policy of gradually reducing the number of territories in respect of which they feel called upon to furnish information under Article 73(e). So far, only a palliative has been offered by the General Assembly; namely, that in the case of a non-self-governing territory whose political development is regarded by the administering Power concerned to be such that Article 73(e) no longer applies to it, a copy of its constitution with details of the structure of its administration should be sent to the General Assembly. More cannot be suggested at the

present stage, until the major problem of a definition of the term has been satisfactorily solved.

One other point of major interest deserves attention. Article 73(d) refers to two types of international collaboration: (1) among the Powers themselves; and (2) through the Specialized Agencies functioning under the General Assembly. There is growing evidence of developments within the last year or two of the first type of such collaboration. Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal have come together to pool their resources, knowledge and experience for tackling certain common problems in their overseas possessions, such as the suppression of rinderpest and of red locusts. Such collaboration is legitimate and even commendable.

There is, however, a difference in practice between the two types of international collaboration mentioned above. Administering Powers tend to view such problems primarily from the standpoint of their own economic prosperity or convenience, whereas Article 73 emphasizes the paramount nature of the well-being and progress of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories themselves. To illustrate the point, a question may conceivably arise whether in a particular territory groundnuts should be replaced by cotton. The administering Power responsible for the territory, looking at the question from the standpoint of its own interests, may hold one view. The people of the territory, on the other hand, may take a different view. It is, therefore, essential to ensure that the first type of international collaboration does not throw the second type, namely through the Specialized Agencies, into the background. These Agencies, functioning in their respective spheres in accordance with the principles of the Charter, will stress the well-being and progress of the inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories as the paramount consideration.

Finally, a reference may be made to the different points of view from which members of the U.N. view the problems which come up under Article 73 before the General Assembly. The U.S.S.R. and the Powers associated with it are anxious to get the maximum benefit out of this Article for non-self-governing territories. They are not inclined to pay any regard to the distinction which administering Powers draw between paragraph (e) of Article 73 and the preceding paragraphs, nor to the restrictions contained in the final paragraph. In fact, the Soviet group would like to see the Special Committee made permanent and strong; they would invest it, immediately if they could, with powers and authority over non-self-governing territories similar to those of the Trusteeship Council over trust territories. There are, again, a number of countries, mainly drawn from South America, whose primary interest is not in the peoples of the non-self-governing territories (though that is a consideration) but in the fact that the economic exploitation of these territories with cheap labour and all the resources of applied science may mean the flooding of the world's markets with commodities competing unfairly with their own exports. Then there are countries—notably India, Egypt, Iran, Burma and the Philippines—which take an active interest in the progress of these millions of dependent peoples from the standpoint that Liberty like Peace is indivisible,

India, in particular, has a significant contribution to make towards the solution of these great problems. Her experiences as a dependency under Britain, her struggles for freedom and the technique she evolved for achieving success under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi qualify India to take a leading part in the movement for the emancipation of nearly 200 million peoples scattered all over the world. This is not only India's opportunity for strengthening the foundations of world peace: it is, also, her mission in ushering in a new civilization free from the threat of war.

INDO-AMERICAN TRADE*

By B. N. GANGULI

A study of the orientation of Indo-American trade during the last few decades reveals certain distinct stages of development leading up to the present complicated situation which poses problems of mutual economic concern for both India and the U.S.A.

Before the first World War, while Indian exports were more evenly distributed over the various geographical regions and commanded a widely spread market through the mechanism of multilateral trade, her imports were very largely derived from the U.K. As a mature borrower India had a large import surplus with the U.K. which was more than offset by the large export surplus with the rest of the world including the U.S.A. The period of heavy import balances in relation to the U.K. started around 1875. Thus in 1913-14 our deficit of Rs.59 crores in our trading account with the U.K. was offset by a surplus of Rs.25 crores with the rest of the British Empire and of Rs.100 crores with the rest of the world, so that there was an overall surplus of Rs.66 crores which was the counterpart of the annual unilateral transfer of funds, such as payment of interest and amortization, shipping and insurance charges etc. in excess of new capital imports. During this year the U.S.A. contributed Rs. 17 crores to this surplus; her imports from India being Rs. 22 crores and exports to India being barely Rs. 5 crores.

During the inter-war period Indo-American trade developed gradually. But her export market in India was exposed principally to the competition of U.K., Japan and Germany. However, by 1929 the U.S.A. was supplying India with a large range of important industrial products and raw materials which have formed important staples of her export trade with India in later times, such as rubber and manufactures, leaf tobacco, raw cotton, cotton fabrics, petroleum and products, iron and steel-mill products, advanced manufactures of iron and steel, electrical machinery and apparatus, industrial machinery, typewriters, automobiles, parts and accessories and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. On the other hand, the U.S.A. was importing from India the traditional commodities like goat and kid skins, edible nuts, tea, crude lac, shellac, castor beans, jute and jute butts, jute bagging for cotton, gunny cloth, jute burlap, jute bags or sacks, carpet wool, carpets and rugs and

*A data paper prepared for the India-America Conference, December 1949.

manganese ore. After 1929 during the whole of the depression period Indo-American trade shrank to small dimensions. American sales in 1932 and 1933 in the Indian market were restricted by the increased severity of competition with countries which had been favoured by currency devaluation. But following the increase in the value of the rupee in terms of the dollar after the abandonment of gold payments by the U.S.A. in April 1933, there was a substantial gain in American exports to India. This was, however, a shortlived impetus. The Ottawa preferences operated against American exports to India. The U.S.A. also lost ground to Japan which made a bold bid for Asian markets. The following table would be interesting in this connexion.

TABLE I

INDIA

Percentage of Total Imports

| | From U. S. A. | From Japan |
|------|---------------|------------|
| 1929 | 7.3 | 9.8 |
| 1931 | 10.2 | 10.6 |
| 1932 | 8.5 | 14.4 |
| 1933 | 6.2 | 14.2 |
| 1934 | 6.7 | 15.5 |

The variations in Indian exports to, and imports from, the U.S.A. and their net effect on India's traditional export surplus with the U.S.A. between 1934 and 1937-8 are indicated in the following table:

TABLE 2

In crores of rupees

| | Exports | Imports | Balance |
|--------|---------|---------|---------|
| 1934-5 | 13 | 8 | +5 |
| 1935-6 | 16 | 9 | +7 |
| 1936-7 | 19 | 7 | +12 |
| 1937-8 | 19 | 13 | +6 |

It will be noted that India's exports to the U.S.A. in 1937-8 were Rs. 3 crores less in value than in 1913-14. But the value of American goods imported into India increased from Rs. 5 crores in 1913-14 to Rs. 13 crores in 1937-8. On the whole, India's export surplus with the U.S.A. declined from Rs. 17 crores in 1913-14 to merely Rs. 6 crores in 1937-8. But this fact has to be studied in the context of the remarkable reorientation of India's trade balance in relation to the U.K. during the inter-war period. Owing to the post-war reduction in India's imports from the U. K. and some increase in the U. K.'s imports from India, India's adverse balance with the U. K. had been reduced to Rs. 36 crores in 1929-30, the last pre-depression year. The sensational fall in imports during the first three years of the slump reduced the adverse balance still further to Rs. 11 crores in 1932-3. Then came the Ottawa Agreement which stimulated India's exports to the U.K. without causing any corres-

ponding rise in her imports. India's imports to, and exports from, the U.K. exactly balanced at Rs. 48 crores in 1933-4. India had a small export surplus of Rs. 5 crores in 1934-5 and of Rs. 2 crores in 1935-6. In 1936-7 the export surplus attained the record figure of Rs. 16 crores and declined slightly to Rs. 12 crores in 1937-8. The decline in imports from the U.K. during the inter-war period was explained by the fact that the British cotton textile industry lost ground to Indian and Japanese competition. The U.S.A. and continental Europe also entered the Indian market and became important suppliers, particularly of capital goods, in spite of the operation of Ottawa preferences. But the remarkable reorientation of India's balance of trade has to be largely explained by the breakdown of the multilateral trading system during the Great Depression of the thirties, as the result of which India was called upon to effect a large annual unilateral transfer of funds by means of, not only gold exports, but also direct transfer, on the basis of an export surplus with the U.K., her creditor. During the eight years preceding World War II India exported gold amounting to \$1400 million (of the 1934 gold parity), out of private hoards.

An important incidental consequence of this development was restriction of India's imports from the U.S.A. among other countries outside the British Empire. But we must note that the outstanding feature of India's balance of trade situation in 1936-7 and 1937-8 was that, with the exception of Burma, India enjoyed an export surplus with every group of countries with which she traded.

The problems of Indo-American trade have to be understood in the context of a balance of trade situation which is now just the reverse of what has been stated above. India has now an all-round deficit in her trading account. Before World War II, although Burma was separated from India, yet she still belonged to the same fiscal unit, and the trade with Burma was still regarded as coasting trade, the excess of India's imports from Burma over her exports being mainly accounted for by India's heavy imports of Burmese rice, oils and timber. Burma cannot be regarded as the same fiscal unit now. Furthermore, owing to the emergence of Pakistan as a separate fiscal unit India's dependence on other countries for food and essential raw materials has increased, and it has become more difficult for India to adjust her imports to a lower level of exports, because the latter has also changed its character in many ways.

An objective account of this new situation with special reference to the significance of Indo-American trade can be given in terms of the trend of economic events during World War II and the post-war years. Before I discuss them it would be necessary to call the attention of the reader to the characteristic orientation which the trade balances of the tropical economies had undergone under a system of multilateral trade and as the result of which dollar funds flowed in such a way as to obviate the possibility of a dollar crisis for tropical economies including India. This would form the necessary background to a proper study of a stable structure of Indo-American trade which would answer the mutual needs of India and the U.S.A. in the coming years.

As a source of supply of tropical products tropical Asia (India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon and South-East Asia) has been more important than tropical Africa and tropical America taken together. The export trade of tropical Asia has undergone fundamental changes due to the development of modern trade after the middle of the 19th century. India which had been an exporter of specialized manufactured goods became an exporter of specialized agricultural commodities. Thus tea became an important export staple of Ceylon and India. As the international trade in coffee and sugar expanded, the export of jute and jute bags from India increased. The development of the production and export of plantation products like rubber and of mining products like tin of South-East Asia is of more recent date, and since the early part of this century South-East Asia has been placed prominently on the world's economic map, as the result of both intensive and extensive foreign investment in this region.

It is important to observe the direction of trade of tropical Asia so as to realize the significance of its position in the pattern of pre-war multilateral trade. The following tables illustrate the trend in the case of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon as a whole and South-East Asia respectively.

TABLE 3
*India-Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon**

| Percentage shares from (to) | Direction of trade | | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|------|---------|------|
| | Imports | | Exports | |
| | 1928 | 1938 | 1928 | 1938 |
| United Kingdom | 45 | 36 | 18 | 29 |
| Rest of Europe | 18 | 20 | 32 | 25 |
| U. S. A. | 6 | 8 | 13 | 11 |

During the period of depression the United Kingdom lost ground, as already said, to both the rest of Europe and the U.S.A. But India's exports were centralized into the U.K. channel to a much greater extent, and the share of both the rest of Europe and the U.S.A. in India's exports declined.

TABLE 4*
South-East Asia
Direction of trade

| Percentage shares from (to) | Imports | | Exports | |
|--------------------------------|---------|------|---------|------|
| | 1928 | 1938 | 1928 | 1938 |
| | | | | |
| United Kingdom | 12 | 11 | 5 | 7 |
| Rest of Europe | 21 | 22 | 18 | 23 |
| U. S. A. | 13 | 17 | 30 | 26 |

The concentration of the trade of South-East Asia in the direction of the metropolitan countries owning colonial empires in this region has long been

* Network of World Trade (League of Nations 1932) Table 30

a usual feature of the trade of this region. During the depression the concentration was intensified in respect of the exports of this region. But the outstanding fact which emerges from this table is that the chief market for South-East Asia's exports was the United States of America. The trade of the Philippines with the U.S.A. and that of French Indo-China with France (like the trade of India-Pakistan-Burma-Ceylon with the U.K.) expanded during the depression on the basis of tariff preference. But the exports of British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies expanded on the basis of a world market for commodities like tin and rubber which found a limited market in the metropolitan countries themselves. Thus the U.S.A. absorbed 42% of British Malaya's exports in 1928 and 30% in 1938. The U.S.A., like other industrialized countries, was more important as a buyer than as a seller in this region. Consequently the whole of South-East Asia had an export surplus to the U.S.A. of \$290 million in 1928 and \$110 million in 1938. In view of the fact that the U.S.A.'s capital investments in tropical Asia has been small the bulk of the export surplus of India and other countries of this region in relation to the U.S.A. has been used for the purpose of indirect transfer of unilateral payment to European investors.

The pre-war flow of dollar funds has been briefly described by the U.S. Department of Commerce as follows:*

'Before the War there was a net outflow of dollars from the United States to the European dependencies, mainly because of our purchases of such products as rubber, tin, tea, cocoa and copra. These funds were generally paid by the dependencies to Europe for merchandise, services or income on investments. From Europe these funds moved back to the U.S.A. directly or by way of Canada or some of the other non-European countries which had an import surplus with the United States. Our transactions with Latin America as a whole were largely balanced, although some of these countries obtained funds from Europe, which they paid to the U.S., others used excess dollars received from the U.S. to make payments to Europe'.

It is evident from this account that tropical Asia even during the worst years of the depression had no dollar problem. It earned sufficient dollars for its 'current needs', which under a colonial régime were met largely by low-income consumers' goods for which the American economy was not adapted and which, therefore, largely meant earning dollars for metropolitan powers and transferring the yield of European investment in this region in the form of American goods and services.

We shall now turn to a review of the next stage of the development of Indo-American trade relations, which started with the Second World War.

During the Second World War India's foreign trade was largely canalized to the British Empire and the United States of America which was one big centre of the United Nations' war effort in a global war. The development of Indo-American trade in war-time is illustrated by the following table.

* R. L. Sammons *Current Business* November, 1948

TABLE 5
India's Trade With U.S.A.

| | (in crores of Rupees) | | |
|--------|--------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | Exports (including re-exports) | Imports | Balance |
| 1941-2 | 54 | 35 | +19 |
| 1942-3 | 30 | 19 | +11 |
| 1943-4 | 49 | 19 | +30 |
| 1944-5 | 57 | 52 | +5 |
| 1957-8 | 19 | 13 | +6 |

The increase in the total value of India's export and import trade with the U.S.A. as compared to pre-war has to be corrected by the rise in the prices of both exports and imports. A significant fact, however, is that India's export surplus, which had reached the war-time peak of Rs. 30 crores in 1943-4, came down to Rs. 5 crores in 1944-5 as the result of a greater proportionate rise in the value of imports as compared to the rise in the value of exports which was as high as Rs. 57 crores. But it must be noted that the trade on Government account, which became large and increasingly important owing to war transactions, is excluded from the table given above. There are no means as yet to trace the magnitude of trade on Government account. But it is certain that if that were taken into account the contribution of the U.S.A. to India's foreign trade would be very much larger than is indicated by the above table.

It would be interesting to note the relative share of the U.S.A. in India's imports and exports in war-time.

TABLE 6

| India | Imports | Percentage shares |
|--------|---------|-------------------|
| | U. K. | U.S.A. |
| 1941-2 | 21.1 | 20.1 |
| 1942-3 | 26.8 | 17.3 |
| 1943-4 | 25.1 | 15.8 |
| 1944-5 | 19.8 | 25.7 |

TABLE 7

| India | Exports (including re-exports) | Percentage shares |
|--------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| | | |
| 1941-2 | 32.3 | 19.7 |
| 1942-3 | 30.6 | 14.8 |
| 1943-4 | 30.4 | 20.2 |
| 1944-5 | 20.0 | 21.2 |

Judged by these figures which relate only to private trade, the share of the U.S.A. in India's imports increased in war-time. If government trading is taken into account the share would be much larger. The U.S.A. absorbed about 1-5th of India's exports on private trade account and a much larger proportion if we include trade on Government account.

The following tables illustrate how the share of the U.S.A. in India's export and import trade has fluctuated in respect of certain important commodities.

TABLE 8

| | Imports | | | Percentages | |
|--------|----------------|---------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Machinery | | Hardware | | Instruments |
| 1941-2 | 31.3 | | 39.9 | | 26.2 |
| 1942-3 | 21.4 | | 22.8 | | 18.3 |
| 1943-4 | 16.7 | | 37.2 | | 25.2 |
| 1944-5 | 25.0 | | 28.3 | | 26.1 |
| | Motor Vehicles | Cotton Manufactures | Silk Manu- factures | | Artificial silk Manufactures |
| 1941-2 | .. | 7.1 | 1.2 | | 1.7 |
| 1942-3 | 63.4 | 14.4 | 12.2 | | .. |
| 1943-4 | 80.7 | 9.7 | 4.7 | | 12.9 |
| 1944-5 | 76.3 | 4.9 | 66.7 | | 10.3 |
| | Liquors | Mineral oils | Paper and Paste- board | Chemical- als etc. | Provisions and oil man's stores |
| 1941-2 | 9.2 | .. | 45.5 | .. | 9.4 |
| 1942-3 | 6.3 | 17.3 | 36.0 | 21.5 | 14.1 |
| 1943-4 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 52.3 | 19.0 | 11.7 |
| 1944-5 | 15.2 | 35.4 | 44.3 | 17.3 | 19.9 |

It appears from these statistics that the U.S.A. became an increasingly important supplier in India of capital goods, important industrial raw materials, consumer goods like cotton and silk textiles and high-income goods belonging to the category of luxuries and semi-luxuries. The share of the U.S.A. increased almost all along the line in respect of many classes of imported goods.

TABLE 9

| | Exports | | Percentage Shares | | | Hides & Skins |
|--------|---------|----------|---------------------------|---------------|----------|---------------------|
| | Tea | Raw Jute | Jute manu- factures | Raw Cotton | Oilseeds | |
| 1941-2 | 5.9 | 29.1 | 38.6 | 12.7 | 3.0 | 34.6 |
| 1942-3 | 5.8 | 58.1 | 26.3 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 35.4 |
| 1943-4 | 15.7 | 29.3 | 34.8 | 14.5 | 0.8 | 46.8 |
| 1944-5 | 14.5 | 20.6 | 32.4 | 13.8 | 0.7 | 53.1 |

The U.S.A.'s share in India's exports remained comparatively inelastic except in two commodities, viz., tea and hides and skins.

These inferences drawn from the statistics of private trade would be subject to the limitations that lend-lease shipments and trade on government account which overshadowed private merchandise trade in war-time are not taken into account. If these could be brought into the picture the significance of the Indo-American trade would be heightened considerably.

The post-war position of India's foreign trade and her balance of trade problem have become radically different from the normal pre-war trends.

The problems of Indo-American trade can be objectively discussed only in the light of the new situation that has arisen.

In the first place, India in common with the rest of the countries of tropical Asia is now faced with a serious dollar problem as the result of the disruption of the pre-war multilateral trading system which created a pattern of flow of dollar funds suited to the dollar requirements of this region. As already explained, in former years Europe was able to meet its trade deficit with the U.S.A. through dollars received from third countries (which included India and other countries of tropical Asia) which they in turn earned out of their export surplus with the U.S.A. Since the war the flow of dollars has been reversed. Europe now pays out dollars to these countries. They in turn utilize these dollars along with dollar credits and resources obtained through liquidation of gold and dollar reserves to meet their trade deficit with the U.S.A., because now a heavy deficit on the goods and services with the U.S.A. is typical not only of Europe but also of this group of countries. In the case of Europe the deficit on goods and services has been covered by dollar loans and grants. Countries of tropical Asia have been able to cover their deficits only partly by this means. According to the Economic Survey of Europe in 1948 (Department of Economic Affairs of the United Nations) the remaining deficit settled through dollars coming from Europe to all the overseas countries was \$2000 million in 1947 and \$1000 million in 1948. So far India has not been able to utilize this means at all. Hence India and other countries of tropical Asia have depended upon Europe for the supply of necessary dollars. In the particular case of India the deficit has been met out of the convertible portion of the allocation of sterling balances. Incidentally, if one considers these facts one realizes how the American aid to European economic recovery is connected with the process of settlement of the dollar deficit of countries in the position of India. The possible solution to the dollar problem in this context is that both Europe and the 'overseas' countries, including countries of tropical Asia, should reduce their dollar import surplus and/or increase dollar earnings received from third countries who have an export surplus with the U.S.A. So long as that is not possible dollars must flow from Europe to meet the dollar deficit of overseas countries, unless the strain on Europe's dollar balances is relieved by the direct flow of loans and grants to countries of tropical Asia. Ultimately, however, the true solution lies in the evolution of a pattern of multilateral trade with the U.S.A. as the terminal point in the various transfer routes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this possibility in detail. But there is no doubt that such a development would depend on the realization by the U.S.A. of her responsibility as the greatest creditor country, which means developing her import capacity to the same extent as her export capacity.

In the second place, India no longer enjoys an export surplus with the group of countries with which she trades, with the exception of Burma. The position has been just reversed. The following table illustrates this trend.

TABLE 10
Direction of Trade (Private and Government) According to Currency Areas

| Area or countries | 1938-9 | | | 1947-8 | | | 1948-9 | | |
|---|---------|------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| | Imports | Exports including re-exports | Balance | Imports | Exports | Balance | Imports | Exports | Balance |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| I <i>Sterling Area</i> (excluding Pakistan) | 89,65 | 89,39 | -26 | 187,28 | 195,81 | +8,53 | 230,46 | 177,33 | -53,13 |
| Percentage .. | 58 | 53 | | 42 | 48 | | 44 | 42 | |
| U. K. .. | 48,73 | 58,37 | +9,64 | 129,10 | 106,52 | -22,58 | 152,13 | 98,26 | -53,87 |
| II <i>Other soft currency countries</i> | 19,96 | 30,12 | +10,16 | 76,73 | 78,65 | +1,92 | 111,01 | 73,27 | -37,74 |
| Percentage .. | 13 | 18 | | 17 | 19 | | 21 | 17 | |
| III <i>Medium currency countries</i> | 2,98 | 60 | -2,38 | 12,56 | 4,06 | -8,50 | 14,70 | 3,33 | -11,37 |
| IV <i>Hard currency countries</i> | | | | | | | | | |
| (a) <i>Dollar countries</i> .. | 11,01 | 20,76 | +9,75 | 158,73 | 110,39 | -48,34 | 120,55 | 106,59 | -13,96 |
| Percentage .. | 7 | 12 | | 36 | 27 | | 23 | 25 | |
| (b) <i>Others</i> .. | 31,91 | 28,96 | -2,95 | 9,33 | 16,90 | +7,57 | 18,90 | 16,08 | -2,82 |

A few remarkable facts emerge from this statistical table. While the sterling area (excluding Pakistan) contributed about 60% of our imports before the war its contribution in 1947-8 and 1948-9 was only about 40%. At the same time the contribution of the dollar countries to our imports which was barely 7% in 1938-9 rose to 36% in 1947-8 and was still 23% in 1948-9 in spite of the rigorous control of imports from the dollar area. The sterling area absorbed 48% of our exports in 1947-8 and 42% in 1948-9 as compared to 53% in 1938-9. On the other hand, the dollar countries absorbed about 25% of our exports in 1948-9 as compared to 12% in 1938-9. The development of Indian trade with the dollar countries is a single fact of great significance which has emerged in the context of an acute dollar crisis.

The overall balance of payments position requires to be analysed in the light of India's hard currency deficit and the main causes which explain it. The major items in the balance of payments which are worth considering in this connexion are merchandise and Government expenditure (merchandise and services). The position in respect of these items was as follows in 1946, 1947 and 1948:

TABLE 11

| | Hard Currency countries | | Merchandise (in lakhs of Rs.) |
|----------|-------------------------|---------|----------------------------------|
| | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 |
| Receipts | 88,72 | 1,19,06 | 1,40,34 |
| Payments | 42,39 | 1,44,26 | 1,17,91 |
| Net | +46,33 | -25,20 | +22,43 |

TABLE 12

| | Hard Currency countries | | Government Expenditure (in Lakhs of Rs.) |
|----------|-------------------------|--------|---|
| | 1946 | 1947 | 1948 |
| Receipts | 63 | .. | 1,18 |
| Payments | 49,39 | 49,47 | 61,59 |
| Net | -48,76 | -49,47 | -60,41 |

It is evident from these tables that the position as regards the balance of payments in respect of merchandise during the post-war years has not been so intractable as many people imagine. With the exception of 1947 in which import control was relaxed there has been a sizable hard currency surplus in 1946 and 1948. But the key to the whole situation lies in the hard currency deficit on Government account. The most important item of merchandise imported on Government account is food. The net imports of food into India before 1939 were of the order of 0.5 million tons, but by the end of the war the import requirements rose to nearly five to six times this quantity. Cereal imports from the Western Hemisphere were unknown before the war, although there was no particular problem of dollar shortage.

But owing to the failure of domestic production to catch up with the increase in the demand for food, the slow recovery of Burma and Siam which have been the traditional suppliers of rice and the partition of the country which deprived India of important food surplus areas, India has been forced to import food from the surplus areas in the Western Hemisphere. In 1948 food imports cost India about 100 million dollars which was nearly $\frac{1}{3}$ of the total cost of food imports and $\frac{2}{3}$ of the hard currency deficit. The other imports on Government account from hard currency areas were locomotives, tractors, hydro-electric plant etc. the financing of which can, and perhaps will, be based on international investment.

While the statistics given above clearly show that the share of the dollar area in India's foreign trade has increased remarkably since 1938, a careful study of the trends will also clearly show that the severity of the dollar crisis has resulted in a replacement of dollar imports by imports derived from other currency areas and particularly the sterling area. Imports from the sterling area increased from Rs. 187,28 lakhs in 1947-8 to Rs. 230,46 lakhs in 1948-9. Imports from other soft currency countries increased during the same period from Rs. 76,73 lakhs to Rs. 111,01 lakhs; from medium currency countries from Rs. 12,56 to Rs. 14,70 lakhs; and from hard currency countries other than dollar countries from Rs. 9,33 to Rs. 18,90 lakhs.

The stark necessity of economizing dollars has created a situation which discriminates against dollar imports much more effectively than the system of Commonwealth tariff preference, the incidence of which has now paled into insignificance. In India there is a traditional hostility to tariff preference, because the advantages of a sheltered market for India's traditional exports were not considered commensurate with the sacrifice in paying a higher price for imports resulting from a preferential tariff, apart from the fact that preference creates international ill-will. It is because of this reason that India has welcomed the reduction in tariff preference in many cases in terms of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade concluded at Geneva and already ratified by India. But what should be India's attitude to preference reinforced by dollar shortage?

The answer to this question hinges on the movement of the terms of trade acting and reacting on the balance of payments equilibrium.

According to a tentative estimate, with 1945-6 as the base year, the index number of India's export prices in 1947-8 was 153.3, while the index number of import prices in the same year was only 118.5. In fact there has been a remarkable improvement in India's terms of trade between 1946 and 1948. According to Table No. 11 above the total receipts in respect of private merchandise from hard currency countries increased from Rs. 88, 72 lakhs in 1946 to Rs. 1,19,06 lakhs in 1947 and to Rs. 1,40,34 lakhs in 1948. Of late there has been a tendency for the total volume of exports to these countries to go down. This has been ascribed to increasing consumer resistance to the rising prices of Indian exports to Canada and the U.S.A. But it should be noted that Indian exports are being diverted to the other currency areas which are able to offer higher rupee prices as the result of inflationary

conditions. To the extent that internal prices tend downward in the U.S.A. and the currencies of other countries remain overvalued, the diversion of exports from the U.S.A. to other currency areas will be larger and larger in magnitude.


But there is no doubt that to the extent that Indian imports are diverted from the dollar area to other areas and particularly to the sterling area, the import prices are also bound to rise, specially when imports are increasingly confined to the 'essential' category. Between 1946 and 1948 the unit value of overseas imports of Europe rose by 37 per cent, while there was only 19 p. c. increase in the unit value of exports. As a result the terms of trade in 1948 were about 10 per cent less favourable than in 1938. India has taken advantage of this situation. But according to the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948* (p. 97) price trends during 1948 indicated that the deterioration may have slowed down or halted in the latter part of the year. Moreover, according to the same Survey, 'the rise in European export prices is far out of line with the rise in the prices of corresponding commodities in the United States' (p. 100). If the rise in export and import prices in Europe had corresponded to the changes in U.S. prices since 1938 the terms of trade would have been far worse for Europe in general and for the U.K. in particular. In fact that the terms of trade have not deteriorated more sharply than they have done seems to have been mainly due, *not to the low prices paid for imports but to the relatively high prices charged for exports.*

The relatively high prices charged by non-dollar countries in their foreign trade may be explained by two causes. One is the higher cost of production in Europe than in the U.S.A., which, owing to the rigidity of the cost structure, can be counteracted by the devaluation of European currencies. There is, however, another factor which has nothing to do with monetary readjustment. This is price discrimination which consists in charging high export prices not justified by costs of production or internal prices. It has been estimated that in the case of timber, pulp and paper export prices have been 50 per cent higher than domestic prices. There is a similar substantial difference in the case of British and Belgian steel; in the case of Belgian steel the difference being as high as 100 p.c. There is also discrimination between various export markets, the export prices being higher for countries with soft currencies than for countries with hard currencies, lower for important and traditional markets than for irregular and small customers. Such inflated prices have sustained inflated cost structure and have led to uneconomic allocation of resources. There is no reason to suppose that India has not been a victim of such price discrimination, which has threatened to become a normal feature of international trade.

Enlightened economic opinion in India feels that a reasonable alignment of European prices with prices in the U.S.A. would be conducive to stable international trade. India is interested in the restoration of competition in international trade, which is the essence of what is supposed to be achieved

a remarkable expansion in their exports in spite of high export prices, because they have found markets sheltered from competition by political or monetary affiliation. India has no constraints of political affiliation. But her membership of the sterling area, her dependence on the liquidation of sterling balances with a limited degree of convertibility, and her large dollar deficit have conspired to draw her closer into the network of non-competitive trade which, paradoxically enough, has been the basis of economic recovery in Europe in the case of countries with inconvertible currencies which have developed trade through bilateral trade agreements. In order to create an export surplus convertible into dollars and to wipe out the import surplus with countries which have access to the dollar markets like the countries in the Middle East, the European countries should find it to their interest to seek a reasonably close alignment of their export and import prices with those of the dollar area. This can be the only long-term solution to their dollar problem.

The simultaneous devaluation of a large number of currencies of the non-dollar area is calculated to bring about a reasonable alignment of export and import prices of countries with non-dollar currencies with those of the U.S.A. The lack of alignment and the possible realignment as the result of devaluation can be represented roughly as under:



So far owing to the inconvertibility of non-dollar currencies freely into dollars, scarcity of dollars and bilateralism in trade, import prices in the U.S.A. have been out of alignment with import prices in the non-dollar area; so are export prices in the two areas. Hence the import prices of one area are the export prices of the other and *vice versa*. It follows from the respective levels of import and export prices that the U.S.A.'s terms of trade are more unfavourable than is justified by the rise of American productivity and the non-dollar area's terms of trade are more favourable than is really justified. The devaluation of non-dollar currencies in relation to the dollar would move the levels of import and export prices and terms of trade in the directions indicated by the arrow marks. Ultimately there would be an alignment of import prices as well as of export prices leading to broader and more competitive basis of world trade and a proper alignment of the terms of trade.

If this does not happen the convergence of demand on the sterling area and other non-dollar sources of supply as the result of the devaluation of the rupee in terms of dollars would undoubtedly tend to produce a relative increase in India's import prices compared with those ruling in the U.S.A. Profi-

teering and price discrimination will increase like a snowball process, and India would be forced to raise the sterling prices of her exports as a defensive measure. I am not sure if our position in this respect is not vulnerable.

Taking the facts of the present economic situation into account enlightened opinion in India would favour the restoration of non-discriminatory multi-lateral trade and is interested in the integration of the dollar area with the non-dollar area into a single competing group. It is only under this condition that we hope to see a stable structure of expanding Indo-American trade during the next decade.

INDIA'S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS—ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS*

By A. APPADORAI

I. INTRODUCTORY

THE object of this paper is (i) to describe briefly the machinery evolved by the Government of India for handling national relations with those international organizations in whose work India participates and more specially the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies; and (ii) to examine how far the machinery is effective, on the one hand for the formulation and co-ordination of policies and proposals to be considered by such international organizations and, on the other, for the implementation of their recommendations and agreements (submitted by those organizations) by the Government—either by itself or jointly with other governments.

Before we attempt such description, it is as well to state and emphasize the fact that India is, in this context, a new State. With the transfer of power from Britain to India in August 1947, no doubt India inherited an administrative machinery which has, generally speaking, enabled the Government to start well in its stupendous task of maintaining law and order, creating unity out of diversity, and improving living standards. But in handling international relations, the new Government had, as it were, to start from scratch. This is primarily because these relations under the British rule, had been handled very largely by the British Foreign Office, and by British personnel. It is to the credit of the Government that during the last two years they have evolved on the whole a satisfactory machinery for handling their relations with international organizations. Of course much still remains to be done by way of precise formulation and the machinery for the implementation of proposals of international agencies has yet to be perfected, specially in the context of a Federal State.

* In the preparation of this paper, the writer has received every co-operation from the ministries of the Government of India, several of which have supplied written answers to the questionnaire sent to them; he has also had discussion with several of their officers. He, however, owes it to them to say that he alone is responsible for all statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in this paper.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CAPITAL

i. *The External Affairs Ministry* : The overall organization of the External Affairs ministry has two broad divisions: the Headquarters Organization and the diplomatic missions abroad. They form one integrated whole in the sense that all officials, from the Secretary down to the Under Secretary at the Headquarters and from the Head of the Mission to the Third Secretary in the diplomatic missions, are members of one Service—the Foreign Service¹. As such, any person may be transferred as need arises from the Headquarters to the diplomatic missions and the *vice versa*.

The organization at the Headquarters can be briefly described thus. Under the Minister for External Affairs and the Deputy Minister, there is the Secretary-General; he is assisted by the Foreign Secretary and an Additional Secretary. They in turn are helped by officers styled as the Joint, the Deputy and the Under Secretaries. Work among officers of the same rank is allotted on a territorial basis, i.e., dealing with matters relating to specified regions such as South-East Asia or the Middle East, specified countries, such as Pakistan or the United Kingdom or a specified group of countries, such as China, Japan, Korea and Hongkong.

Two senior officers of the ministry form an exception to this general territorial division of functions, namely, the Director of the Historical and Research Section and the Head of the Economic Affairs. The former, who has the status of an Additional Secretary, co-ordinates the work of the two Branches in the ministry which deal with international organizations and conferences: there is no special office or committee for this purpose.

The Minister for External Affairs is responsible for the normal working of the ministry and for most policy decisions. Proposals to introduce major legislation in the Central Legislature, and cases involving negotiations with foreign and dominion countries on matters of major importance, for instance the Trade Agreements, have to be brought before the Cabinet.

All matters having financial implications have to be referred to the Finance ministry before a final decision is taken. In the event of an unresolved disagreement between the two ministries the matter is considered by the Cabinet.

ii. *Technical Ministries*: Internal arrangements for work connected with International Organizations.

The responsibility for handling international organizations is primarily, as it should be, of the External Affairs ministry; but other ministries share in this responsibility to such extent as their special experience makes a devolution of the responsibility useful and possible.

International conferences with which India is concerned are divided into two classes. Firstly there are regular conferences, arising from India's membership of international organizations or Commissions—the United Nations and its various organs and Specialized Agencies, the Far Eastern Commission,

¹ It should be explained that (i) the Minister for External affairs and the Deputy Minister for External Affairs are not members of the Foreign Service; (ii) some heads of missions are not members of the Foreign Service.

the International Wheat Council, the Copyright Union, etc. There are at present some fifty-six such organizations. Then there are *ad hoc* Conferences such as the Inter-Dominion Conferences, Peace Conferences, Commonwealth Conferences and Political or Trade Missions from India to foreign countries.

For every international organization of which India is a member, a ministry of the Government of India is designated as the Operative ministry. The External Affairs ministry is the Operative ministry for the principal organs of the United Nations such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and for certain Commissions and committees formed under their auspices such as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. For other organizations such as the Specialized Agencies, the ministry which is specially concerned is the Operative ministry.

Regarding *ad hoc* Conferences, for all Conferences on political matters and those affecting political relations between India and any other country, the External Affairs is the Operative ministry. In the case of others, such as Trade Missions, the ministry sponsoring the Mission is the Operative ministry.

The Agriculture ministry deals with the Food and Agriculture Organization and with smaller institutions like the Commonwealth Agriculture Bureau, Imperial Forestry Bureau and the International Rice Council. This ministry has evolved an interesting innovation in respect of liaison between an international organization and the Government of India. A National Food and Agriculture Organization Liaison Committee was set up by the Government of India in 1947.

The Committee consists of 19 members with the Minister for Agriculture as Chairman and includes representatives of the ministries of Agriculture, Food, Health, Commerce and External Affairs, the Vice-Chairman of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, one representative of the Department of Scientific Research, seven non-officials to represent the Legislature, two representatives of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and three representatives of rural interests. It is interesting to note that the Committee has a non-official majority; the fact, however, that the Minister for Agriculture is the Chairman and a Deputy Secretary of the ministry is the Secretary to the Committee, ensures that it will work according to Government direction.

The terms of reference to the Committee indicate clearly its scope and functions:

- (i) To assist the Government of India in the discharge of obligations accepted by them in the preamble of the constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
- (ii) To co-ordinate the collection of information required by the Food and Agriculture Organization from India, and in general, act as a clearing house for the exchange of information between the Food and Agriculture Organization and ministries of the Central Government and the State Governments.

(iii) To assist the Food and Agriculture Organization in all possible ways.

The resolution authorizing the setting up of the Committee adds that while communications on matters of policy will continue to be made through diplomatic channels, all other communications shall be forwarded to the Food and Agriculture Organization by the Secretary of the Committee, and the Food and Agriculture Organization will be asked to address its communications to the Government of India through the Secretary to the Committee.

The Ministry of Labour is the Operative ministry for all work connected with the I.L.O. There is a special section known as the Labour Conferences Branch which deals with all aspects of international work including labour and social problems coming up before the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies or other international organizations.

The Education ministry is the Operative ministry for all work connected with UNESCO. Since the Education ministry is also responsible for the cultural relations of India with foreign countries, they are naturally in close contact with the External Affairs ministry and occasionally papers from the United Nations concerning Social Affairs, Education and allied subjects are sent to them.

The Industry and Supply ministry is concerned with the International Organization for standardization, the Combined Tin Committee, International Tin Study Group, and the International Textiles Committee.

The administrative arrangements for matters connected with the International Organization for Standardization are noteworthy. They illustrate how in an essentially technical matter a Government Department can act through a quasi-Government institution, and yet retain sufficient control to enable it to discharge its obligations to the International Body satisfactorily. India is represented on the International Organization for Standardization through the Indian Standards Institution. This institution is a quasi-Government body registered under the Registration of Societies Act with membership open to any person or organization interested in the object of Standardization. The Governments of the States and many technical and commercial organizations are its members. The affairs of the institution are managed by a General Council constituted by the representatives of the interested ministries of the Government of India, of State Government and of important Scientific, Technical and Commercial organizations. The Minister of Industry and Supply is the President of the Council, and the representative of the Finance ministry is the Chairman of its Finance Committee as the institution is financed partly by the Government. The Administration is otherwise run by a Director acting under the authority of the General Council and the Executive Committee without any direct control by the Government of India. A close liaison with the Government is always maintained through the Industry and Supply ministry. All proposals made by the General Secretary of the International Organization for Standardization come to the Director, who refers them to appropriate Committees and interested parties; the final decision is taken by the Executive Committee.

Other Technical ministries which deal with international organizations are the ministries of Information and Broadcasting, Transport, Finance, Commerce, Communications, Health, Food, Home Affairs, Railways, and Works, Mines and Power. There are no special features about the internal arrangements made by them for transacting their work with international organizations—a Branch or Division in the ministry deals with the subject under the general control and responsibility of the Secretary of the ministry.

iii. *The External Affairs Ministry and Technical Ministries:* Procedure for co-ordination of work relating to International Organizations.

Inter-ministerial co-ordination in respect of international organization affairs has two aspects. Such co-ordination must ensure (i) that in matters which involve policy the External Affairs ministry is consulted by the other ministries and its decision is implemented, and (ii) that every ministry must be supplied with the relevant information by other ministries in all matters which affect its work. In order to ensure that these objectives are secured, a set of rules of procedure has been evolved, defining the fields of responsibility of the Operative ministry and their obligation to keep in touch with the External Affairs and with other ministries when necessary. The Operative ministry has the following functions and responsibilities:

- (a) Correspondence with the Secretariat of the Conference, Commission or organization concerned, receipt of documents and their distribution to interested ministries, notices of meetings, agenda, etc. (External Affairs will be deemed to be an interested ministry wherever another is an Operative ministry).
- (b) Selection of the personnel of the Indian Delegation: The External Affairs ministry should be consulted before the composition of the delegation is finally settled.
- (c) Preparation of briefs for the delegation: The External Affairs ministry should be consulted if necessary by means of a meeting, before the brief is finalized. Copies of such briefs furnished to the Indian delegations to various International Conferences should be supplied to
 - (i) the External Affairs ministry
 - (ii) the India Delegation Office, New York, and
 - (iii) the Diplomatic Head of the Indian Mission concerned.

The same procedure should be followed when supplementary instructions are issued to the Indian delegates when the Conference is in session.

- (d) Making arrangements for travel and accommodation at the place of meeting.
- (e) Obtaining necessary financial sanction for the delegation.
- (f) Informing the Diplomatic Head of the Indian Mission, if any, in the country concerned of the composition and terms of delegations. (India Delegation Office in New York should also be

informed in this regard in respect of all Conferences of the United Nations Organization or Specialized Agencies).

- (g) Arranging for the provision of foreign exchange to meet expenditure abroad.
- (h) Arranging for the release of Press Note indicating the composition of the delegation as soon as it has been finalized.
- (i) Providing the Public Relations Officer to the delegation or its Secretary (with a copy to the External Affairs ministry) with a biographical sketch of each member of the delegation as soon as the preliminary selection has been made.
- (j) Where several ministries are concerned in the agenda of a conference, the Operative ministry will co-ordinate the views of the various ministries concerned.

Other important ways of securing that the rôle of the External Affairs ministry in the co-ordination of policy is duly respected are the following:—

1. Wherever necessary and possible, a representative of the External Affairs ministry is attached to delegations to international organizations or to *ad hoc* Missions proceeding abroad. He is expected to advise the delegation on the political aspects of an apparently non-political question and to apply the necessary corrective from the political point of view.

2. All correspondence to the United Nations or to its Agencies, it is laid down, should be sent, as a general rule, by the External Affairs ministry through the India Delegation Office at New York. Correspondence on routine matters may, however, be addressed but not sent direct to the United Nations and its agencies by other ministries of the Government. Such correspondence should always be sent through the Indian Delegation Office at New York, and copies should be endorsed to the External Affairs ministry. The ministries concerned may correspond directly with the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations without any intermediary but the External Affairs ministry and the Delegation Office at New York should be supplied with copies of all such communications.

3. Before any ministry of the Government of India accepts an invitation to a conference or decides to send an *ad hoc* Mission abroad for discussions or negotiations with foreign Governments, the External Affairs ministry should be consulted.

4. Each ministry should name an Officer who would co-ordinate conference matters with the External Affairs ministry and whom the External Affairs could consult.

5. In cases where delegations to the United Nations Conference are held at centres other than the Headquarters of the United Nations when they discuss matters of interest to India informally with the officials of the United Nations or other delegations, a record of such discussions and minutes of meetings should be sent by the delegation to the India Delegation Office in New York to keep them fully informed of such discussions.

Verbatim copies of important speeches made by our representatives in

Committees and in Plenary Sessions should be obtained and forwarded to the External Affairs ministry and the India Delegation Office in New York. A copy of such speeches should also be sent to the head of our diplomatic mission concerned, if any.

It must be added that personal discussions and *ad hoc* inter-ministerial meetings play an important part in connexion with inter-ministerial co-ordination. These meetings are arranged not regularly but from time to time as needs arise. At these meetings, important items are discussed frankly and fully.

iv. *Influence of Advisory Bodies:* Advisory Bodies are attached to the ministries of External Affairs, Labour, and Education.

A Standing Committee of the Legislature has been constituted to advise the External Affairs ministry. The following subjects have to be laid before the Standing Committee:—

1. All non-official Bills introduced or proposed to be introduced in Parliament, and legislative proposals which the ministry concerned intends to undertake.
2. Reports of Committees and Commissions (not including unpublished reports of departmental committees) on which Parliament is not adequately represented.
3. Major questions of general policy and financial proposals.
4. Annual Reports.

A number of tripartite national bodies have been set up by the Government of India on the model of the I.L.O. Conference and Committees for considering *inter alia* the issues that come up before the International Labour Organization. These are the Indian Labour Conference, the Standing Labour Committee and the Industrial Committees on important matters like cement, coal, textiles, plantations, tanneries and leather goods etc. The views expressed at the meetings of these bodies by representatives of State Governments and employers' and workers' organizations are taken into account while finalizing the attitude of the Government of India.

An Indian National Commission for Co-operation with UNESCO has been formed (a) to serve as a liaison agency between UNESCO and the institutions concerned with and working for the progress of science, education and culture; and (b) to act in an advisory capacity to the Government of India in matters relating to UNESCO.

The National Commission elects its President.

The Commission has three sub-commissions for Education, Science and Culture. Each sub-commission consists of 15 representatives of educational, scientific and cultural organizations, as the case may be, five persons who are non-official members of the Commission nominated by the Government of India and such official members of the Commission as may be nominated by the Government.

The affairs of the National Commission are managed by an Executive Board of 15 members, 9 selected by the three sub-commissions for Education, Science and Culture and 6 nominated by the Government from among the

other members of the Commission. The Secretary to the Government of India in the Education Ministry is Chairman of the Executive Board.

The Commission met once in 1949; it is too early, however, to estimate its value and influence on Government decisions. This much may, however, be said: while there is no doubt that the Commission consists of persons distinguished in education, science and culture, its discussions tend to be somewhat general, and it may be doubted whether such a large body as has been established can tackle concrete questions effectively. The sub-commissions of the Commission may, however, be expected to perform useful work if the Secretariat of the Commission can give a helpful lead and guidance to them in the discharge of their duties.

v. *Procedure for handling requests for information from international organizations:* To see that replies are despatched within the period set by international agencies no special devices have been developed; the usual procedure of diarizing letters and noting the date by which the reply is to be sent is considered sufficient.

It cannot be said, of course, that delays do not occur. This is especially true of those technical ministries like Education, Agriculture and Labour which have to wait for the receipt of information from the various ministries and State Governments before finalizing the views of the Government of India.

vi. *Archival and reference arrangements for United Nations and Specialized Agency documentation:* The Historical and Research Section of the External Affairs ministry maintains a complete set of the documentation of the United Nations, and Specialized Agencies. Each technical ministry has also the relevant documents with which it is concerned, and takes care to keep separate files for different subjects—in respect of all documents received from I.L.O. Spare sets of documents are indexed, catalogued and arranged properly for easy reference. Copies of some of the more important documents are kept in the library of the ministry also.

3. PERMANENT NATIONAL MISSIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

At present a delegation office is maintained only at the Headquarters of the U.N., New York, under the charge of the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Correspondence to the Specialized Agencies is addressed direct and under certain circumstances through the Heads of our Diplomatic Missions in the countries in which the Headquarters of the Specialized Agencies are situated.

The Permanent Representative to the United Nations is under the direct control of the External Affairs ministry.

All communications between the Government of India and the United Nations are routed through the Permanent Representative. Other ministries of the Government of India can also address the United Nations through the Permanent Representative on purely routine matters; otherwise all correspondence intended for the United Nations, Specialized Agencies and the Permanent

Representative pass through the External Affairs ministry. The Permanent Representative is responsible for liaison work with the United Nations.

The Permanent Representative is responsible for hotel accommodation for the delegates, supply of documents to the delegates, Secretariat assistance and to provide other facilities to the delegates. The Permanent Representative is also sometimes included in the delegation and the First Secretary of the delegation Office is also appointed to represent India on certain Commissions and committees of the United Nations.

At present there are no permanent representatives at the headquarters of the regional offices.

4. DELEGATIONS TO MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES

i. *Composition and procedure of selection :*

The primary responsibility for determining the personnel of the delegation to a Conference is with the Operative ministry. But the External Affairs ministry is always consulted before the composition of a delegation is finally settled, as it may wish to attach a representative of its own to the delegation. Invariably the Finance ministry is also kept in touch with regard to the strength of delegations.

The appropriateness of the personnel is determined primarily by their acquaintance with the specific problems that would come up for discussion in a Conference, by the need for continuity of representation and the necessity for keeping costs to a minimum. The need for continuity is realized. Thus the Secretary and the Leader of the delegation to the UNESCO Conference have so far been the same persons; the Secretary to the Ministry of Labour and the Director, Labour Conferences have always been members of the delegation to the I.L.O. Conference. But experience shows that it is not possible to spare the same persons away from their posts of duty within the country at frequent intervals. Further, as the experience of the Labour Ministry suggests, it is found useful to give representatives of various State Governments an opportunity to get acquainted with the working of International Organizations. The necessity to keep costs to a minimum, and specially to conserve dollars, has led wherever practicable to the practice of utilizing the services of suitable persons serving in the foreign embassies, legations and trade agencies for representing India at international Conferences.

The question of including representatives of opposition parties has so far not arisen since 1947, as organized opposition parties have not yet been formed in Parliament. The Government have, however, always made efforts to get the best personnel for the delegations, choosing from officials and non-officials, from Parliament and outside Parliament, from the Government party and from among independent members, men and women irrespective of communal or other considerations. The delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, for instance, was led by India's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., and included the Constitutional Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, one member of Parliament, a leading Advocate of Bombay, a ruler of an Indian State, a leading representative of Indian women, an outstanding indus-

trialist, the Secretary to the Ministry of Law and a Professor of the Aligarh University.

ii. *Briefing the delegations :*

Reference has been made earlier to the procedure for briefing the delegations. Its essential point is that the Operative ministry prepares preliminary briefs; the External Affairs ministry is always consulted upon important issues of a political nature; if necessary, a discussion with that ministry is held before a brief is finalized. Where necessary, the State Governments, and, as in the case of the Labour ministry, representatives of organizations concerned, are also consulted. Briefs are then submitted to the Minister in charge who decides whether the questions raised are of such importance as to justify their being submitted to the Cabinet for approval.

Normally briefs are prepared well in advance of the Conference Sessions, some two to three weeks ahead. When supplementary instructions have to be issued during a Conference the same procedure is followed, with due regard to the time factor, the Minister taking responsibility for them.

iii. *Organization of work during Conferences:*

At a meeting of the delegation convened before the work of a Conference begins, the members are allotted to the various Committees (where the detailed work of the Conference is done) according to their knowledge of the subject which may come up for discussion at the various Committees.

The Secretariat of the Conference has an important rôle to play. It circulates documents and reference materials; it gets summaries and notes of discussions at Committees and Conference sessions prepared with the help of the participating members of the delegation. It keeps the Government of India informed of the major points raised in the discussions and in the important speeches of delegates. To enable the Indian delegation members to meet the members of other delegations it arranges meetings, luncheons, dinners and receptions and generally does everything necessary to make the stay of the delegation comfortable and its work useful.

The Secretary to the delegation keeps an eye on the day-to-day proceedings and brings to the notice of the leader of the delegation any important matter on which action is thought to be necessary. Normally, meetings of the delegation are convened before or after the Conference or Committee sittings, and the day's work is discussed and agreed decisions are taken regarding the line that the delegation should take in the light of any developments which might have taken place since the briefs were supplied. Where necessary, the Secretary to the delegation contacts the Home Government for supplementary instructions on developments not covered by the briefs, or for other instructions upon matters which the delegation cannot decide on its own authority.

iv. *Reports of delegations to Home Government:*

The report of the delegation is usually prepared by the Secretary to the delegation who in turn gets the material from the members of the delegation and submits it to the leader of the delegation who sends it to the Government.

The Report is expected to be a comprehensive analysis of the substance of discussions, resolutions and amendments tabled, and the final disposal of all agenda items, with special reference to the part taken by the members of the delegation in the discussion.

Normally, copies of the Reports are distributed among the ministries and State Governments and placed on the table of Parliament.

5. BUDGETARY OBLIGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND METHODS OF MEETING THEM

The assessments are decentralized and included in the estimates of each ministry concerned.

The amount which each ministry pays to the International Agency concerned depends largely on the rules which each Agency has framed for itself. To the extent that the Government of India has discretion in determining the amount which India may pay to a specific Organization, advice is tendered by the Operative ministry in consultation with the External Affairs ministry and the Finance ministry.

The budget estimates are submitted by each ministry to the Finance ministry by the end of December and the Finance ministry presents them to the Legislature in February. The estimates are defended by each ministry, and the Legislature completes the discussion on them by the end of March. The appropriations are made to each ministry on 1st April; the fiscal year commences from 1st April and ends on 31st March.

The Government of India have so far conformed to the programme of payment and the question of devising means to ensure prompt payment has not therefore arisen.

6. IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS, AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS

The responsibility for the preparation of the appropriate documents—bills, decrees and executive orders—in respect of United Nations work is lodged initially in the External Affairs ministry in consultation with the ministries concerned; the responsibility for such work in respect of the Specialized Agencies lies with the ministries of the Government of India concerned in consultation with the External Affairs ministry.

The responsibility for seeing to it that the necessary legislative or administrative measures are applied lies with the Operative ministry.

The responsibility for reporting to the International Agency concerned on the action taken is with the External Affairs ministry in respect of the United Nations and other matters involving policy in respect of Specialized Agencies. Otherwise, in respect of the Specialized Agencies, the responsibility is lodged in the ministries concerned.

In the context of a Federal State like India, the important problem in connexion with the implementation is as to how the Centre secures the co-operation of State Governments which has to be enlisted if the implementation is to be effective. The extent of the co-operation required from State Governments varies according to the nature of the subject—whether it is

exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Union Government, a concurrent subject or exclusively under the jurisdiction of the States.

Where a subject is in the Union list, e.g. trade with foreign countries, *prima facie* no difficulties should arise; but to provide against possible obstruction from any State, the Constitution has clearly stated that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.²

2. When a subject is on the concurrent list, e.g., welfare of labour, three contingencies may arise: a law may be passed by a State and administered by it; a law may be passed by the Union and administered by it; a law may be passed by the Union and administered through the State agency.

When a subject is exclusively a State subject, e.g. education, the advantage of taking the States into full confidence before the Union Government commit themselves to a course of action is obvious. The experience of the Education ministry of the Government of India is valuable in this connexion. As adequate time is not available for consultation, the State governments are often not consulted by the ministry before their delegations are briefed on the subjects which come up before UNESCO. It is therefore their experience that the State authorities are naturally tardy in implementing the recommendations. For instance, UNESCO recommends the revision of history text-books in order to improve international understanding. The State Education authorities who are to implement the recommendations are not familiar with the background of decisions made by UNESCO and the discussions in the Organization. While they usually agree with what is recommended they do not have sufficient incentive for putting it to practice.

It is true that the new Constitution of India makes ample provision against serious difficulties of this kind, learning from the experience of other Federations like Canada and Australia by laying down that Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body. But it is one thing to have a legal right, it is another to get willing and enthusiastic co-operation. The method evolved by the Labour ministry of the Government of India to secure full State co-operation is therefore interesting and may therefore be mentioned here very briefly:³—

(i) *Before* the Government of India puts forward a proposal before the I.L.O., the State governments are given ample chance to put forward their views on the proposal. The procedure may be described thus:

Usually the I.L.O. discusses each subject at two successive conferences before a Convention is adopted. Before the subject comes for first discussion the I.L.O. prepares a report containing the law and practice on the subject. This

² Article 256.

³ Acknowledgments are due to Mr. S. P. Saxena, Director, Labour Conferences, Government of India, for clear information on the subject.

report at the end contains a questionnaire inviting opinion of the Member States about the broad lines on which Convention or a Recommendation may be adopted. When a report like this is received, the Labour ministry circulates it to all state Governments, Chief Commissioners, all ministries in the central Government concerned and to workers and employers' organizations inviting their suggestions for the Government of India's reply to the questionnaire. These replies are then analysed and studied in the Labour ministry who finally prepares a reply to each question. These replies are approved by the Minister before they are forwarded to the I.L.O.

On the basis of replies from Member States the I.L.O. prepares a draft memorandum containing definite suggestions on the lines on which, if it is so decided, a Convention or a Recommendation may be adopted. This second report containing suggestions in the form of memoranda is for discussion at the Conference. When this report is received it is again circulated as in the previous case to all state governments etc., inviting suggestions on the definite proposals. The Government of India's brief to the delegates for the first discussion on the subject is prepared in the light of the suggestions received from all sources after careful study. This brief is approved by the Cabinet. Next the I.L.O. circulates a third report which contains the proposed text of a draft convention or Recommendation based upon the decisions of the Conference on the several memoranda discussed at the previous Conference. This text is again circulated to state governments etc., for their comments on each clause of the proposed Convention and the same procedure is repeated in the ministry for examining the draft Convention clause by clause and for preparing a draft brief for the Government delegate. This brief is to be approved by the Cabinet. Thus the State Governments, ministries and organizations are given three chances to put forward their views on each proposal which the Government of India puts forward before the I.L.O. In addition to these, the draft replies of the Government of India are discussed at the session of the Indian Labour Conference or the Standing Labour Committee both of which have a tripartite composition and are fairly representative of all state governments and employers and workers' organizations. At the time of these meetings the reply from the Government of India is considered round the table by all parties together. The views expressed at these meetings are fully taken into consideration in the preparation of the brief for the Government delegates. Through this process of inviting suggestions and examination at various stages and discussions in the Indian Labour Conference or the Standing Labour Committee, most of the differences are eliminated or the Central Government is in a position to find out the view which is most acceptable to the country. There is no doubt that the individual opinions of the States, organizations etc. generally differ but the final view of the Government of India takes into account all these differences.

(ii) When a Convention has been adopted it is forwarded to Member States again for ratification. When the Government of India receives the final text of a Convention the Labour ministry studies each provision in the light of the brief and the existing law. If the Convention is already covered by the existing legislation and does not mean any radical change in the laws, decision about its

ratification is taken straightway by the Central Government. Where ratification involves amendment of the existing legislation or fresh legislation, State Governments are consulted about the desirability of ratification of the Convention and implementation of the Recommendation. The proposals in this respect by the Labour ministry are made after taking into account fully the views expressed by the state governments. Questions of vital importance, such as the ratification of the Convention pertaining to freedom of association adopted by the I.L.O. in 1948, are also discussed at the Labour Ministers' Conference which is composed of all Labour Ministers of state governments. If the Government of India decides to ratify a Convention they undertake necessary legislation to bring the Indian law in consonance with the provisions of the Convention. Here again, the State Governments are consulted on the draft Bill. The Bill when passed by Parliament applies to the whole country. Again with a view to take into account the practical difficulties of the State governments the Act may be given effect to in different States on different dates or to the extent it is practicable. Some flexible provisions are generally kept in the Act to provide for adjustments to suit local conditions. So far there has hardly been any case where any of the State Governments have taken a defiant attitude and have refused to enforce an Act passed by the Central Parliament. This means that on the whole the States have fallen in line with the decisions of the centre, once an Act has been passed. This is mainly due, it is obvious, to the fact that the States are taken into full confidence by the Government of India at every stage of consideration of matters relating to International Organizations.

7. SOME CONCLUSIONS

Co-ordination, with a view to achieving the best results, has four aspects. There must be (i) co-ordination among the United Nations Agencies themselves; (ii) co-ordination between the International Organizations and the Government of India; (iii) co-ordination between the External Affairs ministry and other ministries in the Government; and (iv) co-ordination between the Government of India and State Governments in respect of implementation where implementation affects the sphere allotted to the States. There is scope for improvement in all these four aspects.

The lack of co-ordination in some of these respects may be illustrated with reference to the overseas scholarship scheme of the Government of India and the award of U.N.O. Fellowships. The Overseas Scholarship Scheme is administered by the Education ministry which has certain funds for this purpose. Some of the U.N.O. Fellowships are without transport charges which have to be met from some budget head. The overseas scholarship scheme budget is then sometimes utilized by other ministries. Since the Education ministry co-ordinates the arrangements for education and training of Indians in foreign countries, it tends to become the co-ordinating agency for United Nations Fellowship work also. Co-ordination has not been adequate in this regard. The difficulty has increased because of a lack of co-ordination among United Nations Agencies also: the value of Fellowships varies from one agency to

another and there is never sufficient notice for publicizing the awards in India in order to choose the best possible persons.

A more important aspect of the problem of co-ordination is raised by the decentralization in initiative which now exists so far as the work of technical ministries in relation to international organizations is concerned. There is no doubt that, from all points of view, such decentralization is for the good—indeed nothing else is practicable. But it is also necessary that the External Affairs ministry must have an adequate knowledge of international developments in the technical sides to enable it effectively to co-ordinate its own international work. It is true that this knowledge must be not so much of details as of the broad lines of development and their significance from the political point of view. It is sufficient to mention in this context such important technical developments as the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes, the new means for mass education and propaganda, experiments in collective and co-operative farming (as in Israel), the technique of nationalization of industries and the formation of customs unions like the *Benelux*, to realize how much international developments in these fields are likely to affect political relations and developments. It is also true that the procedure evolved does enable the External Affairs ministry to get all the essential information. But what is not certain is whether there is adequate machinery within the External Affairs ministry to make use of the information which comes in for purposes of political co-ordination. The integration of the Department of Scientific Research with the External Affairs ministry, the creation of the new department of Historical and Research Section and the existence of an Economic Affairs Section within the ministry indicate that the ministry is aware of the problem; perhaps, a small Technical Co-ordination section may be created to supply the necessary knowledge and direction to the ministry in this regard.

And, finally, in respect of co-ordination between the Centre and the States. We have referred earlier to the law of the Constitution which gives the Centre overriding power to implement any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or any decision made at any international conference. We have also referred to the practical necessity for the centre to keep the states fully informed of what is going on at international conferences—and indeed to associate them in the process of arriving at its decision—if implementation is to be effective. It only remains to add that if the units are to be fully associated by the Centre in the process of arriving at its decision, the time factor is a very important one, and international organizations will be helping this process if they give ample time to member States—specially federal States—for consideration of proposals, and if they give to each member State as many copies of their communication to the State as there are units in the Federation—for thereby they will be saving the time taken by the Centre in the taking of copies which in some cases may mean from seven to ten days. For the rest, so long as the same party is in power in the Centre and in the States no major difficulty can be expected; where the party complexion is different, difficulties are bound to arise, but no constitutional or other provisions suggest themselves to meet such a contingency which is inherent in this type of political organization.

PEACE SETTLEMENTS IN THE FAR EAST SINCE 1945

By GIRIJA MOOKERJEE

I

THE war in the Far East continued longer than it had in Europe and while Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945, Japan did so only on 14 August 1945. That is to say, Japan carried on the fight for thirteen weeks longer than her Axis ally Germany, and one hundred and twenty weeks longer than Italy. Japan, however, had entered World War II much later than Germany and Italy, and while the Germans fought for 68 months and 1 week, and the Italians for about 39 months, the Japanese fought for 44 months 3 weeks and 2 days.¹ This of course excludes the period of warfare in China which had begun as early as July 1937. If the Japanese invasion of China is to be included then the Japanese will have fought for 98 months, that is, 8 years and 2 months—one of the longest period of warfare carried on by a modern nation in recent times. The Napoleonic wars are no criteria since they were not as intermittent as the war started and carried on by Japan since her invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Within less than six months after the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Japanese had destroyed British and Dutch power in the Far East, the East Indies and South-Eastern Asia up to the frontiers of India and had made themselves masters of the American-protected Philippines and the American outposts in the Western Pacific. Before the end of June, they had got a foothold in the Aleutians and were attacking Dutch Harbour. Territory conquered by Japan during this period was no less than the territory of the British Colonies excluding India and the Dominions. Japan had engaged in the war about 7 million men of whom more than 250,000 abroad, 380 warships, a merchant marine of 7 million tons and several air squadrons. The cost of making this war had never been estimated but it is known that in 1944-5, the budgetary figure for the Army consisted of 83 p. c. of Government expenditures, and the latest estimate shows that Japan lost 1,506,000 military personnel killed or missing since 1937, or 1 in every 46 of the 1940 population of Japan's home islands.

During this war, strictly speaking, Japan had violated the sovereignty of only one country, namely, China. It had entered into a treaty of alliance with Siam, and all the other countries which Japan overran in South-East Asia, were the colonial possessions of European powers, who had acquired them in the past by adopting more or less the same methods. Of these colonial possessions, Japan had acquired Indo-China by signing a treaty with the legal government in France established at that time in Vichy, according to which Japan had accepted, in principle, French sovereignty over Indo-China. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and Burma, the Japanese invasion was not much resisted by

¹ Japan entered the war by attacking Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 and the War formally ended on 2 September 1945, when the Japanese delegation signed the Instrument of Surrender on board the battleship, *U. S. S. Missouri*, in Tokyo Bay.

the native population, for owing to long years of foreign domination, there was hardly any strong feeling against the invaders in these countries. To most people, the change from a French, Dutch or British rule to the Japanese rule did not seem to be of such a great difference as to lead to active opposition. On the other hand, there were in every one of these countries political groups who were so hostile to the colonial powers that they welcomed the Japanese invaders at first, in the belief that they would be able to negotiate their freedom with them.

When, however, the surrender came, all the territories brought under Japanese control from 1941 to 1945, were found to be at varying degrees of independence or semi-independence. In Burma, the group which had actively supported the Japanese, established contact with the head of the S.E.A.C. and emerged eventually as the Anti-Fascist People's Volunteers Party under the leadership of General Aung San. In Malaya, the Chinese and native partisans awaited the arrival of the British with certain doubts in their mind; whereas in Indonesia the Japanese withdrawal had been followed by the immediate establishment of an independent Republic, renouncing Dutch sovereignty over the Indonesian territory. In Siam, the party which had collaborated with the Japanese had been overthrown by a pro-British group headed by the Regent Pridi Panomyong, better known as Luang Pradit, whereas in Indo-China, the most anti-Japanese nationalist group headed by Dr. Ho Chi-Minh, had seized power before the arrival of an Indo-British Army to accept the surrender of the Japanese and had declared the Republic of Viet Nam on 2 September 1945. In the Philippines, however, owing to the fact that the American troops had fought their way through to the inland, a Government favourable to the U.S.A. had been set up on 2 April 1945, long before the final surrender of the Japanese Army. In China, the surrender did not take place simultaneously as many pockets of Japanese resistance remained scattered all over the country and the government of Chiang Kai-Shek could consolidate its authority over the greater part of China and Formosa with considerable difficulty, and that only by the end of 1945. But the northern provinces of China and specially Manchuria had fallen into the hands of the Russians, who had declared war against Japan just a few days before Japan's surrender and had marched into Manchuria and occupied it. This, the Soviet Union had done in accordance with the provisions of the secret agreement concluded at Yalta in February 1945, which had accepted the predominant position of Russia in Manchuria, thus restoring the main features of the position held by Czarist Russia in that area before the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5. The Kurile Islands were also ceded to Russia by the terms of the Yalta Agreement and the Soviet Union also occupied the Japanese half of Sakhalin after the Japanese surrender. As regards Korea, it was occupied by Russian and American troops and the country was divided rigidly at the 38th parallel, cutting the country in half. It is not yet known when and where secret arrangements were made by the two countries to divide Korea in this way, although at Cairo in 1943, a three-power decision was arrived at to restore Korean independence *in due course*. Great Britain, the United States and China were signatories to this declaration.

II

As regards Japan, the plans for its occupation and administration were prepared by the U.S. State Department as early as 1942. A Research Division of the Department began basic studies at about the time and these studies were discussed in 1944 and early 1945 by a Committee known as the Inter-Divisional Area Committee for the Far East. At about the same time, an Inter-Departmental Committee set up by the War Department was doing the same thing for future occupation troops. This Committee worked in close collaboration with the staffs of Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and of the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration. Afterwards in February 1945, a sub-committee for the Far East was formed with the approval of the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee in order to prepare the basis of the U.S. occupation policy in Japan. When, later, the office of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers was created, it became the custom for the Chief of Staff to secure almost always the views of the Supreme Commander before putting his own recommendation before the S.W.N. Co-ordinating Committee.

All this work was done before the Japanese surrender, on the assumption that Japan would be administered more or less in the same way as Germany, without a government of its own. But when at Potsdam it was decided by the Allied powers on 26 July 1945 that Japan would be allowed to have a nucleus of its own government, the whole thing had to be worked out again in the light of the new situation. This situation grew out of the decision of the Moscow Conference of December 1945, according to which, a Far Eastern Commission and an Allied Council for Japan were to be set up with full authority regarding the policy of occupation. Before the composition of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan was decided upon, a Far Eastern Advisory Commission had been set up on the initiative of the U.S.A., which assembled in Washington on 29 October 1945. Great Britain, China, France, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines were represented at this meeting, but the Soviet Union refused the invitation to take part in its discussions, as it continued to insist on the formation of an Allied Control Council for Japan on the model of Germany. Eventually, the whole question was discussed *de novo* at the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.A., Britain and the Soviet Union, from 16 December to 27 December 1945, and it was decided to set up the two organizations we have referred to earlier, to supersede the Far Eastern Advisory Commission. The Far Eastern Commission was to be composed of representatives of the U.S.A., the U.K., the U.S.S.R., China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. Its headquarters were to be in Washington while the headquarters of the Allied Council for Japan were to be in Tokyo. The Allied Council for Japan was more or less an advisory body and it was composed of representatives of the United States, the British Commonwealth, the U.S.S.R. and China.

The Far Eastern Commission was, however, constituted in such a way that the formation and execution of occupation policy became gradually the

task of the S.C.A.P. only, for although the votes of a majority of members including the votes of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China were necessary before the S.C.A.P. could act, the United States was, however, authorized by the F.E.C. to deal with all urgent matters by issuing interim directions. The exact communiqué empowering the U.S.A. to deal with such matters was as follows:

The U.S. Government may issue interim directives to the Supreme Commander pending action by the Commission, whenever urgent matters arise not covered by policies already formulated by it, provided that any directives dealing with fundamental changes in the Japanese Constitutional Structure or in the régime of control or dealing with a change in the Japanese government as a whole, will be issued only following consultation and following agreement in the Far Eastern Commission.²

These urgent matters were often too many but as the S.C.A.P. was to refer these matters to the F.E.C. only after their issuance and as they were to remain in effect, unless otherwise decided by the F.E.C. by the usual voting procedure, it came to mean in reality that the S.C.A.P. could do whatever he liked, provided his action did not go against the fundamental directives regarding 'changes in the Japanese constitutional structure or in régime of control or dealing with a change in the Japanese government as a whole.'³

The F. E. C. adopted forty resolutions on policy in the first year and a half of its activities and these resolutions referred mostly to the new Constitution and the reparations settlement. The deliberations of the F. E. C. were, however, never productive of unanimous decisions, as very often major decisions of policy were made without previously consulting the F. E. C. For instance, when the U. S. Government formally abandoned its proposal for the deconcentration of Japanese industry and finance, at a meeting of the F.E.C. on 9 December 1948, the Soviet representative M. Panyuskin charged the U. S. Government with 'evading' decisions of the Commission at the meeting of the F. E. C. held on 27 January 1949. The U. S. argument was that deconcentration had already been realized by General MacArthur's administration. At the same meeting on 9 December 1948, a Soviet proposal for a new system of international control to prevent the revival of Japanese war industry was rejected by ten votes to one. Soon afterwards at a meeting of the F. E. C. on 12 May 1949, the U. S. A. announced a major change of policy by proposing that the U. S. Government would halt all existing reparations removals from Japan, would take no further action with regard to future reparations removals, and would also withdraw its offer to make available an important part of its own reparations share for distribution among the other countries represented on the Commission. The American reasons for taking the step were supposed to be that: (1) all of Japan's specialized

² Edwin Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, Stanford University, 1948, p.p. 118-119.

³ MacMahon Ball (Cassell) *Japan—Enemy or Ally* 1948, p. 59.

war making facilities have been destroyed; (2) the task of balancing Japan's deficit economy required all resources at its disposal; (3) Japan should be permitted to move towards self-support; (4) there was little or no prospect of a Far Eastern Commission agreement on the reparations share schedule and that (5) Japan had already paid substantial reparations through expropriation of its former overseas assets and, in a smaller degree, under the advance transfer programme.

III

This unilateral U. S. decision was severely criticized by the Chinese and Filipino delegates at a meeting of the F. E. C. in Washington on 26 May 1949. Similarly, the Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan in a letter to General MacArthur on 11 June 1949, made strong allegations against the Japanese government and later at a meeting of the F. E. C. in Washington, the Soviet Ambassador M. Panyuskin protested against the American support to anti-democratic forces in Japan. The U. S. Government, so far, had paid no heed to these protests. On the other hand, General MacArthur has given effect to the American policy by restoring private exports from Japan on 27 December 1949. This, according to him, was the final major step in returning Japan's foreign trade to private channels. He also handed over to the Japanese government the control of Japan's foreign exchange holding which amounted to about 67,000,000, in dollars and sterling. Japan was also authorized to build new vessels totalling 275,000 tons gross and it was decided that the purpose of this was to 'accomplish a reduction in the cost of imports.' As a further step towards the implementation of the new American policy, the U. S. government agreed on 9 February 1950, to the opening of Japanese consular type offices, functioning under the Japanese Foreign Office and known as 'overseas agencies' in New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles. These agencies would not enjoy diplomatic immunity and their primary duties would be the promotion of trade between Japan and the U. S. A. and they fulfil consular functions in matters relating to Japanese citizens and property in America.

As a result of these steps the F. E. C. and allied Council for Japan have been for all practical purposes held in abeyance. They should not, however, be considered to have been dissolved for as Edwin M. Martin says: 'Despite sharp disagreements on one or two major points, the extent of agreement among the eleven countries evidenced by the policies adopted and by the absence of attempts to amend materially the directives issued by the United States prior to its establishment has been most encouraging.'⁴ These U. S. A. directives consisted of: (1) the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July 1945, of which the U. S. A. was a signatory; (2) the statement of policy prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department and the Navy Department approved by the President and officially communicated to General MacArthur on 6 September 1945; (3) the basic initial post-surrender directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the occupation and control of

⁴ Op. Cit., p. 9.

Japan forwarded on 18 November 1945; and (4) the directive prepared by the State Department and forwarded to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on 26 June 1947, embodying a statement of general policy relating to Japan after surrender.

These directives made the Supreme Commander the virtual head of the occupation system in Japan and the United States the only effective occupying power. The occupation was for a limited period and according to clause 12 of the Potsdam declaration, the occupying forces of the Allies were to be withdrawn, 'as soon as these objectives (enumerated in eleven preceding clauses) have been accomplished and there has been established, in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government.' According to clause 8, Japanese sovereignty was to be limited 'to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.' This clause was in accordance with the Cairo declaration of 4 December 1943 in which President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek and Mr. Winston Churchill stated that all the territories Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, should be restored to the Republic of China. Since then, two general elections have taken place in Japan, first, on 20 April 1947 and the second on 23 January 1949, as a result of which, first, a government headed by Shigeru Yoshida the leader of the Liberal Party was formed and the island of Taiwan (Formosa) had been handed over to China. The Yoshida Cabinet resigned on 23 December 1948, and new elections were held on 23 January 1949 as a result of which Mr. Yoshida's Democratic Liberal Party (in reality ultra-Conservative in character) swept the poll and secured an overall majority in the House of Representatives. The Japanese government has now lost its jurisdiction over Korea and Manchuria and, in addition, the Kurile Islands and the Japanese—half of Sakhalin have been annexed by the Soviet Union.

The newly-formed Japanese government has begun to function in accordance with the Constitution which was adopted by both Houses of the Imperial Diet on 7 October 1946 and was later promulgated in an Imperial rescript by the Emperor on 3 November 1946. The draft of the new Constitution was made public by the Shidehara Cabinet on 6 March 1946 after which it was debated by the House of Representatives (the Lower House) and the Lower House eventually adopted the Constitution by 374 votes to 5 (4 Communists and 1 Independent) and the Constitution came into force within six months of its promulgation by the Emperor. The first important feature of the Constitution was the laying down of rules for the direct succession of the Emperor's direct heirs and the second was the renunciation of war clause, (Article 9) in which, among other things, it has been stated that 'the maintenance of land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be authorized. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.'

In the meanwhile, the United States government on its own initiative had issued on 21 June 1946 the text of a proposed draft treaty between the U.S.A., Britain, Russia and China envisaging four-power control of Japan for a period

of twenty-five years after the signing of the Peace Treaty. It provided that: (1) all Japanese armed forces by land, sea and air, as well as Imperial G. H. Q. and the Army and Navy staffs, should be totally disbanded and demilitarized; (2) no arms, weapons, etc., of any description (except small arms for the Japanese police) or any aircraft, naval vessels or 'fissionable' materials should be allowed; (3) no military installations, fortifications, bases, depots etc., should be permitted; and (4) a quadripartite Anglo-American-Russian-Chinese Commission should for a 25-year period, after signing the Peace Treaty, be empowered to conduct investigations in Japan to ensure the total disarmament and demilitarization of that country, reporting to the Allied Powers concerned and to the Security Council. The next one heard of a Peace Treaty was, when General MacArthur made a statement on 2 September 1949, on the fourth anniversary of the Japanese surrender. In this statement he referred to the progressive gains in the fabrication of a system of government truly representative in character and recommended the restoration of a formal peace. Recently, the three Powers Conference in London has discussed the question of a treaty of peace with Japan.

IV

So far as Manchuria is concerned, the Soviet Army entered the territory after having declared war upon Japan on 8 August 1945, two days after the first atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima by the Americans. Japan, however, did not offer much resistance to the Soviet Army. The Soviet forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria by early September 1945 and the Soviet Union had affirmed its intention to abide by the terms of the secret Treaty of Alliance it had concluded with the government of Chiang Kai-Shek, the terms of which were made public only on 26 August 1945. According to this Treaty, the Soviet government assured the Chinese government that it would not recognize the Chinese Communist régime, and that it would not encroach upon China's territorial integrity in Manchuria and Sinkiang. The Soviet Union also acquired Port Arthur as a naval base to be used jointly with China, and Dairen (Dalny) was to be a free port in which certain port facilities would be leased to the Soviet Union, while the administrator of the port was to be a Soviet citizen.

Another provision of the treaty referred to the status of Outer Mongolia and the Chinese government virtually recognized the *de facto* situation there, although later a plebiscite was to be held in order to determine the wishes of the people. A minute appended to the treaty was supposed to have recorded that Stalin had declared that Russian troops would begin withdrawing from Manchuria three weeks after the capitulation of Japan, the withdrawal to be completed in a maximum of three months.⁵ The treaty and its other supplementary clauses were to be valid for thirty years during which period the Soviet

⁵ The correctness of this declaration is very difficult to verify. No official publication refers to it. It was mentioned for the first time by the Chungking Correspondent of, 'New York Times' in a despatch of 27 August 1945. See *Japan's Prospect* (Harvard University Press) 1946, p. 351.

Union was to hand over the railway system and the installations of Port Arthur to the Chinese government.

Since then, the government of Chiang Kai-Shek has totally collapsed and a communist régime has come into being which has been recognized by the Soviet Union as the legally constituted government of China. The Chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese Republic, Mao Tse-tung, has signed a Treaty with the Soviet Union in Moscow on 14 February 1950, according to which an agreement has been reached regarding the Chinese Changchun Railway (the Manchurian Railway), Port Arthur and Dairen. The treaty provides that after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan and in any case not later than the end of 1952, the Changchun Railway would be transferred to Chinese ownership and the Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Port Arthur. Article 3 of the treaty, however, stipulated that the administration of Dairen 'fully belonged to the People's Republic of China' and that all property in the port, which is only under lease to the Soviet Union, would be taken over by the Chinese authorities during 1950. In notes exchanged between M. Vyshinsky and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, it was asserted that: (1) the treaty and agreements signed between the Soviet Union and the former Chinese Nationalist government on 14 August 1945 were invalid; (2) both the U. S. S. R. and China recognized the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic; and (3) the Soviet government would hand over, free of charge, to the Chinese government, property acquired by Soviet economic organization from Japanese owners in Manchuria, and would also hand over to China all the buildings of the former Russian military cantonment in Peking. It is not known whether there are also some secret military clauses to this Treaty.

V

With regard to Korea, which had an uninterrupted national existence for forty-two centuries, a country occupied by the Japanese since 1905, the first allied declaration about its fate was made in Cairo on 1 December 1943 when the U. S. A., the U. K. and China declared that 'the aforesaid three great Powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that *in due course* Korea shall become free and independent.' This declaration was specifically reaffirmed by the three Powers at Potsdam who defined terms for the surrender of Japan. Later, the Moscow Conference of the three Foreign Ministers elaborated the Allied Policy regarding Korea, in a communiqué issued on 27 December 1945, in which it was stated that with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state there shall be set up a provisional 'Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people.' It was further stated that before such a government was brought into existence a joint commission was to be set up consisting of representatives of the United States Command in Southern Korea and the Soviet Command in Northern Korea. The recommendations worked out by the Commission were to be presented for the consideration of the governments of the U. S. S. R., China, the U. K. and the U. S. A. prior

to a final decision by the two governments represented on the joint commission. The proposals of the Joint Commission were to be later submitted, following consultations with the provisional Korean government, for the joint consideration of the Governments of the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R., the U. K. and China 'for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-Power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years.' Subsequently, China also subscribed to this declaration.

This decision was strongly resented by the Korean people and the Korean Representative Democratic Council addressed an appeal to the United Nations General Assembly on 1 November 1946 in which among other things it was stated: 'Nor do we understand the continued imposition of military rule on a peaceful, friendly nation as compatible with the principles of democracy or with the often stated ideals of the great Powers.' The Council, therefore, suggested that (1) the Cairo and Potsdam declarations should be immediately enforced; (2) all American and Russian military forces should be withdrawn; and (3) the interim Korean government should be immediately admitted to membership in the United Nations. Afterwards at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow, a letter written by General Marshall was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Minister on 11 April 1947, in which the American Secretary of State mentioned that 'unfortunately the work of the Joint Commission became stalemated after a short time through the inability to agree on the definition of the word 'democratic.' He, therefore, suggested that both the governments should instruct their commanders in Korea to reconvene the Joint Commission and charge it with expediting its work under the terms of the Moscow Agreement, on a basis of respect for the democratic rights of freedom of opinion.

But, alas, the two foreign ministers could not agree on the definition of the word 'democratic' and the Soviet Foreign Minister in his reply of 22 April 1947, stated that while 'considerable progress has been achieved in the field of democratization in Northern Korea, where two-fifths of the Korean population reside,' the American delegation at the meetings of the Joint Commission in March-May 1946, had precluded the participation of a series of major 'democratic' organizations of Southern Korea. He, therefore, suggested that a provisional 'democratic' government should be established in order to (1) expedite the political and economic amalgamation of Korea as a self-governed state independent of foreign interference which fact would eliminate the division of the country into two zones; (2) the establishment of democratic bodies of power throughout Korea by free elections on the basis of general and equal suffrage; and (3) aid to the Korean nation in restoring Korea as an independent, democratic state and in developing the national economy and national culture.

As none of the two governments were inclined to modify their attitude, the Political Committee of the U. N. adopted a proposal on 30 October 1947, that a U. N. Commission should be established to facilitate and observe the Korean elections. The U. S. S. R. and the Slav bloc did not vote and there were 7 abstentions. As a result of this proposal, the Commission was set up

by the General Assembly on 14 November 1947, with Mr. K. P. S. Menon, at that time Indian Ambassador in Nanking, as Chairman. The Commission submitted its report to the Little Assembly on 19 February 1948, and suggested that instead of a separate election in the American zone, 'consultative elections,' that is to say, election of political leaders from both the zones should be held so that they might confer among themselves and with the U. N. on the establishment of national unity. The Little Assembly rejected the majority recommendations of the Commission and decided on 20 February 1946 by 31 votes to 2 to accept the U. S. proposal that full elections should be held in the American zone on 10 May 1948.

In the meanwhile, a Soviet-sponsored 'All-Korean Joint Political Conference' was held at Pyongyang on 23 April 1948, and it was decided there to prevent the holding of separate elections in South Korea. Nevertheless, the South Korean election took place on 10 May 1948 and the U. N. Korean Commission reported on 30 June 1948, that it unanimously approved of the manner in which the elections had been held. After the elections, the Korean National Assembly, meeting for the first time in Seoul on 31 May 1948, adopted a new constitution for the Democratic Republic of Korea and it also elected a President on 20 July 1948. During the same period, however, the Korean People's Committee in North Korea had adopted a constitution on 1 May 1948, for the whole of Korea, after which it was announced on 11 September 1948, that a Democratic People's Republic of Korea had been constituted at Pyongyang to which formal recognition was granted by the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The U.S.A. and China gave *de facto* recognition to the South Korean government on 12 August 1948. In the meantime, the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from North Korea was completed on 25 December 1948. On the other hand, an agreement was signed in Seoul on 10 December 1948 by the South Korean Premier and the U.S. representative for assistance of 300 million dollars by the U.S. Economic Co-operation Administration over the next three years. Soon afterwards, the U.N. General Assembly in its Paris session recognized the South Korean government as the legal government of Korea and when on 16 February 1949, a request from the North Korean government was made to the Security Council, it was rejected by 8 votes to 2, the two in its favour being the U.S.S.R. and Ukraine. The Soviet Government has, however, entered into a 10 years agreement with the North Korean government on 17 March 1949 for economic and cultural collaboration. The United States on the other hand, made it known in the form of President Truman's message to Congress on 25 July 1949, that Korea was to be a beneficiary of 300,580,000 million grant for the supply of arms, technical assistance and training services allocated also to Greece, Turkey, Persia and the Philippines. This aid was finally embodied in the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 and was signed by the President on 6 October 1949, but in the process of debates in both the Houses, the original estimate was reduced to 27,640,000 dollars, allocated to Korea, Persia and the Philippines only. The United States has subsequently in a note on 4 April 1950, asked the South Korean government to hold national elections in May 1950 and a proposal is at present

before the U.S. Congress, for 100 million dollars aid to South Korea for the fiscal year beginning from July 1950.

VI

In China, the failure to obtain stable peace conditions was largely due to the secret agreement entered into at Yalta on 11 February 1945, by the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and the U.K. according to which, as mentioned already, certain concessions were made to the U.S.S.R. in exchange of her entry into the war against Japan, 'in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated.' The provisions of this secret pact were made public only on 11 February 1946, but, in the meantime, a series of exchanges of notes and agreements had formalized the relationship between China and the U.S.S.R. which were embodied in a communiqué issued on 27 December 1945, by the three Foreign Ministers after the Moscow Conference. But already the relations had become strained between the war-time allies; and the United States in its note to China and the U.S.S.R. on 9 February 1946, took exception to 'exclusive Sino-Soviet control over industrial enterprises in Manchuria.' Again, on 3 January 1947, the United States in a note to China and the U.S.S.R. asked them that 'normal conditions may be established in Dairen which will permit American citizens to visit and reside at Dairen in pursuit of their legitimate activities.' Thus, strained relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and China and the U.S.S.R. on the other, began soon to be reflected in the internal situation of the country where, by the summer of 1947, the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists were fully engaged in a civil war. By 1947, the fruits of hard-won victory and peace were thus frittered away although the U.S.A. continued without taking sides to help the government of Chiang Kai-Shek until 7 January 1947, when the Marshall Mission came to a close and General Marshall as Secretary of State ordered on 29 January 1947, the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from China. Simultaneously, the Peiping Executive Headquarters was dissolved which led to abandonment of the American policy of mediation in China. At about the same time, the military position of the Nationalist government very precarious in Manchuria and the inflation led to the disorganization of economic life of the nation. This situation was ably summed up by Harold R. Isaacs who wrote in 1947: 'two years after the defeat of Japan, the Chinese people were in a plight worse than any that war had ever produced.'⁶

Subsequent events in that great country proved the forebodings of the author to be correct, leading finally to the flight of the entire government from the metropolitan area and the establishment of the Government of Mao Tse Tung in Peiping. Nevertheless, during the period of its existence, various attempts and some of them quite successful, were made by the Nationalist government to consolidate the peace settlements such as the signing of a Treaty with France on 28 February 1946, in Chungking, regarding the withdrawal of troops from Indo-China, the abolition of French extra-territorial rights in China, the pur-

⁶ Harold R. Isaacs, *New Cycle in Asia*, Macmillan, New York, 1947, p. 51.

chase of the Chinese section of the Kunming railway, the creation of a Chinese free zone at Haiphong, the development of rail connexions between China and Indo-China and statute regulating the rights of the Chinese population in Indo-China. Similarly, treaties abolishing extra-territorial rights were signed with Italy (incorporated in the Italian Peace Treaty) and Portugal on 3 April 1947. Diplomatic relations were established with India on Embassy level on 22 October 1946, and these relations were restored with Siam by signing of the Sino-Siamese treaty of 23 January 1946.

But by January 1950, the Civil War had nearly ended and the People's Republic of China had already been inaugurated in Peking on 1 October 1949. The control of the Nationalist authorities in January 1950 extended over the islands of Formosa and Hainan only and parts of the remote provinces of Yunnan, Sikang and Chinghai.⁷ On the other hand, the government of Mao Tse Tung at that time was in possession of the whole of China's mainland except Tibet and parts of China's 'Far West'. His government was officially recognized by the Soviet government on 2 October 1949 and it was recognized by Bulgaria and Rumania on 3 October, by Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on 4 October, and by Yugoslavia on 5 October 1949. Later, diplomatic recognition was given by Burma on 9 December 1949, by India on 30 December 1949, by Pakistan on 4 January 1950 by Great Britain, Ceylon and Norway on 6 January, by Denmark and Israel on 9 January, by Finland and Afghanistan on 13 January and Sweden on 14 January 1950. At the present moment this government seems to be the only stable and effective government in China.

VII

The case of Indo-China, though different, falls within the political pattern of the Far East and as such is of great importance. According to an agreement, Indian and British troops of the 20th Indian Division occupied the Indo-Chinese territory south of the 16th parallel on 13 September 1945 and the north part of the parallel was occupied by the Chinese troops on 16 and 17 September 1945. The Indo-British troops on their arrival in Saigon, however, found that the city and the surroundings were under the control of an Annamite independence movement called 'Viet-Minh' and they also discovered that during the Japanese occupation, the Empire of Annam had been recognized as an independent state by the Japanese under the name of Vietnam. Fighting, however, broke out between the Vietnamese and the French, on the arrival of French troops in Indo-China, but a cease-fire agreement was reached on 2 October 1945. On 6 March 1946, a treaty was signed at Hanoi by the French government and Dr. Ho Chi-Minh, the Annamite nationalist leader, regulating the status of Annam in the projected Indo-Chinese Union, and its terms were that: (1) France recognized the Republic of Vietnam as a free State with its own government, parliament, army and finances; (2) the Vietnam government agreed to welcome the French troops who in accordance with the Sino-French agreement would relieve the Chinese troops north of the 16th parallel; (3) both

⁷ Since then, the Communist forces have occupied Hainan also towards the end of April 1950.

sides would cease hostilities; and (4) further discussions *concerning mainly the foreign relations of Vietnam* should take place either in Paris, Hanoi or Saigon. The control of the area by the Indo-British troops ceased on 4 March 1946.

On 1 June 1946, the French government announced that it would recognize the Republic of Cochin China as an independent state of the Indo-Chinese Federation within the '*Union Française*' and a Conference was convened at Fontainebleau on 9 July 1946, to discuss mainly the place of Vietnam within the '*Union Française*' and the general idea of the Indo-Chinese Federation. The Conference broke down on account of complete divergence of views between the two delegations but another Conference was convened at Dalat on 1 August 1946, in which the delegates of Cambodia, Laos, and Cochin-China took part in order to outline the nature of the Indo-Chinese Federation. Vietnam did not take any part in the discussion. In spite of this French attempt to sidetrack the main issue, a *modus vivendi* was signed by Dr. Ho Chi-Minh on 14 September 1946; (1) providing for a mixed commission to settle urgent questions; (2) ordering cessation of hostilities on both sides in Cochin-China and (3) guaranteeing the population of this region the enjoyment of democratic liberties. But from the end of November 1946, hostilities broke out again between the Vietnam nationalists and the French troops brought into Indo-China. Fresh proposals were finally made by the French government for settling the conflict on 10 September 1947, which according to M. Bollaert were to be accepted or rejected as a whole. The Vietnam government (reconstituted on 6 November 1946 with Dr. Ho as the Premier) rejected these proposals because the autonomy proposed would not enable Vietnam to possess her own armed forces or diplomatic representatives.

This stalemate continued until March 1949. The French government, in the meanwhile, had succeeded in persuading the ex-Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, to enter into an agreement and consequently it was signed on 8 March 1949, in Paris, the substance of which was that Vietnam was to be guaranteed independence within the framework of the French Union and France was to possess strategic bases in Vietnam and the right of free passage of the French forces on Vietnamese territory. The formal exchange of letters ratifying this agreement took place at Saigon on 14 June 1949, and the first Vietnamese Cabinet with Bao Dai as the Chief of State was announced on 30 June 1949.⁸ Cochin China surrendered its powers to Bao Dai on 23 June 1949, and on 19 July 1949, a treaty was signed in Paris according to which Laos became an independent sovereign State within the framework of the French Union. On 8 August 1949, Tang Ngoc Danh the head of the Vietminh delegation in Paris declared that the French government insisted on conducting a policy of colonial reconquest against Vietnam in spite of Ho Chi-Minh's numerous peace proposals.

After this declaration, combined operations by the French armed forces were begun against the Vietminh forces in the north. The Vietminh Party as a coun-

⁸ After the resignation of this Cabinet, the formation of a new ministry was announced on 7 May 1950.

ter measure announced the formation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 14 January 1950 and diplomatic recognition was awarded to it by China on 19 January, the U.S.S.R. on 30 January, Czechoslovakia on 2 February and Rumania and Hungary on 3 February 1950. Diplomatic recognition was also given to this government by Bulgaria on 8 February and by Albania on 13 February 1950. In its official declaration the new government claimed to be 'the sole government representing the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people.' The Bao Dai government, on the other hand, signed a series of conventions on 30 December 1949, implementing the Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of 8 March 1949, providing for the transfer of administrative powers from French into Vietnamese hands. The Assembly of the French Union (an advisory body) approved on 20 January 1950 the ratification of the treaties making Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia independent States within the French Union and diplomatic recognition was awarded to these countries by the U.S.A. and the U.K., Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia on 7 and 8 February 1950, New Zealand on 9 February, by Greece on 11 February, by Italy on 19 February and by Siam on 1 March 1950.

VIII

Peace was restored to the Philippines by the proclamation of its independence by the President of the U.S.A. on 4 July 1946. Earlier, on 2 July 1946, legislation was passed by Congress: (1) releasing Filipino nationals from obligations to serve in the U.S. Army; and (2) permitting the annual entry of 100 Filipino citizens to the U.S.A. The Filipino Cabinet was formed on 28 April 1946, after the general elections, with Brig. General Roxas as its President. In Siam, the state of war ended after the signature of a peace treaty on 1 January 1946, by India and Britain on the one hand and the Kingdom of Siam on the other. Australia subscribed to the treaty on 10 April 1946, and diplomatic relations were re-established with France on 30 April 1949, after the acceptance by the Siamese Parliament, on 13 August 1947, the decision of the Mixed Conciliation Commission appointed by U.N. in connexion with the Franco-Siamese dispute on the Indo-Chinese frontier. As regards other adjacent countries, peace settlements in Indonesia took the form of a legislation passed by both Houses of the Dutch Parliament renouncing Dutch sovereignty over the territories which were to form the United States of Indonesia. In war-devastated Burma, peace came after the passing of the Burma Independence Bill on 10 December 1947, by the British Parliament, which made Burma a sovereign state 'neither forming part of H.M.'s dominions nor entitled to His Majesty's protection.' This peace, however, was somewhat disturbed owing to a revolt organized against the government by the Burmese Communists, but it seems that peace is slowly returning to that country. In Malaya, which was occupied by the Japanese during the war, a new constitution was granted by the British Parliament which gave a limited amount of self-government to the population and the Malayan Union came into being on 1 April 1946. The movement for the modification of the constitution has taken a serious turn recently, and in some parts of Malaya there are open revolts against the established authority.

Thus, we see that in spite of the years which have elapsed since the termination of the war in the Far East, the prospects of an early establishment of normal peaceful conditions in that region seem to be very remote. Japan, with whom a treaty of peace was to be signed, has become the subject of intense quarrel among the Great Powers and the object of much cajoling from both sides. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff have, it appears, surveyed Japan recently for planning war bases and General Eichelberger, General MacArthur's Assistant and the United States Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs has declared recently that within twenty-four hours after the outbreak of any war, the Japanese would be on the American side. On the other hand, it has been reported that the Soviet Union has proposed to hand back the Kuriles to Japan provided Japan agrees to a trade pact with Communist China. These are no signs of an early peace and the peace settlements which have taken place in the Far East have settled practically nothing and, in fact, they have endangered peace to a great extent.

THE KARENS OF BURMA*

By W. S. DESAI

THE indigenous races of Burma are overwhelmingly of the Mongolian stock. There are three main divisions: (i) The Tibeto-Burman; (ii) the Mon-Khmer; (iii) the Tai-Chinese. Each family is further divided into groups, and each group into a number of branches. The Karens together with the Shans, Siamese, Hkuns, Lus, Laos, etc., belong to the Tai-Chinese family.

Out of 17 millions of the people of Burma, the Karens number about two millions, numerically being second to the Burmans. They migrated into the country perhaps earlier than did the Tibeto-Burmans. They settled principally in Burma, but numbers of them found a home also in Siam. The only exclusive Karen country is the hill region of the Toungoo district and the Karenni sub-division. In the Karenni there are five Karen Chiefs over five states, with an area of nearly 5000 sq. miles and a population of about 50,000. Besides, one Karen Chief rules over a Shan State in Burma, and five other states are ruled by Taungthu Chiefs in the Shan States. The majority of Karens now live in Lower Burma.

Linguistically the Karens may be divided into three groups: the Sgaw, the Pwo, and the Bwe, the most numerous of them being the Pwo. The Sgaw are found in the Irrawaddy Delta from Prome southwards, and from the Arakan coast eastwards to Lakong in Siam. The Pwo inhabit the coastal region from Arakan to Mergui. Included among the Pwo are the Tanugthu tribes called the Pao. They are to be found in the region from Thaton northwards to beyond Taunggyi in the Southern Shan States. The Bwe are the least numerous, perhaps not more than 60,000. They live in the vicinity of Toungoo and hold the Karenni country in the mountainous region.

According to Karen tradition, 'Htaw Men Pa' was the founder or progenitor

* A talk under the auspices of the Council at New Delhi on 25 April 1950.

of their race. They lived somewhere towards the 'north', but over-population made them move out. The term Karen is the Burmese Kayin. This most probably is derived from Ka-ya, which in turn is a variation of the Chinese tribal name Chiang: Ch—people, Yang—the tribal name. The Sgaw Karens call themselves 'Pgha K'Nyaw': Pgha—people; K'Nyaw: 'K' is prefix for tribal names, such as, Kachin, Kathe, Karok, etc.; and 'Nyaw'—Yang which is a Chinese tribal name. So that the Karens originally, it appears, belonged to China, their early homes being in the Nanchao or Yunnan region.

The Karen language is Sinitic, belonging to the Siamese-Chinese sub-family. It is monosyllabic. Till the arrival of Christian missionaries they had no script, and so possessed no literature. All tradition, songs, prayers, etc., were handed down from generation to generation by word of mouth. American Baptist missionaries in the 19th century invented a Karen script which is really an adaptation of the Burmese script. They translated the Bible into Karen and published it. There is now a growing Karen literature.

The Karens are broken up into many tribes, but there is great similarity of dialects and traditions. On the whole, however, they are wanting in social solidarity. Besides agriculture, they engage in hunting, fishing, spinning, weaving, mat-making and basketry. Karens in modern Burma have in large numbers taken service in the Armed and Police forces, in the Railway and government offices, in hospitals and in educational institutions. Before the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1942, American missionaries had a University institution in Rangoon, called the Judson College, which was once called Karen College: The Karens are a lovable people, very hospitable, marked by simplicity and verity: 'a dour industrious people with solid character and honesty.' They are amenable to discipline, and under the British they conducted themselves very acceptably in the armed forces. Karen women have distinguished themselves as nurses both in homes and in hospitals. They are great lovers of music, and both men and women have excellent voices. They have taken to European tunes and can sing most charmingly. They are very fond of drums, the possession of bronze drums being a sign of wealth and importance with them. The national costume of men consists of short black trousers and a tunic. Women wear a petticoat, and over it a tunic more prettily made than that used by men.

The ancient religion of the Karens was Animism, that is, the fear and worship of spirits. The vast majority of them still hold to it, mingled with elements of Buddhism. They believe in three distinct moral and religious conceptions: (i) 'Pgcho' is an impersonal power or force. Perhaps they mean by it the spirit and the soul; (ii) the spirits in nature which should be feared and propitiated; (iii) the Y'wa tradition.

Their conception of 'Y'wa' is one of the most interesting features in their history. Y'wa is really the Yaveh or Jehovah of the Hebrews. They have stories of creation and the fall of man through eating the forbidden fruit; but instead of two trees there are seven, only one of them being evil and defiling. Stories of the Flood and of the division of mankind at Babel are also preserved by them. They have indeed the Hebrew tradition, but there is no

trace of anything Messianic in their folklore. Y'wa is the Eternal God, while Karen is His eldest son. The tradition is that they once had 'The Book' containing their beliefs and the truth concerning Y'wa; but due to the unbelief of their Elders it was lost. Y'wa Himself had given the book to them, so that the loss was a grievous sin. They have also a prophecy that the White Brother would bring this lost book back to them. This must be the Old Testament prophecy concerning Christ the Messiah, the sinless spotless one. Here are two verses on the book:—

The book of the ages was rooted by the pigs
At first the women neglected it;
The men also did not look at it.
If both men and women had studied it,
All the world would have been happy.

Our book of gold that Y'wa gave,
Our book of silver that he gave,
The elders did not obey:
Lost, it wandered to the foreigner.

It is thought by some that the Karens at some time of their history came under the influence of Nestorian Christian missionaries who are known to have visited China in about the 7th century A.D. If so, it is strange that the Karens have no Messianic tradition or stories whatever. Again this Nestorian date does not fit in with the migration of the Karens into Burma, which took place centuries earlier. It is also suggested that they are of the stock of the ten 'lost tribes of the children of Israel'. It seems certain, however, that the Karens at some time in their wanderings, perhaps in China, came into touch with the Jews and the Old Testament. This Hebraic influence is clearly to be seen in their poems:—

When first the earth was made,
Who worked and built it ?
When it was first formed,
Who was the Creator?

When first the world was created
The edolins and the termite toiled together,
When the earth was first formed,
These two helped each other and made it.

When first the earth was formed
It was Y'wa who formed it.
When first the world was fashioned,
It was God who fashioned it.

Y'wa is eternal, He alone existed
Before the world was made; His throne
Interminable ages stood,
And He, the everlasting God.

Two worlds may pass, and yet He lives,
Perfect in attributes divine,
Age after age His glories shine.

Y'wa is unchangeable, eternal,
He was in the beginning of the world.
Y'wa is endless and eternal;
He existed in the beginning of the world.
The life of Y'wa is endless;
A succession of worlds does not measure his existence.
Y'wa is perfect in every meritorious attribute,
And dies not in succession on succession of worlds.

The Karens, like the Israelites, have also propitiatory sacrifices and healing offerings. They are found indeed in all parts of the world; but the Karen mode and invocation is highly Hebraic in character. Prayer offered at the Great Sacrifice performed by the Sgaw Karens is a good example. The chiefs and elders place their hands upon the animals to be sacrificed, while the young men offer the following prayer, and then slay the animals, and sprinkle the blood around the place of sacrifice. It has some resemblance to the Jewish Day of Atonement. The Karen prayer:—‘O Lords of land and water, O Lords of mercy. Lest the country should be stricken and the grain destroyed; lest the people should be distressed and pestilence come upon them, we put our sins on these buffaloes, oxen and goats. From this day henceforth may it please you to disregard our sins. Let illness not come upon our people. O ye Great Spirits that rule the heaven and the earth, receive our offerings, and have mercy upon us. From now on may our land be fruitful, may the work of our children prosper, may they keep well. Forget our evil deeds which bring distress. May these things come to pass because of the offerings that we are now making’.

Christian Missions, particularly the Baptists, have made great progress among the Karens. There are now about 300,000 Karen Christians in Burma. Through Christian Missions many Karens have received education which has enabled them to hold responsible positions in Government service and with European firms. In 1813 Adoniram Judson, the renowned American missionary, arrived in Burma with his talented wife Anne. In 1828 took place the conversion of Ko Tha Byu, the first Karen disciple. Judson visited Karen villages and confirmed the tradition that the ‘Lost Book’ would be restored through the white brother. Many Karen delegations came with him to see another American missionary, Mr. Boardman. One of these delegates had in his possession a copy of the Anglican Prayer Book which he had bought from a sailor and which he was treasuring. Many Karens acknowledged the arrival of these missionaries with the Bible as the fulfilment of their ancient tradition and prophecy. A number of baptisms took place. Ko Shwe Waing, a young Chief of Bassein, secured a copy of the Bible, and secretly carried it to his place. The news soon spread like wildfire. Men, women, and children came to have a look at the lost book found and restored at last. They came

rejoicing, weeping, wondering, worshipping. They kissed the Book, they caressed it; they decided never to lose it again. Christianity spread among the Karens more rapidly than among any other people of Burma.

The Karens made good educational progress during the 120 years of British rule in Burma. They have produced men of note in all walks and professions of life. Under Burmese and Mon rule they were very severely treated; they often rebelled, but they were crushed with a strong hand. Under British protection large numbers of them abandoned their fear of the Burmans and the Mons, came down from their mountainous homes, and settled in the plains, particularly in the Irrawaddy delta and the Tenasserim region. The Hill Karens are still marked by much shyness, and like to live away from civilized areas. Karen moral laws are of a high standard, emphasizing love and peace. Their ideas of marriage also are of a high order.

The Karens are not dashing and pushing like the Burmans. It is possible, because of the smallness of their numbers they had always to take a lower place, and also to learn to be humble and submissive. During the 19th and 20th centuries, however, a remarkable change has come over them. Christianization, Westernization, and Burmanization are the present features of the most forward of the Karens. This has infused new life into them. The British imperial practice of keeping apart their subjects of different races and religions has helped them not only to maintain their identity, but to bring this separatism into the political field as well.

When the introduction of dyarchical reforms into Burma was under discussion in 1919, a Karen delegate presented to the Joint Select Committee of the British Parliament a petition from his people requesting protection for their minority rights. When in 1937, Burma was separated from India, under the new constitution framed by the British for Burma, 12 seats were reserved for Karens in the House of Representatives (total number of seats, 132), members to be elected by their own people through separate constituencies. This arrangement did by no means help to bring together Burmans and Karens. Rather, it produced the opposite effect. When the Japanese invaded Burma in 1942, the Karens stood by the British. When the Japanese lost the war, and the British returned to Burma in 1945, the Karen leaders began to think of a homeland of their own within the Burmese state. Some even spoke of an independent Karen state. The generality of them, however, desired safeguards for their minority, in case Burma was to be granted Dominion Status or independence. A Karen deputation even visited the United Kingdom to draw the attention of the British Government to their fears and requirements.

The British in January 1947 agreed to the people or peoples of Burma choosing for themselves independence for their country 'either within or without the Commonwealth as soon as possible'. The Burmese Constituent Assembly drafted a new constitution for the country, and in September 1947 passed it with a view to complete independence for republican Burma outside the Commonwealth. By this Constitution, the Karenni was constituted into one of the units of the Union of Burma. But only a small and backward minority of the

Karens live in that region, so that it became necessary to make some arrangement in order to win over Karens scattered over Lower Burma. A special provision was made in the Constitution that if the Karens desired it so, a second Karen state would be formed as an autonomous unit of the Union, territorially to consist of the Salween District and such adjacent areas occupied by the Karens as may be determined by a special commission to be appointed for the purpose.

The vast majority of Karens were not unwilling to accept the Constitution and the arrangement as to a new autonomous Karen state. It must be said that the Constituent Assembly and Thakin Nu's government did deal with the Karens very justly and fairly, appointing them to the highest posts in the Defence Services and elsewhere. A section of the vocal Karens, however, remained disgruntled, and began to look for ways and means to set up an independent Karen state.

It was by no means easy for the Karens to be militantly opposed to the national government for any length of time. There were a few factors, however, in favour of them. They were well organized under the aegis of the Karen National Defence Organization, the leadership being able though misguided. About four battalions of the Republican Burma Army were composed of Karens, and these were some of the best of the country's troops. There was an abundance of arms and ammunition in the country left scattered about by the fleeing Japanese in 1945, and later by the allies. The Karens enjoyed the sympathy of many influential foreigners and foreign bodies. Karen leaders, who were not prepared to trust the leadership of the Burmese majority community, roused the fears of their followers and instilled into their minds the danger of again becoming the slaves of Burmans as in the days of old under Burmese Kings. It is also true that Karens suffered grievously at the hands of lawless Burmese elements during the Japanese invasion of the country in 1942.

In spite of these advantages and fears, it is very doubtful if the disgruntled and fear-oppressed Karens would have drawn the sword. It was disunion among the Burmans themselves that encouraged the Karens to rise against the new republican government. The Communists, the White Band People's Volunteer Organization (PVO), and other lawless elements rose in rebellion against the established national government. Certain Karen leaders thought it an opportune moment to demand a separate state for themselves outside the Union of Burma. The national government was prepared to grant them all their demands except the one for going out of the Union. The creation of a separate Karen state bristled with many difficulties, the chief being that with the exception of the Karenni states, the Karens are nowhere in the majority in any marked out area that may be suitably selected for a territorial unit. Still, Karens are numerous in the Tenasserim, Pegu, Bassein, Salween, and Toungoo districts of Lower Burma. They are also to be found in large numbers along the Burma-Siam frontier. A Boundary Commission was appointed, and it was decided, Karen leaders agreeing thereto, that the boundaries for a new Karen state be fixed for the creation of a new constituent unit of the Union. Before the agreement could be signed, however, many Karen troops deserted

with their firearms, ammunition and other military equipment, Karens in various parts of the country broke out in open rebellion and sought to overthrow the government. A small extremist minority had been busy underground not willing to come to terms with the government. The Karen eruption which took place early in 1949 was their work.

Karen fears of the Burmese majority were not without foundation. Although the government was well-meaning and wished to satisfy the reasonable aspirations of the Karens, there were many classes of Burmans who looked upon the Karens with contempt. In certain places they carried out massacres of Karens, and the latter retaliated in areas where they were at an advantage. This brought about the Karen conflagration at Insein; thence it began to spread to various other parts of the country. Dislodged from Insein, they established themselves in Thaton, Toungoo, and Lashio. They even proclaimed that they had founded a state of their own called the Kawthulay. They announced the names of their President, Prime Minister, and other Ministers. These tactics, however, were bound to fail. The Karens are too small and too scattered a minority to succeed in establishing an independent state in Burma. It would be best for them to be thankfully satisfied with two Karen constituent states or units which the Burmese Constituent Assembly is generously offering to them. Some Karen leaders even claimed for their visionary state the whole of Lower Burma including Rangoon. They called upon the Burmans to go back to Upper Burma. But these are the ideals and hopes of mere visionaries who cannot differentiate between the hard facts of history and present realities on the one hand and imagination on the other.

The national government of Burma is doing all it can to crush the rebels, and at the same time to conciliate them. Ultimately, success in the endeavour will depend upon how the Burmans, who form the majority of the country's population, will conduct themselves. Will they stand united for the maintenance of the integrity of their state and country? Will they at the same time have the statesmanship to win over the Karens, creating confidence in their minds? Will they purge their administration of those who believe in putting self before the common weal? Will they be able to keep under control the lawless elements floating over the length and breadth of the country? It can be unhesitatingly said that the present government has the will to move on the right lines. The confidence of other racial minorities, such as the Karens, Mons, Chins, Kachins, etc., will thus be won. The British were able to win over the Scots and heal the old wounds. They failed to win over the Irish, simply because the principle of conciliation was attempted too late for the purpose. It may be hoped that Burmans will accord to the Karens a place of honour in their common state, and help them to shed their fear and suspicion which they strongly feel are not unfounded. The Karen element in the Republic of Burma has an important contribution to make on lines of discipline and duty, courage and dependability.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE*

By M. DETTON

I

It is undeniable that there is, as has been said, 'a harmony between the basic administrative structure of a country and its constitutional cornerstone,' nor can it be gainsaid that, in spite of the many constitutions that France has seen since the end of the 18th century, the general plan of her administration, whose foundations were laid immediately after the Revolution, has scarcely changed in the intervening period. Undoubtedly the administrative institutions of a country are closely linked to the general concepts held by that country. Political trends and movements exercise a direct influence over them, and the national administration of a liberal government differs from that of an autocratic one. But in France the framework has remained much the same ever since it was set up by the Constituent Assembly and Bonaparte who had themselves inherited it to some extent from bygone times.

Today, under the régime established by the Constitution of 27 October 1946, the administration of France is similar to what it was under the Third Republic and under the preceding régimes. It must be pointed out, however, that it has evolved towards relative decentralization. This is due on the one hand, to the liberal tendencies that have gone on increasing for the last hundred and fifty years, and on the other, to the gradual replacement of the old notion of authority which dominated it at the dawn of the 19th century by the notion of public service, which is at present, one might almost say, the keystone of the whole of the French administrative apparatus. Thus it is that liberal democracy has led to the decentralization of administrative organization and the development of parliamentary control over administration. Social and economic democracy has also led to the multiplication of administration and has extended its activities beyond the traditional activities of the State to include production, commerce, assistance and insurance. Private organizations and individuals on whom these activities impinge find themselves increasingly associated with the direction of administration and with tasks of public interest.

This view of the whole field of French administrative institutions would be incomplete if along with a description of the organs that compose its structure, the general principles that guide its functioning were omitted—the privileges enjoyed by these organs as well as the limits imposed on their action. This study will be concerned with first stating the nature of French administration and then showing it in action. The machinery after all cannot be dissociated from its function. It is not enough to reveal its wheels and cogs; its action must be described.

II

A proper description of the organs of French administration demands that

* The original was in French; it was kindly translated by Mrs. Marthe Sinha.

the central administration be distinguished from the local. We shall begin by dealing with the first.

Subject to the high authority of the President of the Republic elected for a term of seven years by Parliament, that is to say by the members of the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic, the general direction of the affairs of the nation is in the hands of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He is responsible politically for the activity of the Government and is entrusted, generally speaking, with the execution of the laws. He is aided and advised by ministers, each of whom is at the head of a Ministry (National Defence, Home Affairs, Finance, Public Works, etc.). Usually, the ministers are politicians, and the composition of a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to the National Assembly is determined by the composition of Parliament and the tendencies it reveals. This leads to a frequent change of ministers. Either they disappear altogether or else they change Ministries. These changes are sometimes criticized and the resulting inconvenience must not be overlooked, but they are natural to parliamentary government. One must not, however, exaggerate the criticisms levelled at such a system. These Ministries that see a succession of different heads are made up of permanent elements (directors, head clerks, civil administrators and editors). They form the fundamental basis of the Ministries and their efficiency and specialization give the central administration of which they are a part a solidity that greatly counter-balances the inconvenience caused by changes in the personnel of the Ministry.

The central administration is composed of both internal and external departments. These are executive organs and frequently very technical. They are often assisted by consultative bodies that give advice and direct activity, such as the Economic Council, the Higher Council of Public Education, or the Council of Public Activities. Among these consultative organs, a special place is allotted to the Council of State, whose function is to make the final drafts for the proposed laws or certain decrees, and to give counsel and advice. In contradistinction to other Councils, that are nearly always specialist bodies, the Council of State does not specialize in any activity. It is an adjunct of the Government and seconds it in all fields; its inner structure has been so conceived as to enable it to carry out its manifold duties.

This, in broad outline, is the central administration of France. With the control of Parliament it ensures the direction of the affairs of the country and animates all its services, both internal and external, both central and local. Indeed its action cannot limit itself to purely national activities. It must appear in regional as well as local affairs and it would be platitudinous to recall the indissoluble unity of central and local administration. The administrative machine is one from the head of the State to the most minor official. It must drive its network of feelers to the very individual whose conditions of life it determines. It forms an immense pyramid. This study is not concerned with a detailed description of it. At the same time, a short account of the way in which France is administered locally would not be out of place.

III

The basic rules for local administration were drawn up at the time of the Revolution. At that time appeared the demarcations that still operate today: departments, divisions and communes have been the basic administrative units. Since the beginning of the 19th century they have not changed, nevertheless, an inner revolution—reflection of the political movement—has profoundly altered the conditions in which they operate, especially with regard to the independence of local groups in relation to the power at the centre. To the highly centralized régime instituted by Bonaparte, at the end of the Revolution, have progressively succeeded institutions administered by citizens themselves, through their own elected representatives. The tradition of democracy is to decentralize. Decentralization, consisting in the main in the extension of powers of local agents elected by their peers, and the increase of autonomy of local administration is nothing but democracy transplanted from the national field to the local. But such autonomy is not without supervision. To ensure the necessary cohesion, to maintain the respect for law, finally to protect the citizens themselves from the errors or negligence of their representatives, the control of activities of elected local authorities by the central power is indispensable. This control is exercised in various ways: by the approval of the decisions of these authorities, by the rejection of decisions at variance with the law and the abolition in certain circumstances of local organs, etc. The body of these measures form the administrative tutelage which is the true corollary of decentralization and whose conditions of function are carefully determined by law. Such tutelage is in fact subject to the most precise regulation, for although it may be essential it must still be free from all arbitrariness on the part of the central government. If not, decentralization would be purely illusory.

The two fundamental demarcations of local French administration are the Department and the Commune. The Department which was founded at the outset of the Revolution is a division of the State. Metropolitan France is divided into twenty-nine departments whose boundaries were guided by the geographical data of the regions and all idea of geometry was eschewed. The approximate, average area of a French department is roughly 6000 Km². For example, Corsica forms one of these departments; Algeria is divided into three departments; and recently, in 1945, the ancient French colonies of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Reunion and French Guiana were turned into departments.

Originally, the Department was an administrative division of the State, an area carved out of the national territory to serve as a basis, as local unit, for all public services. The Department has retained this original character. It was during the 19th century that departmental life appeared and developed. The administrative cell created by the Revolution became a centre for the management of local interests which had taken cohesion within the framework of the Department. Departmental legislation followed a parallel course of evolution. It became more and more decentralized. Today, the Department has a certain independence in the management of its domain; it has its own personality, its own budget. It is decentralized collectivism. True the

Department sees its interests entrusted to an elected assembly, the General Council, which is undoubtedly subject to the central power, but its already fairly wide independence has been further underlined by the 1946 Constitution. The executive power of the Department is indeed vested in the *Prefect* (Chief Administrator) and he is the agent of the State. He is at the same time head of the services of the State in the administrative cell formed by the Department and also the agent of the decentralized collectivism. This dual rôle corresponds to the twofold aspect of the Department.

Omitting the division of the departments known as Arrondissement, (which is administered by a vice-prefect) and the smallest administrative district which is called Canton, and before attempting to describe the commune, it is necessary to indicate the tendencies that have been in evidence for a long time in favour of the creation of administrative units larger than the Department. The latter was conceived over a hundred and fifty years ago and corresponded to the means of communication of the period. Since then, those conditions have completely disappeared. From the administrative point of view as well as the economic, the Department often seems too narrow a division. Many institutions such as the universities and the military and economic organizations have been set up on a regional basis. The most diverse regionalism is made manifest in political, intellectual and administrative circles. Some are actuated by economic or political considerations; others by historical or sentimental reasons. Yet, in spite of one or two successes which may perhaps have been necessary, French regionalism has not ousted the Department, a division which is now solidly established. The former would seem at present to be receding. The division of France into regions, for the moment, appears to be far from realization.

At the root of the administrative organization lies the commune. Before becoming a territorial division, the latter had for a long time been a natural group, an association of inhabitants. If the Department was created artificially the commune is a fact, just as the family, which gave rise to the ancient city. This natural group, whose organization lacked homogeneity under the ancient régime and which had however never ceased to exist, was turned by the Revolution into the basic administrative division. These associations of inhabitants, big and small, were taken as they were. The main lines of legislation of the French communes was laid down in 1884 and is the same for big cities as for little villages, for urban districts as for rural. This uniformity of system is inconvenient for it prevents allotting to big communes services they could well administer and overburdens little municipalities with services they are not always capable of rendering especially for financial reasons. Many a time therefore, the law has had to take into account the fact that it was dealing with the most diverse communities in respect of importance. It has grouped communes together. On the other hand, special formulae introducing a special organization have had to be found for certain big conglomerations such as Paris and Lyons.

The special characteristic of the division of France on the basis of communes is the very large number of communes. This multiplicity of local divisions is

explained by the fact that at the time the commune was taken as the basic cell of the territorial organization, the groups and agglomerations of inhabitants were taken as they existed, both big and small, without any attempt at regrouping, although certain people advocated it. Thus the country is divided into more than 35,000 communes, 20,000 of which have less than 500 inhabitants. If we exclude Paris which has 2,725,374 inhabitants and which, as has been said, has a special administrative organization, the communes of some importance are comparatively few. The following table shows the number of towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants.

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|----|----|----|-----|
| Towns with more than | 100,000 inhabitants | .. | .. | .. | 17 |
| „ | 50,000 to 100,000 | „ | .. | .. | 39 |
| „ | 30,000 to 50,000 | „ | .. | .. | 52 |
| „ | 20,000 to 30,000 | „ | .. | .. | 78 |
| „ | 15,000 to 20,000 | „ | .. | .. | 69 |
| „ | 10,000 to 15,000 | „ | .. | .. | 149 |

It is to these communes, so numerous and so varied in importance, that the legislation of the Third Republic applied and which was its main achievement.

Legislation in both the Commune and the Department is largely decentralized. The Municipal Council with its elected members looks after the interests of the commune. This Council, a local body, enjoys relative independence but is subject to the control of the Central Government and in particular of the *prefet* (prefect) who is its representative in the framework of the department. It elects its executive head, the mayor, from among its own members. The latter, together with assistants who are also elected in the same way, is in charge of the affairs of the commune. It manages the property of the commune, performs its services and organizes the local police. Decentralized authority is vested in the mayor who is, at the same time, the representative of the State in the commune. He also has therefore the twofold character that has already been observed for the prefect in the framework of the Department. There is, however, this difference to be noted. While the latter is put in authority over the collective Department, the mayor is an elected representative imposed upon the State through the confidence of his peers to manage the services of national interest in the framework of the commune.

This in broad outline is the administrative structure of France: ministerial departments at the centre working under the authority of the President of the Council whose powers have been enlarged and increased in the 1945 Constitution; departmental divisions covering the provinces of France and forming territorial divisions that are supplemented by autonomous groups: communes, with their own independent powers in the management of local interests. Between the departments and the communes come the 'arrondissements' (divisions) and the cantons which are purely administrative divisions. They must be mentioned here in order to emphasize the fact that they hold a secondary place in the administrative life.

The purpose of this administration whose machinery has just been described, is to ensure the execution of the services of public interest. To this end, it is

endowed with privileges and powers that clearly fall outside the limits of common law and give it the right to constrain and control individuals.

As for the personnel necessary to its functioning, they come under a régime that is totally different from the working conditions that apply to private enterprise. The decree controlling public service and the regulations governing military service are the two essential forms of this exceptional right. The law of 19 October 1946 determining the status of officials comprises many departures from the normal terms of an employment contract. Military service is distinguished by the use of forced labour. If in peace time this forced labour is limited to military service, in war time it can be extended to all civil employment.

As for the material used by public services, it is subject to a system of control quite different from that of private property. The acquisition of goods by the administration is facilitated by exceptional measures, such as expropriation, requisition and sequestration. Public property is defined according to arbitrary procedure. It is effectively protected both by penal regulations as well as civil regulations. In particular it cannot be alienated or transferred. Administrative resources also profit by exceptional regulations based on authority and force and varied privileges.

Furthermore, administrative activity profits by numerous rules that are a departure from common law principles. The administration has at its disposal the power of unilateral command and of coercion in certain circumstances. It can redress itself by issuing title deeds against private individuals. Finally, administrative contracts are different from those under the common law system. The administration and the individual entering into contract with it are not on a footing of equality.

To balance these privileges justified by the need of ensuring the smooth working of public services, French administration submits to a number of obligations. There is the general obligation to respect the laws and to ensure uninterrupted service in regard to which all citizens are treated as equals; there are special obligations for each administration that depend on the organization or the machinery of these services. It is impossible here to go into the details of these obligations. All that can be done is to point out their existence. It must also be recalled that all the parts of the administrative machine, internal and external, higher and lower, must respect the law; that is the legislative regulations as well as the principles of equality, objectivity and liberalism laid down by law or by the courts.

These obligations to which the administration is subject imply controls. The latter may be exclusively of the government. In that case it presents a sort of hierarchy. The higher authorities control the activities of the lower authorities, either through administration or through finance. In addition to this hierarchical control, administrative tutelage may be recalled which, as has been seen, operates on the decentralized authorities, especially on local collective bodies.

To this dual type of governmental control, namely, hierarchy or tutelage, must be added political control which results from the parliamentary system.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF

It rests mainly with the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic.

This dual control however would be insufficient in the case of a powerful administration endowed with wide privileges. The activities of the superior authorities themselves must also be supervised. Their check on the secondary authorities may be inadequate. In exercising their powers of tutelage, they might overlook the rights of the decentralized branches of the administration. As for political control, it is inevitably sporadic; also, it affects the central government far more than the secondary administrations; and furthermore, it is not always inspired by objective considerations of public interest.

A third form of control has therefore been felt to be necessary in addition to the first two. This has a legal character. Obviously, it might be considered that administrative activity could be subject to the courts and that by turning to them, the population might enforce upon the administration respect for the law and the recognition of their own rights. In France, however, the problem has not been solved in this manner. The principle of the separation of powers was enunciated and applied from the very outset of the Revolution. Thus for historical and primarily political reasons, the activities of both government and administration have escaped the control of the courts. Yet, legal control does exist for them. Throughout the 19th century, there were created special courts that developed later and came to acquire complete independence in relation to the administration. These are the administrative benches. The autonomy of this legal administration with regard to the active administration, as well as its specialization in administrative questions, have formed the stoutest rampart of the French citizens against arbitrary action and illegality. The Council of State that has been mentioned as one of the consultative bodies working in conjunction with the government also acts as an administrative bench. It forms the essential core of administrative jurisdiction. If the latter functions through local courts, in the main Divisional Courts and Disputed Claims Councils overseas, the Council of State may quite well have to consider their judgements. This higher administrative court which thus has to take cognizance of the decisions of the secondary courts either through appeals or through the Supreme Court of Appeal acquires a sort of right of supervision over the whole field of administrative jurisdiction and its trends. It is in the body of this law and the principles it has enunciated that the citizens find the most vigorous protection of their rights. An appeal at little cost enables them to obtain the quashing of an illegal decision of the administration, and this implies its nullification in all its possible consequences. Such an appeal can also be lodged against the general texts issued by the central government itself as well as the individual or collective decisions of the local authorities. Through other types of appeals, citizens can obtain redress against loss through the irregular functioning of the administration. Finally, although contracts with the administration contain the exceptional privileges that have been enumerated above, it is the duty of the administrative judge to see to their regular fulfilment, keeping in mind public interest and the legitimate interests of the contracting parties.

Thus, if French administration comes outside the jurisdiction of the Common

Law and has in relation to it all possible independence, its activity is subject to special courts that extend their jurisdiction much further into its workings and enforces respect for the law and the rights of the individual.

IV

This essay—long, though incomplete—has traced the essential characteristics of the administration of France. Endowed with powerful privileges, this complex and highly graded administration is a legacy of history. Even though it was markedly revised and modified at the Revolution and under the Empire it nevertheless continued for a long time to be dominated by the idea of sovereignty and authority, and strong traces of these still remain today. Nevertheless, the idea of sovereignty has gradually given way to the notion of public service which has now become fundamental. The liberal ideas that have inspired France hitherto, have softened the rigid outlines of the original dictatorial framework. Decentralization has gradually brought the citizens into closer association with the administration. The existence of a parliamentary system brings its activity much more closely under the scrutiny of the citizens, and if on the social and economic planes the rôle of the State has greatly been extended, it exercises its functions under the supervision of a specialized jurisdiction that enforces respect of the Law.

Thus is established a happy balance between the ever increasing demands on the administration and the rights of the individual, between the powerful collective forces that are symbolized by the State and the freedom of the individual. The institutions of a country reflect its tendencies. While certain nations may practise the sort of liberalism that, because of the lack of civic virtues, leads to anarchy, and others may not hesitate to accept the crushing of the individual by the omnipotent mass of the State, France has sought to reconcile collective power with individual freedom and it cannot be denied that she has been eminently successful.

NOTES AND MEMORANDA

ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN BELGIUM

By J. GOORMAGHTIGH

IN order to make a correct estimate of the importance of the internal organization of parties to the machinery of government, it is necessary first to review their relation with the electorate.

1. THE ELECTORATE

The present-day electoral system (universal adult franchise, proportional representation, and secret vote) is the result of a long process of evolution. Although very liberal for its times, the Belgian Constitution of 1831 stipulated expressly in articles 47 and 53 that members of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate could only be elected by citizens paying a

certain electoral tax. But as the social problems of today had not yet arisen, the people did not as yet clamour for the right of vote and were generally disinterested in political problems.

For several decades, internal political life evolved around two poles: the religious problem and the educational problem, the latter being but another aspect of the religious struggle. The Liberal Party called for an effective independence of secular government from the Church and the elaboration of a complete educational system under the direction of the State. The Catholics, on the other hand, wanted the whole community to be governed by Christian ideals and an educational system which was entirely free from the supervision of the State. With the development of another social class in the larger towns, the proletariat, which soon acquired class consciousness and demanded a share in the government, an amendment of the fundamental laws became necessary.

The change was finally brought about by the struggle of different sections of the community e.g. the democratic section of the Catholic Party encouraged in 1891 by Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum*; the progressive left of the Liberal Party which was resolutely anti-clerical and finally the Belgian Labour Party, founded in 1885, and which was committed to 'fight without respite' for the establishment of universal suffrage.

The Constitution, revised in 1893, introduced universal suffrage moderated, however, by the grant of supplementary votes to persons fulfilling certain qualifications, intellectual, material, ownership, etc. At the elections of 14 October 1894, representation in the House was as follows: 104 Catholics, 21 Liberals, and 27 Socialists. A newspaper of the time stated that the most remarkable consequence of these elections was the almost complete disappearance of the Liberals and the advent of the Socialist Party in the Parliament in such numbers as to astonish the party itself as much as its opponents. A Catholic paper wrote 'Belgian Catholics must, without hesitation, start studying actively and thoroughly. Social reforms from now on are indispensable.'

The struggle, nevertheless, had not yet come to an end. The year 1921 saw all men of 21 years obtain an equal right of vote but it was only in 1949 that the Parliament granted universal suffrage to all Belgians of either sex.

II. BELGIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

The party structure in Belgium has always reflected not merely the graduation of opinion from the extreme right to the extreme left, but also the linguistic and religious differences of a nation divided into the French and the Flemish speaking peoples, and into Catholic believers and free-thinkers.

Today, the parties continue as in the nineteenth century to be classified into 'Right' and 'Left' according to whether they have a religious or an agnostic bias. The 'Right' is considered identical with the Catholic party, and the 'Left' with the Liberal, Socialist and Communist parties.

Since the 'Right' has an absolute majority in Flanders and the 'Left' in Wallonia (the French speaking region), it may be said that, very broadly, the religious, political, and linguistic groupings tend to place the Catholics, Conservatives, and Flemings against free-thinkers, progressives and Walloons.

Before studying each party separately it would be interesting to determine their respective importance judging from the results of post-war elections.

| Parties | | | | Votes | % 1946 | % 1949 |
|-----------------------|----|----|----|-----------|--------|--------|
| P. S. C. ¹ | .. | .. | .. | 2,187,000 | 42.53 | 43.52 |
| Socialists | .. | .. | .. | 1,437,000 | 31.59 | 29.78 |
| Liberals .. | .. | .. | .. | 766,000 | 8.92 | 15.25 |
| Communist | .. | .. | .. | 377,000 | 12.68 | 7.50 |

1. THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PARTY (P. S. C.)

A. Principles.

The Belgian Catholic Party has always been a conglomeration of different economic stratas and diverse political opinions: e.g. farmers, workers belonging to the Christian trade unions, part of the commercial and industrial middle and upper classes and the entire clergy and aristocracy. Before the Second World War, the Catholic Bloc (as the party was then called) had been widely dominated by the big financial and industrial interests. It was, generally speaking, conservative and believed that the State should not interfere with free enterprise, nor alter the existing hierarchical structure of society.

But, after liberation, the political, social and economic views of most younger Catholic intellectuals and trade union leaders could now hardly be distinguished from those of the moderate, anti-communist Socialists. On 18 August 1945, the Catholic Bloc formally dissolved itself, to be replaced by a new organization under the name of 'Parti Social Chretien' (P. S. C.). That the P. S. C. wishes to appear as a progressive Christian party is apparent from the inclusion of the word 'social' in its name, and from such statements from its platform as: "The old liberal and capitalist world lies in ruins" and 'we must build a new society in which the individual is no longer a slave of the monied interests.'

The clergy also contributes, in a very important way, to the success of the P. S. C.² Further, the Belgian Catholics ordinarily follow directives of the Church hierarchy in all political matters. But the P. S. C. has not bridged completely the rift between the different currents of opinion among Belgian Catholics, who are actually in agreement only on such fundamental points as

¹ The new Catholic Party.

² For example, the 'school question' concerning state subsidies to 'private', that is Catholic schools, continues to divide the 'right' and 'left' today no less than in the nineteenth century.

adherence to Catholicism as the bulwark of Western civilization, hostility to communism as a doctrine and as a tool of Soviet expansion, support of the economic if not political unification of Western Europe, and close alliance of this 'Western Bloc' with the United States.

To sum up, the P. S. C. constitutes little more than a new facade for the old Catholic Bloc. Its centre of gravity has shifted leftwards, but not as much as its platform claims; and even this programme remains more conservative than that of the French Catholic Party, the M. R. P.

B. Organization.

1. *Local Sections and Town Sections.* Members actively interested in the Party are grouped, on the basis of personal membership, into local sections. They send certain elected representatives to the town sections; the number of these representatives is proportionate to the number of members in the local section. The town sections in turn delegate, in the same way, certain members to the National Congress.

2. *The National Congress.* It constitutes the supreme assembly of the party and fixes its statutes, elects its National President and the members of the National Committee and lays down the more important principles governing the Party. It is convened once a year.

3. *The National Committee.* Entrusted with the executive power, it is presided over by the National President and is composed of 24 members. The National Committee meets twice a month and elects 4 of its members to meet weekly. The Committee decides upon the most important general rules of the Party's political life. It is in direct contact with the parliamentary P. S. C. groups in the House and the Senate; the latter keep their complete independence, appoint their own respective Presidents and Boards and take decisions regarding the tactics to be adopted in Parliament.

2. THE SOCIALIST PARTY (P. S. B.)

A. Principles.

As previously explained, the electoral reform mentioned in the beginning of this article brought about the inclusion of the working classes in the elective body. Although inspired by Marxism and the class struggle, the P. S. B. was influenced by the national atmosphere, and never tended to create anarchy.

The Socialist Party platform must, therefore, relegate the building of a Socialist society to the future, and emphasize the gradualness of the transition from a capitalistic economy to a 'collective economy applied to essential activities.' In fact, the Socialist programme reads less like a plea for socialism and more like a defence of the Socialists' participation in the successive governments which 'has been wholesome for the country and has given the workers advantages which they would not otherwise have had.'

The Belgian Socialist Party is thus essentially conservative, not in the political but in the literal sense of the word. Their primary concern is not to change,

but to defend the existing democratic institutions and civil liberties against the threat of authoritarianism from the extreme left or right.

On 15 April 1945, the Socialist unions merged with the new Communist Unions into the 'Confederation General du Travail de Belgique' (F. C. T. B.). Soon after the foundation of the F. C. T. B. the left Socialists themselves seem to have recognized that by siding with the Communists they had unwittingly served the latter's aims and weakened their own party. Since that time the Socialists have unanimously blocked all further Communist attempts to establish a 'united front of all democrats.'

Socialist Foreign Minister Spaak was one of the pioneers working towards an economic, political and military union of Western Europe and the United States. His policy has been endorsed continuously by the great majority of his party.

In the 1949 elections, the Socialists polled 29.7 percent of the total votes. This indicates that they lost slightly more votes to the Liberals than they gained from the Communists.

To reach their present strength, the Socialists had to overcome a number of serious handicaps. The language question has proved more embarrassing to the Socialists than to the other parties. The Socialist Party has avoided taking a stand on this question, in order not to antagonize either their Liege members or the Brussels and Flemish Socialists who want to preserve Belgium's present 'unitary' structure. Moreover the Socialists' potential following does not include Catholic believers (and therefore most persons) as well as non-Catholic small and big businessmen; it is restricted to those with fixed incomes, workers, employees and intellectuals. Lastly in competition with the Communists, the Socialists are at a disadvantage; being a government party, they cannot make tantalizing promises as the Communists do, but must even support such unpopular measures as the freezing of assets and of wages for the purpose of lowering prices.

B. Organization.

The Belgian Socialist Party is not only a political movement, its organization also depends on the economic and social life of the country. That is why the P. S. B. is constituted of a network of organizations with four spheres of activity.

The Party itself is organized on the basis of individual membership. From local sections to district associations, from the latter to provincial federation and from these to the General Council or the Party Congress, members are assured of control guarantees and access possibilities by a procedure similar to that described above for the P. S. C.

Subsidiary organizations assist the Party and help maintain the Socialists in their respective spheres; for example: Provident Women, Youth, Socialist Mutual Assistance, Agriculturists, Pensioners, etc.

The Co-operative movement is an important means of production and distribution. It has a tampering effect on the country's economic life owing to its large supplies. The Socialist co-operatives in Belgium own a large

number of factories, stores, shops and hundreds of 'People's Houses' (hostels) and theatres.

As regards the Workers' Unions, they had, in 1944, abandoned their traditional organic bond with the Party: but the hostility of the Communist leaders is gradually bringing them closer again to the P. S. B. and they are showing a tendency to reunite with the Party.

Besides these four spheres of activity, the Socialist press owns four newspapers.

An Insurance Company, the Social Provident Fund, a Workers' Educational Centre, the Institut Emile Vaudevelde and a Workers' High School all contribute to the spread of Socialist ideas.

3. THE LIBERAL PARTY

A. Principles.

The Liberal Party, which during the nineteenth century had been co-extensive with the 'Left' has since been reduced to becoming its right side. The party has retained the basic tenets of its nineteenth century liberalism and anti-clericalism. It puts the main emphasis on free enterprise and private initiative, which it contrasts with the 'governmentalism' of the other parties of the 'Left' and the 'corporatism' of the 'Right'. Whether in the cabinet or in the opposition, they have been criticizing the government for keeping too great a number of civil servants on the pay roll, for enacting confiscatory taxation, for dividing citizens into the economically strong and weak, and for subjecting business to licensing, rationing and other restrictions. These criticisms resemble those of the Catholic Party's right-wingers, from whom many Liberals differ only in their free-thinking and anti-clerical proclivities.

On international matters, the Liberals agree with all other parties, except the Communist, in advocating a grouping of Occidental nations.

The Liberal Party has had the support of the financial groups. Most of its followers have come, however, from the middle class, small businessmen, civil servants, and members of the liberal professions.

The Liberal vote has been declining steadily since 1914. The once revolutionary ideas of free thought and free enterprise seem inadequate to more and more intellectuals of the younger generation who have come to view socialism as a more suitable vehicle for their ideas.

But the party had benefited from the fact that it had been in the opposition during the past two years. Many pre-war Liberals who had voted Catholic or Socialist in 1946 renewed their traditional party ties in 1949, as they apparently felt more strongly about the high tax-rate than about the absence of their King or about social security.

There seems thus to be a parallel between the post-war revival of the French Radical Socialists and the resurgence of the Belgian Liberals in the 1949 elections. It remains, however, doubtful whether this latest increase of the Liberal vote constitutes anything more than a temporary interruption of the decline of the Belgian Liberal Party.

B. *Organization.*

The Liberal Party is directed and administered by :

1. *The General Assembly.*

It is the leading organization in which all spheres of activity are duly represented. It lays down the programme and defines the policy to be followed. The General Assembly meets at least once a year and holds extraordinary sessions whenever necessary.

2. *The Permanent Committee.*

It is somewhat smaller than the Assembly. It discusses and decides all matters of urgency or all questions brought specially before the Committee. It also studies all questions pertaining to propaganda and action that are not important enough to be decided by the General Assembly. It fixes membership fee and appoints a restricted Committee whose business is to draw up the budget and control expenses.

3. *Administrative Committee.*

According to the policy outlined by the General Assembly and the Permanent Committee, the Committee administers the Liberal Party.

It meets periodically on fixed days and decisions are taken by a majority of the members present. It appoints Commissions that prepare bills proposed to be put before Parliament by Liberal representatives.

The Committee convenes the Permanent Committee and the General Assembly meetings and prepares the agenda for these meetings. Lastly it keeps close contact with the federations and calls them to attention whenever necessary; for instance, in cases of non-adherence to the Party's policies.

The deputies are in close contact with the National Council of the Party and the various Commissions entrusted with the study of national or party problems. The group assembles before each public meeting and appoints speakers especially competent on various points on the agenda. The Liberal group of the Senate has a working organization identical with that of the House. They meet whenever circumstances make it necessary.

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4. THE COMMUNIST PARTY

To study the Belgian Communist Party it is necessary first to examine how the international Communist Party has been adapting its strategy and tactics to the local conditions in Belgium. Recognizing that orthodox Marxism would not appeal to the post-war masses, the Communist speakers and newspapers have changed their pre-war slogans of 'class struggle', 'world revolution' into such watchwords as 'increase of production', 'decent share of profit for small business' and 'national independence'.

Deviating from Marxism and Leninism, the Communists in Belgium, as in Italy, have avoided attacking religion in order not to repel prospective Catholic voters.

As in other countries, they tried to gain control over other existing parties by establishing a 'united democratic front'. In Belgium, these attempts achiev-

ed no success, since the other parties, and especially the Socialists, refused to give in to Communist pressure.

Their principal concern at present is to oppose the F.R.P. They accordingly changed their policy and platform from 'co-operation with all democratic forces' to 'opposition against American imperialism'. The F.R.P., the Brussels Five Power Pact, the Atlantic Pact, and even the Belgium-Dutch Customs Union are pictured as means to make Western Europe in general and Belgium in particular subservient to American imperialism.

In the General Elections of February 1946 the Communists made by far the greatest relative gain of all parties. But in the elections of 1949, the Communists polled only 7.5 percent of the total votes. Their influence on the workers is greater, however, than their numerical strength would indicate because of their technique of joining in subordinate positions, thus acquiring a greater sway on the rank and file.

That the strength of the Communists in Belgium started to diminish two years before the United States embarked on its aid programme is mainly the result of the same factors which contributed to the corresponding rise of the Socialists, namely, Belgium's uninterrupted economic recovery from the summer of 1945 until now.

III. CONCLUSION

This brief description of the internal organization of parties enables us to make a few observations and draw a general conclusion.

One must differentiate between electors favourable to a party and members playing an active part in its life. Parties are, generally speaking, organized as a pyramid, i.e., an indefinite number of local sections appoint their representatives to district organizations or district federations, and so on to the level of the General Assembly which is the governing body. Besides this there is an Executive Committee and a Committee or Bureau elected by the latter.

Finally, the members elected to the House or the Senate respectively form Parliamentary House or Senate groups. The latter theoretically have a life of their own but they maintain numerous contacts with the Party itself in which they are in any case represented.

What, however, is the exact position of the parties? This is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, the only mention being of 'the nation's representatives'. But the organization and the internal structure of the parties enables them to put forward a constructive programme and candidates who, through the polling system, are those in whom lies the Party's trust.

There is, however, a drawback to the existence of parties. Theoretically each representative and each senator must represent the interest of the whole nation and must act with complete independence, and in no case, therefore, must be submitted to the directives of his party.⁴ It is obvious that the constitutional rule is not always closely observed.

The study of each of the political parties in Belgium leads us to the conclu-

⁴ Constitution, Article 32.

sion which might also be applied to Western Europe as whole. Under healthy economic conditions, the great majority of Western Europeans, while repudiating unrestricted free enterprise, will adhere to the democratic ideal of the supremacy of the individual. Had Belgium's rapid recovery been the rule rather than the exception in Western Europe, there might have been less uncertainty today about democracy's ability to withstand the threat of authoritarianism of the extreme right or left in that part of the world.

THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE¹

By M. RAMASWAMY

THE Constitution of the United States which was hammered into shape by the Philadelphia Convention in the summer of 1787 and which came into effect in 1789 has now been in continuous operation for a little over a hundred and sixty years. The first ten amendments to the Constitution, which taken together comprise the American Bill of Rights, can be regarded as a contemporaneous appendix to the new Constitution because they were proposed to the State legislatures by the very first Congress of the United States which met under the new dispensation, and came into force in 1791 after being ratified by the requisite number of States. Out of the twenty-one amendments to the Constitution up to date, if we leave out the first ten which came close upon its heels after it had begun to function, we are left with only eleven amendments to the original document made over the long span of 160 years. It is nothing short of a marvel how a charter of Government drawn up so far back as 1787 has, with so few changes, served so admirably the needs of a nation which has not only grown enormously in area and population but has undergone a great change in its social and economic structure from a simple rural pattern into a highly complex, largely urbanized industrial pattern. It would be very interesting to probe into the reasons how this miracle has happened, because taken by and large, the Constitution has met the needs of a nation rapidly changing on both its social and economic planes, and has adapted itself to changing needs and circumstances. It is to a study of this task that Professor Rottschaefer of the University of Minnesota has addressed himself in the volume under review. I wish to say that he performs this task admirably well. I have derived much pleasure from reading this volume because not only are the issues well thought out but the manner of their presentation is lucid and attractive.

The volume under review brings together five lectures which Professor Rottschaefer delivered at the University of Michigan in March 1947. They were in fact the first in the series to be known as the Thomas M. Cooley Lectureship established at the Law School of the University of Michigan. The five lectures given by the learned Professor bear the following titles: (1) Develop-

¹ Henry Rottschaefer, *The Constitution and Socio-Economic Change*, The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1948, The Oxford University Press, pp. xvi, 253.

ment of Federal Powers prior to 1933. (2) The Expansion of Federal Powers since 1933. (3) The Expansion of State Powers since 1933. (4) The Protection of Personal and Property Rights. (5) Some Implications of Recent Trends.

Alexis De Tocqueville, probably the most astute foreign commentator on American life and institutions, wrote more than a century ago as follows: If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich, who are united together by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.² It was, I think, inevitable that American lawyers and judges should have taken a prominent part in the process of building up the country's political institutions, as a written constitution establishing a dual polity, with the powers of the federal and regional governments demarcated under the instrument and their powers also restrained in certain directions primarily to secure fundamental human rights, cannot work successfully without the aid of a wise, imaginative and learned judiciary. It is a magnificent tribute to the work of the Supreme Court of the United States that under the guidance of some of its most distinguished judges the constitution instead of becoming a strait-jacket smothering national activity has become a supple garment permitting the nation to grow and blossom out in all directions. Mr. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in his address on the One Hundred and Fiftieth Anniversary of the Institution of the Supreme Court of the United States referring to the rôle of the Court in the life of the nation observed:

The recognition of this anniversary implies the persistence, through the vicissitudes of one hundred and fifty years, of the deep and abiding conviction that amid the clashes of political policies, the martial demands of crusaders, the appeals of sincere but conflicting voices, the outbursts of passion and of the prejudices growing out of particular interests, there must be somewhere the quiet, deliberate and effective determination of an arbiter of the fundamental questions which inevitably grow out of our constitutional system and must be determined in controversies as to individual rights. It is the unique function of this court, not to dictate policy, not to promote or oppose crusades, but to maintain the balance between States and Nation through the maintenance of the rights and duties of individuals.³

The significance of the work performed by the Supreme Court in interpreting the provisions of the constitutional document in their relation to the many difficult constitutional problems having their impact upon the social and economic life of the nation which have come up before the court is brought into vivid relief in the admirable survey which Professor Rottschaefer has essayed in this series of lectures. It was indeed a piece of great good fortune that in the formative period of its life, the Supreme Court of the United States had the guidance of so gifted a judge as Chief Justice Marshall. Under his leadership the court, which was itself an experimental institution, not only built great prestige for itself but also contributed to the successful working of federalism in the country. It is no exaggeration to say, I think, that but for the doctrine

² Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. 1, Chapter xvi, p. 283, The World's Great Classics Edition.

³ *The United States Supreme Court Reports*, 84 Lawyers' Edition, p. 1429.

of judicial review propounded by Chief Justice Marshall in the great case of *Marbury v. Madison*⁴ the success of the federal experiment in the United States would have been greatly imperilled. The doctrine of judicial review which has been maintained as a fundamental institution in American constitutional law for over one hundred and forty-seven years since that case was decided, is, as another great Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Charles Evans Hughes has observed, 'as much a part of our system of government as the judicial office itself.'⁵ Another great decision—*McCulloch v. Maryland*⁶—for which Chief Justice Marshall was responsible blazed a new trail in constitutional interpretation by enunciating the principle that federal powers should be given broad construction and that powers incidental to the effective exercise of the enumerated powers should be regarded as comprehended in the specific grants made. The recognition of the power of Congress to select whatever means are deemed appropriate to carry out the powers allocated to it has helped in the expansion of federal powers to keep step with the changing economic and social conditions. It was upon the foundation of these and other important cases like *Gibbons v. Ogden*⁷ decided during Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice that the future work of the court has been built.

The expansion of federal powers that has taken place since 1933 was largely the outcome of the great depression which began in 1929 and lasted almost a full decade. Professor Rottschaefer has discussed in his second lecture the many measures which President Roosevelt undertook to restore normalcy to the economic system and the many constitutional issues which presented themselves for the court's decision in connexion with those measures. The Supreme Court, after its initial hostility to New Deal legislation, reversed the trend beginning with the *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation Case*⁸ and in a series of important decisions upheld many of President Roosevelt's liberal measures intended to cope with the economic and social problems of the day. This was done chiefly by a broad approach made in interpreting the commerce the taxing and the spending powers of Congress. In the recent *American Power & Light Company Case*⁹ Mr. Justice Murphy speaking for the Supreme Court went so far as to say that the federal commerce power was as broad as the economic needs of the nation. In its recent decisions, the Court has given full recognition to the fact that the many economic forces that operate transcending state lines in a highly industrialized and integrated society such as that which exists in the United States today require effective control from the centre if they are not to work harm to the well-being of the people.

All the five lectures of Professor Rottschaefer are very thoughtful and interesting. They will well repay careful study. I would particularly commend his last lecture entitled 'Some Implications of Recent Trends' to the readers' notice. Professor Rottschaefer recognizes the inevitability of a certain amount of

⁴ (1803) 1 Cranch 137.

⁵ Charles E. Hughes, *The Supreme Court of the United States*, p. 89

⁶ (1819) 4 wheat. 316.

⁷ (1824) 9 wheat. 1.

⁸ (1937) 301 U. S. 1.

⁹ (1946) 329 U. S. 90 p. 104.

wise governmental economic planning even in his own country which largely believes in free enterprise if the nation's resources are to yield the maximum social welfare and economic stability. The complex conditions created by modern scientific and industrial advance make governmental controls imperative. But how far those controls should go is a matter upon which people will always hold divergent views. The only rational and peaceful way to solve it, however, is to allow free discussion of the issues involved. As Professor Rottschaefer observes:

The more that economic freedom is curtailed, the greater the value these other freedoms acquire. The more general such curtailment becomes the greater the public necessity for preserving the others. No group can expect that limiting the economic liberty of another group for its benefit will endure for ever. Hence each group has an interest in protecting the fundamental civil and political rights of every other group. Such experience as is available suggests that their preservation intact will not be easy. But unless they are protected, even to the extent of permitting opposition to the established regime by those who wish peaceably to change it, the progressive restriction of individual economic freedom may prove to be the *Road to Serfdom* (See Hayek: *Road to Serfdom*) for even political societies imbued with the political traditions of western civilization.¹⁰

The value of the freedom of speech and expression for the maintenance of the democratic way of life cannot be exaggerated. If this arch is permitted to decay and crumble, the collapse of democracy is both certain and inevitable.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EUROPE IN DECAY By L.B. Namier (Macmillan, 1950 16 s. net 330)

'EUROPE IN DECAY' is a penetrating study by Prof. L. B. Namier of the University of Manchester of the currents and cross-currents in the diplomatic history of Europe in the fateful years 1936-1940, as unfolded by certain essays and monographs that have come to light since the publication of his 'Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-39'—a work which has already earned in many ways the gratitude of the students of international affairs.

The book opens with an essay on 'Memoirs Born of Defeat' followed by studies of the books lately brought out by MM Flandin, Reynaud, Bonnet and Baudouin—the statesmen who among others presided over the destiny of France in the 'thirties, and of Stucki's vivid account of the last days of Vichy. It is now admitted that until the spring of 1939 the influence which the British Government exerted, or tried to exert, on France with regard to Germany was mostly unsound. On the other hand, there was in France herself 'a lamentable paralysis of will', and the country's threefold unpreparedness—intellectual, material and moral—was a fact which no honest French politician should seek to deny today.

These memoirs are followed by essays dealing with Italian and British themes. In the former we see the Duce's self-important and arrogant conceit but also his servility to the Fuhrer betrayed through such instructions to Ciano as 'to feel Germany's pulse' or 'not to hurt German susceptibilities'. In the latter Mr. Churchill tells us 'how the English speaking peoples through their unwisdom, carelessness and good nature allowed the wicked to re-arm', regretting the complacent policy that 'lacked both magnitude and urgency'. Again, a close examination of the Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-39 shows that a man like Sir Neville Henderson would hardly make a good diplomat; nor did the line of conduct chosen by Lord Halifax himself in dealing with the Czech-German dispute exhibit anything but an incredible shirking of responsibilities.

Next comes another essay based on Documents and Material Relating to the Eve of the Second World War produced by the Russian Foreign office. Its first volume recounting how Czechoslovakia—that infant Republic raised on the debris of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—was sacrificed by the Western Powers and stabbed in the back by Poland, 'resembles a documentary film rather than a collection of diplomatic documents'.

The book closes with two chapters on Soviet Diplomacy. Britain and France, fully realizing the ineffectiveness of their guarantees to Rumania and Poland cajoled (unsuccessfully of course) with Russia (1939) while trying to rate low the value of her added guarantee. Nor did the Russians prove any the less prudent or clever for the Nazis. Indeed, the collection from the German Archives published by the U.S. State Department establishes the fact that the dominant note in the Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-41 was intense mutual distrust: 'for several months each side was holding out vistas of improved relations in order to render the other less inclined to an agreement with the Western Powers while it avoided commitments which the other could have utilized in negotiating with them'. The hybrid partnership ended with Ribbentrop telling the Russian Ambassador that 'the ideological conflict between the two countries had become stronger than common sense.....'

This synthesized presentation of interesting and significant revelations is, like its predecessor, valuable as a 'showpiece of historian's art.' What is most remarkable is the writer's complete mastery of his material, specially that in the French Memoirs. However, the author's sweeping indictment of the Soviet system and his unqualified praise of 'democracies' are not easily understandable. Another snag about the book is that it presupposes a knowledge of French—a language more or less alien to this country.

D. D. KALIA

DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND DEFENCE. March 1947—April 1949. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949.)

It is typical of the time in which we live that the question of recovery of a nation or a continent seems to be invariably linked with its defence. At least that is the view held by the Royal Institute of International Affairs as far as

Europe is concerned; and by publishing the relevant documents concerning the post-war plans of European recovery and the post-war plans of European defence, the well-known British institution has drawn our attention to the peculiar connexion between the two problems. These plans have been numerous beginning with the Benelux Customs Convention of 5 September 1944 up to the very recent plans of a Fritalux or Finebel. In between there have been the European Economic Co-operation Convention of 16 April 1948 and the Franco-Italian Customs Treaty of 26 March 1949. All of them had been designed to bring about a recovery of European economic life which according to the specialists had lost its real vitality owing to intra-European competition and customs barriers. In an age of shrinking markets for Europe's manufactured goods, it is held by many European experts that the European countries should engage themselves in trading more with one another than looking for markets elsewhere.

This as a matter of fact has been the suggested remedy for Europe's economic crises. As regards the defence of the Continent, several pacts as well as treaties have been signed by some of the West European countries and among the treaties the first was signed by France and England at Dunkirk on 4 March 1947 and the last, at Washington on 4 April 1949 by eleven European countries and the U.S.A. The European countries were, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal. These countries are known now as the Atlantic Treaty countries. In between, however, there has been the Brussels Treaty signed on 17 March 1948 at Brussels by the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. All of these treaties have been referred to as defensive treaties, the defence being against future aggression by the U.S.S.R. except in the case of the Dunkirk Treaty which has specifically named Germany as the probable aggressor in the future.

It is thus characteristic of present-day Europe that while the United States by passing the United States Foreign Assistance Act of April 3, 1948 and soon afterwards by entering into an Economic Co-operation Agreement with Great Britain on 6 July 1948 was doing everything in its power to restore the devastated economy of the European continent, the European countries themselves, together with the U.S.A., were devising, at the same time, ways and means of strengthening their military power at the cost of their economic recovery. This contradictory situation has lasted until the present moment and it could have lasted so long, because the rôle which Western Europe was supposed to play in the cold war between East and West had called for it. But a new trend in thinking is already noticeable and opinions have been expressed in such dissimilar quarters as the cautious 'Le Monde' and impulsive General de Gaulle that Europe should be neutralized. This idea has gained strength in many West European countries including Germany, specially because of the growing fear of the Europeans of being involved in a war between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. merely as junior partners. In addition to this desire of neutrality in East-West conflict it is also evident today in many countries of Europe that the people are very unwilling to fight in *any war* and if these two tendencies

home and homeland. Their patriotism is more Malayan than Indian, as it should be. But it is yet too soon for a Malayan nationality and patriotism to supersede altogether the ultra-national loyalties of the Chinese and Indians and their identification with the Malays. Such a consummation must necessarily be delayed than hastened by British colonial rule. At the same time, it is not possible for the British to withdraw immediately and leave the country to the Malays, the Chinese and Indians, who are still conscious of their separate identities, to behave as one nation. Malaya is one of the insoluble conundrums of history. But Mr. Nanjundan is not concerned in this study with the political aspect, and rightly so.

P. KODANDA RAO

PROVISION OF FACILITIES FOR THE PROMOTION OF WORKERS' WELFARE, 1949 (Geneva, I. L. O.)

This report was drafted to serve as a basis for discussion of the second item on the agenda of the Asian Regional Conference held in Ceylon in January 1950. It comprises four chapters and an appendix. Chapter 1 contains the scope of workers' welfare, a brief historical survey and the general background of the welfare work in Asian countries. Chapter 2 gives the present law and practice regarding Sanitary and Medical facilities, Housing facilities, Educational facilities, Canteens, Creches, Day Nurseries and Recreational Facilities for workers in Asian countries. Chapter 3 lays down proposals for action. Chapter 4 gives the conclusion. The information given is fragmentary and does not provide a complete and balanced picture of what is happening in the welfare field. Yet the report must have served as a fruitful basis of discussion. The appendix contains the text of the resolution proposed at the conference.

ORGANIZATION OF MANPOWER WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 'EMPLOYMENT' SERVICES AND TRAINING, 1949 (Geneva, I. L. O.)

This Report was drafted to serve as a basis for discussion of the fifth item on the agenda of the Asian Regional Conference held in Ceylon in January 1950. The Report is divided into two parts. Part I containing 33 pages deals with the Employment Service Organization in the Far East. Organization of Manpower or a Manpower policy cannot create employment opportunities—that is the task of general economic development—but is intended to ensure that the employment market is properly organized in relation to the existing opportunities for useful work. A public Employment Service is indispensable for solving the Manpower problems. A brief history of the development and laws and regulations of the Asian Employment Services is given. The tasks of an Employment Service are pointed out to be (1) to collect facts about employment and unemployment, about occupations and industries, about job vacancies and about the workers in employment or looking for work, (2) to help workers to find suitable employment and employers to find suitable workers, (3) resettling refugees in employment, (4) to do some welfare work. Administrative organizational problems and difficulties in

connexion with an Employment Service Organization in the Far East are lucidly analysed. Part II covering the greater portion of the Report contains the reports (without any change) submitted to the Asian Conference of Exports on Vocational and Technical Training held in Singapore in September 1949 and the report and resolution adopted by that conference. In the Asian countries which in their task of economic development will meet with lack of skilled labour, the need for vocational training for a successful Manpower policy is immense. The four reports reproduced here are 'General Organization and Development of Technical Training,' 'Material Needs and Problems of Technical Organization,' 'Recruitment and Training of Instructors' and 'Vocational Training of Disabled Persons.' The two reports are a welcome addition to the growing literature on Labour Welfare.

A. B. GHOSH

GEOGRAPHY BEHIND POLITICS By A. E. Moodie, (London, Hutchinson's University Library, 7s. 6d.)

In this small book of 176 pages, the author admirably sets out the scope of Political Geography bringing out the influence of geographical factors on the evolution of states and their internal and external relationships. The author rightly emphasizes the need of objectivity in Political Geography and shows the error of the subjective outlook of the German School of *Geopolitik*. He has tried to remove the blot which came to be attached to *Geopolitics* after the propagation of the spurious theories of the German school with their disastrous consequences. The author next deals with the geographical factor underlying the evolution of states and naturally comes to the problem of reconciling the economic interdependence of states with their political independence. The influence of the geographic factors of location, size and shape, relief and geological structure, climate, human elements, ethnic composition, religion and language have been discussed and remedies suggested, since the aim of Political Geography is to study the adaptations of peoples to their physical environment within the territories of states, together with the relationship between them.

The problems of inter-state relationships on which depends the well-being of mankind as a whole have been discussed in a separate chapter. While it is recognized that the solution of the problem is no concern of the Political Geographer, the basic geographic factor is brought out. The truth of Mackinder's observation that the cause of war is the unequal growth of nations owing to the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity is well brought out with reference to the U. S. S. R., U. S. A., France, the Commonwealth, Germany, etc. The global pattern of states is the outcome of geographical realities.

The geographical aspects of frontiers and political boundaries are fully discussed and the fallacy of natural and ethnic frontiers is exposed. Interdependence is the only solution in a world reduced in dimension by the rapid growth of communications and movements of peoples.

As a prelude to later growth of world unity, the author has suggested a grouping of states following Mackinder. It is the Political Geographer's task to indicate the geographical background of any scheme of inter-state relationships. The author has discussed the relationships between 'backward' peoples and those of Europe or European origin, in order to show that investigations into the physical and human conditions which underlie the relationships between groups of peoples, the recognition of the existence of danger areas where maladjustments exist even now, are of immense importance for making policies to remove disparities between different regions of the globe. Unless these disparities are reduced to the natural minimum, causes of international conflicts will not be removed. These are some of the very sound suggestions to be found in this small but very useful book.

S. C. CHATTERJEE

GANDHI MEMORIAL PEACE NUMBER. (*Edited by* Kshitis Roy.
Visvabharati Quarterly. Santiniketan. Rs. 10/-)

One can always count on a Visvabharati publication being well produced. This volume is no exception. The mere sight of it tempts one to open and read. And if you yield to the temptation, you are likely to be well caught for a few hours at least. There may be those who think that too much is already being written about Gandhiji. That may be, though it is as certain as anything can be that the flood of writing will continue. A severe critic might argue that the world would not be much poorer if some of these essays had never seen the light of day. There are no less than forty separate essays, or thereabouts, and it is not to be expected that, out of such a number, every one will be of superlative value and originality. But a high proportion may be so described, and the volume, produced in connexion with the World Pacifist Meeting of December 1950, is abundantly justified.

Even the titles are in many cases most intriguing. Who would not want to see what Bharatan Kumarappa has to say under such a title as 'Gandhian Symbols?' And, indeed, the essay is worthy of the title. For he discourses with much insight and originality of the Spinning Wheel, the Cow, the Goat, the Loin Cloth, and the Stick. One could wish, almost, that he had gone on to discuss the symbolism of the Toothpick, the Writing-desk, the Three Monkeys, and one or two more objects with which Gandhiji's friends will for ever associate him.

Madame Sophia Wadia on Gandhiji's Contribution to World Culture, R. R. Keithahn on Mahatma Gandhiji's Revolutionary Religion, K. G. Mashruwala on Satyagraha against War, Maude Royden Shaw on Master Christian?, Mira Behn on The Cow's True Devotee, are some of the authors, taken almost at random, who seem to have had something they really wanted to say, and who have said it with freshness and originality.

It is useful, too, to have a further chapter from the pen of Henry Polak on Satyagraha and its Origins in South Africa, a subject on which he must be

almost the only surviving first-hand witness. The last section of the book, which tells of Gandhiji's special association with Gurudev Tagore and Santiniketan, is also of special value.

The editor is also to be congratulated on the wisdom of the selections from Gandhiji which occupy the first ten pages. Perhaps those ten pages, and the re-publication of Rabindranath Tagore's own comments on Gandhiji, are the best things of all in this notable volume. It was singularly fitting to close the book with Rabindranath's prophetic poem, *Victory to the Victim*.

We refused him in doubt, we killed him in anger, now we shall accept him in love,

For in his death he lives in the life of us all, the great victim.

And they all stand up and mingle their voices and sing, 'Victory to the Victim.'

HORACE G. ALEXANDER

INTERNATIONAL STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS (I. L. O., Studies and Reports, New Series No. 15, 3s. 9d)

WAGES AND PAYROLL STATISTICS. (I. L. O., Studies and Reports, New Series No. 16, 5s.)

These two reports, prepared by the International Labour Office for the Seventh International Conference of Labour Statisticians held in Geneva in September 1949, deal with two important fields of labour statistics. As in many other spheres, the establishment of international standards for the collection, compilation and presentation of statistics is leading to planned action to effect improvements in the nature and scope of statistics collected in many countries. The periodical conferences of Labour Statisticians convened by the I.L.O. have made valuable contributions in this direction.

The first of these volumes deals with the problems involved in establishing a standard classification of occupations for purposes of international comparisons. Occupational classifications are necessary in analysing data relating to employment and unemployment, labour markets, migration, training, wage comparisons, occupational diseases etc. The absence of a satisfactory occupational classification of the labour force is an obstacle in the way of efficient manpower organization both in the national and international spheres. The volume under review discusses the general principles relating to the classification of occupations and the ways in which a standard international classification can be established without sacrificing basic principles while accommodating the divergent systems followed in the national classifications. The proposed international standard classification consists of 10 major groups and 19 sub-groups and is designed to conform as closely as possible to existing national classifications and to enable an internationally comparable picture of the labour force of each country being presented in as much detail as possible.

The report consists of seven chapters and three Appendices. The chapters deal with the concept of occupation explaining the difference between 'occupational' and 'industrial' classification, the importance of occupational data in

national administration, difficulties in the collection of correct data and a satisfactory and uniform classification of occupations, and the problems that arise in attempting international definitions of specific occupations. The volume also discusses the variations between different national methods and practices in respect of occupational classification and explains the principles that have been followed in the proposed international standard classification. The Appendices give detailed allocation of occupational unit groups in vogue in Canada, France, the U.K. and the U.S.A. under the proposed international standard classification, as illustrative examples.

The discussion of the principles that should form the basis of occupational grouping is of immense value to those connected with population or occupational censuses in any country. The volume breaks new ground and is of considerable importance to Governments and public institutions engaged in the study of problems relating to the labour force.

The report on wages and payroll statistics deals generally with the collection and compilation of statistics of wages and earnings. It consists of eight chapters dealing with the work done so far in the field of statistics of wages, problems raised in the collection of wage and payroll statistics by different methods, estimates of total wages and salaries paid, and the results achieved by I.L.O. Convention No. 63, concerning statistics of wages and hours of work (1938). The last chapter contains proposed resolutions on the subject for the conference of Labour Statisticians. There are also three Appendices. The subject of statistics of wages and earnings of workers has been a topic of discussion by the I.L.O. for some time. In view of the importance of this information, a Convention was adopted at the 24th session of the International Labour Conference in June 1938, which set forth a minimum programme of wages-and-hours statistics to be compiled by each State. Furthermore, the total labour income in relation to national income is assuming great importance and it is essential to have reliable data regarding the share of labour in the national income. International comparisons of real wages also depend on the availability of correct wage statistics. These and other considerations lend particular importance to the collection of statistics of wages, salaries and earnings of workers.

The volume under review deals adequately with the various phases of this work and sets out difficulties in the collection of reliable data. The practices in the different countries where statistics of wages and payroll are being collected have also been critically examined. There is a section which discusses in detail the I.L.O. Convention No. 63, concerning statistics of wages and hours of work and the results achieved in regard to the collection and availability of data on the lines formulated in that Convention, in the different countries. The Appendices contain a number of tables giving average daily earnings, hours of work, index numbers of wage rates etc., in a number of countries in which statistics are available. The volume is a thoroughgoing discussion of the present position in regard to the availability of wages and payroll data. It also suggests lines along which further attempts to collect statistics of labour income should be made.

EQUAL REMUNERATION FOR MEN AND WOMEN WORKERS FOR
WORK OF EQUAL VALUE (I.L.O. Report. V (1), for submission to the
33rd session of the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 1950).

The question of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value came up for discussion before the 33rd session of the International Labour Conference at Geneva in June 1950. This report summarizes the existing laws and practices in regard to this subject. The principle is one on which there is general agreement but difficulties arise when the scope and methods of application in practice are debated. The reasons for differential wage rates for men and women for equal work are both traditional and economic, and though the acceptance of the principle has provided an approach to the solution of the problem, there is a long way to go before men and women are paid equal wages on identical jobs. The problem is receiving increasing consideration as female labour is becoming more and more important in many countries. During war-time, women performed many jobs which were till then the exclusive preserve of men and this has led to a revaluation of the basis for determining women's wages in industry. This process has gone on apace and the question has assumed sufficient importance to deserve the re-statement of principles at the international level and the formulation of proposals regarding methods of its application.

The attitude of various governments to the claim for equal remuneration for equal work has been encouraging and a considerable body of national laws and regulations exists which tends to provide for the application of the principle. Workers' organizations also generally favour the practice. Employers' organizations, however, with certain exceptions, have not favoured the universal application of the principle although they do not challenge its validity.

The problems involved in the establishment of international regulations regarding the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work relate both to the definition of what is meant by equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value as also to the scope and methods of its application. Tradition, economic necessity, job content, cost of production and many other factors are involved in the examination of this problem. The application of the principle may be secured both by legal enactments nationally enforced, as well as by collective bargaining between employers and workers. A number of national constitutions, including that of India, recognize the principle of equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, and the State is in a position to exercise direct influence upon its implementation. It may, however, be said that the tendency in democratic countries in this respect has been to evolve uniform practices by collective agreements between employers and workers in preference to the enforcement by the State of legislation enacted for the purpose.

The report under review deals exhaustively with all aspects of the question of equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value and places before the reader the salient points that require consideration in enunciating a solution that is internationally acceptable. The views of Govern-

ments, Employers' and Workers' Organizations and the existing laws and practices in various countries in this respect are well summarized. The last chapter contains a questionnaire dealing with different aspects of the problem to be answered by Governments, replies to which were to form a further basis for discussion at the 33rd session of the International Labour Conference to be held in Geneva in June 1950.

A. N. K. NAIR

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THE KOREAN CRISIS—SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

By S. L. POPLAI

I

WHEN in the early hours of the morning of 25 June the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel in strength and began to march relentlessly towards the southern coast, it was nothing new or unusual. It was neither the first place nor the first time since the end of World War II that armed force was used to settle a political dispute. It appeared likely that as in the case of Greece, Palestine, Kashmir, Burma, Indonesia and Indo-China the major powers in the United Nations would not take the clash in Korea seriously, would be content with the proposals of mediation and cease-fire and wait for the two parties to reach an agreement between themselves. However the United Nations Security Council met the same afternoon in response to an urgent request from the United States and adopted a resolution declaring the action of North Korean armed forces to constitute a breach of peace and called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to north of the 38th parallel. Even this remarkable alacrity of the Security Council need not have led to any important development. In a message to Mr. Trygve Lie, the United Nations Korean Commission had said: 'In view of the Commission's past experience and the existing situation, the Commission is convinced that the North Koreans will not heed the Council's resolution, nor accept the Commission's good offices. . . . The danger is that the critical operations now in progress may end in a matter of days, and that the question of cease-fire and of the withdrawal of the North Korean forces suggested by the Council's resolution may prove academic.'

As it happened the realization of the possibility of the rapid deterioration in Korea was not confined merely to the Korean Commission; it was shared by the United States as well. The American resolution adopted by the Security Council on 25 June had also asked all member-states 'to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities'. This resolution was passed at 6 p.m. on 25 June. At 10.30 p.m. President Truman authorised General MacArthur to give military supplies and assistance to the Korean Government as envisaged in the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of Oct. 1949. *Earlier the same day, the United States Government had received a direct appeal from the Korean National Assembly for increasing support and for 'effective and timely aid in order to prevent this act of destruction of world peace.'* The Korean National Assembly had also appealed to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security. In a statement issued from the White House on 26 June, President Truman appreciated the speed and determination with which the Security Council had acted and affirmed that the

United States Government would vigorously support the efforts of the Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace. How seriously the United States viewed this threat to the peace of the world was shown when shortly before noon on 27 June, President Truman announced that he had ordered the United States air and sea forces to give 'cover and support' to the South Korean troops. He added that the US 7th Fleet would prevent any attack on Formosa, that the US forces in the Philippines would be strengthened and that the rate of military assistance to the Philippines and Indo-China would be accelerated. In the statement, President Truman had explained: 'In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The U.N. Security Council called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel. This they have not done, but, on the contrary, have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances, I have ordered the United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.' It was this decision of the United States to go to the aid of the Republic of Korea that transformed the Korean crisis from a local conflict to a major international issue.

II

The two issues that have exercised the popular mind in Asia are the validity of the United States' action (i) with regard to fighting in Korea, and (ii) with regard to Formosa. While the 25 June resolution of the Security Council gives some cover to the initiative taken by the United States Government in giving assistance to the Republic of Korea, the Formosa policy of the United States stands entirely unsupported by the United Nations. On 27 June, the United Nations Security Council adopted another resolution presented by the American delegate: 'The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces of North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace; having called upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel; having noted on the report of the U.N. Commission on Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security; *and having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security*; recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. With this resolution the Security Council made history. When least expected, it acted promptly and effectively to put a stop to a breach of peace.

This action of the Security Council added more complications to the Korean issue. For one thing, it has been questioned whether the United Nations could take such serious decisions on 25 and 27 June as to declare North Korea an aggressor and to invoke military sanctions against it when the Soviet

Union delegate was not present at the meetings of the Security Council. Article 27 of the United Nations Charter stipulates 'Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters (other than procedural matters) shall be made by the affirmative votes of seven members including concurring votes of the permanent members provided that a party to the dispute shall abstain from voting.' Could the Security Council take a valid decision (a) when one of the permanent members was absent from the meetings and (b) when that member questioned the validity of the decision taken in his absence? Another criticism of the United Nations' action was that its conclusion that the crossing of the 38th parallel by the armed forces of the North Koreans constituted an act of aggression was based on insufficient evidence and ignorance. The fighting in Korea, from one point of view, is no more than a civil war which, as such, could not be properly objected to by the Security Council.

III

To understand the U. N. policy in Korea, it would be necessary to go back a little and note the development of a growing rift between the United States and the Soviet Union, both in Korea and elsewhere. The conflict has grown in different parts of the world at different times and has ranged over diverse problems. It started overtly with the USA, Great Britain and Canada refusing to take the USSR into confidence about the secrets of the atomic bomb. From the problem of the control of atomic energy the difference was extended to such items as the question of the Italian Colonies, the administration of the jointly-occupied Austria and Germany and the admission of new members to the United Nations; to the civil wars in Greece and China, the question of reparations and war prisoners and the peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Japan. When the East European countries lined up with the USSR, America rehabilitated her prestige by building up the North Atlantic Pact and launched the stupendous scheme of the European Economic Recovery Programme. The passing of the entire mainland of China under the Communist regime upset the balance of power in the Far East. It also brought out more sharply the significance of the Communist danger in Burma, Indo-China and the Philippines. While in the Western sphere, the two blocs were more or less evenly balanced, in the East with Japan vanquished and a number of new intensely nationalistic but militarily weak states rising upon the demise of the British, the Dutch and the American empires, the American Bloc was definitely out-manoeuvred. In the West, the swing to the left in the internal politics of Belgium, France and Italy had soon given way to more liberal regimes as the war-shattered economies slowly recovered their earlier prosperity. In the East, the wars of national liberation in Indonesia and Indo-China and the aftermath of partition in India and of civil war in Burma had made the economic situation increasingly worse and increased the attraction of extreme political ideologies to the peoples' mind. The anxiety of the new National Governments to quickly build up their backward economies did not find any heartening response from Western democracies to whom Asian countries had turned for help in capital and technical skill. It

a little puzzling for them to understand the attitude of the United States towards the rebuilding of European economy and to the development of backward areas in Asia. It was not realized that the European problem as compared to the Asian problem was a short-term problem and that a rehabilitated West was a pre-requisite for a rapid development of the several Asian economies. Western countries, highly industrialized before the war and in spite of war losses still very rich in capital and technical skill, could be put on the road to prosperity far more quickly and with far less effort than was necessary to develop the backward agrarian economies of Asian countries. In the case of the latter, it was natural that any development programme should emphasize first an improvement of agricultural technique. It would be sometime before the Asian countries could hope to themselves fruitfully absorb all the agricultural wealth that they produced. It would be necessary for their rapid agricultural development that the countries of the West, which have so far provided traditional markets for Asian raw products, should be put on their feet first, so that they could absorb the expanding agricultural production from Asia. Of course, this consideration was not the main reason for the preference that Europe got in American foreign policy. Immediately after the war, the danger of Communist successes loomed much larger throughout Europe than in Asia. Moreover, the cultural and emotional links of USA were much stronger with Europe than with Asia and it was natural that USA should turn to Europe first. But it was equally natural for the Asian countries to base their attitude towards the United States on her indifference to their great need for capital. Again, the American interest in the Iranian oil gave USA the traditional rôle of an imperialist exploiter in the eyes of all Asian countries. They are, therefore, extremely suspicious and critical of American moves in the East. On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling of goodwill and trust towards the USSR which has been greatly strengthened by the reported developments in the internal conditions in China after the victory of the Communists and by the admiration for the prolonged resistance of the Communists in Malaya and Indo-China against tremendous odds. At the moment, things are at such a pass that if the USA and the USSR were to do exactly the same thing, there would be severe criticism of the USA but a sympathetic understanding of the Soviet action. It is in the light of this world-background that the American policy in Korea should be approached.

IV

The beginning of the present Korean crisis goes back to 2 September 1945 when the Japanese forces in Korea surrendered to the American and the Soviet commanders. When on 11 August Japan had offered to surrender, the American and the Soviet authorities decided that north of the 38th parallel the Soviet Commander and south of that line the American Commander should take the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea. The Cairo and the Potsdam Declarations had stated in 1943 and 1945 the determination of the USA and the USSR to re-establish Korea as an independent state, to create conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible

liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination. However, from the very first, the Soviet occupation authorities treated the line of demarcation between the two military zones as a permanent delineation between North and South Korea. The US Commander failed to negotiate arrangements with the Soviet commander to re-establish the unity of the country so far as movement of inhabitants, trade and the American personnel were concerned. Later, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain met at Moscow in December 1945 and decided to set up a Joint Commission of the US and Soviet Commanders to assist in the formation of a provisional government for the entire country. But no real progress was made as the representatives of the two powers could not agree on the number or character of the parties that were to be consulted in the formation of the provisional government. To the American proposal that a provisional legislature should be elected in each zone by universal suffrage and that these two together should constitute a provisional national legislature and elect the provisional government of Korea, the Soviet authorities suggested that in the national legislature the representatives from North Korea should be equal in number to the representatives of the South instead of being in proportion of 1:2 according to the population in each zone.

Throughout 1946 and the greater part of 1947, these differences continued. The Soviet Union seemed determined to treat the two occupation zones not as temporary *ad hoc* parts of a single political unit but as two political units or states equal and independent in all respects. When the question was referred to the second session of the General Assembly in September 1947, it was decided to set up a United Nations' Temporary Commission to expedite the setting up of a government in Korea. During the debates in the Assembly, the Soviet Union maintained that like other problems connected with the conclusion of peace treaties, the Korean question did not fall within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. It was said that Korea could not establish its government freely until troops of the foreign occupation powers had been withdrawn. The Soviet Union accused the United States of deliberately obstructing the settlement of the Korean question. She proposed that the occupying powers should withdraw their troops immediately. This proposal was rejected by the Assembly in November 1947. The Soviet delegate then proposed that elected representatives of the people from both parts of Korea should be invited to take part in the discussion in the General Assembly. The first committee of the General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal as they could not be assured of the elective character of the representatives except by holding elections under the observation of the United Nations Commission. The Soviet delegate declared that if the United Nations set up any Temporary Commission without inviting the Korean people to participate in the Assembly discussions, the Soviet Union would not take part in the voting of the resolution proposing to set up the Temporary Commission and that if this Commission were set up the Soviet Union would not take part in the work of the Commission.

On 14 November 1947, the General Assembly resolved to set up a Tempo-

rary Commission to help in the election of the representatives of the Korean people, not later than 31 March 1948, for the establishment of the National Assembly and the National Government of Korea. To expedite its work, the Commission was 'to be present in Korea with the right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.'

The Commission met in January 1948 but soon found that the 38th parallel constituted an insuperable barrier in its path. It learnt that the Officer Commanding of the Soviet forces had refused to receive the Commission's communication desiring to pay a courtesy call. A reference by the Secretary General of the United Nations to the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union only brought a reference to the 'negative attitude' of the USSR towards the Temporary Commission. Thus, it appeared that the temporary line of division between the two occupation zones was made into a sacrosanct political frontier, which was closed not only to the American military personnel in South Korea, but also to the inhabitants of South Korea, as well as to the international, non-military body appointed by the General Assembly (by 43 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions) to work for the setting up of a representative government for the whole of Korea. In effect, the 38th parallel had become a full-fledged international frontier.

When the Temporary Commission reported to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly its inability to discharge its functions north of the 38th parallel, the Committee directed the Commission to implement the Assembly's programme in such parts of Korea as were accessible to it. The Indian, Canadian and Australian representatives expressed doubts regarding the wisdom of holding elections in a part of Korea only. Nevertheless, the Commission accepted the decision of the Interim Committee and elections for National Assembly were held in the South on 10 May 1948. On 12 July, the Assembly adopted a constitution for the Republic of Korea. On 9 August, president Syngman Rhee notified to the American occupation authorities that a Korean Government had been formed and on 15 August General Hodge, the head of the US Army Military Government in Korea, announced the end of the military government as from mid-night of that date. On 24 August, an interim military agreement and on 11 September, a property and financial settlement concluded the process of transfer of power to the Syngman Rhee Government.

Parallel developments were taking place in North Korea. According to the information available to the United Nations Temporary Commission, the formal executive authority in Korea had been vested, since February 1947, in the North Korean People's Committee which was established by the North Korean People's Council. General Kim Ir Sung was the chairman of the Committee. In April 1948, the people's Council had approved the draft constitution for a Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In accordance with its provisions, elections were held on 25 August for the Supreme People's Assembly. On 9 September, this body established the Government of the People's Republic of Korea under General Kim Ir Sung. The North Korean Government asserted that the people of South Korea had taken part in the secret election.

Pyongyang Radio claimed that 1080 representatives from South Korea had met in Haeju in North Korea and had in turn elected 360 Assemblymen, while 93% of the population of North Korea had elected 212 North Korean Assemblymen. When in December 1948, the General Assembly considered the report of the Temporary Commission on the establishment of two separate governments in North and South Korea, the Soviet bloc contended that the Temporary Commission and the Interim Committee had been established in violation of the Moscow Agreement and had no legal authority to back their actions. They further maintained that the elections in South Korea were not covered by the resolution of 14 November 1947, and since they had also been boycotted by all parties except the extreme right group, the report of the Commission did not reflect the wishes of the Korean people. They contended that not only the Commission had not contributed to the carrying out of free elections but, on the contrary, its activities had resulted in their taking place in conditions of severe police constraint and repression which had led to the establishment of a reactionary, anti-national regime in South Korea. That it had split Korea into two and that it had suppressed the democratic forces of the Korean people. The Soviet delegate proposed that the Temporary Commission's report should be rejected and the Commission be abolished. The Assembly, however, decided to establish a new permanent commission on Korea and declared: .

‘.....that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea.’

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was recognized by the USSR in October 1948 and since then by ten other states. The Government of the Republic of Korea was recognized by the United States in January 1949 and since then has been recognized by China, France, the United Kingdom, the Philippines and several other states. The United Nations decisions to recognize the Government of the Republic of Korea had been adopted by 48 votes to 6 and one abstention. Thus, the 38th parallel starting as a simple line of demarcation between the two occupation zones had become a political frontier on each side of which political authority was wielded by an independent government recognized by a number of sovereign states. By 25 December 1948, the Soviet occupation forces had been withdrawn from the North and by 30 June 1949 the American forces had been withdrawn from the South Korea.

V

At first sight, the Korean crisis would appear to be a civil war: it is a fight in Korea, among the Korean people, for the establishment of a united State

for the whole of Korea. But a brief reference to the development of events described above would show the complexity of the situation. Normally, a civil war is an insurrection or rebellion by local elements against a traditionally established government—whether indigenous or foreign—of that country, which has been generally recognized by other states as representing the lawful government of that state. Because other states recognize one of the participants as the *de jure* government of that State they usually refrain from taking sides in the fight. Indeed, in international law there is an obligation upon all states not to help the insurgents in any way.

It is not easy to define the character of the Korean war. Before fighting broke out, there was no single government in effective control of the entire territory of Korea nor was there a government generally recognized by other states as representing the *de jure* government of Korea. Instead, Korea had been divided sharply into two units by a line of demarcation which during the last five years, had all the characteristics of an international frontier, totally obstructing a free movement of goods and persons. Each territorial unit had a government which was recognized as the *de jure* government of Korea by a number of states. Each government had formally applied for the membership of the United Nations—South Korea in January 1949 and North Korea in February 1949. The Security Council had rejected the applications of both but a rejection of applications for membership to the U.N. constituted no rejection of the claim of either territorial unit to constitute an effective state. Again, it must be remembered that notwithstanding the declarations made by the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union and China at Cairo and at Potsdam to set up Korea as an independent state, since 1905 the Korean territory had been under Japanese rule. Unlike the areas occupied by Japan during the war, mere withdrawal of the Japanese power from Korea did not automatically confer upon Korea any international status; that has to wait upon the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan.

Of course, it is very unusual that almost five years should have elapsed since the cessation of hostilities without a peace treaty being signed with Japan. While the solution of urgent practical problems cannot always be postponed till the ground has been cleared of all formal impediments, nevertheless, this delay in the conclusion of a peace treaty has confused the formal status of the two parties to the present dispute in Korea. It is not possible, therefore, to accept the argument frequently advanced by the Soviet Union that the war in Korea is a civil war, that the United States has unwarrantably intervened in the domestic affairs of Korea and that the United Nations has no *locus standi* in the matter.

Till 30 June 1949, American troops were in occupation of part of Korea which upto September 1945 had been Japanese territory. The American troops have again returned to Korea at the invitation of the Government of the republic of Korea to defend it against aggression by North Korea. The Republic of Korea had also appealed to the United Nations to take immediate and effective steps to secure the peace and security of Korea. So far as the United States of America and the United Nations are concerned, they have

only gone to the aid of the Government of the Republic of Korea which had been recognized by them as the *de jure* government of Korea long before the present dispute.

Whatever be the real reasons behind the American and the United Nations' decision to go to the help of the Republic of Korea, their action is strictly correct in form and by no valid argument can be described as an act of aggression. It is not that the United States alone was anxious about the dangers inherent in Korea. The 27 June resolution of the Security Council when circularized among the members of the United Nations General Assembly, was endorsed by 52 out of 59 member States with only 4 against and 3 declining to give any opinion. The reason for this general appreciation of the prompt action of the Security Council is to be found not so much in the concern of the members of the United Nations with Korea, as in their anxiety to remove a threat to the peace and security of the world.

If the United Nations, which aims at a legal regulation of the use of force to settle international disputes, was right in its attempt to set up a machinery for the collective enforcement of law, it follows that the use of force is illegal both in a war between different states and in a war between members of the same state. No arrangement for collective security can work unless similar international measures are applied to civil wars as to the armed conflict between states. This conclusion may seem to militate against the concept of national sovereignty as it obtains today in practice as well as in legal theory, but this follows naturally from any scheme of a legal order that is established to enforce peace among the members of a group. Institutionalizing the use of force in the affairs of a community means that force can be lawfully used only for the pursuit of common interests and by persons or bodies who are duly authorized by the community. The only exception to this rule is the right of self-defence granted to individual members. The use of force, whether made by the authorized agents of the community for common good or by individuals for self-defence must always be open to review by an agency other than and independent of the persons whose actions are reviewed. In other words the establishment of a *legal order*, whether on the international or the municipal plane, necessarily requires two institutions. Firstly, the legal use of force must be reserved for the community to enable it to end the condition of anarchy; secondly, whenever force is used it should be open to a party adversely affected by its use to have the action reviewed by an independent body. In this way alone is it possible to remove the threat of arbitrary and oppressive action by the stronger members against the weaker members of the community. In the present context, the Security Council is the duly authorized agent of the international community. It alone can act on behalf of the United Nations. As things are at present however, there are insuperable barriers in the way of United Nations. International law still recognizes the right of a State to wage war, although it has repeatedly worked to eliminate the use of war as an instrument of state policy and has set up a permanent machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Yet it is desirable that all use of force

should be presumed to be illegal unless the international authority has reviewed the situation and reached a conclusion justifying the use of force.

While opinions may differ about the propriety of the use of armed forces by the North and South Korea, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the United Nations Security Council had acted in Korea in discharge of its lawful obligation to preserve the peace in that part of the world. The fact that it had not discharged its obligations with the same promptness or in a similar forceful manner on several earlier occasions does not detract from the lawfulness of the measures taken in the present instance. Indeed, the obligation of the United Nations to protect the Republic of Korea is particularly heavy as the Republic came into existence directly as the result of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly by a large majority of its members. If the United Nations had not acted promptly and had not given military aid to the Republic of Korea, soon the latter would have ceased to exist.

VI

As regards the procedural question whether the Security Council could take a valid decision in the absence of the Soviet Union, the matter does not raise any major difficulty. Article 27 has been invoked to challenge the validity of the resolutions of 25 and 27 June. Article 27 requires that all matters other than the procedural shall be decided by the affirmative votes of seven members including the concurring votes of the five permanent members. This provision confers the right of veto upon the permanent members. But to be effective the veto must be exercised by means of a negative vote actually cast. There is a long chain of precedents whereby a convention has developed that mere abstention from voting by a member does not constitute a negative vote; that is, absence does not violate the requirements of Article 27. For Article 28 requires 'the Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.' Voluntary absence of a permanent member from the Security Council, particularly when protracted for seven months, cannot be treated as anything else except a continuous abstention. It was never anticipated by the framers of the Charter that a permanent member might seek to perpetuate a general portmanteau veto by continuous abstention. It is difficult to believe that even by implication the Charter should sanction any such move on the part of one of its members. It is also to be remembered that while the Soviet Union had abstained from voting on ten occasions before, the United Kingdom on two occasions and France on one, no question was raised by any of these Powers about the validity of decision taken at each occasion. Even in the case of Korea, apart from the Soviet Union, no other member of the Security Council throughout the months of June, July and August ever questioned the legality of the decision taken at the Security Council. The resolutions of June 25 and 27 would have been *ultra vires* only if the Soviet Union delegate had cast a negative vote on those days. As an after-thought it is not open to any permanent member to seek to impose an *ex post facto* veto on a decision taken earlier.

VII

As regards the question of Formosa, it is a question of the validity of the American action only. So far as the international status of Formosa is concerned, it is dubious in the absence of the peace treaties. While on several occasions Korea has been the subject matter of international decisions, Formosa has not been discussed at all. So far as the United States is concerned, her action is quite simple and obvious. The United States Government has always given help to the Kuomintang régime. Even after the loss of the entire mainland and the flight of the Kuomintang group to Formosa, the United States has continued to regard Kuomintang as the lawful government of China. The action of the United States has not been liked by a large number of States but that does not take away from the United States the right to decide whom they would recognize as the *de jure* Government of China. Having decided not to recognize the new régime, they have taken an unilateral action with regard to a territory, occupied by a friendly government. This action was taken simply to *neutralize* Formosa in the Present crisis. The question of Formosa is tied up intimately with the question of the recognition of the Communist China. So far neither the United States nor the United Nations have recognized Communist China. When there is no compulsion for them to recognize any particular régime as the *de jure* government of China, it is not correct to say that in ordering the Seventh American Fleet to stop invasion of Formosa from the Chinese mainland and *vice versa*, the United States had committed an act of aggression against China.

VIII

These are some of the formal aspects of the Korean crisis. Other aspects of this conflict are mainly political. As far as the United Nations is concerned its action in Korea has served to revitalize the Security Council which had suffered grievously from lack of effective action. It has been a turning point in the history of the United Nations. Again, the 'cold war' between USA and USSR also has reached a mutation point. The Berlin crisis, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Communist insurrections in the Philippines, Indo-China, Malaya and Burma and the flight of the Kuomintang group from the Chinese mainland represented an ever-widening field of Soviet-American clash of interest. In Korea, USA believed that USSR had thrown down the gauntlet which must be picked up. On the one hand President Truman ordered the US armed forces to go to the help of the South Korean government, on the other he asked the Congress and got an additional grant of \$ 10,000 million for defence services and equipment. The United Kingdom increased her defence budget from £ 780 million to £ 1,000 million, while France, Norway, Denmark and even Switzerland have substantially increased their defence budgets. The Council of Europe meeting last month at Strasbourg seriously considered the military resources of Western Europe and set up a committee to study the problem of a unified and co-ordinated defence system for the whole of Western Europe. Incidentally, the Continental powers have

been greatly heartened by the swiftness of the American response to the dangerous situation in Korea. In the West, the Korean crisis has hardened the line of the West-East division. Mr. Churchill said at Plymouth on 15 July, 'I do not say that what has happened in Korea has made the dangers of a third World war greater. They were already grave. It has brought them nearer; they are more apparent. . . .'. But in the East, in Asia, the sudden, and impulsive action of U. S. and the unprecedented swiftness with which the Security Council recommended military sanctions against the government of North Korea have provoked severe and widespread popular criticism. The Soviet accusation of "aggression" and "intervention" directed against the USA has found ready believers among the Asian peoples. They believe that the United Nations has played the rôle of a stooge and has meekly shifted to its own shoulders the responsibility for American expansionist policies. However, throughout Asia, all responsible sections have supported the action of the United Nations even if they have not accepted the *bona fides* of the United States. While there has been some doubt about the wisdom of American attitude to Formosa, there is no hesitation in any quarter that the United Nations could no longer watch as a spectator the fast deepening rift between the West and the East all over the world. In Korea, the hour for action had struck and it was reassuring to find that at last the Security Council had found its voice and had spoken the words, 'Let war spread no further'.

THE DURAND LINE—A SURVEY

By S. R. TIKEKAR

FOR many months past, a heated controversy has been raging in the Press and over the wireless of our two neighbours, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The bone of contention appears to be the Durand Line. In simple terms the point of dispute is: Who should control the Tribal Territory? Under whose sphere of influence does it fall, Pakistan's or Afghanistan's?


Actually, there should be no ground for dispute over a matter of such importance, since there must be definitive records of treaties and agreements governing it. But, Afghanistan contends, these have lapsed with the withdrawal of the British power in India and with the creation of a new State on her borders. They have *not* lapsed, says Pakistan in effect, in fact the provisions of those treaties and agreements are still binding on Afghanistan on the one side and on Pakistan on the other as successors to the British power in these parts. The British Government appears to support the latter claim.

Perhaps the issue is too complicated, only fit for the legal pundits at the Hague to discuss and to decide. We can, however, as students of world affairs, have a peep into past history and study the contemporary documents to find out the facts as recorded there. For our purpose, there is the two-volume autobiography of Amir Abdur Rahman during whose reign the Durand Line came to be agreed to; there is also an authentic biography of Sir Mortimer Durand the hero of the diplomatic drama, and other material about Afghan-

MAP SHOWING THE DURAND LINE & TRIBAL TERRITORY

Scale 1 Inch to 70 Miles.

The Indo-Pakistan boundary shown on this map has not yet been demarcated as an international boundary. The alignment, therefore, is to be regarded as approximate and is not authoritative.



istan and the North-West Frontier of India (Pakistan), both from official and non-official sources, is plentiful.

Before digging up the old records, some basic facts may be clarified. The Durand Line is the Afghan frontier on the Indian (Pakistan) side marked in 1893 by mutual consent of the Amir on the one side and the British Indian Government, as represented by Sir Mortimer Durand, on the other. Between the Indian frontier on the Afghan side and the Durand Line, lies a narrow strip of land known as Tribal Territory, locally called Yagistan. It comprises an area of about 25,000 sq. miles and about 30 lakhs of people, Pathans of different tribes, live there.

It is said that Yagistan can easily produce about 140,000 good fighters armed with rifles at short notice. There is no government as such in the Tribal Territory and every tribe is practically independent. The geographic and climatic conditions of this narrow strip of land are such as to encourage in its residents a spirit of loot, brigandage and kidnapping, with the result that their very presence constitutes a constant source of anxiety to the two adjoining States. 'These Tribesmen are never at peace unless they are at war.'

It is not necessary for our purpose to go deep into the past history of Afghanistan. At the end of the Second Afghan War the British found themselves in control of Kabul, Kandahar and the territory in between. It was decided to back a strong local chief instead of annexing Afghanistan or part of it. Accordingly, Abdur Rahman was helped to consolidate his position as ruler of the country. The understanding¹ between Abdur Rahman on the Afghan side and Sir Lepel Griffin as representative of the British Government is recorded in 'The Memorandum of Obligation' (July 1880). Stating that the British Government did not want to interfere with the internal administration of Afghanistan, it laid down that the Amir could have no political relations with any foreign Power except with the British Government.

Having given this undertaking, the Amir was anxious to have the boundaries of his kingdom fixed. In fact, he kept on asking for marking them in many of his communications with the British Indian Government. When other boundaries were fixed, attention was focussed on the Afghan frontier on the Indian side. That was a complicated matter because of the presence of many unruly tribes of Yagistan between Afghanistan and India. The obvious question was: who should exercise control over these tribes? A practical man of the world and instinctively shrewd, Abdur Rahman warned the British statesman that if the Yagistani tribesmen

'were included in my dominions, I should be able to make them fight against the enemy of England and myself....I will gradually make them good friends of Great Britain. But if you cut them out of my

¹ 'The personal nature of the agreements is clear from the preamble in which the parties negotiating are mentioned as the Amir and the Government of India; not the Governments of Afghanistan and India. Secondly, when the 2nd mission went to Kabul, with the purpose of securing confirmation of the previous treaties, it was specifically asked to impress on the new Amir the personal nature of the old agreements.

'The relations established with Amir Abdur Rahman were in his personal capacity for the simple reason that there wasn't any Government of Afghanistan as such then.'

dominions, they will neither be of any use to you nor to me; you will always be engaged in fighting and troubles with them, and they will always go on plundering....In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, ... you ... will make me weak and my weakness is injurious to your Government'.²

The differences between the two neighbours are thus clear. When Sir Mortimer Durand reached Kabul, his task was very delicate. He was a trusted friend of the Amir and knew quite well that

the Amir had shown deep hostility and jealousy to the British maintaining direct relations with the independent tribes lying between India and Afghanistan, more especially the Waziris, the Afridis and the peoples of Bajour and Swat.....

Durand's instructions therefore were to

endeavour to change this hostility into a friendly attitude by assurances that our interests and those of His Highness (the Amir of Afghanistan) were identical and that Russia alone would gain by lack of co-operation between India and Afghanistan.³

There were many meetings between the two friends and many an interesting story is recorded by the British diplomat, who in one such meeting asked the Amir:

'After all, Amir Sahib, if there is so little population and wealth in the country (of Yagistan) you describe, what good will it do you?' His answer was one word: 'NAM—name, honour!'⁴

Yet after protracted negotiations, Durand was successful—he did score over the Afghan Amir and an agreement was at last signed in Kabul on 12 November, 1893. Its preamble makes things quite clear:

'Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontiers of Afghanistan on the side of India and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by a friendly understanding and of fixing the limit of their respective spheres of influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of opinion on the subject between the allied governments, it is hereby agreed.....'

And the concluding part of the agreement reads:

'Being fully satisfied of His Highness's goodwill to British Government and wishing to see Afghanistan independent and strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further in order to mark their sense of friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the

² Abdur Rahman: *My Life*. Vol. II pp. 157-8.

³ Percy Sykes: *Sir M. Durand*, Cassels, London, 1926, p. 211.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 216.

Government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness.⁵

The details of how the line was drawn and how it was received by the courtiers at Kabul need not be gone into. Nor is it necessary to say why the British Government were so anxious to have the Agreement. It is sufficient to note that much against the wishes of the Amir the Tribal Territory was to be within the British sphere of influence. It is not difficult to understand the British insistence on this—it was dictated by the increasing Czarist influence round and about Afghanistan, in the first instance. Secondly, the huge responsibility of guarding the 'brightest jewel' in their Empire loomed large in the mind of the British statesmen.

On the Afghan side too, there were strong reasons why the Amir thought it necessary to accept (though somewhat reluctantly) the conditions as laid down in the agreement. He had to consolidate his position and centralize his authority in the face of many rivals. For such a task, he wanted peace at least on his most turbulent frontier—the Yagistan side. By delegating the authority to deal with the Yagistani tribes to the British, the Amir solved his major difficulty. Finally, he needed very badly the financial assistance under the agreement, as, without it, it would have been impossible for him to do anything.

For our present purpose the one crucial point about this agreement is that the contract was made with the Amir in his personal capacity. This personal character of the contract was subsequently confirmed when twelve years later another British delegation went to Kabul for negotiations with the son and successor of Abdur Rahman. Mr. (later Sir) Louis Dane visited Kabul to meet Amir Habibullah. He was instructed to

'insist that the engagements made with Abdur Rahman were personal; he was to embody in a treaty the assurances given to Abdur Rahman...; he was to insist on the absolute control by the British Government of the foreign relations of Afghanistan; he was to offer the Amir the personal subsidy of 18 lakhs granted to his father.....'⁶

Accordingly, Habibullah confirmed all the undertakings of his father, 'The Lord of the Nation,' who had found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb!

When in 1919 Amanullah came to be the ruler of Kabul, there would have been a similar delegation from the British Government to get confirmation from him of the previous treaty obligations. But the young Amir started his career with a declaration of war—in fact by invading India. Although this Third Afghan War came to an abrupt end, the Amir had been successful in achieving his immediate objective—the independence of Afghanistan. But in the Treaty of Peace signed at Rawalpindi on 8 August, 1919, there is no

⁵ Percy Sykes: *A History of Afghanistan* (Macmillans, Lond. 1940), Vol. II, pp. 353-4.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 218.

mention of Afghan independence, although in Article 5 the 'Indo-Afghan Frontier' is said to be accepted by the Afghan Government. What exactly does this term mean? Afghan frontier on Indian side or Indian frontier on Afghan side? The vagueness on this most important point did not seem to worry the new Amir; he was more concerned with the acceptance of the independence of his country. He therefore addressed a letter to Sir Hamilton Grant, who was negotiating on behalf of the British Government. Grant's reply was typical:

'You asked me for some further assurance that the Peace Treaty which the British Government now offer contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan either in internal or external matters. My friend, if you read the Treaty carefully, you will see that there is no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have told me that the Afghan Government are unwilling to renew the arrangement whereby the late Amir agreed to follow unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to his external affairs. I have not therefore pressed this matter and no mention of it is made in the Treaty. Therefore the said Treaty and this letter leave Afghanistan officially free and independent in its internal and external affairs. Moreover this war has cancelled all previous Treaties.'⁷

Grant was severely taken to task in some quarters for this very frank letter, as Sykes tells us.⁸ Far from clarifying the issue, this letter, its last line in particular, adds to the confusion about the Durand Line. Does it or does it not leave Amanullah free to negotiate with the residents of Yagistan, transferring that territory from the British to the Afghan sphere of influence?

In the treaty signed later, on 22 November, 1921, between the British Government and Afghanistan, Article 11 makes the position of the Tribal Territory still more vague and undecided:

'The two High Contracting Parties having mutually satisfied themselves each regarding the goodwill of the other, and especially regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in future of any military operation of major importance, which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing within their respective spheres, before the commencement of such operations.'⁹

Are we to conclude from this Article of the Treaty that the Tribal Territory was divided into two spheres, partly Afghanistan's and partly British Indian, as a result of Afghanistan becoming independent?

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 359.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 284-5.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 368.

After Amanullah, the son of a water-carrier occupied the throne of Kabul for some time and it was no small task for Nadir Shah to oust him from that position. The Afghan crown thereafter passed on to Nadir Shah, whose son is now the ruler of the country. It is not known what undertakings these successive rulers have given to the British Indian Government regarding the Tribal territory, in particular the Durand Line.

THE ECONOMY OF NEW DEMOCRACY*

By P. RATNAM

SHANGHAI is a dead city, so the Shanghai landers say. This city, once famous for its beauty and roaring and prosperous export and import business, paradise of speculators and profiteers and the Mecca of all foreign and rich Chinese financiers, has now been deprived of all its borrowed glory, glamour and attraction and is pitilessly laid low. Due to lack of raw materials and export facilities of finished luxury goods, many industries are idle and some of them even closed down—resulting in unemployment of a considerable number of people. To add to this is the number of dock hands reduced to idleness and destitution by the blockade—who till yesterday handled, with feelings of security of their jobs, colossal number of cargo ships which steamed day in and day out into the Shanghai harbour. Due to blockade the export and import business closed, driving the foreign business interests to despondency and justifiable misgivings about their future business prospects. Also, there is scarcity of food and the cost of food in the local market is phenomenal. The above factors have thus created, after the liberation of Shanghai, gigantic problems of unemployment, scarcity of food for the city's teeming millions and idleness of the existing industries. Have the communists any remedies for these economic ills? If so, what are they? These questions and others similar to these lead us to an enquiry into the most general problem—the economic policy of the new democracy—which it is our object to deal with in greater detail.

Politics and economics have always been closely related to each other, exerting mutual impact. In the state of the new democracy, the political leadership over the economic situation is particularly important. The communist leaders have long ago realized that to introduce communism into China all at once is to court economic disaster. The situation, therefore, required careful planning and skilful handling. The communists, as is well known, do not want to tread on the road of the old democracy. They also recognized the economic interests and uneven economic levels of development in different parts of China. Hence, their decision to go through a series of stages of revolution aimed at gradual transformation suited to different levels of economic development, till they ultimately achieve communism. The three stages according to them are: (1) New Democracy; (2) Socialism; and (3) Communism.

* A talk delivered under the auspices of the council at New Delhi on 10 June 1950.

New Democracy

New Democracy is the first stage of the revolution, and the economy developed is to carry out the objective of this 'New Democracy.' The economy of the 'New Democracy' does not come under the category of capitalism nor of socialism, but it is an economy which contains some elements of private capitalism; yet it is not capitalistic in its entirety. The New Democracy thus permits the continued existence of private production. For example, it allows the farmers to own what is produced from their land, handicraftsmen from their workshops, merchants from their shops and the small middle class capitalists from their factories. Furthermore, during a certain period of time, the people not only can preserve their private production system, but the exploitation of the surplus value of the capitalist type is also permitted. It has an avowed object as stated by Mao Tse Tung in *Present Situation and Our Task*—a political report presented by him to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in December 1947—'of wiping out feudalism and monopolistic capitalism, i.e., only the land owners and bureaucratic capitalists (the large property class). It is not the indiscriminate obliteration of all capitalism, the wiping out of the small property class and the middle property classes. Because of the economic backwardness of China, the capitalist economy represented by the extensive small property class and the middle property class must be allowed to exist for a long period of time even after nationwide victory of the revolution.' He also pointed out that the State will also have an agricultural economy liberated from the feudalistic order; and, though for a long time yet such an economy will still basically be scattered among individual hands, it is capable of being gradually led along the path of development on a co-operative basis. Mao Tse Tung thinks that there is no danger in the existence and development of the small and middle-class capitalistic elements within this economic order as a whole. The above therefore sets a definite well-laid economic policy for the 'New Democracy.'

Composition of the machinery

What is the machinery to carry out this objective? It is here the communists have shown great realism in choosing to carry out their first stage programme with divergent elements. These elements are the workers, peasants, petty bourgeois and the national bourgeois of the cities. They are divergent in their aims, but, nevertheless, have a common purpose and that is to wipe out feudalism and monopolistic capitalism. It is towards this purpose that the communists would like the above elements to work. They also realize that there will be rivalry, petty jealousies and competition among the various groups which constitute the machinery. Under the communist leadership it is however hoped that the divergent groups would get together and focus their attention on the above common object. This method of uniting divergent elements of society, to fulfil, during a period of certain economic development, a common objective, is not foreign to Marxist doctrine of dialectical materialism. This doctrine of 'progress by

conflict of opposites' envisages in the course of its operation stages of development where 'unity of opposites' is admitted. The experiment of 'New Democracy' is based on this principle of 'unity of opposites.'

The object and the machinery to fulfil this object reduce the 'New Democracy' into a mixed economic State which includes different component parts. They are :

- (i) *The Economy of Socialism* : This refers to all public operated enterprises. There is no capitalist and no exploitation.
- (ii) *The Economy of State Capitalism* : This refers to enterprises operated jointly by the Government and private interests, or those operated jointly by Chinese and foreign interests, and the enterprises owned by the State but entrusted to private operation. Here, then, still exist the capitalist and the exploitation. But such a capitalism is entirely different from private capitalism. In the first place, the State assumes leadership in operation, and in the second place, the profits earned go to the State.
- (iii) *Co-operative Economy* : At the present moment, in the rural areas markedly, co-operatives are the first need, to be followed by the development of consumers' and credit co-operatives, and gradually leading to large scale production co-operatives (collective farms). In the cities consumer co-operatives should be universally established as well as producer co-operatives as far as possible.
- (iv) *Private Capitalist Economy* : This will be chiefly found in industrial and trading enterprises. There is still scope for great development of this type of economy *as long as it benefits the State and people's livelihood*. There must necessarily be exploitation under the private capitalist system; but, as long as it is capable of accumulating capital for the enlargement of reproduction, it will prove conducive to the interests of society and the State.
- (v) *Economy of the small merchant* : This will principally be found in agriculture and also in handicrafts and small trading enterprises. This economy may face a period of prosperity in the near future. As to its future, it will most likely be converted into a co-operative economy, and a small part of it into capitalist economy.
- (vi) *The Economy of self-production and self-consumption* : In the rural areas most of the peasants have such an economic life. Especially in the backward border areas a great part of the locally produced products are still not yet commercialized.

With the above as background let us examine how the new economic policy has been put into effect in the following :

- (a) Industries
- (b) Trade and
- (c) Land reforms.

(a) *Industries :*

A country must rely on industry, especially heavy industries, for its strength. The central theme of the new economic reconstruction programme is the building of heavy industries. Only with the independent heavy industries may light industries freely develop and individual agriculture be converted into collective agriculture so that the national economy may be thoroughly remodelled.

The communists feel that there must be co-ordination, unlike in the past, in the development of light and heavy industries. Industry, therefore, must develop in three stages. In the first stage, both light and heavy industries will be given equal attention. On the one hand, the basic foundations of heavy industries will be appropriately developed to improve the living standards of the rank and file. In the second stage, major attention is to be paid to heavy industries. In the third stage, light industries should claim greater attention.

Also the redistribution of location of the present industries and factories all over China has been engaging the greatest attention of the communists. They decided to distribute the industries according to their strategic location and the vicinity of raw material resources. With this view, the present set-up of industries in Shanghai will completely be overhauled.

With the question of industries the problem of capital and its relation to labour is closely associated. What is the attitude of communists towards capital? This question is being asked everywhere. Development of production to benefit both capital and labour is the principle which the communists have decided to follow. It must be pointed out that there are two aspects to this principle. On the one hand, only through the development of production may capital and labour both be benefited. On the other hand, only by benefiting both capital and labour will production be developed. Chinese communist leaders and economists have come to the conclusion that the present difficulty which is facing Chinese national economy is not one of over-development, but rather under-development of people's capitalism and not bureaucratic capitalism.

China is industrially backward and in the interests of the workers as well as the nation as a whole the most immediate need is the development of production. That the Chinese working class can succeed as leaders of the whole country is only due to the fact that they can take care of their national interests as a whole. Their interests are inseparable from those of the whole body of the people. In the circumstances if all the profits from private industrial enterprises are used for the benefit of the workers alone how can the capital be accumulated for the development of production and promotion of industry? It is necessary, therefore, that the major portion of the working profits should be allowed to accumulate for the capitalism of development projects providing also an appropriate return on capital investments.

Under the Government of New Democracy, the middle and small capitalists have great scope for development. The time during which national capitalism would be represented by small and middle property classes

will not be a short one. Though the communist party has not yet officially decided on a definite time limit for their operation, Mao Tse Tung's political report in December 1947 indicated that a fairly long period would be expected. For Mao Tse Tung said: 'Because of the backwardness of Chinese economy, capitalistic economy as represented by large numbers of the small property and middle property classes must be permitted to remain in existence for a long period even after nation-wide victory of the revolution; and, in accordance with the principle of allocation of work in the promotion of national economy, scope for development must further be allowed for such operations of their activities as are beneficial to national economy.'

(b) *Trade :*

The trade policy of new China may be summed up in the words 'Freedom for domestic trade and control of foreign trade.' Since China is a backward nation, though the development of the national economy will be greatly enhanced in the course of time, to ensure the speedy progress of this development, planned control of foreign trade is indispensable. The object of foreign trade control is to promote the importation of goods needed for the national economy and the prohibition of imports which will undermine this economy, protection of national industry and promotion of the export of industrial and agricultural products and the use of foreign exchange earned for economic reconstruction. The programme of control exercised by the New Democracy will be implemented with the interests of the State as a whole in mind.

It is possible that the State will also undertake trading operations in the few very important commodities which tend to become centralized in order to have greater access to foreign exchange earners. But the legitimate profits of the producers will be protected. As to exporters who sell their exchange to the State, the principle will be observed under which the foreign exchange goes to the State but the profits go to the merchants.

The legitimate profits of industry and trade will most assuredly be respected, and there need be no fear that profits earned will be confiscated by the State. Though no definite limits have yet been decided upon as constituting the margin of legitimate profits, an equitable decision may be expected some time later.

(c) *Land and Agricultural Reforms :*

Land reform is a basic mission of the revolution of the New Democracy, and its objective is the thorough abolition of the feudalistic and oppressive landlordism and the elimination of all the special privileges enjoyed by the landowners economically, politically and socially, and the realization of the freedom wherein 'tiller owns his land.'

The reduction of rentals and the reduction of interest rates represent the preliminary stage of land reform. After this stage the political consciousness of the masses of peasants will be aroused, and their strength for organization augmented. The time and scope of land reform must be decided by the political consciousness and degree of unity of the peasants. The actual measures of land reform must be based on concrete political conditions and

actual experience gained in struggle. In the old liberated areas land reform has been completed. In the semi-old liberated areas land reform has been largely completed. In the new liberated areas land reform will be undertaken in due course.

After land reform the peasants, having access to their own land, will be encouraged to work hard, thus increasing agricultural production and improving the peasants' livelihood and paving the way for successful industrial development in the cities.

Scheme of compensation to farmers :

The basis of the new taxation promulgated in the various liberated areas is to ensure the victory of the communists, supply of resources vitally needed for constructive enterprises in the liberated areas and the equal and fair distribution of the taxation burden on all classes of the people. Thus, the new measures are drawn up on an entirely new basis and with a motive different from that of merely yielding revenue to the Government as was the case under the Kuomintang rule.

In the distribution of the burden of taxation the regulations have discarded the former practice of computation on the basis of the area of cultivated land. Instead, agricultural income and the size of the household have become the basic factors in determining the amount of taxation to be borne by the farmer.

Under the present regulations only production from the land is taken into consideration in the computation of the income of the farmers. In order to raise the production zeal of farmers newly freed from the oppression of landlords and other reactionaries their income from auxiliary occupation is not taxed.

Production from the land is based on the quality of the holdings. The actual yield is assessed once a year and the tax is payable twice a year.

For the purpose of taxation all persons, adults and minors, living in the same household are included in the number of people for the household. The taxation computation is based on the average production for person *per capita* by dividing the total production of the family by the number of members (adults and minors included as stated). The tariff is a sliding scale of 13 grades, the minimum taxable income being 120 catties (rice or wheat) *per capita* per year. The taxation tariff is as follows:

| <i>rate</i> | <i>Annual Production per capita</i> | <i>Percentage Tax rate</i> |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1 | 120 — 200 catties | 5 |
| 2 | 201 — 250 „ | 7 |
| 3 | 251 — 300 „ | 9 |
| 4 | 301 — 350 „ | 11 |
| 5 | 351 — 400 „ | 13 |
| 6 | 401 — 500 „ | 15 |
| 7 | 501 — 600 „ | 18 |

| | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---|----|
| 8 | 601 - 700 | „ | 21 |
| 9 | 701 - 800 | „ | 24 |
| 10 | 801 - 1000 | „ | 28 |
| 11 | 1001 - 1200 | „ | 32 |
| 12 | 1201 - 1500 | „ | 36 |
| 13 | 1501 catties and over | | 40 |

Income from land leased to tenant farmers by small industrial and commercial operators shall, however, be taxed at the flat rate of 15% of total value of income.

There are also provisions for the spreading of the taxation burden over landlord and the tenant and in cases where there is a standing arrangement of the division of the yield from the land between them. Provisions are also made for the aged and sick without dependents and for the families of revolutionary martyrs and members of the services.

FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Foreign Exchange

In view of the standstill in export and import trade due to blockade of the sea coast, trading in the foreign exchange market has more or less come to a standstill. The appointed banks sold some small lots of foreign exchange to the Bank of China on behalf of their clients mostly for remittances from abroad by both foreign nationals and overseas Chinese.

The foreign exchange quotations were revised several times by the Bank of China. The rise in the U.S. dollar rate similar to that of other foreign currencies is far behind the quotations of rice and other commodity prices—an ironical contrast to those chaotic ‘pre-liberation’ days when the U. S. dollar dominated the market and took the lead in price upsurges. The situation is causing increasing difficulties to many foreign firms whose incomes are in terms of U.S. dollars. Whereas some 7 to 8 U.S. dollars were sufficient to buy one picul of rice before the liberation of Shanghai, more than 20 U.S. dollars are necessary for the purchase of the same quantity of rice at present.

Obviously, the absence of demand for foreign exchange on the part of the importers for the time being has contributed to the prevailing rates which, though seemingly low, are perfectly normal. In the Kuomintang days the ‘green backs’ were the main financial article of speculation and their value was greatly over-estimated.

The same situation holds good for silver dollars. If the foreign trade is resumed more currency would be needed by the Chinese people to import foreign industrial machinery etc. then it is anticipated that the foreign exchange quotation would increase and thus appreciate considerably foreign currency. By keeping the exchange rates for the foreign currency behind the increase in rates of commodity prices, the communists have succeeded in wiping out black market dealings in foreign currency.

By introducing the ‘Parity Unit System’, the communist authorities have increased the savings deposits of the people in the banks, and substantially

decreased the velocity of currency circulation, and, therefore, inflation. 'The Parity Unit System' is based on commodity prices and consists of the value of the following four commodities:—

- (1) 1 Sheng of rice
- (2) 1 foot of cloth
- (3) 1 tael of peanut oil
- (4) 1 cattie of coal briquettes

The advantage in the system is the value of the unit increases/decreases as the prices of the commodities increase/decrease so that the person who invests savings into the bank will not be the loser. Also as and when required the depositor may withdraw any number of units out of his savings.

SHANGHAI

Blockade put an end to exports and imports into Shanghai. No raw materials could be imported and no finished goods could be exported. The result was that quite a number of factories had to keep idle. The communists' solution to this problem is integration of the cities' economy into that of the country's. In the past, Shanghai served as a manufacturing centre not for the hinterland, but mainly for the undeveloped countries in the south-east. Actually the city got its industrial start because it was found that the labour was so cheap and it paid both foreign and native industrialists to bring raw materials, particularly cotton, to Shanghai and manufacture it into yarn and cloth and then export it to South-East Asia. Thus the city's economy grew rather strangely and in many ways rather disconnected from the Chinese hinterland.

This fact has been one of the root causes for many of the city's past economic difficulties. Its manufactured products in a period of slump could not find a market since internal ones had never been well developed. Also since many of the new raw materials came from abroad no substitute supply was ever developed internally. This situation frequently was the basis for the oft-heard assertion that while the city was located in China, it had little to do with China.

The industrial situation of Shanghai has four defects. The first defect is the colonial nature of the industrial situation. Shanghai was basically a colonial city, and as a result its industry has not been independent, being dependent on foreign countries for raw materials, organization, technique, power and food. Dependence on foreign supplies has been clearly marked.

The second defect is the consuming nature of Shanghai industry. Most industrial operations may be classified as light industries with a limited number of semi-heavy industries. There is a scarcity of plants for the manufacture of production tools. Apart from a certain amount of daily necessities produced, Shanghai's industry has been turning out luxury items.

The third defect is the nationally representative character of Shanghai's industry which is entirely unwarranted. China is an extensive country with her communication systems not yet fully developed, and the concentration

of practically all industrial activity in Shanghai is entirely against the interests of the national economy.

The fourth defect is the recently developed situation in Shanghai's industry in which national industry interests have been invaded and eaten. The so-called 'State enterprises' have been concentrated in Shanghai and given special opportunities to flourish. Economic chaos and financial confusion under the Kuomintang rule further added to the deterioration of the situation with the result that many industrial undertakings have become insolvent.

The difficulties that confront Shanghai's industries are reflected in various developments. There is first the severance of ties between liberated Shanghai and American industrial interests. Due to cutting off of certain raw material supplies the factories could not continue operation. Then again, because of Shanghai's national importance, with the damaged communication facilities, there has been the disruption of connexions between Shanghai and the rural areas and the problems of fuel and markets have become difficult to solve. Moreover, the change in the social order has led to a state where the former privileged classes are either lying low or facing decadence, and the markets for luxuries and other non-essential items are stagnant, and it is not possible for industrial operators to make immediate readjustments in catering to the needs of new classes of buyers, and weakness of Shanghai's industrial structure has brought about subjective difficulties in the way of finance and acquisition of raw materials for the resumption of operations.

The communist policy of tackling these industrial problems in Shanghai is, in my opinion, the correct one. According to the communists, all industrial enterprises, either public or private operated, should seek ways and means of ridding themselves of their economic dependence on foreign currencies and should hereafter adopt 'producing for the domestic markets and serving the Chinese people' as the production policy and development of Shanghai. The first principle for the adjustment of the situation is the rectification of the sense of dependence and the upholding of the spirit of independence for Shanghai's industry. The task is no light one. In the matter of raw material supplies, formerly dependent on foreign imports, domestic supplies or substitutes are being found. The difficulties relating to fuel, machinery and techniques are being tackled. The communist principle for industrial adjustment is the conversion of the purely consuming nature of Shanghai's industry into a productive one. It may be possible to specialize in certain industries or to deal with the light industries exclusively, especially the textile industries. It must be admitted that Shanghai is lacking in the factors needed for the development of heavy industry. Nevertheless, the industry of Shanghai must no longer serve the needs of a small number of the privileged class but rather serve the greatest masses of the people. The third principle in effecting the adjustment of the present industrial situation is the decentralization, to some extent at least, of the abnormally concentrated industrial establishments in the city. There are many plants in Shanghai which are not suited to its needs, or which are operated with difficulties. They should be

transferred to the interior. Thus the following practical steps are being taken by the communists to adjust the industries to the new situation:

(i) *Removal of factories to the interior*: The Universal Handkerchief Factory has decided to move a part of its plant to Tientsin in order to develop operations in North China. It is understood that there are several advantages for such a move. Power is cheap in Tientsin. The supply of raw materials is available from local mills. Tientsin manufactured products are exported, and even if the blockade should be extended there, there are potential markets in Manchuria and North China.

(ii) The cigarette industry of Shanghai is planning the removal of some of its plants to the interior districts. It is proposed that the smaller plants among the many suspended establishments be moved first. Hankow is one of the centres to which part of the local industry is to be transferred in view of the easy access of tobacco leaf supplies from Honan and the possible development of markets for products.

(iii) The Li Sheng Machinery Works which manufactures looms for the textile areas in North China, is planning a move.

(iv) The Hsin Hung Kee Match Works is drawing up plans for the removal of its plants to the Peng Pu area.

Change of Production Policy

(i) The machinery industry of Shanghai is making plans to devote the greater part of its future efforts to the manufacture of various implements and machinery required for agricultural purposes. Pumping machines and other machinery equipment as well as internal combustion engines suitable for rural uses are among the objects to which production efforts are to be directed.

(ii) The woollen industry is turning its attention to cotton and semi-woollen fabrics. The use of domestically produced wool instead of imported grades has been decided upon by some of the plants still engaged in woollen production.

(iii) The shirt-making industry is changing its production policy and is suspending the manufacture of high-class shirts and producing only popular grades.

(iv) The cotton industry is likewise stopping the production of fine yarn and engaging in the production of the coarser brands which meet the practical demands of domestic consumers.

(v) Other cases include the suspension of the manufacture of high-class cosmetics by the Star Perfumery Works which has turned its attention to the making of laundry soap, and similar decisions by other chemical manufacturing establishments in the city. The Shanghai plant turning out Coca-Cola is planning to change to the production of candy and biscuits.

Domestic substitutes sought for imported raw materials

Efforts are also being exerted in various directions for the use of domestic substitutes wherever possible for hitherto imported raw materials. Many

machinery plants are altering their diesel oil consuming equipment so that coal may be used instead. The chemical industries report that there are only very few materials for which domestic substitutes can be found. Natural rubber is one item, however, which is giving rise to anxiety. Experiments are being carried out in Manchuria for the production of synthetic rubber.

PALESTINE, ISRAEL AND JORDAN*

By ABDUL MAJID KHAN

I.

IN World War I, Turkey sided with the Central Powers. By 1915, the spirit of nationalism had developed considerably among the Arab subjects of the Turkish Sultan. The Arab leaders thought that their interests would be best served if the Allies were victorious. The Britishers, fully aware of the animosity of the disgruntled and politically-awakened Arab leaders towards their Turkish rulers, approached Sherif Hussain of Mekka and his son, Abdullah, with a view to obtaining their active co-operation. This led to the famous MacMohan-Sherif Hussain correspondence in 1915. Sir Henry MacMohan was then the British High Commissioner in Egypt. The Arab side of the Jewish-Arab question in Palestine revolves around this correspondence, which is almost unprecedented in sheer tortuousness, ambiguity, and obtuseness in motive, method and expression.

Sherif Hussain proposed to the British Government:-

- (1) That all Arab lands in Asia, within defined borders, become independent after the War, with the solitary exception of Aden.
- (2) That Britain recognize the Arab Caliphate.
- (3) That the Arab Government or Governments to be set up after the War, give Britain economic preference.
- (4) That the contracting parties promise mutual aid in case of aggression.

The point to be underlined about the entire correspondence is that Palestine was not even once mentioned or referred to. If words indicate anything, all unbiased historians are convinced that Palestine was not made an exception and that the Arabs had every right to believe that Britain at least did not contemplate a special status for or extraordinary treatment towards Palestine. Anyway, nothing was done to disabuse them of this belief.

It was on this basis that Sherif Hussain revolted against the Turks and authorized his sons to rouse the Arabs to co-operate with the Allies, wholeheartedly.

2.

In 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, between Britain, France and Russia, was secretly concluded. Its object was to divide the Turkish empire among

* A talk delivered at New Delhi on 29 July 1950, under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs.

the three Allied Powers. After endless bickering and argumentation, Russia earmarked for herself Constantinople with a few miles of hinterland on both sides of the Bosphorus as well as large sections on the Russo-Turkish frontier. France was to get the greater part of Syria, part of South Anatolia and the province of Mosul in Iraq. Great Britain reserved for herself the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine, a strip across to Iraq in order to include Basrah and Baghdad. In terms of this Agreement, Palestine was reserved for special treatment under an international régime.

But plans of men and mice seldom materialize and the honeymoon did not last. In the following year, i.e. in 1917, with the complete exhaustion of both Russia and France as effective military Powers, it had become essential to ensure the early armed intervention of the U.S.A. Also in 1917, the Bolsheviks came into power in Russia. They repudiated all secret treaties and divulged the contents of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Then Sherif Hussain also came to know of it.

3.

During the First World War the Zionist movement was steadily gaining strength in Britain as well as in the U.S.A. Dr. H. Weizmann, a Polish Jew, was for several years a Lecturer in Chemistry at Manchester University, where he was able to convert former British Prime Minister Balfour to Zionism. Another ardent protagonist of Zionism—L. D. Brandeis, a lawyer of more than local fame—actively supported Woodrow Wilson for President of the U.S.A. and was himself rewarded by being made a judge of the U.S. Supreme Court; meanwhile, Woodrow Wilson developed active sympathy for the Zionist ideal. Balfour became Foreign Secretary of Britain in 1916. In these circumstances, the British and American Jews submitted a proposal in 1917 to the British Government for the 'recognition of Palestine as the national home of the Jewish people,' with internal autonomy, freedom of immigration and the establishment of a Jewish Corporation for the resettlement of the country. Then there were talks between the Jewish leaders and members of the British Cabinet, which resulted in the famous Balfour Declaration of November 1917: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.' People see things in which they are interested and interpret declarations and documents according to their preconceived notions and ideas. There is, indeed, a fundamental distinction between the original Zionist proposal and the finally-British-Cabinet-approved declaration, which is quite ambiguous and hedged with reservations. But of that more anon.

The Army authorities in Palestine did their utmost to keep the terms of the Balfour Declaration as a hermetically-sealed secret so far as the non-Jewish communities, i.e. Arabic speaking Muslims and Christian (who formed 90% of the then population of Palestine), were concerned. Nevertheless, a report

of the Declaration reached Sherif Hussain, who got considerably perturbed and asked Britain for an explanation. In reply he was informed that British support of Zionist aspirations went only 'so far as it is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political.'

The war came to an end in Nov. 1918; and later on the League of Nations came into being. The Covenant of the League contained definite, specific provisions to govern the assignment and scope of mandates, but rightly stipulated that the wishes of the people concerned should be a decisive factor. The Treaty of Versailles came into force in January 1920, together with the attendant provisions for determining the future status of territories liberated from Turkey. In April 1920, the Supreme Council of the League of Nations, attended by representatives of Britain, France and Italy, met at San Reno and made the following dispositions, Italy's claim being disregarded as not concerning the Arabs:—

1. Iraq to be a single State under British Mandate.
2. Syria and Lebanon to come under French Mandate.
3. Great Britain to undertake the Mandate of Palestine.

The Arabs took their stand on the MacMohan Commitment; while the Jews as well as the Arabs put different interpretations on the Balfour Declaration. This led to a lot of confusion, turmoil and unrest in Palestine. Consequently, the policy of His Majesty's Government was again outlined by Mr. Winston Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies) in a statement in June 1922, with a view to re-interpreting the Balfour Declaration. It explicitly reaffirmed:—

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to, do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. Further it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status.

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essen-

tial that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connexion.

4.

Whatever the phraseology of the statements and declarations which emanated from time to time from the British Government, there was no end to the fears of the Arabs and the aspirations of the Jews, who were definitely encouraged by the pronouncements of such responsible statesmen as President Wilson, Lloyd George, Smuts and Balfour, in favour of an eventual Jewish State. The ignorance of these eminent persons with regard to the rise of Arab nationalism was profound and they apparently thought of the Arabs of Palestine as mere Bedouin, as little worthy of serious consideration as the Red Indians of America or the Bantu of Africa—a sort of politically inert and inarticulate group of 'natives', whose destiny it was to give place to the colonization of more progressive peoples. The British administrators of Palestine tried to do a lot of tight-rope walking but all to no purpose. Another cause of their failure was the calibre of the men who had been chosen for the task.

It is also widely believed that the High Commissioners were, by and large, totally inaccessible. They knew no Arabic, much less Hebrew; important tasks were thus entrusted to incapable and inexperienced junior officers. Perhaps, the relative proximity of London made the High Commissioners only transmitters of orders, which might have been left to the man on the spot to formulate and issue.

Anyway, the sum total of the history of the British mandate in Palestine has been five uprisings, much bloodshed, with strikes, terrorism, deep-rooted discontent and general unrest; while the Jews kept doggedly at their extensive economic enterprises and illicit immigration persisted.

The Arabs became more and more restive under a situation which seemed to block their aspirations, with Axis propaganda considerably intensifying their passions and suspicions.

With the advent of World War II and the resultant military occupation conditions became peaceful for some time as between Arabs and Jews, with both Jews and Arabs enlisting in the British forces in surprising numbers.

5.

In Palestine, with a Jewish population only half that of the Arab, twice as many Palestinian Jewish volunteers, to the mild annoyance of the pro-Arab Palestine Administration, served in British and Allied units. Palestine became the one war base in the Middle East about whose loyalty Britain never needed to worry. Thirty thousand Jewish volunteers joined the British forces, in spite of the plea for a Jewish Army being resisted to the end. There was a higher proportion of voluntary enlistments from among the Jewish Palestine population than from any part of the Empire or Commonwealth. However, many of the Palestinian Jewish troops in the Middle

East forces were employed in supply and ordnance companies along lines of communications and in base areas, an admirable situation for the smuggling of arms to Palestine, to which they resorted on a large scale, under the directions of terrorist societies. The organization of this 'underground railway' was excellent; there was no lack of funds and transport; and corruptible and venal Allied soldiers were drawn into the racket. The difficulty of supplying the Middle East Forces by the dangerous and slow long sea route round Africa had caused the British military authorities to give contracts to Palestinian Jewish concerns for the manufacture of small arms, including mortars, which they produced with efficiency, but these arms also found their way to the armouries of the Jewish terrorist organizations.

The 1939 White Paper as well as the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940 were to be resisted by the Jews by all possible means—fair or foul. Also they knew that after the war, the British mandate would come to an end and that the prospects of any peaceful settlement with the Arabs were not bright.

6.

The total population of Palestine grew from seven lakhs fifty thousand in 1922 to seventeen lakhs eighty thousand in 1944. Over the same period the number of Jews rose from eighty-four thousand to five lakhs and fifty thousand—from 13 to 31 per cent of the total. This increase in the Jewish population was chiefly attributable to immigration; because the Jewish inhabitants have a relatively low rate of natural increase. Between 1941 and 1944, the Jewish annual rate of natural increase was 1.8 per cent; while the Arab rate was over 3 per cent, and was rising sharply. From 1922 to 1925, the comparable rates were 2 per cent for Jews, and 2.3 per cent for Palestinian Arabs. Thus the Jewish percentage of the population has risen because of immigration, but in the absence of further immigration, it would at once begin to fall off. If the Arabs could stop immigration, they could thereby ensure a rapidly increasing numerical preponderance in Palestinian society. The Jews insisted on unrestricted immigration; while the Arabs were totally opposed to it. Due to the crusade of extermination against the Jews started by Hitler, and as a result of World War II, the total number of Jews in Europe has been reduced from ten million in 1939 to about four million in 1946. The survivors include four lakh refugees and displaced persons. At the moment there are nearly 25 lakh Jews in the Soviet Union, about twelve lakhs in the rest of continental Europe and three lakhs and fifty thousand in the United Kingdom; while in the United States there are five million Jews and these five million are strong enough to influence the American Government to urge other countries to do something for them and in particular the American Government has all along been pressing Great Britain to admit a large number of them to Palestine.

The other side is the relentless Arab resistance to immigration. The opposition to immigration is not confined to the Arabs in Palestine. It is also the resistance of the entire Arab League. Any disturbance of Arab feeling directly affects France as well as Great Britain; for it threatens the French Empire in North Africa and the French having been driven from Syria and Lebanon are

keen on clinging to what remains of their colonial possessions. For the British, a policy of friendship with the Arab States of the Middle East has hitherto been regarded as indispensable in the interest of British Empire communications. That relations with the Indian Muslims, who till 1947 were under the influence of the Muslim League, would be worsened by any open rupture between Great Britain and any part of the Muslim world has also been one of the factors, which shaped the British policy towards Palestine for several years.

Large supplies of oil come from Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but the British pipe line passes through Jewish Palestine and the American pipe line would also have Haifa as its terminus, when completed. Thus both the U.K. and U.S.A. have been keen on keeping the Arab States in the anti-Soviet bloc, while the American Government has been committed to help the Jews in an impressive and effective manner. For Great Britain, never was there so inconvenient a mandate as that of Palestine. It has been impossible for the Britishers to fulfil irreconcilable and inconsistent promises, made to Jews and Arabs from time to time. The task of holding the balance between the bi-partite obligations imposed by the Mandate was something super-human. The British Government, therefore, in February 1947 abandoned the attempt to find a solution acceptable to both Jews and Arabs and refused to impose a settlement. The exasperatingly intractable problem was then turned over to the United Nations. The resulting investigation produced a General Assembly report adopted by 33 votes to 13 (the latter including the seven Arab States and the former Dominions minus India and Pakistan, the United States as well the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), recommending the partition of Palestine. The Arab States announced their intention to end the partition of Palestine by armed force and went ahead openly with their preparations to fight.

The British forces withdrew from Palestine on 15 May 1948 and the State of Israel came into being, while regular war started between the Jews and Arabs that very day. The Jewish forces were successful in stopping six Arab armies and thus delivered a mortal blow to the power and prestige of the supposedly mighty and invincible Arab League. In January 1949, cease-fire agreements were concluded between Israel and various Arab States.

So far the State of Israel has been diplomatically recognized by 34 different nations. In November 1948 the population of Israel was seven lakhs and seventy thousand but during the last two years four lakh Jews have immigrated and settled there. At present its population is nearly twelve lakh Jews and fifty thousand non-Jews, i.e. Christians and Arabs.

As it is, Palestine has been split up into three parts:- (i) Israel; (ii) the part of territory around Gaza, occupied by the Egyptian Army after the Arab States' invasion of Palestine; and (iii) the portion of Palestine which now forms the Hashmeite Kingdom of Jordan.

The Palestine Arab Higher Committee, after holding a meeting on 22 September 1948, in Damascus, announced the formation at Gaza of a 'Palestine

Government,' claiming sovereignty over the whole of Palestine, and including among its members Ahmad Hilmi Pasha as Prime Minister. King Abdullah of Transjordan, however, declared on 23 September that he would oppose the formation of the new 'Government' within the security zone of the Transjordan Government, which he defined as extending 'from the frontiers of Egypt to the frontiers of Syria and Lebanon,' i.e. embracing the entire length of Palestine and including the territory of the State of Israel.

To counteract the move of the Gaza Palestine Government, a congress of Palestinian Arabs, attended by 2,000 delegates, met at Jericho, on 1 December 1948 and unanimously passed resolutions which were forwarded to the United Nations, requesting King Abdullah of Transjordan to unite Transjordan and Arab Palestine in a single constitutional monarchy, with King Abdullah as its head. The proposal that King Abdullah should accept the crown of a United Transjordan and Arab Palestine was approved by the Transjordan Cabinet on 7 December 1948 and by both Houses of the Transjordan Parliament on 13 December, the Premier of Transjordan (Tewfik Pasha) declaring that the Union would be executed by constitutional methods at the proper time in accordance with the principle of self-determination.

The resolutions of the Jericho Congress and their acceptance by King Abdullah and the Transjordan Government evoked indignation and protest in the other Arab countries and in Palestinian Arab Gaza Government, which on 10 December repudiated the right of the delegates at the Jericho meeting to speak for the Palestinian Arabs. The Secretary-General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, challenged the validity of the resolutions and criticized King Abdullah's acceptance thereof in a press interview.

On 20 December 1948 King Abdullah nominated a new Mufti of Jerusalem in place of Haj Amin-el-Husseini (a leading figure in the Gaza Government) in the person of Sheikh Hassan Meddin Jarrallah, for long a political opponent of Haj Amin-el-Husseini, and formerly Chief Justice of Muslim Religious Courts in Palestine.

On 2 June 1949 it was officially announced in Amman that Transjordan would henceforward be known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The change of name arose from the fact that the country included a large part of Arab Palestine and that the Kingdom of Abdullah lay on both banks of the Jordan. King Abdullah expanded his Cabinet to include Palestinian Arab representatives. The establishment of the State of Israel thus enabled him to double the population and revenue of his kingdom, the area of which has been increased by about 4 thousand sq. miles at one stroke.

So far as the economic absorptive capacity of Israel is concerned, perhaps, the saturation point (of 2 million and a half) will be reached ere long, as there is no gainsaying the fact that even under conditions of peace it is not possible for Israel to support a very large population. Even the prosperity of twelve

lakh Jews of Israel depends greatly on the state of world markets and on the existence of relations favourable to trade with neighbouring countries. A slump in world markets, coinciding with antagonistic relations with the surrounding Arab States, could place the economy of Israel in an exceedingly awkward predicament, in view of its great dependence on foreign trade for the means of subsistence.

To ensure peace between Israel and the Arab States, the British, French and the U.S. Governments did well in issuing the following joint statement on 25 May 1950, regarding the supply of arms:

The Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States, having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab States and Israel and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material, have resolved to make the following statement:—

(1) The three Governments recognize that the Arab States and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defence and to permit them to play their part in the defence of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connexion the three Governments reaffirm the statements made by their representatives, in the Security Council on 4 August 1949, in which they declared their opposition to the development of an arm race between the Arab States and Israel.

(2) The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the States in question to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries that the purchasing State does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other State. Similar assurances will be requested from any other States in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

(3) The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in, and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the States in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these States was preparing to violate frontiers, or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the U.N.O., immediately take action, both within and outside the U.N.O. to prevent such violation.

The terms of the historic joint declaration had been conveyed the same day by the U.S., British, and French diplomatic representatives to the Governments concerned. President Truman, in a statement issued after the publication of the joint declaration, said that the latter was 'another of the many valuable results of the London meeting' and that it was 'the belief of the U.S. Government that the declaration will stimulate in the Arab States and Israel increased

confidence in future security, thus accelerating the progress now being made in the Near East and contributing to the well-being of its people.'

In London, a Foreign Office spokesman stated that the assurances of non-aggression, mentioned in the joint declaration, had been received by Britain from Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, by the U.S.A. from Egypt and by France from Syria and Lebanon; that both Britain and the U.S.A. had also received assurances from Israel, and that the assurances though not identical had all been similar to all intents and purposes.

10.

It has already been remarked above that the establishment of Israel enabled King Abdullah to double the population and revenue of his kingdom, the area of which has been increased by about 4 thousand square miles at one stroke. In this connexion certain factors have to be taken into consideration:-

- (a) The union of Arab Palestine with Transjordan was the only feasible and proper thing under the conditions that obtain there, because the area of Palestine annexed by King Abdullah was under control of the Transjordan forces, led by Glubb Pasha, during the Arab-Jew clashes, after 15 May 1948.
- (b) Out of ten lakh displaced Arabs, about six lakhs and fifty thousand were the original inhabitants of Arab Palestine.
- (c) Two thousand delegates, who assembled at Jericho on 1 December 1948, and unanimously passed resolutions to the effect that King Abdullah be requested to unite Transjordan and Arab Palestine into a single constitutional monarchy had the best interests of their co-religionists at heart and they truly represented their feelings.
- (d) Two lakh Arab refugees, who have been reduced to a miserable plight and are under the jurisdiction of the Gaza Arab Government, which is dominated by the pro-Egyptian elements or the henchmen of Mufti Haj Amin-el-Husseini, have not been adequately looked after by the Egyptian Government, which has even opposed their entry into Egypt.
- (e) It was impossible for 6½ lakh population of Arab Palestine to carve out for themselves an independent viable State.
- (f) The geographical contiguity of Arab Palestine and Transjordan, along with the community of economic interests of the Arabs living on both sides of the Jordan river, were the main factors which strengthened the hands of the Arabs, who wanted to be under constitutional monarchy of King Abdullah.

The politics of the Arab League constitute a kind of tangled skein. There are currents, cross-currents and under-currents; internal rifts and dynastic jealousies. The rivalry of King Ibn Saud, on the one hand, and the Hashmeite rulers of Iraq and Jordan, on the other, has all along been a serious obstacle in the way of Arab solidarity and cohesion. The Egyptian politicians can never take kindly to Greater Syria or the Fertile Crescent plan inasmuch as

it would eclipse the importance of Egypt in the Arab world. They are keen that the pre-eminence of Egypt in population and wealth should continue to be reflected by her predominant influence in the Arab League. The Syrian Arabs, on the other hand, regard the Egyptians as intellectually and culturally inferior to themselves; as speaking an uncouth kind of Arabic; as Arabized Africans rather than true Arabs. Azzam Pasha, the Secretary of the Arab League, is reported to be jealous of Nuri Pasha¹—the most prominent politician and the sanest statesman of Iraq. And of late, the Saudi Government advanced a loan of Rs. 3 crores to Syria, in order to strengthen the anti-Hashemite bloc of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

King Abdullah has been getting for the last twenty years or so an annual subsidy of Rs. one crore and a half from the British Government, while the Egyptian political leaders are in a way anti-British, because the British forces have not been yet completely withdrawn from Egyptian soil. Also, in Egypt there is a lot of heart burning on the Sudan issue.

The foregoing are the chief reasons which have so far prevented the four Arab States—Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia—from endorsing and recognizing the legality or validity of the union of Arab Palestine with Transjordan.

The most intricate problem at the moment is the question of Jerusalem—a city equally sacred to the Jews, Christians and Muslims. In January 1949 when the cease-fire agreements were concluded between Israel and the Arab States, old Jerusalem was in the hands of the Transjordan forces and New Jerusalem was under the control of Israel.

On 13 September 1949 the U.N.O. Palestine Conciliation Commission's plan for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area was published. Those proposals, however, met with a hostile reception in Israel, and were immediately rejected by the Israel Foreign Office. Mr. Sharett, the Israel Foreign Minister, called the plan 'anachronistic and incongruous' and said that the Israel delegation at the forthcoming General Assembly would urge that the application of the principle of international responsibility for Jerusalem could not go beyond supervision of the holy places.

The *ad hoc* Political Committee commenced, in the U.N.O. General Assembly, on 24 November 1949, consideration of the proposals of the U.N.O. Palestine Conciliation Commission, for an international régime of Jerusalem but was informed by the delegates of both Israel and Jordan that those countries would refuse to accept internationalization of the city, though fully prepared to give free access, under U.N.O. supervision, to the holy places and would adhere to the present arrangement, whereby Jerusalem was partitioned between them.

Despite the clear and unequivocal declarations made by Israel and Jordan representatives that their countries would not agree to the internationalization of Jerusalem area, though prepared to guarantee full and free access to the holy places, the plenary session of the General Assembly adopted in Decem-

¹ G. E. Kirk, *A short History of the Middle East*, Page 28.

ber 1949, a resolution that Jerusalem and its environs should be administered by a permanent international régime, under the aegis of the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council being given the task of drawing up an appropriate 'Statute of Jerusalem' for this purpose. The resolution, sponsored by Australia and based on the Assembly's partition plan of 1947, was strongly opposed by Britain and the U.S.A., but was carried with the support of the Soviet, Arab and Latin American groups.

When the resolution came before the plenary session, on 9-10 December, 1949, both the British and U.S. delegates held that its implementation would be impossible in view of the opposition to internationalization expressed by both Israel and Jordan, between whose forces Jerusalem was already partitioned. Sir Alexander Cadogan (U.K.) declared that Britain would not take any part in the implementation of measures which were not acceptable to Jews and Arabs alike. Mr. John Ross (U.S.A.) similarly warned the Assembly that the resolution was impossible of implementation against Israeli and Jordanian opposition, and declared that it was calculated to 'deceive world opinion, particularly Arab and Christian', since it offered no assurance whatever that the internationalization of the Jerusalem area could or would be achieved; he also maintained that the internationalization of Jerusalem was desired neither by the Arab nor the Jewish populations concerned.

The common sense point of view is that the Jews will never agree to put New Jerusalem under international control, because they hold that it could not exist in land-locked isolation from the State of Israel, since all its economic, social and governmental services, as well as its constitutional loyalties, are derived from its connexion with Israel.

The Latin American States think that if the present armistice between the Arab States and Israel does not develop into permanent peace, the chances are that in a future Arab-Jew conflict the holy places of Jerusalem will not be safe from aerial attacks, so they support the internationalization of the Jerusalem area. The Arab States which are in favour of the internationalization, viz, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon, are out to kill two birds with one stroke—Old Jerusalem will be taken away from King Abdullah and Israel also will be deprived of New Jerusalem.

A STUDY OF FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES

(1871-1950)

By GIRIJA MOOKERJEE

PART A

I

FRANCE has been called an *état d'esprit* and not a country and French politics, a despair to all students of public affairs, yet a careful study of the political system and, specially, the political parties reveals that, as in other West European countries so in France also, politics has reflected the social changes

which have taken place in course of time. There have been groups, as everywhere else, opposed to changes, groups willing to make compromise with changes and groups who were uncompromisingly in favour of radical changes. This is true in spite of the fact that French temperament had much to do with the particular character of social institutions in France, for, according to Prof. Brogan, 'the French are proud, perhaps too proud, of being right in the intellectual sense, of seeing through everything and everybody, above all through themselves.'¹ Because of this, there has been in France a highly exaggerated notion of civic rights, if not of responsibilities and no French statesman ever had the opportunity of being completely trusted either by the party to which he belonged or by the people who voted him to power.

It may be, also, that because of this somewhat special attitude to life of the Frenchmen, the French voters usually voted 'Left' or 'Right', whereas the English voter voted 'for' or 'against.' Anyhow, a study of the elections in France and England for the last eighty years shows that the French electors have shown a greater sense of stability than their political parties, whereas in England the political parties have been more stable than the voters who supported them. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to think that the 'two-party system' is a typically English institution and unknown in France. It is true that there have been many parties in France, but for electoral purposes they have very often been merged into, either two blocs, two cartels or two coalitions and although the governments have been formed by coalition of groups rather than of blocs, yet, the French parliamentary system did not differ so essentially from the British parliamentary system, as to call it a separate system altogether.

Of course, it did not evolve in the way it did in England and there was nothing like the Whig and the Tory parties in France either in the nineteenth century or in the twentieth. Prof. Brogan had noticed this feature already with reference to the election of 1871 and had observed that names rather than political parties were the symbols in French elections at that time. 'Thus' he says, 'Paris returned at the head of the poll Louis Blanc, in exile until September 1870 since his brief period of power (or office) in 1848; he was a symbol of the 'Social Republic' and innocent of all the recent disasters, treasons and crimes.'² On the other hand, parties which existed before the foundation of the Third Republic were more partisans of a doctrine or doctrines rather than 'parties' as we understand them to be today and, although France had experienced at least two revolutions (1848 and 1870) before the Republic came into being, it cannot be said that these revolutions were works of revolutionary parties in the sense the October Revolution of 1918 was the work of the Bolshevik Party. In fact, this lack of an organized party system, was largely responsible for the quick collapse of the Commune in 1871 and in this connexion also the remarks of Prof.

¹ *French Personalities and Problems*—D. W. Brogan (Hamish Hamilton) 1946, p. 15

² *The Development of Modern France*—(1870-1939)—Hamish Hamilton, 1947, p. 18.

Brogan are worth while mentioning. Referring to the advantageous position of the Versailles government presided over by Thiers, the author says: 'Without provision, the capital of France had fallen into the hands of a revolutionary government, but it had not fallen into the hands of a revolutionary party. It was this lack of an organized revolutionary party that prevented the Central Committee from taking advantage of the panic that fell upon Versailles.'³

The election we have referred to was in connexion with the formation of a National Assembly in order to frame a Constitution for the Republic, which came into existence on 14 September 1870, as a result of a meeting of the Republican Deputies at Hotel de Ville of Paris. The provisional government was headed by General Trochu who was also the military governor of Paris. The National Assembly met at Bordeaux on 12 February 1871.⁴ The Constitution came into force in 1875 and the first election under the new Constitution was held in 1876. The parties which contested the election were not many, as the issue before the elector was rather a simple one. France had to decide whether she would have a monarchical system of government or whether she would confirm the legality of the Republic which had begun to function as the established government of the country, specially after the signature of the Treaty of Frankfurt. The French Conservatives were in favour of restoration, and they were ranged into two parties, namely, the Orleanists and the Legitimists. The Left on the other hand, was represented by four parties, namely, the party of '*Extrême-gauche*' led by Louis Blanc and the *Radicals* led by Clemenceau who opposed some of the milder measures of the moderate Republicans who in their turn were split into two groups within the '*Gauche republicaine*,' led by Leon Say and Casimir-Perier, respectively. All the four parties on the Left were, however, of the opinion that monarchy should not be restored, national sovereignty should be expressed only through universal franchise and the civilian government should have supremacy over the Church. The first two parties, however, considered that the Republic should become an instrument for the solution of social problems, whereas the last two parties were of the opinion that the Republican régime to be established should be such as to create the least division amongst Frenchmen. Of the Right-wing parties, the Legitimists supported the claim of Comte de Chambord to the throne, whereas the Orleanists were in favour of Comte de Paris. The Orleanists, however, were split into another group called the '*Orleanistes-parlementaires*' who, though royalists, believed in the sovereignty of the people.

With the advent of the Republic, the Monarchists came to represent the Right-wing in the first parliament elected in 1876 which was composed of 340 Republicans, 75 Royalists, 75 Imperialists (in favour of the restoration of the Empire) and about 40 Constitutionalists, who were in reality

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ According to J. P. Mayer in '*Political Thought in France from Sieyès to Sorel*' (Faber 1943), the Assembly met on February 13. (See page 79).

Republicans although they did not want to say so. The Upper House, or the Senate elected by the delegates of the Municipal Councils, nominated in 1874, was composed of 92 Republicans, 116 Conservatives and 17 Constitutionalists.

This broad division of the parties, with slight variation from time to time, continued until the outbreak of World War I, and all through this period and on all public questions, French opinion remained divided mainly on the line which we have noticed just now. The main issues which shook public opinion during that period were: (1) Boulangism; (2) structural changes in the system of taxation; (3) the Dreyfus affair; and (4) the separation of Church and State. The Right, after some time, ceased to be Monarchists because monarchy had ceased to be a live issue, but a study of the results of elections held between 1877 and 1914 shows that the regions of France which had supported monarchy in the early days of the Republic, continued to support the Right-wing parties throughout, nearly for forty years. The Left-wing parties, on the other hand, maintained their hold on the regions south of the Loire, the industrial centres, big towns, as also on most of the mountainous districts. The analysis, however, reveals that the same social groups which had supported monarchy went on supporting the party or parties in favour of established order, whereas, the social groups composed of population in big cities remained most susceptible to new ideas and new social doctrines.

II

The social consequences of this change from the Second Empire to a Republic were not, however, unsatisfactory, and, in spite of a troubled period between 1906-1910 and in spite of heated discussions on the platform and in the press, the daily administration of the country was run efficiently by the civil servants and France was able also to acquire a Colonial Empire without raising either much jealousy or much controversy among her imperialist neighbours. At the same time, in spite of the defeat of Sedan, the country prospered and, excepting some minor financial scandals, generally speaking, the equilibrium of public finances was maintained well. Paris became during this period one of the important centres of the world money market and although England and Germany increased vastly their industrial exports to other countries, France made this up by increasing her financial investments abroad.

This prosperity, however, did not discourage an unreasonable attitude towards social problems and the activities of the rising trade unions were considered by the large mass of people as 'subversive', and neither the '*grands bourgeois*' nor the '*petits bourgeois*' ever realized that the material and psychological insecurity under which the proletariat lived was more likely to lead to social explosions. Like people of that period, more or less, all over the world, the majority of Frenchmen also believed that all social problems were a matter of force or of police. The result was that although France showed outward prosperity, this was very superficial. The birth-rate went on falling, the villages were deserted, and diseases such

as tuberculosis and syphilis ravaged French manhood to a disastrous extent. No well-known political leader of the time paid much attention to these problems and the political parties confined themselves to the discussion of question of such general nature as the secularization of universities and schools and the expulsion of the Jesuits from educational institutions, without ever taking up the grave social problems which France was facing. Political problems of other countries did not particularly stir public opinion and in spite of some excitement over the incident of Fashoda and the Boer War, France lived almost a self-centred existence between the years of 1871 and 1914. The Tangier incident had revealed to the French, the growing might of Germany, yet when the war broke out in 1914 most Frenchmen were bewildered by it and they remained still unable to appreciate the reaction of world events on their economy and politics. With a self-sufficient economy and a self-centred system, France was ill-prepared for the storm that broke upon her, and, as Prof. Brogan has remarked: 'France in 1914 seemed stagnant, an easy victim of more dynamic, more modern, more enterprising nations.'⁵

However, during the entire period of the war, all political differences were forgotten and party politics gave place to a united front against the enemy of the nation. But the war and its social consequences began soon to influence French national life to an extent hitherto unknown and new political parties, with aims and the objects very different from those which had agitated the public mind before, came into existence. The Russian Revolution, British Liberalism and the Rooseveltian New Deal Policy all came to affect the party system in France in the post-war period. During the war, however, all political activities had been concentrated on the Cabinet formed with the leaders of all parties on 28 August 1914, and the Cabinet was termed the government of '*Défense Nationale*' and the coalition thus obtained came to be known as '*l'Union sacrée*'.⁶ This 'sacred union', did not last long after the war and the conflict between the Left and the Right came out in the open as soon as the question of peace-making with Germany became the subject of quarrel among the parties. The Left and the French public opinion were at that time generally in favour of treating Germany with some lenience if such a treatment did not go against a '*rapprochement*' with the Anglo-Saxon Powers. But the Right won a remarkable electoral victory on 16 November 1919 by contesting the election in the name of a 'Bloc national' and their success continued until 1924 when the party known as the '*Cartel des gauches*' consisting of Independent Socialists, United Socialists and the Radical Socialists, obtained a majority in Parliament in the elections of 11 May 1924. Unfortunately, this discomfiture of the Right did not last long, for in July 1926, the Radicals, i.e. the Radical Socialists, agreed to join a Cabinet of the Right-wing

⁵ *Op. Cit.* p. 418.

⁶ There was, however, a serious ministerial crisis in April 1917, after the disastrous offensive of that month. M. Painlevé resigned and M. Poincaré asked Clemenceau to form a Cabinet although he was Poincaré's political enemy, because as he flamboyantly said: "The President had only one enemy in times of war: '*celui qui occupait le territoire*'—J. Paul-Boncour, in "*Entre Deux Guerres*" (Plon, Paris 1945), p. 280.

parties under the leadership of M. Poincare and this government came to be known later as the government of 'Union Nationale', although the Socialists S.F.I.O., led by M. Blum, refused to join the Cabinet. This Cabinet has also often been referred to as the '*Mur d'argent*' because of the preponderance of rich people in the Cabinet and the interest of the big banks they served in it. The formation of this Cabinet was largely due to the increasing popularity of Clemenceau's ideas of a foreign policy which consisted in creating a powerful French army and maintaining France's power by the old method of alliances, although the progressive ideas of Briand who placed much faith in the League of Nations had led in 1925 to the signing of the Locarno Pact which had greatly increased France's prestige abroad. The success of the Right was also largely due to the changed public opinion with regard to the question of treatment of Germany, which no longer supported the Socialists and the more progressive parties who had opposed since 1920 (the occupation of Frankfurt Main) the German policy of the successive governments. The middle-of-the-road policy of Briand which resulted in the Locarno Pact had however, pleased both the Right and the Left parties at the time owing to British guarantee regarding the permanence of the Franco-German frontier. But at the elections of 1928, the Right consolidated its gain and in parliament, the deputies representing Left tendencies were no more than 265, out of which about 100 were Socialists, 40 Republican Socialists and 120 Radical Socialists. This was out of proportion to the percentage of votes cast in favour of the Left, for in the first scrutiny, this percentage was 51.63 and the Right had won 4,524,000 votes or only 48.37 p. c. of the total. In the second scrutiny, however, the Right won 4,920,000 votes compared to 4,360,000 votes cast in favour of the left parties including the Communists.⁷ Consequently, when Poincare reconstituted his Cabinet, he took only one member of 'Gauche Radical' as the Minister of works and one member of the U.R.D. as an Under-Secretary in order to satisfy the demands of the Alsatians.

III

The new Ministry of Poincare lasted until the end of July 1929. M. Briand succeeded him as the Prime Minister and then followed a period of ministerial crises, leading to formation of Cabinets in succession by Eduard Daladier, Andre Tardieu, Camille Chautemps, Pierre Laval and again Tardieu in 1931, until the general election of 1932 in May. The loss of the Right parties at the May election was considerable although not disastrous, for from 48.37 p.c. votes that they won in 1928, it fell to 45.76 p.c. although the Communist votes had also equally fallen from 11.38 p.c. to 8.33 p.c. The parties known as the '*Cartel des gauches*' improved their position by increasing their percentage from 40.25 to 45.81. Anyhow, it was clear that the Left (excluding the Commu-

⁷ This election was very significant, for it broke the 'Union Nationale' movement and created the bitter schism between the Left and Right which continued until the outbreak of World War II. This election also inaugurated ministerial instability, which was so characteristic of pre-war France.

nist) had won a decisive victory, for in Parliament there were 157 Radical Socialist deputies, 37 Republican Socialists, 129 Socialists S.F.I.O. and 11 Socialist-Communists. As a result, M. Herriot the leader of the Radical Socialist Party and also the leader of the single majority party in Parliament, formed the new government and in order to give the Cabinet a united character he took also a member of the '*Gauche Radicale*', and a member of the '*Republicain de gauche*' in his Cabinet. The Herriot Cabinet, however, fell in December 1932 and with it began the story of helplessness of Parliament to stabilize governments in France for nearly a decade. This date also coincided with the growth in France of extra parliamentary political movements, such as Fascism, the movement known as '*Croix de Feu*,' and communism. It represented also the end of an epoch and the beginning of a new era in French politics and party system. From 1926 to 1930, France, in spite of the general conditions of unsettlement in the world, had more or less been in favour of a pacific solution of the European problem as represented in her adherence to the Locarno Pact. After 1931, owing to the economic crises in Great Britain, the U.S.A. and Germany, France had also felt for a while that she had acquired a certain preponderance in world affairs but the fall of the Herriot Cabinet and the rise of National Socialism in Germany, very soon afterwards, destroyed the favourable position which France had so long enjoyed in the post-war world. From 1933 to the outbreak of the World War II French politics, in the words of André Gide, entered '*une ère nouvelle de la confusion*.'

This confusion was marked by the sudden change in the policy of both the Right and the Left parties. The Right which had until then opposed any generous handling of the question of German reparations and the German problem generally, transferred its hostility to the Soviet Union from Germany; and in foreign policy it gave generally its support first, to Fascist Italy and then to Nazi Germany. The Left, on the other hand, which had loudly championed the cause of Germany and had lent its wholehearted support to the Weimar Republic, became henceforth a bitter enemy of Hitlerite Germany and demanded that in order to save Europe from a war, France should enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union.⁸

The fall of the Herriot Cabinet took place at a time when France was faced with serious problems in foreign policy, owing largely to the rise of Nazism. The internal dissensions within the parties grew at the same time very acute, partly because of the growth of Left tendencies in the country, and it was in the midst of such crises that M. Paul Boncour succeeded M. Herriot, but was forced to resign after a few weeks in January 1933, and was replaced by M. Daladier in the spring of the same year. After a few weeks, his ministry too was thrown out and a government was formed by Albert Sarraut which lasted only for a few days and was replaced by a

⁸ The Franco-Soviet Pact was later signed and it was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 27 February 1936 by 356 votes to 164. M. M. Herriot and Flandin supported the Pact.

government formed by Camille Chautemps. Thus, in less than one year, France came to know four governments in rapid succession, and after the Stavisky scandal and the incidents of 6 February 1934, a new emergency government was formed composed of the members of all the parties, called the government of 'Union Nationale' with M. Gaston Doumergue, the former President of the Republic, as the Prime Minister. M. Doumergue's Cabinet lasted for a few months only and he was succeeded by M. Flandin. The only thing which was special about M. Flandin's Cabinet was that it was formed in record time.⁹ He started by putting off the constitutional reforms which were being discussed in Parliament, in order to win the support of the Conservatives. But the Flandin Cabinet, however, could not survive the social discontent which arose as a result of the world trade depression of the period and the monetary crisis in France. It resigned after a few months and was succeeded by an interim government presided over by M. Bouisson until the formation of a regular government by M. Pierre Laval composed of Moderates and Radical Socialists. It received '*pleins pouvoirs*' to rule by '*décrets-lois*' until 31 October 1935, so that the financial crash, so much anticipated at that time, could be averted. But neither the policy of deflation nor the brutal application of the financial remedy inspired by the policy of liberal economy could prevent the worsening of the economic situation and at the beginning of 1936, the Laval government was replaced by a government formed again by M. Albert Sarraut, more or less in anticipation of the general election to be held in spring. The elections of April-May 1936, were fought by the Left in the name of a group called '*Rassemblement Populaire*' which came to be known soon as '*Front Populaire*' and as the success of the Left parties seemed to be overwhelming, a '*Front Populaire*' government was formed by M. Léon Blum at the beginning of June 1936.¹⁰ The coming into power of the Left parties, at the head of which were the Socialists, was viewed with extreme dissatisfaction by the Right and the devaluation of the franc enacted by the end of 1936 did not increase the popularity of the Blum government. The Moderates (the Radical Socialists among them) thought, therefore, that it was essential that the Communists and the Socialists S.F.I.O. (*Front populaire*) should be made to go into opposition instead of guiding the destiny of the country. The organised campaign for the export of gold to foreign countries undertaken by the powerful banks and industrial concerns brought the '*Front Populaire*' further into disrepute and the commission which was appointed to report on this situation submitted its recommendations but they were not acceptable to the members of the extreme Left, and, consequently, the Blum government resigned in March 1937.

⁹ "Mon Ministère fut constitué entre midi et minuit qui fut un record sous la III^e République" *Politique Française* (1919-1914) by Pierre-Etienne Flandin (Les Editions Nouvelles) Paris 1947-p. 169.

¹⁰ The Parties to the Left composing the '*Front Populaire*' had won 580 seats of which 72 were by the Communists, 149 by the Socialists S.F.I.O., 109 by the Radical Socialists and 56 by several other parties of the Left. The Right had won altogether 222

IV

The Right felt satisfied at the resignation of the Blum government and it was hoped that the Radical Socialists would be more amenable to reason and be persuaded to follow a more conservative financial policy. M. Blum was succeeded by Chautemps who also formed a '*Front Populaire*' government composed largely of Radical Socialist ministers. But as its policy did not succeed in preventing the further fall of the franc, it resigned on 14 January 1938. M. Blum was called upon again to form a new Cabinet and the second ministry formed by him was supposed to belong to a party called the '*Union Nationale*' although in reality it was more or less the same '*Front Populaire*' Cabinet over which M. Blum had presided before. But the second Blum Cabinet did not last long. Having put the question of confidence before the Senate on 8 April 1938, it was unable to obtain a majority and the experiment of a coalition government of the Socialists S.F.I.O. and the Radical Socialists came to an end and three days after the resignation of the second Blum Cabinet a new government was formed by M. Daladier, composed of Independent Socialists, Radical Socialists and the Moderates.

The Daladier Cabinet, very soon after its formation, was faced with serious domestic and external problems. The instability of the monetary situation and the grave social unrest forced the Daladier government to take resort to a number of '*Décrets-lois*' or emergency decrees, while, on the other hand, the growing German problem made its task even more difficult. In October 1938, M. Daladier signed on behalf of his government the Munich Pact, which caused much resentment to the Left parties but the Socialists eventually supported his action in Parliament, whereas the Communists numbering 78 in Parliament voted against the government on this occasion. When eventually war broke out in September 1939, these divisions were not altogether eliminated and although the Right, even then, remained suspicious of Communism the Left continued to think in terms of the danger of Fascism. The Socialists S.F.I.O. were also divided amongst themselves with regard to the foreign policy of the government, because they remained, as before, torn between their traditional ideas of pacifism and the desire to make an end of Fascism. But after the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact of August 1939, the Socialists were able to overcome their hesitation and, generally speaking, they gave qualified support to the Daladier government in its war efforts, while the Communists advocated a policy of peaceful understanding between Germany and France. Anyhow, when war was declared by the government of M. Daladier there was still no sign of political unity amongst the various political parties, because nearly two decades of party squabbles, had left the parties so distrustful of one another that, in spite of the common danger, France was not able to form a Coalition Government of all the political parties like the one which conducted the war of 1914-18.

After the defeat of 1940, however, several new political parties came into existence in France, mainly with the object of dealing with the occupying

Power, in spite of the fact that the party system in vogue during the Third Republic had more or less come to an end with the defeat. These parties were not really political parties in so far as they never contested any election, since no election was held during the German occupation of France. They were, in reality, rather 'movements' and opinions than parties, but as they played an important rôle in French affairs during the last phase of World War II, they are worth mentioning here. First of all, there was '*Le Rassemblement National Populaire* (R.N.P.)' a party founded on 1 February 1944 with the object of bringing about an immediate national and social revolution '*en vue d'une reprise de la coopération franco-allemande*'. Its leader was a French Journalist called Marcel Deat. The party was dissolved after the liberation of Paris by an official ordinance of 9 August 1944. The second party of some importance was '*Le Mouvement Social Revolutionnaire*' which consisted of former members of '*Comité Secret d'Action Revolutionnaire*,' that is, the C.S.A.R. or commonly known as '*La Cagoule*' and whose members were called '*Cagoullards*.' The M.S.R. was fanatically anti-communist and it was eventually merged with the R.N.P. or the '*Le Rassemblement National Populaire*.'

The P.P.F. or '*Le Parti Populaire Français*' founded on 28 June 1936 by Jacques Doriot, an ex-Communist was in favour of close collaboration with Germany and was violently anti-Communist, anti-Jewish and anti-Masonic. The party was also dissolved by an official decree after the liberation of France by the Allied forces. '*Le Progrès Social Français*' was founded by Colonel de La Rocque after the first World War and was composed mostly of ex-Servicemen. It was dissolved by the government on 18 June 1936 but was reformed and registered in the name of '*Parti Social Français*' on 11 July 1936. After the armistice of 1940, it appeared in its former name and supported strongly Marshal Petain, although, generally speaking, it remained critical of his government. The party, however, did not advocate Franco-German collaboration and its leader, Colonel de La Rocque, was afterwards arrested by the Germans. After the liberation the party supported the policy of General de Gaulle but the decree of 9 August 1944 was equally applicable to it and it was consequently dissolved.

During the occupation, however, there were also some secret political groups known as '*Résistants*' but they never formed themselves into political parties and could not, therefore, form a subject of discussion in this context. But the C.N.R. or '*Le Conseil National de la Résistance*' which was founded on 15 May 1943 was composed of various groups who wished the liberation of France from German occupation. Although its immediate objective was to unite all the various national elements for offering resistance to the Germans, it, nevertheless, elaborated a programme which consisted of a plan; (1) to do away with the vested interests of the big trusts and (2) to secure for the workers a share in the management of the factories where they work. Besides the C.N.R., there were such clandestine organizations as; (a) the '*Mouvements Unis de Résistance*' (M.U.R.) which was named afterwards the M.L.N. or the '*Mouvement de Libération Nationale*'; (b) '*Le Front Nationale*' founded in May 1944; (c) '*L'Organisation Civile et Militaire*' founded in July 1940; (d) '*Libéri-*

tion *Nord et Sud*' founded in October 1940; (e) C.D.L.R. or '*Ceux de la Résistance*,' recognized by General de Gaulle at the beginning of 1943; and (f) the '*Ceux de la Libération Victorieuse*' called first '*Ceux de la Libération Vengeance*' and formed in Ile de France but eventually extended to Bourgogne and Brittany.

In spite of all these various secret organizations, it was obvious, after the liberation of Paris, as expressed by Gaston Palewski, *Chef de Cabinet* of de Gaulle, that except 'a persistent communist nucleus, great enthusiasm for de Gaulle and a Republican sentiment, there was no political organization worth the name in 1944.' The Communist Party had an excellent record of resistance to the Germans, yet, according to Palewski, 'its strength was only in 1936 level of fifteen per cent of the country's vote'¹¹ but it happened to be the only pre-war party which had remained intact and came out unscathed at the time of liberation. This situation was, however, somewhat anticipated by the followers of General de Gaulle and consequently a "*Comité Général d'Etudes*" (C.G.E.) was established in London as early as 1942 consisting of 'Francois de Menthon a Christian Socialist' and Paul Bastid, a Radical Socialist politician, in order, first, to draft a new constitution for France and, secondly, to draft an electoral system designed to stimulate the growth of the two-party system in France.

But the party which emerged as the most successful new party after the war was a Catholic Democratic Party known as the M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) with M. Georges Bidault, a resistance leader, as its head. Although newly constituted, and composed mostly of Christian Socialists, Popular Democrats and such youth and trade-union organizations as "*Jeunes Ouvriers Chrétiens*" and "*Jeunes Agricoles Chrétiens*," the M.R.P. won control of no fewer than 500 of the 35,000 town councils in France at the municipal elections of April and May 1945. And then, six months later, in October 1945, the party polled nearly four and a half million popular votes and at the elections of 1946 the M.R.P. candidates ran neck to neck with the Communists in order to be the single majority party in Parliament. But already by 1946, all the evils of the multi-party system were being clearly evident and the multiple resistance groups, although absorbed to some extent by the Communists, the Socialists and the M.R.P., began to form political parties so much so that in the present Parliament there are as many as six important parties and two groups who vote according to the suitability of the occasion.

PART B

I

In spite of the existence of a multi-party system in France, one should not think that the French are anarchical in their approach to political problems. As a matter of fact, although France never developed the two-party system on the

¹¹ Gordon Wright *The Reshaping of French Democracy* (Reynal and Hitchcock) 1948, p. 64.

British model, yet, according to Francois Goguel,¹ there have been in reality, all throughout the centuries, only two political parties in France, which he calls (a) the party for '*l'Ordre établi*' and (b) the party for '*Mouvement*.' That is to say, the main tendencies of all the political parties in spite of their varying declarations are two, namely, the tendency for established order and the tendency for 'movement' or change. These tendencies embody what the French have called the parties '*à droite*' and the parties '*à gauche*.' Thus, in fact, there have been only two parties composed, first, as shown by Goguel, of '*grande et moyenne bourgeoisie, industriels, négociants, populations catholiques*' and secondly, of '*petits bourgeois, fonctionnaires, subalternes intellectuels or demi-intellectuels, vignerons, journaliers agricoles, ouvriers d'industries*.'² In other words, people belonging to '*Couches Sociales*' which were more less free from the daily worries of existence supported the party which stood for '*l'ordre établi*' while the people whose work did not bring them enough reward to live in some comfort, always supported the party which stood for '*mouvement*.' Since this classification holds good even today, in France it has been necessary to point out the fundamental character of the party system in France which is very often misunderstood by those foreign observers who are impressed by the high-sounding names of parties which abound the country and the French Parliament.

The two tendencies I have referred to are to be found with major or minor variations in all the political parties which dominated the national life during the Third Republic and which dominate the French scene today. The formation of new parties was realized only during the electoral campaign of the Second Constituent Assembly of 1946, while at the time of the First Constituent Assembly the political groups which contested the elections did not have any well-defined political programmes. These groups were nine and they were as follows:

1. Groupe Communiste—154 members.
2. Groupe de républicains et résistants (M.U.R.P.)—Supporters of the Communists—8 members.
3. Groupe Socialiste—8 members.
4. Groupe musulman algérien—Supporters of the Socialists—7 members.
5. Groupe de la Résistance démocratique et Socialiste—27 members and 5 Independent supporters.
6. Groupe radical Socialiste—25 members (5 Independent Supporters.)
7. Groupe M.R.P.—150 members.
8. Groupe de Républicains indépendents—14 members.
9. Groupe du Parti républicain de la Liberté—37 members with 2 supporters.

¹ *La Politique des Parties Sous la IIIe Republique* (Editions due Seuil) 1946.

² *Ibid.* p. 28.

II

At the time of the election of the Second Constituent Assembly held on 2 June 1946, all these groups were merged into five distinct political factions consisting of Communists, Socialists, Left Republicans, M.R.P. and P.R.L. giving Parliament, thus, one right party (P.R.L.), one Centre Right (M.R.P.), one Centre Left (Rassemblement de Gauches républicains), one Left (S.F.I.O.) and one extreme Left (P.C.). As a result of the election, the M.R.P. emerged as the single majority party, whereas all the Marxist parties suffered a considerable defeat. At the election of 'L' Assemblée Nationale' (Parliament) held on 10 November 1946, the Communist Party became the first majority group with 171 seats and 5,351,926 votes. The M.R.P., on the other hand, won only 162 seats and the votes cast in its favour fell from 5,589,213 in June 1946 to 4,988,609 in November 1946. Of the other parties, the 'Rassemblement de Gauches' increased its seats from 31 to 42, the P.R.L. from 32 to 34, 'Le Parti Paysan' from 7 to 8, while the seats of the Socialists S.F.I.O. decreased from 127 to 102. The resultant situation as analysed by Paul Marabuto was that '*la Campagne électorale et le résultat des élections ont démontré que le Collège électoral s'est divisé en deux blocs: le bloc marxiste et le bloc anti-marxiste.*'³ In other words, France had once again returned to her traditional party divisions, consisting of the parties for '*l'ordre établi*' and the parties for '*mouvement*' or change. This becomes even clearer when one studies the composition and the strength of the Right and the Left parties in the present Parliament, which are the following:

RIGHT:

- (1) *Le Parti Republicain de la Liberté* (P.R.L.).—The party was formed on 22 December 1945 at the initiative of several members of "l'Unité républicaine" and all the components which formed that group, are to be found also in the P.R.L., namely, (a) *la Fédération républicaine*, (b) *le Parti de la Renovation*, républicaine (c) *L'Alliance démocratique*, (d) *Femmes Françaises libres*, (e) *Radicaux* independents; and the (f) *Republicains modérés*. The party wants separation of executive and legislative powers and stands for a strong executive. In foreign policy, it supports the policy of U.N.O. and the idea of a pact of the Western European Powers with the Anglo-Saxon bloc. Its economic policy consists of a demand for free enterprise with the least amount of State interference. The party is hostile to nationalization and also to self-government of the French Colonies. It is also fanatically anti-Communist, although it supports some limitation to profit made by the proprietors of industries. The P.R.L. has 39 members in Parliament including its leader M. Joseph Laniel, the deputy from Calvados and three other supporters. The P.R.L. has 11 members in the *Conseil de la République* and the President of this faction, is M. Georges Pernot,

³ *Les Partis Politiques et les Mouvements Sociaux Sous la IV^e République*—(Recueil Sirey 1948)—p. 45.

who represents Doubs in Parliament. Two other groups in Parliament support its policy and they are as follows :

- (a) *Le Groupe des Républicains Indépendants* : It has altogether 29 members in Parliament and 10 in the *Conseil de la République*. The president of the group in Parliament is M. René Coty and that in the *Conseil de la République* is M. R. Serot. The party votes in both the Chambers, generally with the P.R.L.
- (b) *Le Groupe Républicain d' Action Paysanne et d' Union Sociale* : Its origin can be traced to the 'Parti Agraire' which was founded sixteen years ago. In the Assembly, it has now 7 members and its leader is M. Paul Antier and in the Upper House, it has 5 members, presided over by M. Ch. Morel. The party takes interest only in agricultural problems and it has also voted sometimes with the M.R.P.

CENTRE :

- (1) *Le Mouvement Républicain Populaire*—(M.R.P.) : Although the party was formally constituted at a meeting in Paris on 26 November 1944, it was really composed of members of two former groups known as, 'Le Parti Démocrate Populaire' and 'La Jeune République.' The P.D.P. was founded on 16 November 1924 and its doctrine of Christian Socialism can be traced back to the writings of Lamennais and Albert de Mun. Besides, the Papal Encyclical of 18 May 1891 known as 'Rerum novarum' had forced the attention of the Catholics to the poor conditions of the workers and the political expression of this concern was found in the P.D.P. and 'La Jeune République,' both of which were reformists with Socialist ideas. *La Jeune République* was founded by the Catholic writer Marc Sangnier* in 1899 with the idea of uniting all the republican elements who believed in democracy and pacifism, but he himself joined the M.R.P. in 1945; and the P.D.P. also merged its identity with the M.R.P., in spite of some attempt made in 1944 to maintain its separate character. The M.R.P. stands for a 'Socialisme humaniste' and emphasizes, above all, the dignity of human person. It is opposed both to private capitalism and State capitalism and supports the theory that the President of the Republic should have more effective power. With regard to foreign policy, it is in favour of collective security and has shown its opposition to the formation of blocs on ideological lines. It is also in favour of structural reform of the French national economy and considers that a certain amount of nationalization is desirable and necessary. Regarding French Colonies, it holds the view that they should be given more self-government gradually and within the French Union and without sacrificing the principle of humanity. The party consists of 162 members in the Assembly and 75 in the *Conseil de la République*. The President of the party in the Assembly is M. Robert Lecourt and that of the party in *Conseil de la République* is M. Charles Bosson.

* He died in Paris only very recently.

- (2) *Le Parti radical et radical-Socialiste* : Although the party has a long history and tradition, yet for the purposes of election after the war it merged itself in a group called '*Le Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines*,' together with the party called '*L'Union démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance*' which was formed on 10 July 1946 as a party by several splinter groups, consisting of Resistance movements. The date of the foundation of the Radical Socialist Party, however, is traced by some to 22 September 1792 at the time of the declaration of the First Republic and the organization of a party called, *la Société des Jacobins*. Coming to more recent times, the spiritual fathers of the party were considered to be such men as Ledru-Rollin (1848) and Gambetta, whose programme in 1869 for a party to be called '*Parti républicain avancé*' is believed to be the basis of the present programme of the party. The story goes that in 1880, a nucleus of the '*Parti radical*' was formed by Clemenceau who was a co-founder of a paper called '*La Justice*.' From 1892, some of the Radicalists began to add the term '*Socialist*' to the name of their party and from 1898, more and more Radical Socialists began to be invited to join the successive Cabinets. But the formal foundation of the party dates from 1904 when it held its first Congress. Since then, the party had always held an annual Congress except during the German occupation of France. The party is supposed to have received its inspiration from the declarations of '*droits de l'homme et du Citoyen*' and stands today between the doctrines of the Right and the Left. Its policy with regard to domestic problems, as formulated at the Congress of August 1945, is that religious neutrality of the State should be maintained and that the republican institutions should be based on laity. In matters of foreign policy, the party holds the view that in addition to the Franco-Soviet Pact, France should enter into close contact with England and the U.S.A. Its economic policy upholds the theory that the best thing for France would be to steer clear of liberal economy as well as '*dirigisme*.' It is also opposed to nationalization. The party has 43 members in Parliament and the President of the group in Parliament is M. Edouard Herriot.

LEFT :

- (1) *Parti Socialiste S.F.I.O. (Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière)* : The party with its present name dates back from 1905 although the First International was founded in London on 28 September 1864 and the French branch of it was founded in Paris in 1865. On 23 April 1905 at a meeting held in Paris, all three different factions were united in a common Socialist Party with the object of realizing socialization of all the means of production. In 1920, Socialist unity was seriously challenged and a very important section of the party dissociated itself from the Second International and accepted the principle of national defence as opposed to international defence, as a part of its programme. The revolutionary section joined the Third International and called

itself the '*Section Française de l'Internationale Communiste*,' whereas the more moderate section called itself the '*Section Française de L'Internationale Ouvrière*.' In 1933, the party again excluded some members who were in favour of a more authoritarian programme, but at the elections of 26 April and 3 May 1935, the Socialists joined hands with the Communists, the neo-Socialists and Radical Socialists owing to the altered political conditions and the result was the creation of the first '*Front Populaire*' government composed of all these elements. This government, however, collapsed on 20 June 1937; and after the defeat of France in 1940, many Socialists refused their support to the Vichy government, and, eventually, after the liberation of Paris, the first Congress of the party was again held in Paris from 9 November to 17 November 1944, consisting of all the Socialist groups which had opposed German occupation. At the 37th National Congress of the party held on 11 August to 15 August 1945, the post-war policy of the party was clearly defined and it was decided to maintain co-ordination with the Communist Party. But at the 38th National Congress held in August 1946, this co-ordination was promised on condition that the Communists abandoned their policy of dependence on Russia in all important matters. At the 39th Congress held in Lyons in August 1947, the party adopted an even more moderate social policy, in spite of the opposition of the younger elements. At the elections of 1946, the party was able to win only 102 seats, although in the Constituent Assembly, its strength was 127. The policy of the party as defined in the manifesto of the party issued in November 1944, consists of, first, the realization of a world organization for the purpose of attaining collective security. The party has also upheld the principle as affirmed by M. Jules Moch,⁴ that, for the sake of world peace, the nations ought to surrender some of their sovereignty to a world organization which ought to be provided with an army able to assure '*la sécurité de chacun et de tous*.' Secondly, the party is opposed to an Upper Chamber of Parliament and supports also complete independence of the judiciary from the executive. It wants also some decentralization of the administrative system. Thirdly, its economic policy consists of a new phase of structural reform of the entire economic system and the party, as before, stands for the socialization of the means of production and exchange. In other words, the party wishes that the management of industries should be vested in the hands of the workers and the technicians in the interest of all. The control of the industries would be such that it would enable the workers to control, '*Produit et Stocks, prise et marges et d'accéder à la pleine gestion des entreprises*.'⁵ The strength of the party in the '*Conseil de la République*' is 61 and the leader of the group is M. Alex Roubet. The President of the group

⁴ In '*Le Parti socialiste au peuple de France*' (Editions de la Liberté, 1945, Paris).

⁵ L'ordre de jour de l'Assemblée Nationale du 3 décembre 1946.

in the National Assembly is M. Charles Lussy. The party has often been represented on the Cabinet and its one-time Vice-president, M. Ramadier, has been the Prime Minister of France in a coalition government.

(2) *Le Parti Communiste :*

The French Communist Party was formed at the Congress of Tours in December 1920, as a result of the schism within the Socialist Party which led to the majority of its members adhering to the Third International. The Communist Party had accepted the twenty-one conditions laid down at the first Congress of the Third International held in Moscow in March, 1919 and had agreed to break with the social Democrats. From 1920 to 1934, the party remained in opposition in Parliament to what it called the '*lutte contre la police bourgeoise*', but after the coming into power of '*Front Populaire*' it modified some of its programme and joined hands with other parties, in fighting 'fascist reaction.' After the conclusion of Russo-German Pact of August 1939, however, the party voted a policy of non-participation in the war and was consequently dissolved by a decree of 1 September 1939. But after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in 1941, it organized resistance against the occupying Power and many of its members fought heroically against the Germans after the invasion. The party held its first meeting on 31 August 1944 and started the work of its reorganization. The Tenth Congress of the party since its foundation was held on 26 June 1945 and it had also participated in the municipal elections of April-May, 1945. Eventually, at the Parliamentary elections of November 1946, the party won 166 seats in the Lower House and 73 in the Upper House. The party has also 15 members in the Assembly of the '*Union Française*.' M. Marcel Cachin acted as the President of Honour of the Parliamentary group of the party at the time of the sessions of the Second Constituent Assembly, but now the group is under the control of '*Bureau politique*' of the party consisting of twelve important members. Its domestic programme is to abolish the upper chamber and to make the Lower House all-powerful; and it also advocates the suppression of the offices of district '*prefets*' whose power ought to be vested in the elected Mayors of the local and district councils. It supports also the thesis that the power of the President of the Republic should be rendered even less, and the party is of the opinion that the government should be composed of Ministers nominated by single chamber Parliament from among the members elected by the people and they should be made responsible, individually and collectively, to Parliament. The judges, according to the party, should be elected by the people from among the citizens who possess sufficient qualifications and who have been trained in civic virtues. The government, on the other hand, should be assisted in its task by four Consultative Councils, which would deal with economic, social, cultural and military problems.

respectively. As regards its economic policy, the party demands that all the branches of economic activities of the nation should be nationalized and that a National Economic Council should be established for the collection of statistics, distribution of raw materials, specialization of the industries, organization of researches, improvement of technique, distribution of credit and the control of foreign trade. The party has also emphasized that it respects private property which is acquired by work and saving; but it will suppress proprietorship of the means of production. It also wants that the purchasing power of the worker should be increased and that every worker should be assured of an old age pension. In so far as its foreign policy is concerned, the party advocates peace based on an understanding between the Soviet Union, the U.S.A., and Great Britain. It is opposed to the formation of a West European bloc and does not approve of the creation of a European Union. With regard to Germany, the party wants internationalization of the Ruhr and the destruction of German militarism.

MOSLEM PARTIES :

(1) *L'Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien :*

Apart from the parties in Parliament which can be classified broadly on the political ideologies, there are three parties in the National Assembly which represent the Moslem population of Algeria. The most important of them is the U.D.M.A. founded in 1946 by an Algerian politician called M. Ferhat Abbas. The party has 11 members in Parliament and 4 in the *Conseil de la République*. The party demands the creation of an independent Algerian Parliament and government, with a flag of its own. Its main object is to bring about an end of French colonialism in Algeria.

III

We have described here in length only those political parties which are represented in Parliament, but outside the National Assembly there are also a few political organizations in France whose importance cannot be underestimated. It is probable that some of them will become parliamentary parties in the near future. Of these, the first mention should be made of '*Le Rassemblement du peuple Français*' or the R.P.F., which has been organized by General de Gaulle after the elections of 1946 and which has, since then, won many seats in the municipal elections of 19 and 26 October 1947. Many members of the P.R.L., the M.R.P., and the P.U.D.S.R., belong now to the R.P.F. and at the time of the elections of 1946 a party called "*Union Gaulliste*" had won 9 seats in Parliament but these members, since then have merged their identities with the parties of the Right and the Centre. In addition to the R.P.F., there are such political parties in France as, "*Egalité*" and "*Mouvement libertaire*" which were formed out of the remnants of the old parties called "*Union anarchiste Communiste revolutionnaire*" (the U.A.C.R.) and "*Federation*

anarchiste française" (the F.A.F.), both of which belonged to the extreme Left. On the other hand, the extreme Right represented by the monarchist movement and the newspaper "*L'Action Française*," before the war, has organized now a group called "*La Mesine*," since the dissolution of all monarchist activities after the war. Besides these parties, the powerful trade union movement is represented in its various ideological nuances in such parties as: (1) La Confédération Generale du Travail or the C.G.T. (Extreme Left); (2) La Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens or the C.F.T.C. (Centre); (3) La Confédération Nationale du Travail or the C.N.T. (Trotskyists); (4) La Confédération Generale des Cadres or the C.G.C. (Technocrats); (5) La Confédération Generale de l'Agriculture or the C.G.A. (Left); and (6) Force Ouvrière (Centre). In addition to the trade unions of the workers, France has also a number of organizations on the same lines representing the interests of the employers and traders. They are of recent origin and they were formed to counteract the growing influence of the workers' trade unions. The more important among them are: (1) "*L'Union des Chefs d'entreprise pour l'association du Capital et du Travail*" or the U.C.E.A.C.T., whose main object is to bring about a harmonious relationship between the management and the workers; (2) "*La Confédération generale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises*," composed of small traders; (3) "*La Confédération française des Professions*," consisting of men of liberal professions who believe in a Christian solution of the problem of capital and labour; (4) "*Le Centre des Patrons*," which recognizes the conflict between labour and capital and looks for a more comprehensive solution; and (5) "*Le Conseil national du Patronat français*" or the C.N.P.F., which is the parent organization of all the others and functions as a co-ordinating body for all the organizations of this kind.

IV

Although our study so far of the history of rise, growth and also of decline of French political parties has been far from an exhaustive one, yet it reveals certain very interesting facts, on which we can base certain conclusions of much sociological significance. We have noticed that during the period 1871 to 1914, that is, the period which covers the foundation of the Third Republic up to the First World War, the Right parties had reached power only spasmodically, and that also, in a precarious manner. The Right held power between 1893 and 1899 and once again between 1912-13, but even then, the extreme Right was always excluded from governmental authority, as during that period, the extreme Right represented the movement for restoration of monarchy, which meant, in reality, the non-recognition of the Republic. The successive governments in France, during this period, were, thus, in the hands of parties with more progressive social ideas and it is equally interesting to note that France made remarkable progress in all the branches of life during this period. After World War I, however, there was a definite swing towards the Right, for during the five elections held between 1919 and 1939, the Right won clear victories in two, namely those of 1919 and 1928. And even when the Left won the largest number

of seats in Parliament, as for instance, in 1924, 1932 and 1936, the Centre and the Right groups managed to come into power in the intervals, which were, in each case, two years after their electoral defeats. In all these cases, governments were formed with the Right and Centre groups, which, in the parlance of the time, were supposed to be the '*majorité de la majorité*.' Thus, out of the twenty years which had preceded the Second World War, the Right wing parties had held power in France for fifteen. They did it from January 1920 to June 1924, and then, together with the Radical Socialists, from July 1926 to November 1928, and again from November 1928 to June 1932. The Right came to power again in February 1934 and exercised power in a coalition with the Radical Socialists until January 1936, at the head of such moderate Prime Ministers as Doumergue, Flandin and Laval. From April 1938 up to the defeat of France in June 1940 the Right was again in power. Afterwards, during the occupation of France, the men who actively collaborated with the occupying Power and held important posts in the Vichy Cabinet, belonged, almost all of them, to the Right wing or Moderate political parties. After the war, again, except during the period of coalition with the Communists from 1945 to 1947,⁶ the parties which controlled power had Right-wing affiliations although the participation of the Socialists S. F. I. O., had given the successive governments a national character and these governments had been considered by some as representing the "*troisième force*" and not as the government of the "*d'élite*."

These facts ought to give rise to some reflections, for often it has been said that the debacle of 1940 was due to the short period of reign of France by '*Front Populaire*' and that the present political instability of France is largely due to the radical ideas preached by the Left. These accusations are not borne out by facts, for France has been ruled for about thirty years by the party which stood for '*l'ordre établi*' and the intervention of the Left parties in changing the social structure of the governmental machine, has produced so far no tangible results. As a matter of fact, on the three occasions, viz., in 1926, 1934 and 1938, when the Left bloc, known as the '*Union de des gauches*' came to power, its desire to bring about social changes has always been frustrated, because of the unsatisfactory alliances it had made with the parties which had totally different conceptions of social and economic problems. The Socialist Party disagreed violently with the Radical Socialists in 1925-26 and again in 1933-34, and with both the Radical Socialists and the Communists in 1937-38. And on all occasions, the Right eventually triumphed although the mass of French voters had all the time remained loyal supporters of the Left; at any rate, they were undoubtedly loyal to the Left bloc, that is, the '*Union des gauches*.'

This arises also from the fact that the party system in France, unlike in

⁶ The Communists joined the tripartite government in 1945 and in 1946 the leader of the Communist Party held the important post of the Vice-president of the Cabinet. In May 1947, the Communist ministers showed their sympathy openly with the strikers of the Renault factory and on this account, they were deprived of their functions by a presidential decree.

England, is based on fundamental divergencies on political ideology. In France, political compromise is not considered to be as something wise and desirable. The French attach to the word 'compromise' such meanings as 'ambiguity, equivocation' and '*nègre blanc*,' for they do not think empirically. The French think logically, and hence, probably, dogmatically. And that is why, even electoral battles are taken as life and death struggles, for the victory of one party is looked upon not only as the triumph of a political doctrine, but also as a triumph of a philosophy and a way of life. Thus, the party which wins, wants also to have complete power and wishes to eliminate its opponents completely. And this desire to cause a point of view triumph totally over others is not new in France. It has its roots in French history, for Louis XIV was imbued with the same idea when he issued the Edict of Nantes, the Jacobins when they declared war against Europe; and Napoleon I when he reconstructed the State and the administration. The same traits are to be found later in Charles X, Napoleon III, in Broglie and Combes. The Right and the Left belong, as aptly put by Goguel,⁷ to '*deux familles d'esprits et de tempéraments*' and this leads to much indifference to public affairs, so characteristic of the French, who often confound the State with government and, because of their opposition to the government in power, weaken in reality the State itself.

This becomes understandable when one remembers that during the sixty-five-year life of the Third Republic, France had 102 Cabinets and, according to Gordon Wright, 'Calculators have figured that from 1875 to 1920, governments lasted an average of less than ten months each; but that from 1920 to 1940, the speed of rotation just about doubled.'⁸ That is to say, the life of a government in France was not longer than that of five months for nearly twenty years and the social consequences of such a state of affairs could not but be harmful for a country.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF CEYLON

By VISHWAMBHAR NATH

'CEYLON is predominantly agricultural and her foreign trade consists in the exchange of agricultural products for manufactured articles and food in the world markets. Tea, rubber and coconut products constitute more than 90 per cent of her exports and Ceylon's prosperity therefore depends on the prices fetched by these products in the foreign markets.'¹

The above statement summarizes quite effectively the basic facts about Ceylon's economy—an economy geared to the production of plantation products for the world markets. The island produces only a fraction of the food needed for its population, and there is no manufacturing worth the name, beyond the processing of products like tea, coconut and rubber. In normal

⁷ *Op. Cit.*—Goguel p. 552.

⁸ *The Reshaping of French Democracy*—(New York, 1948) p. 9.

¹ *Ceylon Year Book*, 1948. p. 45.

times, about two-thirds of the rice requirements, large quantities of other foodstuffs, and almost all manufactured goods are imported. The Ceylonese are concerned about this excessive dependence of their economic life on foreign markets, and upon foreign sources of supply. Attainment of self-sufficiency in food and development of manufacturing are the two most popular economic objectives of the day. It is the purpose of this article to examine the natural resources on which the present plantation economy has been built, and to appraise the current economic objectives in the light of the availability of natural resources.

Ceylon is an island with an area of about 25,400 square miles, or slightly less than that of the State of Mysore. It is situated off the tip of the Indian Peninsula, from which it is separated by the Palk Straits. From the standpoint of geologic structure, it is part of the Peninsula. It has been connected with the Peninsula through most of geologic time, the Palk Straits being of only very recent origin. The straits are quite shallow and are from 20 to 80 miles wide. There is a regular train-ferry service between Dhanushkodi (India) and Talaimannar (Ceylon), where the straits are only 20 miles across.

Topography. The topography of the island is quite simple. There is a core of mountains in the south-central part. Surrounding it are lowlands, which occupy about three-quarters of the total area of the island. The plains are less than 500 feet in elevation; are well drained for the most part, and are suitable for the production of crops. The mountains rise to elevations of 6,000 to 7,000 feet, though the highest peaks are more than 8,000 feet high. They are deeply dissected by numerous streams which flow away from them in all directions. The largest of these streams is the Mahawali Ganga, which flows to the north-east and is over 200 miles long. The highlands are quite rugged in character. Deep narrow canyons, through which turbulent streams tumble down over waterfalls and rapids to the plains below, are a common feature among them. In these swift-flowing streams lie Ceylon's water power resource—the chief power resource in this island which lacks both coal and petroleum.

Climate. The climate of the island is tropical marine—hot and humid in the plains, cool and humid in the highlands. Because of proximity to the equator (Ceylon lies between Latitude 6 and 10 degrees North), there is little seasonal variation in temperature. In Colombo, monthly temperature averages from 78.5 degrees in December to 82.5 degrees in May—an annual variation of 4 degrees. In the highlands, temperatures decrease with increasing altitude, but the seasonal variation is equally small. There is no snow in these mountains, and crops can grow throughout the year, without serious hindrance from frost. January temperatures at Nuwara Eliya at an elevation of 6,200 feet are comparable to those at Amritsar in the Punjab plains.

Rainfall is received from both the south-west and the north-east monsoons, and is abundant in most parts. The greater part of the island has more than 50 inches of annual rainfall, and parts in the highlands receive more than 150 inches annually. The western and south-western parts receive the maximum rain in the season of the south-west monsoon, i.e., from May to October.

The eastern and north-eastern parts receive the greatest amount in the season of the north-east monsoon (from November to March). The difference between the wet and the dry season is not nearly as pronounced as in most parts of India; rainfall is much more evenly distributed. In Colombo there is no month with less than 2 inches of rain, and even the four months of the dry season have about 20 per cent of the annual total.

It is common to divide Ceylon into a 'wet' zone and a 'dry' zone. Areas with an annual rainfall of 75 inches or more are considered 'wet', those with less rainfall are considered 'dry'.² This division between wet and dry zones is of considerable significance. In the former, crops can be grown without irrigation, and the chief problem is often of drainage. Over the greater part of the dry zone, however, irrigation is either necessary or desirable as a protection against drought. At the present time, the wet zone is the best developed and most important part of the island. Here are produced most of the plantation and food crops, and here is concentrated the greater part of the population. In the dry zone, there is only one area of intensive cultivation and dense population—the Jaffna Peninsula, the home of the Ceylon Tamils. The remaining parts of the dry zone are thinly populated. *Chena* cultivation prevails. This is a shifting type of primitive agriculture similar to the types found in the forest interiors of Assam, Malaya and other countries of S.E. Asia. This agriculture consists in clearing a site in the jungle by felling the trees and burning down the undergrowth. The clearing is only partial; stumps of trees are generally left standing in the fields. Crops of maize, *korak-kan* (a millet similar to *ragi*), vegetables and other food crops are sown. After one or two years, the plots get badly eroded or infested with weeds and have to be abandoned. The process is repeated at a fresh clearing. This is a primitive and extremely wasteful mode of agriculture. Steps are being taken by the Government to settle down the *Chena* cultivators on permanent farms.

The dry zone formerly supported intensive agriculture and dense populations. The centres of ancient Ceylonese civilizations, and the old capitals of the Sinhalese kings, like Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, are in the dry zone. These civilizations were based on well-developed systems of irrigation. Remains of old tanks and reservoirs are abundant in the dry zone. These reservoirs were abandoned and fell into disrepair. Wars and ravages of disease are given as the principal reasons for the decline. It is believed that large parts of the dry zone can be effectively developed by revival and extension of the irrigation works, and control of malaria, which is a major problem in this area. In the dry zone lies the major land reserve for the rapidly expanding agrarian population of the island, and in its development is her main hope of achieving self-sufficiency in food.

Agriculture. Out of a total area of about 16 million acres, $3\frac{1}{4}$ million acres, i.e., nearly 20 per cent, were reported under crops in the Agricultural Census

² It will be seen that even the 'dry zone' is quite moist by world and Indian standards.

of 1946. An approximate idea of the areas under different types of land use is given by the following figures:—

TABLE 1. *Land Utilization in Ceylon.*³

| | | |
|--|----|----------------|
| Cultivation | 3½ | million acres. |
| Forests including national reserves and sanctuaries | 3½ | „ „ |
| Rocky and steep land, as well as land above 5000 ft. | 4½ | „ „ |
| Roads, streams, tanks, towns, villages etc. .. | 1¼ | „ „ |
| Land available for development | 3½ | „ „ |
| Total | 16 | „ „ |

Excepting the areas under 'cultivated crops' and 'forests,' the other estimates are obviously very generalized, and should be regarded only as the best available working guides.

Rice, coconuts, tea and rubber are the four major crops, and together occupy about 90 per cent of the area under crops. Among the minor crops arecanuts, cinnamon, citronella and cacao are the most important. The relative importance of the various crops is shown in the following table:—

TABLE 2. *Important Crops of Ceylon.*

| Crop. | Acreage. Census of 1946 | Value of Exports in 1948 | Remarks. |
|---------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| <i>Major Crops.</i> | | | |
| Tea | 534,000 acres. | 590.3 million rupees. | Grown mostly for export. |
| Rubber | 573,000 „ | 143.4 „ „ | Grown exclusively for export. |
| Coconuts | 920,000 acres. | 166.1 million rupees. | Important both as export and local food crop. |
| Rice | 913,000 „ | No exports. Large imports. | Local production supplies only about 1/3 of total need. |
| <i>Minor Crops.</i> | | | |
| Arecanuts | 69,000 | 4.4 million rupees. | Exports and local use. |
| Cinnamon | 33,000 | 4.5 „ „ | Mainly for export. |
| Citronella | 30,000 | 3.3 „ „ | |
| Cacao | 20,000 | 7.0 „ „ | |
| Palmyra | 50,000 | No exports. | For local consumption for toddy, jaggery etc. |

³ *A Six Year Plan for Ceylon*, p.

| Crop | Acreage. Census of 1946 | Value of Exports in 1948 | Remarks. |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| Chena, Vegetables and other. | 140,000 | „ „ „ | For local consumption. |
| Total area under crops in 1946. | | 3,282,000 acres. | |
| Total value of all Exports in 1948. | | 1,011 million rupees. | |

The Estate Crops: Tea and Rubber. Tea and rubber are the two main estate crops, and the acreage under the two is approximately equal. Tea is grown at higher elevations than rubber. If we travel from the western coast towards the central highlands, we meet coconut groves and paddy fields, then comes rubber and then tea. The paddy fields are on the alluvial bottoms; the coconut groves on the sandier and better drained coastal plains; rubber comes on the lower slopes of the hills (up to elevations of about 2,000 feet), and tea on the higher and steeper slopes (mostly between 2,000 and 6,000 feet). A considerable proportion of the tea plantations are on slopes which would be considered too steep for other crops, and to this extent tea does not take land away from other crops.

Both tea and rubber are grown primarily for the export market. All the rubber production is exported, there being no users locally. The bulk of the tea (generally more than 90 per cent) is also exported, though the Ceylonese are heavy tea drinkers themselves. Before the development of tea plantations, Ceylon had a flourishing coffee industry. This industry suffered very heavy losses from the coffee blight in the 1870's and 1880's. The planters, faced with ruin, turned to tea as an alternative. The tea plantings proved so successful that within a few years tea came to occupy the pre-eminent position of chief commercial crop of the island. Climatic conditions in the highlands are quite suitable for tea. Rainfall is abundant (more than 100 inches in most parts), and well distributed through the year. Unlike China and Japan, where growth of the tea bush is retarded by frosts during the winter, growth can continue throughout the year, and year-round pickings are possible. The plantations were started by the Europeans (British mainly), and still remain very largely in European hands. The great majority of the labourers are Indians—Tamils and Malayalis from South India.⁴ Indian labourers were brought to work on the plantations in the 19th century because they were found to be more industrious and efficient than the Ceylonese. Considerable numbers have settled down on the estates; others migrate continually between homes in India and jobs on the plantations. The plantation workers form about three-fourths of the Indian community in Ceylon. In recent years, there has been

⁴ 98 per cent of the labourers on the tea estates are Indians. *25 Years of Labour Progress in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1948 p. 35.

some feeling against Indians in Ceylon, and during the last two years, the Ceylon Government has passed legislation which imposes certain restrictions in matters of citizenship rights, movement between India and Ceylon and remittances to India. These measures have of course been passed in order to safeguard the interests of the Ceylonese, but they have created a feeling of uncertainty among the Indians. Efforts have been made in recent months to arrive at a solution which would be satisfactory to both sides, and the situation is now much better than it was some months back. A satisfactory solution of the problem of Indian labour would do much to ensure cordial relations between the two countries and to maintain prosperity in Ceylon.

Whereas most of the tea acreage is in large plantations, a considerable proportion of the rubber acreage (about a quarter of the total) is in small holdings of 10 acres or less. Ceylonese interests own about 60 per cent of the acreage, and the Europeans own about 35 per cent. The labour is 60 per cent Indian, 40 per cent Ceylonese.⁵

Exports of tea and rubber together form 75 to 85 per cent of the total value of the exports of Ceylon. The relative importance of each varies in different years, depending upon market prices. In 1938, the value of tea exports formed 68 per cent of the total, and rubber exports were 17 per cent of the total. By 1944, tea had declined to 50 per cent, and rubber increased to 36 per cent. In 1948, tea had again come up to 60 per cent, and rubber gone down to 14 per cent. The rubber industry experienced boom conditions during the war. The two major rubber producing countries—Malaya and Dutch East Indies—were occupied by the Japanese, and Ceylon was one of the few sources of natural rubber left for the Allies. Prices increased more than 2½ times (158 per cent.⁶) between 1938 and 1945. But since the end of the war, production has revived rapidly in Malaya and the East Indies, and the principal buyer of rubber—the U.S.A.—has developed a considerable artificial rubber industry. Prices have declined markedly from their war-time peaks, from Rs. 102 per 100 lbs. in 1945 to Rs. 59 per 100 lbs. in 1948. During the inter-war period, overproduction was a constant problem in the world rubber industry, and various schemes of international control had to be resorted to prevent prices from sinking to extremely low levels. International control may again be necessary—and before long. Ceylon's rubber industry suffers from the additional disadvantage that a large proportion of the trees are old, and much of the rubber holdings (175,000 acres in 1947) are uneconomic.

Prices of tea also increased during the war years, but the increase was much less than rubber (61 per cent between 1938 and 1945). The U.K. is the principal buyer of tea, and the British Government purchased all available tea supplies. Prices were regulated and were increased slowly in proportion to the rise in the cost of living and other production costs. After the termination of the sole purchase scheme, prices have risen rapidly, and in 1947 were 160 per cent higher than in 1938. Most of the tea is still sold under bulk purchase agreements between Ceylon and purchasing countries.

⁵ *Ibid* p. 39.

⁶ *Ceylon Year Book*, p. 45.

Great Britain, the U.S.A., Australia, Egypt, Canada and South Africa are the chief buyers of Ceylon tea. India and Pakistan, and Indonesia are the principal competitors. A rising competitor is E. Africa, where production has been increasing recently. As in the case of rubber, overproduction was a problem before the war, and international control of production and prices had to be adopted. This may not again be necessary for some time. The demand for tea is sharp; production in Indonesia has been seriously reduced by disturbances there and will take some time to reach pre-war levels.

Coconuts. In terms of acreage, coconut is the leading crop of the island. It is grown both as an estate crop, and by the Ceylonese peasants. It occupies a very important place in the economy of the peasant. It is the principal source of cash, and its products serve for both food and raw material. The principal coconut producing area is in the western coastal plain, extending inland from the coast to elevations of 500-1,000 feet. Other areas are Jaffna Peninsula, and strips scattered along the coast. Most of the coconut estates are owned by the Ceylonese, and the labour is Sinhalese.

The products of the coconut—copra, coconut oil, desiccated coconut, and coir—are important exports. In 1938, they contributed about 10 per cent to the total value of Ceylon's exports. But because of the world-wide shortage of oils and fats during recent years, there has been a phenomenal increase in their prices, and their share in the value of exports has increased to 16 per cent in 1948. Prices of copra increased 4 times, between 1938 and 1947; of coconut oil 5 times and of desiccated coconut 6 times. Although latest figures are not available, the current prices are much higher than the 1947 prices. The coconut trade is having a veritable boom.

Rice: Rice is the staple diet of the Ceylonese, and is the chief food crop grown in the island. Production is concentrated in the lowlands of the south-west, and again in the Jaffna Peninsula. The main crop of rice is sown between June and August, and is harvested about six months later. There is also a secondary crop, which is planted in February-March and matures in somewhat over three months. Out of 913,000 acres under rice, 551,000 acres are irrigated, from tanks, reservoirs or streams.⁷ Production methods in the Jaffna Peninsula are very similar to those in Tamilnad in S. India. In the wet zone, however, they do not appear to be even as good. Yields are very low. The average for the island is given as 520 lbs. per acre.⁸

In the pre-war years, Ceylon produced less than one-third of the rice consumed by its population. The balance was imported. Burma supplied about 75 per cent of the imports. Siam, Indo-China and India supplied the rest. With the Japanese domination of S.E. Asia in 1942, imports from these sources were cut off, and Ceylon was faced with a critical food shortage. Larger imports were sought in India, but India could not help much, because she too had been dependent on supplies from Burma, and was facing a food shortage herself. Other sources of supply were tried, but the situation was

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 104.

⁸ *A Six Year Plan for Ceylon.* Secretariat, Colombo. 1948. p. 54.

saved only by imports of large quantities of wheat flour from Australia. All during the war years, Australian wheat flour supplied a large proportion of the foodgrain needs of the island. In 1944, flour imports were more than twice the volume of rice imports. Rice was then obtained chiefly from Egypt and Brazil. The change from rice to wheat meant great hardship to the people, as it required drastic changes in their food habits. But it was inevitable in the emergency. With the end of the war, rice imports have gradually replaced imports of wheat flour. By 1948, Burma had again become the principal supplier of rice, with Egypt second in importance.

Besides foodgrains, Ceylon imports large quantities of other foodstuffs. Most important among these is sugar, which used to come from Java, but now comes mostly from Mauritius. Pulses, chillies, onions, and curry-stuffs are imported, mainly from India. Dried fish is imported from Pakistan and Aden, and fresh fish from the Maldivé Islands. The quality of the local livestock is very poor, and until recently there was no dairy-farming worth the name. Large quantities of meat (mutton and beef) and dairy products—condensed and powdered milk, milk foods, butter and cheese—are imported, mostly from Australia. Livestock used to be imported for slaughter from India, but these imports have virtually ceased.

Self-Sufficiency in Food: The war pointedly brought attention to the necessity of growing more food at home. Attainment of self-sufficiency in food has become the declared objective of the present government, and efforts are being directed towards that end. Growing of such crops as chillies, onions, potatoes and vegetables is being encouraged by distribution of free seeds and by propaganda. There have been some efforts made to improve livestock husbandry also. A few herds of dairy cows have been brought from Australia, and some dairy farms started. The principal hope of increasing food production lies in the development of the undeveloped lands of the dry zone. The Finance Minister in his 1948-49 Budget speech estimated that there were $3\frac{1}{2}$ million acres of land which could be brought under cultivation—an average sufficient to double the present cropped acreage.⁹ Most of this land will require extension of irrigation facilities, clearing of jungle, and eradication of malaria before it can be utilized. Settlement of the undeveloped lands of the island, under Government sponsored colonization schemes, has been going on for a number of years, and the process is being accelerated. In the Six Year Plan for Ceylon, referred to above, a total of 130,000 acres will be added to the cultivated area of the island, during the period 1947-53. Even if all this land could be planted with paddy, it would mean an increase of 14 per cent over the 1946 paddy acreage, or an average increase of about 2.5 per cent per year. The population of the island increased from 5.3 millions in 1931 to 6.7 millions in 1946. This represents an increase of 25 per cent in 15 years, or an average increase of 1.7 per cent per year. This rate of increase may well be expected to be maintained (or accelerated). It is obvious, then, that Ceylon will not be growing any more of her rice requirements after the com-

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

pletion of the Six Year Plan than she did before. If the dependence on foreign imports is to be reduced, the rate of development of new lands will have to be much greater than that proposed in the Plan. Or, there must be a very rapid improvement in techniques of production and yields per acre.

Forest Resources. The most important forests of Ceylon are those of the dry zone. These yield the main commercial supplies of timber and woods for furniture, engineering purposes (construction of bridges, railway sleepers etc.) as well as ornamental woods like satin-wood and ebony. The forests of the wet zone are tropical evergreen forests, and supply several varieties of softwoods suitable for the manufacture of boxes, matches etc. There are large numbers of spices growing intermixed in the wet zone forests, which fact, coupled with difficulties of transportation, hinders their exploitation. The greater part of Ceylon is officially classified as 'forested.' But over large areas, the 'forest' is little better than scrub and is of little economic value. The present output of timber from the island's forests is barely sufficient for its needs and small quantities are imported mainly from Australia. But by regulation of cutting, stopping the depredations of the Chena cultivators, and by scientific methods of forest management, the forests of the island can be developed to supply all its needs for timber, and to yield valuable exports of tropical woods like ebony and mahogany. The forests are a major economic resource of Ceylon, and there is great scope for their scientific development.

Forests also play a vital rôle in a country's economy by checking soil erosion, and reducing flood hazards. This rôle is of particularly great importance in this country. In this climate of torrential downpours, soil erosion is extremely rapid, and floods very destructive. The Government has recognized the importance of this fact and reserved forests in critical catchment areas. Altogether, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ million acres of forests are under State control—as protection forests, productive forests, national parks and sanctuaries of wild life. Cutting is regulated in the reserved forests. In the other forests however, methods of exploitation are still quite destructive.

Fisheries. Fishing is done in coastal waters by fishermen in their picturesque outrigger canoes and small fishing boats. The catch is sold in the local markets, but is not sufficient for the country's needs. Quantities of fresh fish are imported from the Maldive Islands, and of dried fish from Pakistan and Aden. The methods of the native fishermen are rather primitive. Most of them are poor and heavily in debt. The Government has been trying to help the fishermen by providing cheap loans and cheap supplies of salt and other necessities. Fishing methods are also sought to be improved. A fishing trawler began operations in 1945, and icing facilities are being installed. The fishing industry can be easily developed to meet all the fish needs of the island.

In the early years of this century, Ceylon had a rather important pearl fishing industry. The fisheries were located in the Gulf of Mannar, off the north-eastern coast. The industry gradually declined, and after 1925 the pearl oyster disappeared, and there has been no pearl fishing since. The reasons for this

disappearance have not been discovered, and no attempt has as yet been made to revive the industry through pearl culture.

Mineral Resources: The mineral resources of the island have by no means been investigated in detail. But a Geologic Survey has been in existence, and the major facts of its geology are known. According to present knowledge, the mineral resources are rather meagre. The greater part of the island is underlain by ancient crystalline rocks (similar to those in the Deccan), in which there is no coal or oil. There are small deposits of iron ore, scattered in several localities. The ore is of fairly good quality (metallic content about 50 per cent), but the deposits, which are estimated to provide about 6 million tons of iron ore, are too small to support a modern iron and steel industry. There are no known deposits of ferro-alloy metals like manganese, or of non-ferrous metals like copper, zinc, lead, etc. There are, however, promising deposits of kaoline and glass sands, which might be utilized to develop ceramic and glass industries.

The only minerals being exploited at present are graphite and gems. Vein deposits of graphite are worked at several points in the western and south-western parts of the island. Ceylon is the principal producer of graphite in the world, and its graphite is of very high quality. It finds important industrial uses, in the manufacture of electrodes, crucibles and as a lubricant. All the production is exported. The U.S.A. and the U.K. are the principal buyers. Production and prices are subject to violent fluctuations, depending upon the vagaries of demand. The mines are owned by Ceylonese capital, and worked by Ceylonese labour. Conditions in the mines are rather primitive. The stuff is exported after simple cleaning and grading.

Gems are found in alluvial sands. The centre of the gem industry is Ratnapura. Sapphires and rubies are the most important stones found in Ceylon. The annual output is valued between $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 million rupees.

Water Power Resources: Ceylon is fortunate in having abundant resources of water power. This fact is of particular importance for the island's economy, in view of the lack of coal and oil. A large power potential is provided for by the abundant and well distributed rainfall, and by numerous streams falling through steep gradients in the central highlands.¹⁰ A number of suitable power sites are available, and it is a great advantage that most of these are easily accessible, and close to plantations and centres of population.

But relatively little of the water power has been developed so far. Most of the power needs are supplied by imported coal, oil, or to a small extent by charcoal. Two fairly large-scale hydro-electric projects are under construction at the present time, and others are planned. The Gal-Oya Project, a combination irrigation-water power project, is being constructed in the eastern part of the island. When completed, it will generate about 9,000 k.w. The second project is at Norton Bridge in the central highlands,

¹⁰ There appears to be no question that the water power resources are sufficient to supply all the present needs, and those of the near future. But it is unfortunate that no reliable estimate of the total power potential has been available.

ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF CEYLON

about 50 miles east of Colombo. Work was started on this project in 1924, but had to be suspended for financial reasons, and active progress started only in 1946, after the war. The first stage of the project, which is almost complete is expected to generate 25,000 k. w. The entire project when completed is expected to supply 125,000 kilowatts.

The Tourist Industry. The great natural beauty of the island can be one of its greatest resources. Its tropical setting, a pleasant climate, hillsides clothed in deep green, groves of stately coconut palms, clear blue lakes and numerous beaches along the coasts, make it a tourists' paradise. The island is easily accessible, being on the cross-roads of ocean routes and airways of the Indian Ocean. An excellent system of motor roads extends through all parts of the island. The population is friendly, hospitable, and can take to the tourist industry readily. With such large and populous neighbours as India and Pakistan, it has an immense reservoir of potential tourists to draw upon. At the present time, most of the tourist income is contributed by transients who pass through the island, on their way between the U.K., India, Australia and the Far East. Consciousness of the possibilities of the tourist industry is slowly growing, and efforts are being made to attract more tourists to the island.

Conclusion. Ceylon's economy centres round the production of plantation crops like tea, rubber and coconuts for the export market. Plantation agriculture as it exists in Ceylon is a well developed form of modern agriculture. It has brought great prosperity to the island, and has made possible a much higher standard of living than would have been attainable with a subsistence agriculture. (*Per capita* income in Ceylon, estimated at Rs. 282 in 1947¹¹ is about the highest among the S.E. Asian countries.) Ceylon should make all efforts to keep the plantation industries vigorous and flourishing, and to maintain her position in the world markets.

The island can and should grow more of its own food. This can be done by improving the techniques of agriculture, which are at present very backward indeed, and by developing new lands. The progress being made in this direction is very slow. The rate of development of new lands is barely sufficient to keep pace with the increase in population. There is great need for diversification in the peasant agriculture. Large quantities of dairy products, meat, curry-stuffs, chillies, onions etc. are imported which can be easily grown at home by greater emphasis on dairy farming, live-stock husbandry and market gardening. Forestry, fishing, and the tourist industry, are other industries which have bright prospects of development.

The country does not have the resources to build basic heavy industries like iron and steel, metallurgical and heavy chemicals. Also, because of the limited home market, it will remain more economical to import many classes of manufactures (textiles, for instance) than to produce them at home. But the island has abundant water power resources and important raw materials like coconuts, rubber, tropical woods and spices. It can well develop indus-

¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 48.

tries based on the processing of these raw materials (rubber goods, coir and soap manufacture, for example), and also many classes of consumer goods industries. The prices of Ceylon products have been good in recent years. The country is in a sound financial position, and has surpluses available to carry through a programme of development.

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PROBLEMS OF DARKEST AFRICA

By MASSIMO SALVADORI

In the press of Western countries African news is copious, though inconspicuous. It took the quarrel between the United Nations and the Union of South Africa and the problems of the disposal of the former Italian colonies to make the front page. Even the explosion of racial tension in Natal which caused the death of many Indians did not attract much attention. Recent minor items have been richly varied. Nationalism is growing in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The Ewé of Guinea have protested against the division of their lands between the French and the English. A Bechuana chief ran into difficulties because he married a White girl. Don Pedro, nominal ruler of the Bakongo, was received by the Pope. Somalis and Eritreans are increasingly restive. The British groundnuts project in Tanganyika is bogging down. Natives notable among the Basutos and the Ashantis received stiff sentences for following the old custom of despatching bodies so that the spirit of a dead chief should have company. Swahilis have received enthusiastically Molière's plays translated into their language. Frightened people say that they have heard a 'lua' (dinosaur?) moving in the swamps of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. American scientists are finding support for the theory of Africa as the breeding ground of mankind.

Africa is the Dark Continent only as far as the skin colour of most of its inhabitants goes. It is no longer dark because of the mystery of the unknown. Where Mungo Park, Livingstone and Speke took years to travel, a plane takes

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hours. Railways climb from the coast to the highlands and a network of well kept roads connects all the important centres. American canned goods can be bought in Timbuctoo on the Niger and in Lialui on the Zambezi. Modern plants process copper in Katanga and tin in Nigeria and will soon be processing uranium in the Belgian Congo.

The war speeded the opening up process. At the end of 1942 not only Tunis and Egypt, seats of ancient civilization, were in the news, but also Dakar, Madagascar, Brazzaville. Natives from South Africa and the Senegal fought in Italy and France. Mombasa and Massawa on the east coast of Africa had become huge dumps for all kinds of equipment. The war also brought changes. Ethiopia for instance is again independent. Rumbings of social upheavals can be heard at both extremes of the continent. Something is happening among the tribes which were stunned two generations ago by the impact of Western civilization.

Interest in Africa is likely to increase in Western countries, not only because roads are being built or trade may develop but there is another reason. Thirty-five years ago a European or an American could travel wherever he pleased in the world. Today a huge area, from central Germany to the Bering Straits, is closed to him. Without being unduly pessimistic it is foreseeable that, as a result of the convulsions in most of free Asia and in the Near East, Westerners will find it increasingly difficult to visit that part of the world. Instead of having the world as their playground, the nations of Western civilization will have to be content with half of it, or a little less, at least until such time as the still nebulous One World acquires greater solidity. That half world is likely to contain most, perhaps all, of Africa.

LIMITS OF DARKEST (NEGRO) AFRICA

To paraphrase Caesar, all Africa is divided into three parts: (A) In the extreme south (Union of South Africa) eight million Negroes and one million Coloured and Indians have few, if any, political rights; the country can up to now—things may change—be considered to all intents and purposes White Man's property. In the rest, one can draw a 3,500-mile line from the Atlantic coast just north of the mouth of the Senegal to a point where the 12th latitude n. crosses the Blue Nile; from there for another 1,000 miles to Lamu on the Indian Ocean. (B) North and east of this line live the sons of Ham, often mixed with Semitic or Negro blood or both. (C) South of the same line is the land of the Negroes, one hundred and ten million of them.

The peoples of northern Africa can keep their distinctive civilization in face of the pressure of other nations. They have proved it in Egypt and Ethiopia, they are proving it today in French North Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The Negroes however are not strong enough to hold their own when pressed by nations with a more advanced and more aggressive culture. They can do this no better than the Mayas and Incas could in the Western Hemisphere, or the South Sea Islanders in Tahiti or Hawaii.

Dark Africa, the land of the Negroes, is the area from the Sahara to the Union of South Africa. It is nearly four times as large as the Union of India. With

the exception of less than 400,000 Europeans settled here and there on the highlands, in the mining districts, in the towns; of about 300,000 Asians (Indians in British East Africa, Arabs along the eastern coast, Syrians in French West Africa); with the exception also of a few score thousand survivors of primitive populations, Bushmen, Hottentots, and Pygmies, there are only Negroes.

Nations scarcely exist in Dark Africa. The largest unit towards which loyalty is felt is usually the tribe, of which there are hundreds. Many have become known to the outside world from the Yolufs of West Africa (the blackest of the blacks, probably the ancestors of most American Negroes), to the Zulus and the Matabeles of South Africa; from the Mandé and the Hausa founders of empires to the Yorubas, the Ashantis, the Dahomeys of the Gulf of Guinea; from the Lundas of the Belgian Congo to the Himas west of Lake Victoria.

Until two generations ago, only a few coastal strips in Dark Africa were ruled by European or Moslem Governments. Then there was the mad colonial scramble of the last quarter of the 19th century. Today 42% of the area of Dark Africa and 47% of its population are part of the British Commonwealth and Empire. The French own about one-fourth (including Madagascar). The rest is divided nearly equally between Belgium and Portugal, except for a small Spanish colony, the western provinces of Ethiopia, and independent Liberia where 60,000 Americanized Negroes rule two million natives.

SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OF NEGRO CIVILIZATION

When they first came in contact with Europeans, the Negroes of Africa were not the backward savages described by early travellers, missionaries, and others. The legend of Negro backwardness was spread through the reports of people who were unable to understand what they found. Of course the cultural level of Africans was then and is now considerably lower than that of most Western and Eastern nations. But if we look at Negroes and Whites from the vantage point of total human development, the difference does not appear so great. Modern man has after all been on the earth for hundreds of thousands of years. Various groups have evolved at different rates of change because of geographical conditions and historical accidents, and in the race towards civilization African Negroes are not so far behind as conceit leads many to think. A century ago, before the progress of the Negroes was halted by White invasion, many tribes were at the same stage as the ancestors of today's proud Anglo-Saxons and Scandinavians twelve or fifteen centuries ago; what are a few hundred years in the face of thousands of centuries of human development? Romans were unjustified in laughing at the Barbarians of the North fifteen centuries ago: who can say that Westerners have any right to scoff at the Barbarians of the South? Are there not white communities with as low or lower cultural level than many African communities had one hundred years ago?

For the last eight hundred years or so African Negroes have been going through the birth throes of their civilization. They have been doing what Hamitic peoples did in the lower valley of the Nile five or six thousand years ago, what Aztecs and Incas were doing in the highlands of Mexico and Peru.

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If making the transition from tribal organization to the political structure of the State is taken as an index of the birth of civilization then the Negroes can be considered to have entered civilization, as the transition from tribal to State organization has been taking place since the 11th century. They progressed in spite of a debilitating climate, an unfavourable geographical environment; they struggled valiantly against Christian and Moslem flesh traders, until finally they had to give in to the overwhelming power of European nations.

At the time of the Crusades, when wild European hordes were lured into the deserts of Asia Minor by religious fanaticism, and later when despots were consolidating their rule in Europe, Mandé first, then Songhai and Haussa, were founding civilized States in the plains of western Sudan.

Without any help from outside the Ashantis (who fought bravely against the British), the Dahomeys (ditto against the French), and the Yorubas formed States which lasted for centuries. Their 'customs' or festivities in which human sacrifices occurred horrified Europeans and Americans, forgetful that their own 'customs' connected with the blood orgies of wars and revolutions were, if anything, more barbaric than the Negro ones; forgetting also that the States founded in western or central Europe by Germanic tribes from the 5th to the 9th century of our era were more barbaric than the Negro kingdoms along the Atlantic coast.

The same civilizing process was going on in the vast grasslands which cover most of Africa south and east of the Congo Basin. Already at the end of the 15th century, Portuguese seamen had disported themselves in the State organized by the Kongo tribes. Western map makers knew little or nothing of the interior of Africa, but on the maps appeared the names of Mwata Yambo and Monomatapa, later on identified with two States which had been visited by adventurous ivory traders. Many of them crossed Dark Africa from coast to coast, but they never bothered to write books, and only by word of mouth did some of their discoveries become known to bookminded geographers. When Speke first reached the sources of the Nile he found along the coast of Lake Victoria a string of States enjoying a high level of civilization, the result of the amalgamation of a number of tribes brought about by the Himas. Farther south, at the end of the 18th century and during the 19th century, the States of the Zulus, of the Matabeles, the Basutos, the Barotse, had been formed without European help.

From the mouth of the Senegal in north-west Africa to that of the Limpopo in the south-east—a distance of five thousand miles as the crow flies—a rapid civilizing process was carried on by what ignorant Europeans dared to call savage tribes!

Many say that the Negro is constitutionally unfit for civilized progress. Is this really so? Can African Negroes be judged on the basis of white prejudices? Arrested development may be the result of the clash between two ways of living, thinking, and acting; something which has nothing to do with one's natural abilities. Both American Negroes and American Indians are still under the influence of the shock they received when Europeans tried to force

their ways on them; as a result they have become apathetic and their creative abilities have been numbed.

The complexity and variety of their institutions in the pre-colonial period, and of the beliefs and values underlying them, are as sure an indication as any of the creativeness of the Negro mind. Before European influence exercised its demoralizing and disintegrating influence, Negro societies knew democratic, oligarchical, and monarchical forms of government. Most of them possessed the one institution which characterizes today's free nations: government through discussion by an assembly. The autocracy which is basic in the political structure of other nations had only just begun to make its appearance. Even in what well-meaning but usually ignorant travellers considered autocratic governments, the power of the ruler was limited by the will of an assembly representative of some sections at least of the people. This was the case not only among the Hima States of East Africa where parliaments carried out most governmental functions, but also among the Lundas, the Yorubas, and the Hausa.

The term pagan erroneously used by missionaries covered a number of religious beliefs, some animistic and some deistic, some monotheistic and some polytheistic. And if Europeans want to criticize what it pleases them to call fetishism, they had better examine the innumerable examples of fetishism still existing in countries of Western civilization, from the wearing of charms to the frantic adoration of idolized human beings.

The agriculture which provided a living for most African Negroes was no more primitive than the agriculture of certain parts of southern Europe and Latin America. Negroes knew how to care for their animals as well as Europeans did until a couple of centuries ago. Many crafts had developed, from pottery to weaving. Metal-working had reached, particularly among the Bantus, as high a degree of proficiency as that known in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages. There was both individual ownership of property and collective ownership; actually most tribes possessed a successful blend of both, such as Westerners seem to be unable to produce. Among African Negroes there was enough collective ownership to give a sense of security to every member of the tribe, and enough individual ownership to give most of the people economic freedom and the advantages which go with it.

Records of individual achievements are of course scanty, except where rulers are concerned. As rulers are not fundamentally different from common men, on the basis of records one may deduce that there was considerable individual ability among the African Negroes. Mansa-Musa, one of the greatest Mandé rulers, who lived at the beginning of the 14th century, appears to have been a most remarkable man. Closer to us in time was Chaka, the Black Napoleon, who unified the Zulu tribes and during the forty years of his reign probably did more for his people than his contemporary, the White Napoleon, did for his. Oseru Tutu among the Ashantis, Danfodio among the Peulhs, stand out as individuals with exceptional abilities. Moshesh in the 19th century founded a nation which still enjoys a considerable amount of autonomy, and his contemporary Lobengula proved to be a much greater man than Rhodes, the White

adventurer (empire-builder to his admirers), who through deceit and force brought Lobengula's people under the rule of England.

IMPACT OF WESTERN COLONIALISM

The independent development of African Negroes has been suddenly halted. Sometimes with the best of intentions (as when missionaries wanted to spread Christianity), more often with the aim of depriving them of the few riches they had, or of exploiting their labour, Europeans and Arabs have introduced in Dark Africa new political, religious and economic institutions. They have also imported a number of debilitating diseases.

It is true that colonial rule has put an end to wars, raids, slavery, cannibalism, and human sacrifices, that it has brought considerable economic advancement, but one may wonder if these advantages compensate for the loss of a creative spirit which had already produced remarkable results.

In many parts of Africa the old social order has already been destroyed. There are probably millions of what are called detribalized Negroes. Having lost their place in society, being unable to feel part of a community, they become a liability to themselves, to the other Negroes, and even to the White people. Elsewhere, other mistakes have been made. It hasn't helped the Negroes that most colonial administrators, in the upper brackets and the lower ones alike, had very little understanding of African life. They had been taught that the Negro is at best a child to be treated paternally, and at worst an unreliable savage, hardly worthy to be called a human being. Usually the petty bourgeois Europeans who fill the ranks of the colonial service like their jobs. They have servants, spacious quarters, and the possibility for satisfying the poisonous craving for power which slumbers in the souls of most frustrated people.

White administrators have often succeeded in divesting of real power what used to be the traditional sources of authority, the Councils and the Chiefs. The result is the creation of a political vacuum. Missionaries have been able to prove that idols are not worth worshipping, but they have not succeeded in replacing, except in a few cases, the old religion with their own. The Christianity of most converts would hardly be called such if missionaries paid more attention to ideas and less to ritual. In many parts of Africa 'mission boy' (the Negro educated by missionaries) is synonymous with scoundrel. Government authorities, planters, and settlers, have collaborated in replacing the free economic life of the African Negroes with some form of forced labour, and fairly persuasive methods have been devised to induce them to work for the Europeans.

Of course the picture is not so dark everywhere; there are grey spots, there is even some light. The greatest havoc to native institutions has probably been caused by the French and the Belgians. But there has been some improvement in their policies in recent years through an effort to reach a better understanding of the Negro and to interfere less with his life. The least havoc has been caused by the British, in some at least of the fifteen territories they own in Dark Africa. It is true that Kenya Colony, with its four million natives, is

run mostly to the advantage of a few thousand Europeans; that in Southern Rhodesia one-fifth of the land is reserved for nearly two million natives while less than one hundred thousand Whites have the use of the other four-fifths. But it is also true that in Uganda most of the administration is in the hands of native authorities; that local parliaments really conduct the affairs of some of the tribes; that Europeans and Indians are not allowed to buy land, while efforts have been made to promote native agriculture, thereby raising the standard of living. In Tanganyika the colonial administration has intervened to protect the natives against exploitation by European and Oriental traders. In the Gold Coast and Nigeria, native political institutions have been respected and the share of the natives in running public affairs has increased. It is in these districts, in Uganda, in Nigeria, on the Gold Coast, that today one finds a vigorous native life, and considerable progress achieved—a proof that African Negroes fare better where there is a minimum of European interference.

THE PRESENT PROBLEM: A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

It doesn't help much to blame and complain. The crimes of the slave trade, the killing and enslaving of tens of millions of Negroes, have happened. It is fair to add that Europeans were not alone in such abominable activities, but that they were alone in stamping them out; but is the success of the anti-slavery crusade sufficient atonement for the crime committed? It is not much use to debate today whether it was right or wrong for Europeans to occupy Dark Africa. In the 19th century European States were politically, economically, and intellectually the strongest, and they occupied all political vacuums in the world. Today they are weak, and, thanks to their weakness, they may be obliged to revise their policies.

The problem is: What is going to be done with Dark Africa, with that huge mass of land where more than one hundred million people live? If no agent interferes, the British, French, Belgians, Portuguese, and South Africans, are likely to continue a system which is destroying the self-development of African Negroes, and which has cloaked the creative abilities of most Negro peoples. The average well-intentioned citizen of Western countries will say (as he has been saying for a considerable time): 'African Negroes are our wards. They cannot look after themselves. If we abandon them, our place will be taken by Arabs or by Communists, who are more ruthless than we, and Africans will be worse off than they are now. Therefore we cannot abandon them'. And they go on to say: 'But they must not be exploited. We will provide them with hospitals and schools. We will make Christians of them, and teach them to do away with polygamy, to accept our concepts of right and wrong. We must introduce in Dark Africa the blessings of mass production, of labour and management efficiency. We must introduce democracy'.

It is probably true that if European colonial Powers were to leave Africa immediately they would be replaced by something worse. It is true also that the transfer of control from the four Powers (five, with the Union of South Africa) to the United Nations would not help, at least until such time as the U.N. functions as a government. But it is also true that oppression and exploitation

as represented by miserable wages and forced labour should be wiped out.

But as a positive programme, would the best thing be to make of the African Negroes replicas of Westerners, to clothe their bodies with trousers and skirts, and fill their minds with the beliefs, values, and prejudices with which the Western mind is at present overburdened? That Western civilization has many favourable aspects is easy to prove, both on the grounds of intellectual and material achievements; but to maintain, as many Westerners do, that it represents the last word in the field of cultural development is conceit. During the last 400 years, the West produced the religious wars of the Reformation (which brought death to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the German nation), the political wars of the French Revolution and the two World Wars. There is a good deal wrong with a civilization which has produced the Inquisition, the burning of witches, the Red terror and Himmler.

In the relationship between the West and African Negroes, three things should be considered: the limitations and drawbacks of Western civilization, the inevitability of close contacts between the West and Africa, and the considerable progress made by African Negroes on their own. What would be to the greatest advantage of both the West and Dark Africa from the point of view of further progress in civilization? The best reply to be given to this question would—I think—be the following: not to interfere with the Negro way of life to such an extent as to cause a breakdown in native culture or to destroy the creative abilities of the Negro peoples. If this is the right answer, it means the granting of a maximum of autonomy to the Negroes; to expose them to Western and other cultures without forcing any on them; to let them develop their own individual and group characteristics.

African Negroes can be helped to know that there are democracy and autocracy, Christianity and Islam, Aristotle and Confucius, Jefferson, Marx and Nehru. But would it not be according to the real spirit of modern civilization, as it has developed during the great liberal period of the last two centuries, to let the Negroes make their own choice of their own free will?

Now that Western Europe, which includes the main colonial Powers, may realize some kind of economic, and, possibly, political unity, the question of the relationship between Europe and Africa needs to be taken up. There are many people in England who recognize that where interference in the affairs of native populations has been limited to protecting the life and freedom of individuals and tribes, Negroes have prospered, and their prosperity has also benefitted the colonial Power. In France it is slowly being recognized that a policy of cultural autonomy may be preferable to one of exploitation and assimilation. If pressure is put so that the two main colonial Powers mend their ways, the smaller ones are bound to follow. American and Asian criticism of the colonial policies of European Powers has already helped considerably those in Europe who have worked for a change in the conditions under which African natives live. As time goes on, the influence of non-European public opinion in determining European policies is likely to increase; the newly freed nations of Asia have a say in matters of colonial administration which is likely to be taken into account more and more.

CULTURAL AUTONOMY

When mentioning cultural autonomy, it is not in the sense that the term is used in the Soviet Union, where great emphasis has been put on what they call the new freedom of national minorities. In the Soviet Union, autonomy means only that one may speak one's traditional language and develop a national literature. But apart from that, the Soviet Union is today following a policy of complete assimilation. Political and economic institutions are the same for Russians and non-Russians. Minds and consciences are indoctrinated to act in terms of Marxian dialectics. Under the pressure of identical laws, customs are rendered uniform.

Cultural autonomy includes a good deal more than language and lore. It means in the first place self-government, the possibility for each tribe or nation to determine the political institutions under which it wants to live, and the right to choose its leaders freely. It means the development of different legal systems; the application of a variety of economic systems; the free choice of religious and ethical beliefs; the competition between different ways of using one's mind and organizing one's ideas.

The idea of cultural autonomy for African Negroes is bound to cause resentment in a number of quarters. Certainly among those greedy and narrow-minded Europeans for whom imperialism, colonialism and exploitation are good things (happily today they are not as influential as in the past). There are still many Europeans who believe, in spite of the sad experiences of the last third of a century, in the right to impose their civilization everywhere; who want to transfer *en bloc* the structures of the West to the lands of Dark Africa.

There are those who fear that autonomy for African Negroes would deprive the colonial Powers of the riches which they believe to be buried in the womb of African earth. Apart from the fact that the wealth of Dark Africa should properly belong to her Negroes, it is realistic to add that this wealth is mostly in the realm of dreams. Africa has produced in abundance only such non-essentials as gold and diamonds. As far as anyone knows, Dark Africa does not possess the huge deposits of iron, coal, and oil, which are the basis of the wealth of the great industrial nations. Nowhere, from the Sahara to the Limpopo river, are to be found the huge stretches of fertile soil existing in Western Europe, in the central United States, in the south of Russia, in Eastern China and Northern India. There is copper in the upper Congo valley, and tin east of the Niger; they would still be available even if the natives were granted full autonomy. The same would apply to the iron of East Africa, to the small amount of coal in Nigeria, to the timber available in the forests. Those who think of Dark Africa as a market for the supply of raw materials and the sale of manufactured goods should look at recent figures. In 1945 (when trade was still swollen by the war) the total import-export trade of British territories in Africa was equivalent to less than one-fifteenth of British foreign trade. The combined trade of all the other territories was even less.

Present-day production and trade of course are not indicative of what may happen in the future. Those who know the dark section of Africa agree, however, that it is less blessed with material resources than many other parts of the world, and that the exploitation of these resources requires capital which today is not available.

PRACTICAL STEPS

The first step in a revision of colonial policies in Dark Africa should be an agreement, reached under the auspices of the United Nations, between the five main ruling Powers, with the aim of replacing a variety of policies (often conflicting with each other) by one based on the principle of minimum interference. This minimum could perfectly well correspond to what has been for generations the limited programme of enlightened people: to prevent wars, slavery, serfdom (even if only of the peonage and forced labour variety), and human sacrifices; to develop means of communication, from harbour facilities to railways and telephones; to maintain hospitals and schools; to check the despotic tendencies of native and non-native rulers; to supervise but not to manage. Only where these principles of limited intervention have been applied have African Negroes not been stultified and have maintained the energy for independent achievements.

If the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations were given power to supervise the application of a policy of limited interference, two useful results would be achieved. What today is mostly a skeleton would be endowed with flesh and blood and could come to life; and non-colonial Powers would be able to correct the abuses and mistakes made by the administering Powers. They could see for instance that African Negroes were not deprived of land and mines to the advantage of Europeans, and that all financial and economic resources were used for the benefit of the inhabitants of Dark Africa.

The application of this plan would involve a reorganization of Dark Africa according to the areas within which the various tribes and nations live. Besides this, as what has already been done can seldom be undone without causing further injustice, a few reservations, totalling less than 1% of Dark Africa, could be set aside for the Europeans, Indians and Arabs where they are at present most numerous, in the highlands of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa, in the mining districts of the Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia. Other reservations would be formed by the score or so towns, from Dakar and Abidjan in French West Africa, to Sao Paulo and Lourenco Marquez in Portuguese territory, and Mombasa, Lamu and Zanzibar, containing large non-Negro populations.

Outside the reservations, non-Negro people would be aliens, subject to the laws and regulations passed by native administrations. There, in 99% of today's Dark Africa, Negroes should be allowed to shape their own destiny. Only thus could the West atone for the abuses to which Negroes have been subjected for the last four hundred years.

REVIEWS AND NOTICES

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN. By Edwin M. Martin (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1948).

'THE Allied Occupation of Japan' is a concise but authoritative review of the aims, methods and accomplishments of the military occupation of Japan. It is undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the wealth of literature on the very intricate problems of reconstruction and reform of defeated Japan initiated by the Institute of Pacific Relations as part of its international research programme. Other volumes in the series include *Prospects of Democracy in Japan* by T.A. Bisson—a critical appraisal of the occupation, with special emphasis on the SCAP programme of economic and political reforms, *New Paths for Japan* by H. Wakefield, *Labour in Japan* by Miss Miriam S. Farley, *Japan's Agricultural Problems* by Dr. A. G. Grad and *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* by Dr. J. B. Cohen.

The book is not, as the author takes care to point out, an appraisal of the success and failure of the Allied occupation of Japan, but it does form an excellent introduction to such an appraisal. The chief merit of the book is its brevity and the masterly treatment of a vast amount of literature—largely unpublished—which is gathered around the Allied occupation of Japan. The first chapter deals with the formation and execution of the Allied occupation policy. The occupation has the character of operation on behalf of the principal Allied Powers and the occupation forces are under the command of the Supreme Commander designated as such by the United States. Although a machinery is provided for consultation among the Allied Powers for the purpose of establishing policies for the control of Japan, virtually the policies of the U.S. prevail. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government are subject to the Supreme Commander who possesses all powers necessary for effecting the surrender terms and carrying out the policy established for the conduct of the occupation of Japan.

It is interesting to note that the policy is to 'use the existing form of government of Japan, not to support it.' This policy is, as explained in the book, the result of an elaborate study in a Research Division of the State Department begun as early as 1942. The Allied Council in Japan is composed of representatives of four big Powers—U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R., and China—but recently the U.S.S.R. representative staged a walk-out, because the representative of China still belongs to the old régime. But the Allied Council has never been taken or treated seriously by the SCAP Headquarters and it has enjoyed little voice or prestige in the current affairs of Japan. The Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) is a Trinity with three different capacities, viz., Commander of the U.S. forces in the Far East, U.S. Representative on and the Chairman of the Allied Council and Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. General MacArthur in keeping with his position and attitude has appointed his Deputy as Chairman of the Allied Council. Almost all the

countries interested in Japan have missions in Tokyo attached to SCAP none of whom is allowed to deal with the Japanese Government except through SCAP.

The surrender of Japan has certainly presented novel and puzzling problems for the occupation authorities, for the Japanese are so different in cultural background and social history from the Americans and the British. By far the most important and ticklish problem, however, has been that of SCAP-Japanese relations. SCAP has tried to get reforms on books promptly as a stimulus to new approaches and a release for hitherto repressed forces and this is done through the Japanese Government mostly by informal devices ranging from working-level conferences of a primarily educational character to personal letters from SCAP to the Prime Minister. Several tasks which have been accomplished more or less successfully relate to demobilization, repatriation, trial of war criminals, reparations, restitution of all identifiable looted property, on all of which the book provides interesting material. In one of the chapters reference is made to the Potsdam Declaration in respect of territorial changes. According to the Presidential Policy Japan's sovereignty is limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as may be agreed upon. So far as the four islands mentioned above are concerned, there is no problem, as their *de facto* transfer to Japan has already taken place. The only important issue still unsettled is in respect of the disposition of a number of small islands near Japan including the Ryukyu islands.

Another important chapter is devoted to the subject of democratization and pacification. The policy is to ensure that Japan will never again become a menace to U.S.A. or to the security of the world, and the Japanese people are to be encouraged towards following the principles and practices of modern democracy. As regards the former, the renunciation of war and the desire for peace are incorporated in the very Constitution of Japan, thereby giving Japan an initial and big advantage over most of the modern countries, inasmuch as Japan is not burdened by a heavy military budget and to that extent she is enabled to achieve economic progress more easily. Article 25 of the Japanese Constitution provides that 'all people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultural living' and Article 26 says that 'all people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.' All this, however, still remains a dream to the majority of the Japanese people.

A large part of the book is devoted to a number of very interesting questions, such as educational reforms, reorganization of political life, reorganization of labourers' institutions and agrarian reforms. Japan has, no doubt, achieved considerable progress in certain sections of her economy, notably in the cotton textile industry. The 4 million spindles limit allowed to Japan has already been achieved and only recently this limit on the maximum number of spindles has been removed by the SCAP—an event of no small consequence from the point of view either of Japan's economic health or as an indicator of the political climate.

Not very long ago in a public statement General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander) significantly claimed of Japan that 'the concepts of Americanism have found no barrier to their assimilation in Oriental culture or custom and the resulting blend between the best of the East and the best of the West is proving an impregnable front against Communism's most aggressive assaults.' The expectations of the General have not, however, been fully realized in recent months and Joseph Grew, former U.S. Ambassador in Japan, attributes the slow progress of Democracy in Japan to a number of factors which need to be taken care of, such as (1) inflation of currency, (2) shortage of consumer goods, (3) lack of appreciable foreign trade, (4) housing shortage, (5) destruction of national ideals and (6) disorganization of society. Japan still remains an object lesson for the world and books like Martin's deserve to be widely read.

15 August 1950

L. C. JAIN

FINLAND—THE ADVENTURES OF A SMALL POWER. By Hugh Shearman (London—The London Institute of World Affairs p.p.i-viii,

Finland assumes considerable importance as relations between East and West worsen. It is a country cold and serious, not a land of ardour, youth and lavishness. Hard climate and limited resources make the people practical and realists. Small in number—only 4 million—the Finns have maintained their own national individuality. This brief study of the history and psychology of the people is of special significance today, as once again the fate of smaller nations hangs in the balance.

Finland is the oldest and hardest land in Europe, a land of granite, gneiss and crystalline slate. The resources of the land, apart from timber, are small, and mining discoveries are recent, and many of them were ceded to Russia during the recent defeat. The people are mostly agriculturists, and industry is mostly State-owned or on a co-operative basis.

The country was never independent before 1920, but was ruled as a Grand Duchy by its powerful neighbours, Sweden and Russia, as a pawn in their game of power politics. The Swede rule was benevolent, so was the rule of Emperor Alexander I of Russia. The Finnish national spirit was culturally Swede; and not too hostile to Russia—till the craze for Russification of Finland started under the weak, young well-meaning Nicholas II, the last of the Czars. Since then the Finns to the last soul have been hostile and distrustful of Russia, and their fears were amply justified in 1940, when Russia once again attacked them. There is hardly any affinity between the two people, one Protestant, the other Catholic; one democratic, the other autocratic in their outlook. Culturally the Finns drank deep the writings of European intellectuals; and have a rich intellectual and cultural life. They have a proud place in the history of the emancipation of women and the establishment of equality of the sexes in rights, opportunities and honour. Women deputies are quite considerable in number. Naturally they have had the sympathy of Western Europe and America.

The other side of Finland is poverty, squalor and misery, but given the opportunities and peace, the Finns hope to eradicate these evils. During and after World War I, they had an experience of civil war, of revolutionary and counter revolutionary movements. In the slump years of the early thirties they suffered much due to fascist tendencies and movement. The Finns, by temperament and circumstances conservative and peace-loving, shun extremist ideologists; and since 1940, they have fought hard, though with little success, any imposition from Russia or fascist Germany. Terms of peace have been hard on them; they are sad but more than willing to fulfil them, provided they are left in peace. Today they are left a betrayed and victimized nation.

The best qualities and first achievement of the Finns are closely connected with their capacity for avoiding extremes. It may, under suitable circumstances, provide a synthesis of what is best in Russia and the Western Democracies.

The book is written in clear, crisp and lucid style and makes interesting and well connected reading. Russia's point of view, and Finland's strategic importance in the game of East and West have been tactfully avoided. The Finns' case is put boldly and squarely, but one itches for details, and feels the book to be sketchy and elementary, specially because literature on Finland is not vast.

Wisely, no conclusions are drawn and no forecasts made. The book has certainly a great educative value; and is invaluable in understanding the Finnish point of view.

13 July 1950

BRIJ BHUSHAN

OTHER BOOKS

CONVERSATIONS OF GANDHIJI. By Chandrashanker Shukla.

This delightful little book is a valuable addition to the fast growing volume of Gandhiana. It records some of the talks that took place between Gandhiji and many others during the years 1933-34, when the Harijan question and individual satyagraha agitated the country. Gandhiji had much to say on those questions, and, as usual with him, said it all very well. His conversations have not the glitter and brilliance which are met with in Heine or Wilde, but they have the profundity and the sad lucidity of soul which is only found in nature's own aristocrats. Mr. Shukla has done well in garnering this splendid harvest, and, if at times he errs in admitting items which are inane, it must be realized that his task was a very difficult one. He has earned the reader's gratitude by adding significant little introductory comments which help us to visualize the setting in which the conversations took place. The book is very well printed and excellently got up; it ought to serve as a good introduction not only to the thought of Gandhiji but also to his charming and deeply human personality.

25 August 1950

B. P. MISRA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT IN ASIA—International Labour Office, Geneva, 1949.

It is significant that one of the subjects discussed at the Asian Regional Conference of the I.L.O. held last January in Ceylon was 'conditions and methods best calculated to promote full development of the Co-operative Movement in Asia.' We seem almost to take it for granted that a labour organization would primarily be concerned with urban and industrial problems and that co-operation, at any rate in Asian countries, is predominantly a rural problem. But, if we remember that the main purpose of the I.L.O. is 'to promote social justice in all countries of the world,' its interest in the development of the Co-operative Movement will be easily understood. To the Co-operative Movement belongs the enviable distinction of cutting through the barricades of contending economic ideologies and it is today universally recognized as one of the most effective instruments of combating social injustice.

This publication is a report on the recent development of the Co-operative Movement in Asia and was intended to serve as a data paper for the aforesaid Conference. Besides containing a succinct résumé of the 'new trends' in the Co-operative Movement, it contains a discriminating summary of the 'Means and Machinery for Co-operative Development' employed in these countries. But, as pointed out in the introduction, the main object of the report 'is rather to endeavour to meet the wishes of the Government and the co-operative institutions by supplying information and advice which may help them in conceiving and executing their plans for co-operative development.' In spite of its laudatory interest in the field of co-operation, one may not feel quite certain whether the I.L.O. has sufficient experience in the sphere to tender advice on the subject. Like many other economic problems of under-developed countries, the one pertaining to this vast field of co-operation has its peculiar facets and is much complicated by the social and political background. But it is all to the good that the question is placed on an international agenda, for co-operation has potentialities which are as yet dimly realized, both in the East and in the West.

18 August 1950

M. L. DANTWALA

GENERAL GUIDE BOOK OF BELGIAN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION —1949 (Published by the Federation of Belgian Industries, Brussels— 372 pages).

The promotion of Belgian export trade is obviously the object in publishing this guide book. It gives a brief description of about 29 major industries, their working processes, their structure and organization and a list of products and by-products they produce, a perusal of which may give foreign importers of Belgian products a good idea of the large variety of products that can be obtained from Belgium. With a view to helping foreign customers to contact the producers of goods in which they might be interested, the names and addresses of the organizations of various industries are also published.

The guide book also gives an outline of the economic organization of Belgium and brings to the notice of the readers the easy availability of various facilities required for establishing trade relations. The book, it can be said, serves its purpose well and Indian importers of Belgian products will certainly find it very useful.

25 August 1950

V. M. J.

LABOUR LEGISLATION IN INDIA, (1937-1948)—Pages 1-62 : Published by the International Labour Office, Geneva.

This is a reprint from the April and May 1949 issues of the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW.

The prominent landmarks of a decade of labour legislation are not only the various acts that were passed, but the gradual leaning towards industrialization that is evident from the various regulations, the changes that occurred as a result of the constitutional developments in 1937, the impact of war-time demands on the labour regulations prevailing in India and the far-reaching changes effected after 1947. Throughout, it is evident that efforts were made to widen the scope of the labour laws to conform to the changing requirements, though, oftentimes, the labour movements and labour developments were in advance of the regulations.

Amongst some of the important enactments of this decade was the Minimum Wages Act of 1948. This act makes it compulsory for the employers to conform to certain scales of pay that are fixed from time to time under the law.

The Factories Act in its various stages of development, has stressed the need for fixing the hours of work. In 1948, the hours of work were fixed at 48 per week and the distinction between seasonal and perennial factories was abolished. The act limits the working hours of children to $4\frac{1}{2}$ a day while other provisions of the Act relate to age limitation of child employees and the granting of annual holidays with pay.

The Payment of Wages Act as enacted in 1936 applies mostly to those workers whose earnings are below Rs. 200 per annum. It prevents delay in payment and strictly limits the rate of fines that can be imposed on the workers.

A number of Shop Acts have also been passed not only to regulate the hours of work, but also the conditions of work.

Apart from these acts, however, it is the emphasis on welfare legislation that is the keynote of most of the economic programmes launched during these years. In India, the most important of welfare measures are (1) the Children's Employment Act which not only raises the age limit of the child labour to 14 years in all factories, but also limits their hours of work, (2) the Maternity Benefit Act which provides for compulsory rest for 7 weeks and a maternity benefit at the rate of As. 8 per day for women employed in factories, mines and plantations, and (3) compulsory insurance and provident funds. Besides these, many other welfare measures, as for e.g. the Workmen's Compensation Act, have also been adopted with a view to ameliorating the working conditions of labourers and to ensure decent living standards to those on

whose manual labour depends mostly the prosperity and welfare of the nation. These welfare measures are especially meant for factory workers, miners, dockers and other transport workers.

In order that these statutes may not be confined merely to theory, an elaborate system of labour officers, welfare officers, conciliation boards and industrial tribunals for the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes have been established in all labour centres. Various standing orders have also been passed which make it compulsory for all employers to see that established laws are uniformly applied to all employees and that the conditions of work are clearly explained to the workers.

A common defect of most of these regulations however is the lack of uniformity in their application. The acts vary from Province to Province and it is difficult therefore to state that these regulations represent the Indian Labour Code. For e.g., the minimum age for admission of young persons is fixed at 12 in Assam, Bombay, C.P. & Berar and Sind and at 14 in Madras and U.P. The various provincial shop acts also differ materially both in scope and content. A great deal therefore remains to be done. No doubt recent legislation, especially after integration, is mostly directed to establishing a uniform code of regulations, but taking into consideration the varying standards of progress achieved by different States, the task may take a much longer time than expected.

Significant of the recognition accorded to labour in the last decade, is the right granted everywhere for the establishment of trade unions which satisfy the specified requirements. This principle implies in short that workers have a right not only to their own organization, but the right to protest or negotiate in case of any disputes, through their accredited representatives.

An outstanding feature of this decade in India is the establishment of a tripartite machinery for consultations between Government, workers and employers. This tripartite machinery has proved invaluable in times of threatened strikes and labour unrest. Tripartite industrial committees have also been set up for most of the major industries and these have been greatly instrumental in preventing many industrial crises.

The progress of labour legislation in India when studied in the context of that prevailing in countries like Britain, U.S.A., Czechoslovakia, etc., appears to be wanting in many respects. Many of the international regulations as set down by the I.L.O. have yet to find their way on to the Indian Labour Code. But though the odds against raising the standards of living in India are certainly formidable, successful efforts have not been wanting in that direction, especially after the advent of a national Government. The various acts promulgated after 1947 both by the Central and provincial governments are a proof of this, as also a clear indication of the desire of the Governments to treat labour as an equal partner in the great task of national production. The directive principles embodied in the Constitution clearly enunciate the goal towards which the Indian Government's labour policy is directed.

Agricultural labour has not yet been touched. The strike fever has become more and more chronic and rampant. The system of bonded labour is still

tration in India is still very rudimentary and it is no surprise that the Communist psychology is fast spreading. Now that the Indian Constitution has been finalized, it will be for the popular leaders in the Indian Parliament to codify and modernize labour legislation in India as also set down principles for labour agitations proceeding on more rational and constructive lines.

23 August 1950

S. KESVA

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UPLAND AREAS IN THE FAR EAST. Vol.

I. Authors P. Gouyon, J. E. Spencer, G. E. Trewarthe, (New York, Institute of Pacific Relations)

This work is the first of a series of brief surveys on the present condition and possible future significance of upland areas in the Eastern and South-Eastern area. It consists of three essays dealing with the land-use patterns in China, the Philippines and Japan. The main thesis of the book is that these countries have exploited only the fertile plains and riverine deltas which constitute only one-quarter of the total land area; the remaining three-quarters, being largely infertile and isolated upland, has been comparatively neglected. This is because these countries have a 'vegetable civilization' and have not developed the animal husbandry side. The solution for the rapidly increasing populations is seen to lie in developing a 'pastoral outlook.' These vast uplands can be conveniently developed as pastures and grass lands; tree and bush crops can be grown on the slopes of the hills to provide employment and food for large numbers, and forests, when properly conserved and rationally exploited, can become valuable assets. This will also help to check soil erosion and thereby enable to grow a number of minor crops. In short the prevalent methods of land-use have led to the present impasse in the economic and demographic situation and a deliberate policy of reorientation should be pursued to make the economy more broad-based. The authors have made many useful suggestions regarding the rôle of the State in assuming leadership and providing such services as guidance, re-afforestation, checking disease and soil erosion and educating cultivators in the methods of correct crop rotation.

With all its painstaking marshalling of facts and carefully worked out solutions, however, the book leaves one with an uneasy feeling that everything is seen from the technician's point of view and that little account has been taken of economic costs and social patterns. It would have been useful if at least a rough indication had been given of the probable cost of the various measures advocated by the authors. It is to be hoped that future studies in this series will pay some attention to the economic and social aspects of the problem as well.

5 August 1950

J. S. RAJ

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY: 1950 Annual Number. (Edited and Published by Shri Sachin Chaudhuri, 13-15, Tamarind Lane, Bombay).

Unlike the Annual Numbers of other economic weeklies, e.g., *Capital*, *Economist*, *Commerce and Indian Finance*, the present journal does not

have a set pattern. It is merely a collection of some ably written articles. Particular mention may be made of Shri Y. S. Pandit's article on 'Rural Savings', and Mr. W. H. Morris Jones' appraisal of 'Civil Service in Controlled Economy', apart from Acharya Narendra Deva's 'Thoughts on Agrarian Problem' and Prof. A. K. Das Gupta's analysis of the 'Theory of Black Market Prices.'

This independent weekly started publication about a year and half back and those reading it regularly bear testimony to its independent judgment and clear analysis of issues. Some of its articles at times have been found even to have a distinct news-value.

31 July 1950

RAM GOPAL AGRAWAL

YEAR BOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS, 1947-48—(International Labour Office, Geneva. 1949. 15s.)

The Year Book gives a summary of important statistics relating to labour in different countries of the world and covers a two-year period. It gives statistics relating to the economically active population, employment, unemployment, hours of work, wages and labour income, cost of living studies, social security, industrial injuries and disputes, migration and index numbers of wholesale prices. The table relating to the main branches of social security and those dealing with national income and income from labour have been brought out for the first time in this tenth issue of the publication. The scope, method of collection and significance of the figures available in the different countries have been explained clearly.

In the case of India figures are not given for employment and unemployment, hours of work, retail prices, industrial injury rates and migration. The series of Index Numbers of wholesale prices is also not quite accurately shown. In the table relating to index numbers of wholesale prices in India, the word 'Calcutta' should be deleted from the head of the relevant column as the Indices shown therein pertain to all-India figures.

International comparisons of different statistical series should, however, be made with reservations, as the methods employed are different in different countries. The fluctuations in time of the various series are more amenable to international comparison than the actual figures for a given time.

6 June 1950

G. D. MATHUR

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